TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
SUBJECT: Mission tracking
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): One of the most challenging aspects of logistical support is to track each mission from beginning to completion.
DISCUSSION: Many support operations shops have the basic tools for mission tracking displayed, but seldom use them properly. After the first few missions, tracking fades into only following those missions that are yet to SP. The section needs to have visibility of all missions. The biggest problem is the mission close-out. The company accomplishing the mission seldom closes the loop with the support operations section. Without closure, the support operations section will not have a good picture of what assets are available for future missions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: A solution is to have a trip ticket that the driver can fill in after returning which the company forwards to the support operations section. The support operations section can then update their boards with the correct information.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Tracking friendly unit positions
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Maneuver battalions are consistently unable to keep track of all the friendly units operating in their zone.
DISCUSSION: Although the TOC generally has a good view of where its organic subordinates are on the battlefield, it often lacks awareness of brigade or division forces deployed within the battalion's boundaries. This leads to clearance of fires problems and increases the probability of fratricide.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The solution comes in two parts.
1. Battalion TOCs must be proficient in battle-tracking techniques. Specific techniques are discussed in CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, Tactical Operations Center (TOC), May 95.
2. Brigades should not assign units missions within battalion sectors without designating a command relationship or issuing specific coordinating instructions. For example, the brigade ADA officer wants to employ an avenger in a battalion sector in order to cover a likely enemy avenue of approach. The often seen but usually unsuccessful technique is for the ADA company commander to keep the avenger under brigade control and position the asset in sector without coordination. A more effective technique would be to task-organize the avenger to the battalion and give the battalion the specified task to subordinate units of denying the air avenue of approach. This method achieves both the desired tactical effect and forces the appropriate coordination.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Setting the conditions - battalion command and control (C2)
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Maneuver battle staffs do not conduct detailed analysis (IPB or mission analysis) and fail to see the terrain or decisive point in a battle.
DISCUSSION:
1. The XO and S-3 do not adequately involve the S-2, FSO, or engineer officer in the troop- leading procedures.
2. Staffs do not understand the capabilities and limitations of non-organic assets such as mech/armor, attack aviation, AT, and engineers.
3. Units do not understand how to conduct backbriefs and rehearsals.
4. Unit combat multipliers are not integrated or synchronized at the decisive point and time.
5. Staffs do not have adequate battle drills and SOPs to facilitate efficient TLPs. Staff teamwork is not enforced. The XO is not forceful enough in requiring the staff members to work together and integrate all their products. Staffs lack knowledge and internalization of the orders process.
6. Staffs commonly fail to identify the decisive points and fail to nest the tasks and purposes of the subordinate units to the decisive points.
7. Commanders fail to enforce the linkage between their intent and the concept of the operation. As a result, subordinate units execute missions without a clear vision of the operation.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Train all staff elements to do their own IPB.
2. Conduct frequent orders drills with all primary staff members.
3. Use the concept sketch as per doctrine when briefing the concept of the operation (a picture is worth a thousand words).
4. The battalion XO must enforce strict timelines and standards of work during the TLPs. Be, Know, Do (FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations).
5. Conduct regular Home Station officer professional development (OPD) and staff training on the orders process.
6. Develop SOPs on how to set up a rehearsal site, who will brief/execute, and what will be briefed.
(TA.4.2.1.1
Analyze Mission)
SUBJECT: Aviation task integration
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Maneuver task force battle staffs lack proficiency in planning for the doctrinal employment of aviation assets not assigned to the unit.
DISCUSSION: Attack battalions have difficulty in employing assault and heavy lift assets and vice versa.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Two fixes to this difficult problem are Home Station training and the use of aviation LNOs. Commanders must ensure their staff officers, including the LNOs, are intimately familiar with all aviation doctrinal references, not just attack or cavalry or assault employment.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Use of aviation liaison officers and cells
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Brigade task force organizations training at the JRTC economize on one of the most versatile staff officers in their TOC/TAC - the aviation task force LNO.
DISCUSSION: Granted, the parent aviation headquarters has the responsibility to be represented at the higher headquarters, but what is often seen at the JRTC is a junior captain or first lieutenant, often only one deep, with limited experience, expected to perform duties beyond his experience and education level. The result is inefficient planning and coordination and often aborted missions.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Put experienced officers with extensive experience in the liaison role to benefit everyone in planning and preparation. Otherwise, conduct Home Station training to provide liaison experience for junior officers.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Utilization of aviation assets
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Due to inexperience of the aviation liaison, many units do not properly use aviation assets.
