MANEUVER BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Employment of night observation devices (NOD)
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Soldiers and leaders are proficient in the use of NOD.
DISCUSSION: Soldiers consistently use NOD during hours of limited visibility. NOD were usually, with a few exceptions, worn correctly (i.e., mounted and in use rather than worn around the neck). This is due to leaders checking their soldiers and making on-the-spot corrections.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Soldiers seem to have more confidence in their equipment. Although a strength, this must be sustained in order to allow the force to "own the night." NOD usage should be incorporated wherever and whenever possible to increase the soldier's proficiency, knowledge, and comfort with the system.
(TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces (Units and Equipment))
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
Move tactically
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Most units use proper movement techniques, formations, and dispersion when conducting mounted movement.
DISCUSSION: During movement, squads used proper formations and maintained dispersion based on METT-T. Visual contact between leaders and soldiers enabled the unit to maintain control. Platoons moved on covered and concealed routes.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Most units executed all tactical movement IAW the fundamental standards listed in FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and FM 7-10, Infantry Rifle Company. Move tactically/mounted movement techniques can be referenced in ARTEP 7-91-MTP, pg. 5-13.
(TA.1.1.1.2.2
Move while Dismounted)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Movement techniques
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units quickly adapt to the terrain and the need to mutually support other platoons within the company.
DISCUSSION: Planned, detailed routes assist in accurate land navigation and rapid movement. Commanders know where they are and are able to react to any contact that arises.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Use of appropriate movement techniques and formations continue during periods of limited visibility. Avoidance of difficult terrain, along with identifying and securing key terrain prior to passage of the main body, supports security and force protection. Units are arriving in the attack with maximum personnel to conduct the mission, as well as with a force well rested and ready to fight.
(TA.1.1.1.2.2
Move while Dismounted)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
Terrain flight techniques
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aircrews are employing traveling overwatch and bounding overwatch techniques during reconnaissance missions.
DISCUSSION: During the search and attack phase when contact with enemy forces is possible, the overwatching element is keying its movement off the wingman and terrain as much as possible. Mutual support is readily available for the teams conducting the missions. The "team concept" or "wingman concept" is being properly executed for the most part. Occasionally, team members become separated. The separation distance is often too far for immediate direct fire support if an aircraft is engaged.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders make the determination, based on the enemy situation, to "accept risk" by separating a team.
(TA.1.1.1.3
Move Through Air)
TREND
5
SUBJECT:
Land navigation
OBSERVATION (TF 1): There is full integration of the Global Positioning System (GPS) with traditional land navigation within scout squads.
DISCUSSION: GPS is being used not as the primary means of land navigation, but as the "second opinion," resulting in improved land navigation.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Successful land navigation can be directly attributed to thorough map reconnaissance and soldiers who have a high competency level in dismounted land navigation.
(TA.1.1.3
Navigate)
TREND
6
SUBJECT:
Enter building/clear room - squads
OBSERVATION (LF): Units have shown improvement in clearing rooms.
DISCUSSION: Squads employ internal support and obscuration when assaulting to seize a foothold on buildings. Squads are quickly stacking on the exterior of buildings, checking for booby traps, and entering rooms with well-rehearsed and synchronized three- or four-man entry techniques.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Close quarters battle (CQB) marksmanship has improved, and units are successful at discriminating friendly from enemy inside the rooms. Some units are using white lights for clearing, and others are clearing under night-vision goggles (NVGs). Both have been proficient.
(TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
OBSERVATION (TF 2): During live-fire operations, soldiers quickly destroy targets using correct marksmanship techniques and fire commands from the small unit leader.
DISCUSSION: During force-on-force operations, leaders were diligent in maintaining the MILES zero to provide accurate direct fires on the enemy.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Rifle platoons should continue to emphasize marksmanship in Home Station training.
(TA.1.2.2
Conduct Close Combat)
Needs Emphasis
TREND
1
SUBJECT:
Assembly area operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Assembly area (AA) activities have not improved.
DISCUSSION: Units are still not executing basic daily tasks while in the AA. Units are conducting security in name only; there is no plan, and soldiers executing AA security are not prepared for the mission. In conjunction with poor security, priorities of work are not being established. Units have also failed to perform proper consolidation and reorganization operations. They do not execute these missions in any organized way, and often do not execute them until it is too late.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must follow doctrinal procedures for occupation of assembly areas, and these procedures should be part of any unit standing operating procedures (SOP). Consolidation and reorganization operations allow a unit to adequately distribute resources and prepare for future missions.
(TA.1.1.1
Position/Reposition Forces (Unit and Equipment))
TREND
2
SUBJECT:
React to contact
OBSERVATION (LF DIV): The battle drill for react to contact is the most important task performed at fire team, squad, and platoon level; however, units continuously do not perform to standard. The number one reason for this centers on the individual task of seek cover/return fire and the soldier's hesitation to immediately return fire.
DISCUSSION: Seek cover and return fire are two separate tasks, but are taught as a single task that should occur simultaneously. The concept is a problem for soldiers to grasp and, more often than not, they dive to the ground in search of the nearest tree without engaging the enemy. A SALUTE report follows and then an engagement; O/Cs have seen this procedure take as long as ten minutes. The process of finding cover does not necessarily imply that the soldier dive to the ground; it may be as simple as stepping behind a tree or the corner of a building. The simultaneous piece of the task is that the soldier is thinking and looking for cover as he returns fire. In some cases, the soldier may fire and move at the same time, such as shooting as he dives to the ground or as he quickly moves behind a tree or building. In the ideal situation, the react to contact is not a reaction to enemy fire, but a case in which the soldier identifies the enemy first and engages.
