Military

2. Leaders at all levels must create checklists to ensure their units are meeting the five requirements for accurate predicated fire.

(TA.5.2.2 Collect Target Information)

TREND 4
SUBJECT: Air defense contributions to "seeing the enemy"

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense officers (ADOs) do not contribute effectively to the brigade or battalion S2's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products (R&S collection plan, situation and event templates).

DISCUSSION: If the ADO does not contribute to these products ("seeing the enemy"), he will have difficulty planning, coordinating, and integrating the air defense operating system into the brigade/battalion concept of operation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. ADOs must put more effort into mission analysis and their particular staff estimate. Clear and concise aerial IPB should include analysis of enemy air capabilities, limitations, and, most importantly, vulnerabilities. When this analysis is integrated with the S2's IPB products, it creates an integrated threat product.

2. When looking at enemy air, the ADO must consider the operating systems. For example, how will air contribute to the enemy's intelligence operational security (OS)? Common sense dictates that they will focus on reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). Every enemy aerial platform will look at RISTA despite their task and purpose. How will enemy air contribute to the fires and maneuver OS? Lastly, how will enemy air contribute to the logistical OS? The challenge is to articulate the "so what analysis" (Who [type of unit and aerial platform], What [clear task, recon, resupply/deliver minefields/chem/bio or attack], When [predictive based upon pattern and linked analysis with the S2], Where [location or type of target - HVT/HPT], Why [purpose for the aerial platform]).

3. ADOs must be trained in TTPs and have the required tools to achieve pattern and predictive analysis. The four-step IPB process should be the methodology to achieve pattern and, most importantly, "predictive analysis." ADOs must determine what enemy aerial platforms will do and how it will contribute to a linked and integrated threat picture.

4. Although the brigade/battalion commander's mouthpiece for intelligence OS is the S2, the ADO must aggressively assist the S2 with the pattern and predictive analysis for the enemy's most probable and dangerous course of action. Bottom line: Without seeing the enemy, we will never see ourselves fully integrated and synchronized at the brigade and battalion level. (See FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, Appendix A.)

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

TREND 5
SUBJECT: Training for analysis control team (ACT) integration

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): There is a failure of the ACT to be fully integrated in a brigade S2 section; therefore, the brigade does a poor job of developing fused intelligence products of the threat picture.

DISCUSSION: The primary reasons for the failure of the ACT to assist the S2 in developing a threat picture is that the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) operators are not fully able to exploit all the capabilities of the system. ASAS operators are not fully trained prior to conducting a JRTC rotation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Home Station training should emphasize Radar Warning System (RWS) training as well as exploitation of the capabilities of the system.

2. The following should be accomplished in a field environment, not in the comfort of garrison:

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 6
SUBJECT: Seeing the enemy

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The S2's responsibility to provide an integrated threat picture hinges upon presenting how the enemy plans to bring all of his assets to bear on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: Presenting this picture requires the S2 to make evaluations on some enemy capabilities that lie outside his area of expertise. In order to portray how the enemy commander will integrate his BOS, the S2 must rely upon and use the expertise of the battle staff. The S2 habitually develops courses of action consisting of a simple sketch that only portrays maneuver, fire support, and air defense for the close fight. His task and purpose statement for the enemy only presents a vague, broad overview. The results are an unfocused battle staff and unfocused commanders.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The battalion staff should review the importance of reverse BOS integration in the planning process as presented in Chapter 2, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. Additionally, Chapter 4, FM 34-130, illustrates IPB requirements for the special staff and support units. The guidelines presented there delineate information that staff sections should contribute to reverse BOS integration. Using that information, the battle staff can develop a systematic method to present feedback to the S2 and allow him to develop an enemy course of action (ECOA) that integrates the enemy's entire BOS into a cohesive plan. Developing a detailed narrative on the method the enemy commander plans to employ concerning each BOS in support of his maneuver plan further enhances the focus of the commanders.

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 7
SUBJECT: Event templating and collection management

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): After identifying the set of potential threat courses of action (COAs), the initial challenge is to determine which one the enemy will actually adopt.

DISCUSSION: The art of identifying initial collection requirements revolves around predicting specific areas and activities which, when observed, will reveal which courses of action (COAs) the threat has chosen. The difference between the named area of interests (NAIs), time phase lines, and indicators associated with each COA form the basis of the event template. The event template is a guide for collection management and R&S planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The S2 must make the effort to consistently update the event template. It is the tool that allows the battalion to keep its collective focus on the enemy and how he will fight.

2. The S2 must be relentless in his pursuit of updating the event template, whether it is for a targeting meeting or if the threat is fighting differently than was anticipated. An inability to develop a timely, visible product leads to a less than synchronized collection plan and focus for the commanders. In order to determine the ECOA, the S2 must also consistently update the collection plan.

3. References are Chapter 2, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), and Chapters 2 and 3, FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning.

4. These references will allow the S2 to achieve a better understanding of the processes associated with event templating and collection management, as well as essential insights into the benefits of knowing his higher headquarters' collection focus.

(TA.5.3.4.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 8
SUBJECT: Information flow

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): While integration with the S2 is improving, there is still a need for improvement with information flow from brigade to subordinate units.

DISCUSSION: Brigade and battalion chemical sections do not see all of the intelligence that is received by the brigade S2 from the division. In every rotation some critical pieces of intelligence were missed. This resulted in unknown capabilities being developed or moved within range of friendly forces by the enemy, and even chemical events happening out of sector that chemical staffs were unaware of. The development of the S2's situational or event template did not include a complete picture of the enemy's most likely or most dangerous NBC course of action.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Staff sections should train as a battle staff to determine "who else needs to know" new information as it is received from higher and lower units. By having personnel train as a battle staff, information that is received can be disseminated to appropriate individuals and acted upon accordingly. Only then can meaningful communication procedures be developed to ensure that this information is disseminated laterally and horizontally across the staff and the brigade.

(TA.5.4 Prepare and Disseminate Intelligence Reports)

TREND 9
SUBJECT: Information management

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Information management continues to be a negative trend. Operating the tactical operations center (TOC) at the JRTC continues to be a problem.

DISCUSSION:

1. Information and intelligence arriving at the various TOCs is not always getting to the S2, nor is the S2 section properly disseminating information and intelligence to other battle staff sections. S2 sections do not aggressively solicit intelligence and combat information from higher and subordinate units as well as within the TOC. Incomplete or vague reports are not pursued for additional details.

2. Upon receiving reports, S2 sections have no tracking mechanism in place to ensure that the reports are logged, plotted, analyzed, and disseminated to higher, subordinate, and staff elements.

3. S2 sections' battletracking capabilities are greatly diminished because the sections do not routinely develop a standing operating procedure (SOP) or do not read the one which exists that clearly delineates individual duties and responsibilities and establishes a section battle rhythm. Consequently, the sections cannot effectively conduct current operations, battle tracking, and future operations planning.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Accurate and timely reporting can only occur if reporting standards receive command emphasis from the brigade commander down to the squad leader level. At a minimum, the standard SALUTE report format should be enforced as the proper reporting format.

2. Brigade and battalion tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) and the S2 section SOPs must refer to information management in great detail. The TACSOP should address how reports are disseminated within the TOC and also establish criteria for types of reports that require an "ATTENTION IN THE TOC" announcement.

3. A good baseline to use is: Any report that impacts on one of the commander's CCIR should result in an "ATTENTION IN THE TOC" announcement. The SOP must give better examples of how to record information in the journal, to include "actions taken."

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy)

User's Guide

TA.1 Maneuver BOS Narrative