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The division's aviation brigade deployed to Bosnia to provide aviation support for MND(N) and theater aviation operational reserve (OPRES) for the stabilization force (SFOR). The brigade's table of organization and equipment (TO&E) consists of a headquarters company, a division cavalry squadron with OH-58D armed reconnaissance aircraft, an AH-64D Longbow attack helicopter battalion (ATKBN), and a UH-60 general support aviation battalion (GSAB). The brigade headquarters supported the division during its entire year-long deployment (SFOR 4 and 5), while its GSAB provided lift assets during SFOR 4 and division cavalry provided armed reconnaissance assets during SFOR 5. The AH-64D Longbow ATKBN did not deploy to the Balkans. Since each rotation required a mix of lift and armed reconnaissance/attack aircraft, the brigade received augmentation units to fill remaining aviation requirements. This chapter will discuss only the lessons from the division's organic aviation units.

While deployed, the brigade's mission consisted mainly of reconnaissance, security, and general-support aviation missions. Armed reconnaissance/attack aircraft supported base camp and convoy security, provided a round-the-clock Quick Reaction Force (QRF), monitored weapons storage sites (WSSs), and monitored unusual gatherings. This allowed the division's OH-58D pilots to remain proficient in METL tasks, such as conducting screening operations, and conducting zone reconnaissance. However, the squadron deployed only its aviation and aviation support assets, without the three ground troops that round out the division cavalry squadron. Without organic support ground assets, the squadron was not able to remain proficient in air/ground integration, a key component in most of the unit's METL tasks. Air/ground integration thus became a key training requirement during reintegration training. Aerial gunnery for the two air cavalry troops (ACTs) was another training requirement based on high personnel turnover and readiness requirements.

The GSAB flew air movement, and C2missions while supporting MND(N) and SFOR. The GSAB was able to remain proficient in most of its METL tasks while conducting its mission in Bosnia. However, the battalion suffered degradation in terrain flight because of a minimum 300' above ground level (AGL) altitude restriction in theater. Additionally, operations in Bosnia did not require, nor was time available to train in, night multi-ship and night slingload operations.

While conducting different, but complementary, missions in Bosnia, the division cavalry squadron and the GSAB had a similar need for reintegration training and suffered similar challenges in reintegration training. Both needed time to retrain skills that had atrophied during deployment. Challenges included brigade support of the corps red cycle, personnel turnover, and a lack of dedicated training time. The GSAB was further challenged by its task organization and continuing support requirements. The GSAB had to support three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with only two support aviation companies (SAC). While the BCTs managed their training using the red-amber-green cycles, the GSAB that supported them did not have the same luxury. The GSAB had to balance its own training requirements with support of the BCTs, the division, the corps, and the installation. Because of this challenge and differing training requirements, the GSAB and division cavalry squadron formulated different reintegration training plans.

General-Support Aviation Battalion Training Lessons

While in Bosnia, the GSAB unit key leaders conducted mission analysis of unit reintegration training requirements. In some cases, this mission analysis resulted in changes to the battalion's mission-essential task list (METL). Reflecting these changes, the battalion minimized its battle book and standing operating procedures (SOP), paring them to the essential information. Because of Bosnia peacekeeping operations (PKO), the unit required training in night multi-aircraft and night slingload operations. Additionally, the 300' AGL hard-deck in Bosnia required the unit to focus training on terrain flight.

The GSAB developed an aviation reintegration plan using a building block technique:

• Phase I - Individual Training.
• Phase II - Platoon Training.
• Phase III - Company Training.

The GSAB commander briefed the plan to the division commander, who approved it. Nevertheless, the unit faced a number of training challenges in executing its plan:

• Taskings from higher headquarters, including installation support (red-cycle) taskings.
• Large personnel turnover when stabilization period for Bosnia-deployed personnel ended.
• High mission support operational tempo (OPTEMPO) after redeployment, including "BAMBI bucket" fire-fighting missions, support for Roving Sands exercise, and support for the division's BCTs at the National Training Center (NTC).
• The two SACs authorized by the GSAB Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTO&E). The two SACs challenged the battalion's ability to support the division's three BCTs and train simultaneously. The third line company, a command aviation company with C2, electronic warfare (EW), and mine-dispensing aircraft, could not provide general support for the BCTs similar to sister companies.

Facing these training challenges, the GSAB had to be tenacious in securing training resources, to include ranges, training time, and ammunition. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to train, the unit had to show that the training produced added value to the supported unit.