DISCUSSION: The aviation LNO will advise the brigade commander on the use of aviation assets within his task force (attack, assault, medium lift, and EW). Additionally, he can coordinate for other aviation assets (external to the TF) and assist in integrating them into the fight. He typically manages A2C2 for the brigade and assists in the management of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC assets. He performs "911" liaison with the aviation task force when standby aircraft are needed, and assumes staff responsibility for aviation risk management.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The liaison must be prepared to advise the commander on interpretations of weather, fighter management, maintenance, and tactical employment of the aviation task force.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Collocation and shared responsibilities of A2C2
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): An efficiency to be considered at the brigade level is the collocation and shared responsibilities of A2C2 by the aviation LNO cell and the ADA cell.
DISCUSSION: Both cells must remain vigilant in airspace management and, along with the tactical command post (TACP) and the field artillery (FA) cells, must ensure accurate tracks on their respective systems to avoid fratricide or worse.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The sharing of the A2C2 function and collocation of these two cells worked effectively in several of the brigade task force organizations that trained at the JRTC.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Aviation integration in mission planning
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation assets must become involved in the infantry battalion's planning process early to affect a coordinated effort during the search and attack.
DISCUSSION: The aviation unit can do several things to facilitate the planning effort. Establishing command relationships ("OPCONing") is one method which forces involvement in the infantry's planning process. Sending liaisons (LNOs) to the infantry tactical operations center (TOC) is another method. The bottom line is that aviation units need to have the ground scheme of maneuver and graphics to affect a coordinated search and attack. The brigade targeting process begins 48 hours out, with orders going to infantry battalions 24 hours out. The infantry battalions should have targets planned for execution 12 hours prior to execution. The brigade LNOs have the responsibility to pass information from the targeting meeting to the aviation task force for future planning. The 24-hour "window" is where aviation integration in the planning process needs to occur at the battalion level. Knowing when the infantry will start point (SP), their target, their composition, and their movement plan to the target are basic elements aircrews need.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The aviation unit needs mirror supporting graphics, frequencies, and rehearsed battle drills.
2. Once the aviation unit has this information, it can plan "zone reconnaissance" to coincide with the infantry movement.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Air defense officer integration
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense batteries experience difficulties in understanding and contributing to the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION: Air defense officers (ADOs) develop the air portion of IPB without much detail and refinement. They do not integrate their products with the S-2's overall enemy situational and event templates. ADOs must aggressively integrate the enemy air event template with the S-2 to further refine the brigade's intelligence products. ADOs must understand threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations, and articulate this to commanders and staffs. ADOs do not understand their role in the targeting process. ADOs can use the enemy air situational and event templates to plan and fight the future brigade fight during the targeting process. ADOs have difficulty in synchronizing the air defense plan due to ineffective direction to platoon leaders and sporadic communications during execution. ADOs have difficulty integrating with the brigade's scheme of maneuver. This results in an ineffective task organization against the enemy air threat. These difficulties contribute to improper positioning of teams to gain early engagement, ineffective early warning planning, and ineffective command and control.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. ADOs must develop air defense priorities and allocate sufficient combat power to protect the brigade's high-value targets (HVTs) while simultaneously positioning teams along enemy air avenues of approach (AAA). There is very little visibility at the brigade level on how critical assets are protected. As a result, the enemy is able to conduct numerous air reconnaissance, resupply, and attack missions successfully.
2. Units should conduct leader training on the MDMP and on planning air defense operations.
3. Units should conduct leader training on the targeting process and the ADO's role in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) refinement and targeting.
4. Refer to FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operation; FM 44-100, US Army Air Defense Operations, specifically Appendix A, Air Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; and FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Route clearance
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Detailed route clearance planning at the brigade level is not being done.
DISCUSSION: Units need to put an effort into identifying routes, conducting threat analysis, and assigning appropriate command and control (C2) and task organization in order to execute a route clearance mission.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Appendix D of FM 5-7-30, Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light), addresses mission analysis and planning considerations for route clearance.
2. CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 96-1, Route Clearance Operations, provides techniques for the employment of route clearance.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Integration of the heavy team into the scheme of maneuver
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The brigade often fails to integrate the heavy team into the scheme of maneuver.
DISCUSSION: The most common result is the piecemealing of armor and mechanized forces across the battlefield, reacting to the enemy's success. The problem is exacerbated by the lack of experience light infantry brigades have with employing heavy forces.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This is primarily due to the stationing of forces in CONUS and the difficulty in training together routinely. Units must maximize training opportunities to the fullest.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Use mass in determining the use of the heavy force
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): The challenge to brigade staffs is to identify the decisive point to employ the heavy team in order to achieve massed effects.
DISCUSSION: When determining task organization, the brigade should be wary of dividing the heavy team below the platoon level. This is the basic maneuver unit of the heavy force and contains sufficient C2 to operate independently of the company.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The brigade must ensure that it provides a valid task and purpose to the unit to conduct the mission.
2. The brigade must provide sufficient time for the subordinate elements to plan and rehearse. Because of the limited opportunities available to train with the heavy force prior to the rotation, this planning and rehearsal time becomes even more critical.
3. The integration of the heavy team liaison officer (LNO) into the brigade staff will enhance the brigade's success.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Forward logistics element (FLE) operations
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): FLE operations are failing to be a combat multiplier for light infantry brigades.
DISCUSSION: Typical weaknesses include:
1. No assigned task or purpose.
2. Not adequately integrating all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) or tactical logistics functions into the composition.
3. Lack of participation and/or attendance by key players for rehearsals.
4. Failure to follow an established standing operating procedure (SOP).
5. No clear C3.
6. FLE not on the brigade execution checklist.
7. Not integrating the brigade's organic logistics assets.
8. FLE not treated as a combat operation and often scheduled so late in the brigade's scheme of maneuver that it has little or no effect on the mission.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The brigade S-4, S-1, and the FSB support operations officer must take the lead to resource the FLE properly and ensure that it is integrated into the brigade's scheme of maneuver.
2. Treat the FLE operation as a combat operation and integrate all BOS and tactical logistics functions into the composition.
3. Plan for a separate FLE rehearsal. Elevate the importance of the FLE in the MDMP and at the maneuver rehearsal.
4. Ensure the FLE is a brigade logistics node by integrating the brigade S-1/S-4 section into the operation.
5. FM 63-1, Support Battalions and Squadrons, Separate Brigades and Armored Cavalry Regiment, Chapter 1, provides further tactics, techniques, and procedures as well as useful guidelines for this operation.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Staff coordination
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Staff coordination and integration of all task force elements are critical to accomplishment of the mission. At the outset of the operation, task force structure is often not well defined or understood by the C2 element or those units subordinate to the task force.
DISCUSSION: Events such as MASF missions, battle damage assessment (BDA), logistical support, and internal tasking requirements often act as catalysts in forcing units to act as a single functional element rather than as a member of the task force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Commanders need to project a team effort in order to aid the integration of all staff and task force elements prior to deployment.
2. A commander must set a battle rhythm that allows the staff to predict when he needs information, and then give the staff time to work together on a course of action.
3. Participating in the Leadership Training Program at Ft Polk is a valuable training tool to accomplish this.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Integration of medical clinical and administrative staffs
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Integration of clinical and administrative staffs is difficult. Because of a separation in function, information flow between the two elements is often limited.
DISCUSSION: Clinical staff personnel often fail to see the S-3 about what the maneuver units are doing in order to anticipate requirements, and are not always present during the daily updates. The S-3 will not usually take the opportunity to find out if there are any problems that would hinder the hospital in providing support. Clinical personnel are often not incorporated into operational planning and, therefore, cannot anticipate or forecast upcoming demands on the hospital system.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 35 above.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: CSS units at corps level
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Corps-level CSS units routinely perform poorly in the
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION:
1. Staffs assume the process is for combat units and fail to see the utility of the process in estimating and executing their own support missions.
2. Courses of action are not wargamed or synchronized with the brigade's plans. Consequently, units consistently react to taskings rather than plan for support.
3. The results become evident in high died-of-wounds rates; last minute preparation for transportation missions, putting drivers and mission accomplishment at risk; and little if any situational awareness of the battle.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The MDMP can be used by CSS units to effectively plan, integrate, and synchronize efforts to enhance the capabilities of all EAD units and consequently enhance support to the brigade.