Nighttime lethality has greatly increased with the use of PVS-7B/7D/14s, AN/PAQ-4s, and AN/PEQ-2/6s, but they have also somewhat slowed reaction times during a limited visibility react to contact. Although better equipped to acquire targets, soldiers hesitate to fire instinctively at a muzzle flash, movement, or sound, and instead rely on their IR source, wasting valuable seconds trying to place the "beam" onto the target before engaging. All too often, O/Cs watch the "beam" from the IR source bounce around the target for 5-10 seconds before a soldier fires. This time increases when the distance is greater than 25 meters, all the while giving the enemy more time to acquire and engage. This is compounded by the fact that the soldier is usually prone and having a difficult time repositioning to where he can see through his night- vision goggles (NVGs) and fire at the same time.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Soldiers must realize that returning fire is the most important task during a react to contact. Instinctive fires from members of the unit in contact are a must. The first rounds fired need not be completely accurate, but at least aimed in the general direction of the enemy. If the first rounds strike near the enemy or hit him, then the purpose has been served. The first rounds alert the remainder of the lead fire team or squad to the location of the enemy and will allow for placing more accurate fires.
2. The initial problem encountered in a react to contact (returning instinctive fire) is a training must. During daylight, the use of a jungle sling or snaps that keep the butt of the weapon in the soldier's shoulder pocket will greatly enhance his ability to fire instinctively, and he will not waste valuable time bringing his weapon into position. The jungle slings also works at night, but a soldier can just as easily fire his weapon from the ready position using the AN/PAQ-4 and NVG combination.
3. Training to fire instinctively is the next step. Instinctive shooting is neither quick fire nor CQB, although there are similarities. To train to a level of complete accuracy on it requires a great deal of rounds and time; however, that is not the near goal. As long as a soldier understands the principles of acquiring a target through sight or sound and firing in that direction, he can be trained without ever firing a live round. Training to fire instinctively is not done from the prone position but from the standing, kneeling, or squatting position, because these are the positions that a soldier will be in when contact is made. It also helps that the soldier train wearing the equipment that he will be carrying (e.g., rucksack, LBE, Kevlar, NVGs). The most important soldier task in a react-to-contact scenario is to return fire.
(TA.1.2
Employ Direct-fire)
TREND
3
SUBJECT:
Fire control and distribution
OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Many leaders, from team to company, do not understand the basic principles of direct fire control.
DISCUSSION: Leaders almost always fail to develop a direct fire plan that includes control measures, rules of engagement, ample marking and signals, and engagement priorities. This results in poor placement of weapons, poor distribution of fires, and the expenditure of all ammunition prior to completing the mission. Leaders should develop a direct fire plan based on the enemy situation and rehearse it.
It is very important that team and squad leaders understand how to acquire targets and to use commands to direct and control the fires of their elements. Technological advances in the infrared (IR) spectrum allow for greater lethality and engagement distances at night; however, leaders, whether in rifle squads or support-by-fire (SBF) positions, do not properly use the AN/PAQ-4C or ground command pointer (GCP) to "paint targets" for their subordinates. Some units have magnifiers for the PVS-7Bs and PVS-14s; however, they either do not bring them to the rotation or they do not know how to properly use them. The magnifier allows a weapon squad leader to clearly see an objective at a distance of 600-800 meters, easily doubling or tripling the normal engagement distance for a support-by-fire position. Although M240B gunners may only see limited, blurred portions of the objective, the weapon squad leader can clearly observe and mark bunkers or enemy personnel with a beam from his AN/PAQ-4 or GCP. The gunners then only have to line up the beam from their IR source with that of the squad leader for an accurate engagement. Once the targets are acquired, the squad leader can control the machine guns' rates of fire and distribution through either voice commands or his IR source.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders must recognize the time required to conduct a breach or similar task. By understanding the potential time requirements for certain tasks, leaders can compute the amount of ammunition required for sustained fires by factoring the quantity on-hand versus time required.
2. Leaders in the support-by-fire element also need to consider the likelihood of a counterattack, and prior to computing the number of rounds needed for suppression during the mission, subtract at least 200-300 rounds from the basic load for defending against a counterattack. Most importantly, leaders and members of the SBF element need to know the difference between suppression and volume of fire.
3. An intense machine gun leader's course at Home Station that focuses on the employment of the weapon system and not the technical aspects provides the best opportunity to improve direct fire control and distribution of crew-served weapons.
(TA.1.2
Employ Direct-fire)
TREND
4
SUBJECT:
M240B machine gun expertise
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units do not fully understand how to properly employ their M240B machine guns.
DISCUSSION: During halts, units rarely position machine guns along likely avenues of approach. While conducting the defense, units do not position machine guns to maximize their capabilities. During military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT), companies do not plan for specific use of their machine guns. Furthermore, machine gunners and assistant gunners do not have sufficient knowledge of their weapon system (e.g., rates of fire, difference between final protective line [FPL] and principle direction of fire [PDF], and using the tripod).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies should conduct leader development on employment of machine guns.
(TA.1.2.1.1 Process Direct-fire Targets)
TA.5
Intelligence BOS Narrative
TA.2
Fire Support BOS Narrative
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