Phase I (Individual Training)

This phase began with a three-day reorientation conducted by Corps Aviation Standardization personnel designed to have pilots think about the local flying area and regulations. The battalion standardization instructor pilot (SIP) received a reorientation flight, documented on flight records, from the Corps SIP. The battalion SIP, in turn, conducted reorientation flight with the company SIPs, who then flew with other unit IPs. The IPs then flew with other unit aviators.

Because of the large influx of new pilots to the battalion as personnel were reassigned, the GSAB created a Progression Platoon. Newly assigned aviators, commissioned and warrant officers alike, reported to the platoon with the focus of being certified to Readiness Level 1 (RL1) as quickly as possible. This technique shortened the amount of time required to certify a pilot from RL3 to RL1 from 120 days to 42 days.

Phase II (Platoon Training)

With one company tasked to support Roving Sands exercise 45 days after redeployment from Bosnia, the battalion focused its training efforts on the second SAC, preparing it for an NTC rotation within four months of return from Bosnia. Various training distracters caused the battalion to focus on platoon collective tasks. The company did not fully gain proficiency in night collective tasks.

The unit requested and received a U.S. Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) inspection prior to the NTC rotation to validate individual crew reintegration training. GSAB leaders also discussed unit-training weaknesses with NTC Aviation Observer/Controllers (O/Cs) prior to the rotation to gain their assistance in improving unit proficiency. The company successfully completed its rotation at the NTC and its lessons learned were immediately fed to the second company, which was preparing to support another BCT's NTC rotation.

Phase III (Company Training)

With the completion of its NTC rotation, the second SAC used its take-home package from the NTC as the basis for gaining proficiency in all tasks, to include company collective tasks. Additionally, the take-home package provided lessons learned that the battalion applied in getting the first SAC ready for its NTC rotation.

Division Cavalry Squadron Training Lessons

Whereas the GSAB remained proficient in most of its METL tasks while deployed in Bosnia, the division cavalry squadron had to conduct reintegration training in many of its METL tasks because of degraded proficiency in air/ground integration. The squadron's two Air Cavalry Troops (ACTs) and its aviation support assets were tasked to support the SFOR 5 rotation, while the three ground cavalry troops were left in garrison. The ACTs also had to conduct NVG currency and local area orientation training upon redeployment. To accomplish its training requirements, the squadron faced several challenges, key among them were personnel turnover and training distracters.

Skills Degraded as a Result of Bosnia Peacekeeping Operation

The first three of the six months in Bosnia coincided with Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), the NATO air campaign designed to force the Serbian Army from Kosovo. As a result of OAF, U.S. forces conducted more aggressive reconnaissance and security (R&S) missions in neighboring Bosnia to prevent any sympathetic uprisings. The unit heightened proficiency in METL tasks that supported the R&S missions (such as screening operations and zone reconnaissance) and lost proficiency in those missions that did not support the PKO mission (such as hasty attack and movement to contact). The ACTs did plan exercises to practice non-PKO tasks, but they were often not executed because of conflict with mission requirements and lack of training area and resources. While both ACTs did conduct "Movement to Contact" training with troops from the Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade, the exercise had a strict (canned) scenario.

Soldier skills in field-craft and field operation tasks diminished. For example, while training at Fort Hood, TX, an exposed tent stake, caused by lack of training of crew chiefs in a field environment, damaged the skid on a helicopter causing a Class E mishap when the aircraft landed on it. Since the unit assumed an established refuel operation in Bosnia, unit fuel handlers had to re-familiarize themselves with setting up field refuel operations after redeployment. In many cases, units did not have the training resources available in Bosnia to maintain field skills (units did not deploy with camouflage nets to practice assembly area operations).

Division Cavalry Squadron's Air/Ground Integration Suffered

The two ACTs, along with slices from the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT) and Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) Troop, deployed to Bosnia. The three ground troops and their support packages remained in garrison.

While the ground troops continued to conduct METL training in garrison, the air troops practiced METL tasks such as conducting screening operations, zone reconnaissance, and family support in Bosnia. However, since the ground and air troops were not training and operating in conjunction with each other, their skills in air/ground integration diminished. Both ground and air troops attempted to maintain their skills by coordinating with available counterparts (ground troops with division attack helicopter battalion and air troops with deployed BCT). Because of the nature of the mission in Bosnia for the air troops, which required them to make reports to, and coordinate their actions with, ground elements, the cavalry aircrews maintained their air/ground integration skills. However, the ground cavalry troops did not have enough training opportunities with aviation elements to maintain proficiency.

