MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Temporary route signing
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) units realize the success that temporary route signing can accomplish in providing flexibility for limited MP teams, as well as dramatically assisting movement of the brigade's assets.
DISCUSSION: The MP platoon possesses the capabilities of conducting temporary route signing throughout the brigade combat team (BCT) area of operation. Deliberate planning remains the essential element for execution.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP platoons need to sustain execution of temporary route signing to standard in accordance with (IAW) FM 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations.
(TA.6.1.2.3
Facilitate Movement on Routes)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Construct a nonstandard mined, wire obstacle
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Small unit leaders exhibit a high degree of innovation when constructing defensive obstacles.
DISCUSSION: With a lack of organic or attached engineer support, units were usually required to emplace obstacles in their sector to achieve the obstacle intents of block, turn, disrupt, and fix. Although units did not emplace doctrinal obstacles, they did use their initiative to create obstacles that were tied into existing obstacles and achieved the desired effect.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: None.
(TA.6.2.2
Emplace Obstacles)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Fratricide prevention
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units have improved air and ground integration, resulting in a reduction in fratricides.
DISCUSSION: Units continue to appreciate the importance of the rules of engagement (ROE) and have taken significant measures to ensure all members understand and follow the ROE. Aviation units must continue to ensure this trend is sustained.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A good starting point for developing unit fratricide prevention standing operating procedures (SOP) is to review CALL Newsletter No. 92-4, Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses.
(TA.6.3.1
Provide Battlespace Hazard Protection)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Entry point operations
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Brigade support area (BSA) entry point operations are innovative, organized, and rehearsed.
DISCUSSION: A single entry point is used to ensure control of vehicles entering and exiting the BSA. Gate passes are issued to ensure departing vehicles are properly briefed, debriefed, and tracked.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Brief gate guards so they are knowledgeable on challenge procedures and vehicle inspections and have communication with the command post (CP).
2. Review the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of defensive battle drills found in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Command and control (C2) survivability operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Brigades recognize the need to maintain positive and responsive command and control of critical survivability assets.
DISCUSSION: Units are routinely implementing the "CinC Dozer" concept, which affixes responsibility for execution of the published survivability plan to a key leader or leaders within the brigade. This action reduces the friction and leadership challenges faced by engineer lieutenants and sergeants in the heavy equipment section.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Sustain the cooperation that has improved blade utilization and support of the commander's intent for force protection and survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Security of critical assets
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Many brigade combat teams (BCTs) task military police (MP) assets with the security of designated assets and personnel.
DISCUSSION: Flexible employment of the MP platform was found to be crucial to mission success. Static security of critical assets was found not to be the most effective use of MP equipment and capabilities.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP leaders were quite effective when tasked with providing security in depth and mobile security screens and listening posts (LP)/observation posts (OP) in the area of the protected asset.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Proficiency of chemical staff personnel
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Chemical officers and chemical NCOs of rotational units participating in the last six months have shown improvement in integrating themselves into the battle staff, particularly with the S2.
DISCUSSION: This resulted in greater effectiveness in chemical avoidance measures and selection of the optimal protective posture.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Chemical staff personnel also demonstrated an improvement in the performance of required tasks in response to chemical attacks.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Construct individual/crew-served fighting positions
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Soldiers are very capable of constructing survivable positions in a limited amount of time given appropriate Class IV.
DISCUSSION: Many leaders know the standards for both individual and crew-served fighting positions.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: With minimal observer/controller (O/C) coaching, soldiers were able to construct fighting positions with adequate frontal protection, overhead cover, and clear fields of fire to enable them to engage and destroy enemy forces while remaining protected from indirect fire.
(TA.6.3.1.1.2
Prepare Fighting Positions)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Decontamination (decon) operations planning and site preparation
OBSERVATION (DIV LF): Chemical platoons made reconnaissance of decontamination sites a priority. Resupply of water was also integrated into the overall decontamination plan.
DISCUSSION: When selecting a decon site, chemical platoons were able to ensure it was large enough to accommodate all types of equipment that may have been contaminated in the brigade sector.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The sector selected must be based on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
(TA.6.3.1.2.1
Decontaminate Personnel and Systems)
Needs Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Breach wire and mine obstacles
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units are not applying the fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) during breach operations.
