AIR DEFENSE BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Target engagement
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense teams have great success in engaging and destroying enemy aerial threat platforms.
DISCUSSION: Soldiers have demonstrated proficiency in visual aircraft recognition, resulting in early target identification and the prevention of fratricide.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Air defense soldiers are proficient at crew drills and battle drills and use of proper searching and scanning techniques.
(TA.3.2.1
Conduct Lethal Engagement of Air Targets)
Needs Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I)/sensor management plan
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): The most misunderstood capability air defenders bring to the fight is the early warning (EW) assets (LSDID/Sentinel) and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) capability.
DISCUSSION: ADOs, specifically battery commanders, do not fully understand the capabilities and limitations of these assets and, thus, cannot efficiently employ them to facilitate the "sensor-to-shooter" link. Besides providing counter-air, SHORAD, air defense and other active defense terms, an essential task is to provide "early warning" to the supported unit and assist with passive air defense operations. This process starts with the sensor management plan. This is more than just determining and publishing a C3I frequency plan. It requires that ADOs define specific procedures for sensor management and early warning dissemination. Sensor team chiefs must be included during the planning process because they are the subject matter experts. They can assist the commander in developing the sensor management plan, the employment of sensors, and techniques to disseminate early warning.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The sensor management plan must include EW frequency management, sensor looping, sensor chaining, and maintenance management. Batteries must understand linkage architecture, correlation of tracks, and troubleshooting procedures. They need to develop TTPs for each of these and include them in EW planning. This will eliminate problems associated with early warning link-up with fire units. Batteries experience significant challenges in getting all fire units to monitor digital early warning. Fire units lack confidence using the simplified handheld terminal unit (SHTU)/handheld terminal unit (HTU).
2. Batteries must improve operating and integrating the system into their daily air defense operations. Additionally, there are inconsistencies within batteries to monitor the division's early warning (DEW) net. Many fire units receive early warning through platoon or battery command nets. The combined effect of not using their SHTU/HTU or monitoring DEW is late or poor target engagement. Batteries must execute a C3I communication exercise (COMMEX) before deployment to identify inoperable HTUs and verify the fire unit's ability to gain link-up. Batteries need to fully exploit the capabilities of the Air Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS). Batteries should develop training scenarios to enhance the fire unit's confidence in the HTU and exploit the full range of AMDWS capabilities. Batteries and platoons must review technical manuals on the operation of HTUs and develop training exercises to enhance their familiarity with HTU use and employment.
(TA.3.1.1
Select Air Targets to Attack)
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Air defense officer (ADO) training
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): ADOs are not trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) or have the required tools to achieve pattern and predictive analysis.
DISCUSSION: The four-step IPB process should be the methodology to achieve pattern and, most importantly, "predicative analysis." ADOs must determine what enemy aerial platforms will do and how it will contribute to a linked and integrated threat picture.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Although the brigade and battalion commanders' mouthpiece for the intelligence operating system (OS) is the S2, the ADO must aggressively contribute in arming the S2 with the pattern and predictive analysis for the enemy's most probable and dangerous course of action. Bottom line: Without seeing the enemy, we will never see ourselves get integrated and synchronized at brigade and battalion level.
(TA.3.1.2.1 Determine System Capability for Engaging Air Targets)
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
TA.6
Mobility/Survivability BOS and NBC Narrative
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