Upon redeployment, the division cavalry squadron scheduled platoon live-fire exercises and troop situational training exercises (STXs) integrated with air cavalry assets. This training, conducted while the air troops were still in their individual training phase, helped the ground troops reach minimum proficiency in air/ground integration (communications, target hand-over, and familiarization with equipment capabilities).

The Squadron Commander believed that the squadron was hurt and that the division's overall training readiness in combat reconnaissance and security missions suffered by not deploying the entire squadron. The air and ground troops trained separately causing divergent training efforts at times and loss of air/ground integration skills. The commander approximated that the squadron required a year to reach pre-deployment skill level in METL tasks: six months of individual training (predominantly aircrew), three months of platoon/troop collective training, and three months of squadron collective training.

Air and ground scouts are a very effective combination once they have trained together. Deploying the cavalry squadron as a "force provider" for Kiowa Warriors or as an emergency aero-reconnaissance force without its supporting organic ground troops can quickly dull the effectiveness of the division's "eyes and ears."

Aviator Training Requirements

Since the squadron's aircraft redeployed by sea, the unit could not train with its aircraft for over a month and a half, thus causing unit pilots to lose NVG currency. To minimize the amount of time required to conduct NVG currency flights, the unit coordinated with another unit on post to borrow aircraft to keep unit instructor pilots (IP) NVG current. The IPs were then ready to conduct NVG currency flights with other unit pilots immediately upon redeployment of the unit's aircraft.

Unit aviators also needed a local area orientation after six months of not flying in the local area. The squadron used two different requirements for the local area orientation depending on a pilot's previous pilot-in-command (PC) experience. The unit conducted a multi-ship orientation for those pilots that were designated PC prior to deployment. The unit required the pilots that were designated PC while in Bosnia to fly with IPs for their local area orientation.

Large Personnel Turnover In Air Cavalry Troops

Upon return from Bosnia and the end of assignment stabilization period, many experienced OH-58D aviators from the ACTs were reassigned. During a three-month period, eight Readiness Level 1 (RL1) pilots (of the unit's 32 authorized aviators) departed the unit. The reassignment process broke up experienced battle-rostered crews. The large influx of newly assigned aviators within a short period of time required a long individual training (RL progression) period. The Squadron Commander attempted to accelerate individual training but found that an accelerated aircrew training program created a higher-than-acceptable risk environment.

Personnel turnover also affected the unit gunneries. After redeployment, the unit conducted Tables VII and VIII gunneries to fulfill annual gunnery requirements. Unit SOP required that only battle-rostered crews conduct Tables VII and VIII gunneries. As a result of this requirement and large personnel turnover, less than 50 percent of crews were available for this gunnery. The unit had to schedule an additional gunnery to qualify the remainder of aircrews.

Finally, personnel turnover in the NCO ranks after redeployment had the potential for hurting aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) in the air cavalry troops and support (AVUM) troop. To stem the anticipated loss of NCOs after redeployment, units intensified their efforts at developing unit soldiers to take over key NCO leadership positions. While in Bosnia, unit leaders mentored their soldiers with leadership potential, assisted them with preparation for promotion boards, and afforded them greater responsibilities in their daily duties. These soldiers were prepared for professional development schools upon redeployment and ready to assume leadership positions vacated by reassigned NCOs.

Division Cavalry Squadron Training Distracters

During its reintegration training process, the Division Cavalry Squadron encountered numerous training distracters:

• Personnel turnover - this affected the amount of time required for individual aircrew training (RL progression).

• Taskings from higher headquarters - this included assistance with another unit's Aviation Resource Management Survey (ARMS) inspection, O/C personnel, support personnel for division warfighter exercise, ramp-up exercise, and command post exercise (CPX). Additionally, personnel tasked to support these computer simulation exercises were required to attend week-long simulation training prior to each event. At times, this training was unnecessarily repetitive.

Planned training worked best when units followed the Corps' eight-step training model:

Training distracters and other competing priorities often pre-empted many of the steps of the training model. Leaders at all levels had to prioritize training requirements and juggle unit personnel so that trainers and trainees were available for training events. Lack of time devoted to following the eight-step training model normally resulted in lack of thoroughness in the training. Although units may be trained on certain tasks (rating of T on the METL assessment), this often meant that they were only at the minimum acceptable level.

The Division Cavalry Squadron headquarters attempted to minimize training distracters to the air cavalry troops unless a tasking required someone from these units. Since the ground cavalry troops did not deploy, they received the brunt of the taskings from higher headquarters.