DISCUSSION:
1. In the movement-to-contact operation, indirect fires are not planned or executed during in-stride breaches. This is due mainly to a lack of rehearsals and route reconnaissance; by the time the obstacle is identified, the element is too close and/or in direct fire contact with the enemy at the obstacle.
2. In the deliberate attack there is a lack of combat patience. Breach elements are too close to the breach, and when indirect obscuration and suppressive fires are initiated, the breach elements attempt to breach immediately.
These both result in increased time and exposure to enemy fire, both direct and indirect, during breach operations. The breach element is being destroyed or attrited to the point where assets are pulled from the assaulting element to complete the breach.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Utilize dismounted techniques for route reconnaissance. This can be done with scouts, dismounted infantry platoons, or even soldiers from an anti-tank (AT) platoon moving on foot with M2 machine gunners (MG) in overwatch.
2. Posture breach elements where they can maintain visual contact with obstacles, call for and adjust indirect fires, position direct fire weapons (M240s), gain advantage over the enemy during the suppression, and then conduct the breach.
3. Conduct rehearsals within specified route clearance elements to ensure SOSR.
(TA.6.1.1.1
Breach Obstacle)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Military police (MP) support to movement control
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Movement control continues to plague rotational brigades.
DISCUSSION: The origin of this problem seems to be the lack of deliberate movement control planning. Historically, the brigade combat team (BCT) conducts detailed planning for movement from the intermediate staging base (ISB) into the maneuver box with little consideration for movement control within the brigade's area of operation. Consequently, the BCT loses numerous personnel and rolling stock as a result of traveling on unclear routes. The MPs possess the capability to facilitate the movement control plan through the execution of special circulation control measures, temporary route signing operations, participation in combined arms route clearance security operations, and hasty route reconnaissance and reporting missions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The BCT should recognize and plan movement control as a branch to the operation, and the MP platoon leader/Provost Marshal (PM) should provide MP input through the development of a traffic control plan.
(TA.6.1.2.3
Facilitate Movement on Routes)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Combined arms obstacle integration
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Brigade and battalion staffs do not understand the fundamental relationship between fires and obstacle effects.
DISCUSSION:
1. This poor relationship leads to poor execution of defensive operations. These operations are often based on an unspecified or unclear commander's obstacle intent (target, effect, relative location). As a result, engineer and maneuver leaders are often unclear on how to shape the battlefield or where the commander wants to mass the effects of his organization.
2. The staff often fails to jointly consider and overlay key steps of the IPB process as the basis for developing the defensive maneuver and obstacle plan. Infantry leaders are often not proficient in siting tactical obstacle groups or emplacing protective obstacles, resulting in minimal delay of enemy forces. Fires are not consistently integrated with obstacles, and situational FASCAM minefields are rarely planned with the detail required to achieve the desired effects.
3. Obstacle construction is often unnecessarily delayed because infantry units are slow to occupy sectors and conduct ground reconnaissance. Additional obstacle effort is often sacrificed by not identifying directed obstacles to support battalion/brigade decisive points and by utilizing engineers to operate battalion Class IV/V points.
4. Obstacle emplacement is not tracked at battalion level, so the commander does not adjust his plan based on actual battlefield conditions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Review the relationship between fires and obstacle effects as outlined in FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.
(TA.6.2.2
Emplace Obstacles)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Modular pack mine system (MOPMS) employment
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Engineers do not track the status or location of the Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS) and Remote Control Units (RCUs) until a few hours prior to the NLT defend time.
DISCUSSION: Units will draw the MOPMS and load it with other cargo, but not track it as a weapons system. Engineers often do not inventory and inspect the MOPMS before deployment from the intermediate staging base (ISB). Once preparation for the defense begins, engineers do initial pre-combat checks (PCC)/pre-combat inspections (PCI) of their RCUs. However, engineers planning on turning over their MOPMS to infantry units do not verify that overwatch units know how to operate the RCU. As a result, engineers with an RCU are often left behind in order to operate MOPMS.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Engineers should inventory and inspect the MOPMS when it is first drawn in the intermediate staging base (ISB).
2. Leaders need to work closely with the brigade S4 and battalion support platoon leaders to ensure that munitions are tracked by serial number and are readily available when needed.
3. Engineer platoon leaders need to ensure their task force plans for resources and trains on their RCUs at Home Station. Engineers should provide RCU refresher training to their supported infantry unit at the ISB.
(TA.6.2.3
Mark Obstacles)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Standards for fighting positions
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Soldiers do not know the standards for individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions.
DISCUSSION: These fighting positions are almost always substandard and frequently dangerous to the soldiers in them. Leaders are not familiar with the collective survivability and force protection requirements outlined in FM 5-103, Survivability.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders must be aware of proper force protection measures and train to the survivability standards in accordance with FM 5-103, Survivability.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Survivability operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Soldiers often cannot construct individual and crew-served weapons fighting positions to standard.
DISCUSSION: The force protection of the unit is compromised by the lack of standards and poor safety considerations used in the construction of individual and crew-served weapons fighting positions. Leaders are not familiar with collective survivability and force protection requirements outlined in FM 5-103, Survivability, and the force protection planning process described in FM 5-114, Engineer Operations Other Than War, and Joint Publication 3-10.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Base Defense. Frequently, units do not construct viable survivability positions for critical systems, such as artillery batteries, counter-fire radar, TOCs, signal nodes, aviation assembly areas and ammunition transfer points, leaving them vulnerable to ground and air attack. Cursory "berming" rather than "digging" are the norm. Camouflage measures are rarely used outside immediate tactical operations center (TOC) areas. Finally, there has been a failure to identify low-density survivability assets (dozers and SEEs) as enemy high-value targets (HVT), especially during defensive preparation operations. The result has often been a failure to plan and/or execute viable job site or convoy security for these assets, frequently resulting in their destruction.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Train leaders and soldiers on survivability standards in accordance with FM 5-103, Survivability.
2. Plan for an appropriate level of security and force protection for survivability assets based on the enemy sit-temp and assessment of his HVTs.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
7
SUBJECT:
Force protection
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Units are not prepared to defend themselves from ground attack, air attack, or indirect fire.
DISCUSSION: Units sustain more casualties than necessary.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The brigade engineer must adequately resource the FA battalion with engineer assets. Once engineer assets arrive at the batteries, FA units must maximize engineer potential.
2. Batteries must begin force protection as soon as they arrive at the position and not wait to dig until engineer assets arrive. Additionally, batteries need to carry Class IV as part of their load plan so they do not depend on resupply.
3. Review GTA 7-6-1, Fighting Position Construction Infantry Leader's Reference Card, in order to build overhead to standard.
4. Battery first sergeants must ensure the battery has interlocking fires (see paragraphs 2-18 through 2-24, FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad) and conduct adjacent unit coordination (see paragraph 2-26, FM 7-8) in order to maximize all friendly weapon systems.
5. Units must demand timely development and dissemination of fire support plans from brigade to battalions.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
8
SUBJECT:
Force protection and basic soldier skills
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Soldiers do not always apply basic combat skills (e.g., vehicle dispersion, camouflage, cover and concealment, active and passive air defense measures, 360-degree security, security at halts).
DISCUSSION: While conducting mounted patrols, military police (MP) followed each other too closely and failed to dismount to provide security at halts. While moving mounted and dismounted and at halts, soldiers did not seek cover and concealment quickly enough to avoid detection and injury. Soldiers did not harden vehicles, sandbag turrets, or dig fighting positions with appropriate overhead cover. Leaders did not employ the platoon mine detector with squads on route reconnaissance missions. Many soldiers did not know how to properly use the mine detector or the M2, .50-cal machine gun. In addition, there is a great need for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) training across the entire spectrum of operations.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units should review and apply the techniques outlined in FM 21-75, Combat Skills of the Individual Soldier; FM 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations; ARTEP 19-100-10-DRILL, Military Police Drills; and STP 21-1-SMCT, Common Tasks (#071-326-0513, #071-326-0502 and #071-326-5703). This review should help reinforce the importance of force protection.
Incorporate these measures, as well as NBC, into training scenarios that require leaders and soldiers to react to challenging, complex situations.
2. Continue to train and equip squad combat lifesavers.
(TA.6.3.1.1
Protect Individuals and Systems)
TREND
9
SUBJECT:
Use of the M8A1 chemical agent alarm
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Units are adept at getting M8A1s out on the perimeter. Once placed, however, they are very seldom checked or maintained.
DISCUSSION: None.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units should include the plan for employment of M8A1 alarms in accordance with the templated chemical threat.
2. Additionally, the unit's NBC portion of the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) should address employment as well as periodic checks of the equipment to ensure continuous operation when needed.
(TA.6.3.1.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)
TA.3
Air Defense BOS Narrative
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS Narrative
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