2. Participating in the Leadership Training Program (LTP) at Ft Polk is a valuable training tool to accomplish this.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Targeting process and targeting meetings
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Most battalion staffs do not understand the basic concepts of the targeting process and intermittently conduct targeting meetings with no agenda or focus.
DISCUSSION: As a result, most units fail to focus combat power to find, fix, and finish critical high-payoff targets (HPTs).
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Read and review FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process, with emphasis on Chapters 2 and 5, and the Targeting Process Video script in the JRTC FS DIV TTP red book, 1 Oct 96, page 21, to gain a better understanding of the targeting process and the targeting meeting.
2. The battalion XO should open the meeting by detailing its purpose and the agenda, and specifying the time period or event being discussed in the meeting. The S-2 provides an intelligence update. First, he briefs the current enemy situation. Next, the S-2 reviews the current collection and reconnaissance and surveillance plans. Third, he provides a battle damage assessment of targets previously engaged since the last targeting meeting and the impact on the enemy course of action. Next, he provides an analysis of the enemy's most probable courses of action and locations for the next 12-24 hours using the event template and a list of high-value targets. Finally, the S-2 briefs changes to the PIR for review by the battle staff.
3. The next briefer is the S-3. First, he briefs any particular guidance from the commander and changes to the commander's intent. Second, he briefs any requirements from higher since the last targeting meeting and a review of current operations. Finally, he informs the battle staff of the status of assets available for the targeting process.
4. The third briefer is the battalion FSO. He briefs the status of all delivery assets and reviews the current target synchronization matrix, providing a summary of results of actions taken. Next, he provides the new target synchronization matrix with the proposed list of HPTs and locations for the battle staff's concurrence and refinement. Once any changes to the HPT have been made and any locations updated or refined, the battalion XO or S-3 facilitates a BOS crosswalk to complete the rest of the matrix by identifying a detector, determining an attack means, and assigning an asset to assess each HPT.
5. Upon completion of the targeting meeting, the XO, S-3, S-2, and FSO should brief the commander on the results of the meeting for his approval. Once the results are approved, the following products are updated, written, and reproduced for timely distribution.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Maneuver unit battle staff integration
OBSERVATION (TF 3): Battalions do not effectively integrate all staff members and BOS into the planning process.
DISCUSSION: Intelligence is not driving maneuver, and the intelligence and fire support BOS are not synchronizing their efforts or sharing information. This results in the battalion fighting its base plan and not modifying it based on the changing enemy situation. There is seldom an adequate CSS plan to support the scheme of maneuver, which causes the battalions to halt operations due to lack of supplies.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Chapters 2 and 8 of FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, cover this in detail and need to be applied during operations.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Aviation unit execution of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation staffs do not effectively execute the decision-making process.
DISCUSSION: Staffs do not have a clear understanding of the MDMP and the linkage between the steps. Often the commander is focused on other issues and the executive officer deals predominately with logistical matters.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must know FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and must understand how the separate staff sections participate in the planning process. Home Station training is a must in order to become proficient in the decision-making process IAW FM 101-5 as well as the unit's Leadership Training Program (LTP) conducted at the JRTC.
2. Review CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning," May 97.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Course-of-action (COA) development
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): The manner in which most units continue to develop an operation around a single COA does not maximize their potential for successful execution.
DISCUSSION:
1. Staffs almost always develop their JRTC operational plans at Home Station prior to a rotation. Sometimes these begin in the LTP. Regardless, most units arrive with predetermined plans. "Plan" is emphasized here and and not "OPLAN" because they are seldom accompanied by assumptions. The plan becomes the single COA when the staff executes the MDMP. It seldom receives elaboration and is almost never put in the context of the current friendly/enemy situation "in the box."
2. Commanders seldom provide any criteria to analyze the COA. Doctrinally, any COA, at a minimum, must be weighed as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Commanders have an obligation to expand and add to these doctrinal criteria for accepting a COA. This is part and parcel of the commander's vision, intent, and guidance.
3. Staffs seldom provide, nor do commanders ask for, updated staff estimates prior to or during mission analysis. At best, staff estimates are assumed to be whatever they were back at Home Station when the plan was written or they depend entirely on whatever the current battle tracking charts display in the TOC. The latter are seldom explicitly addressed in the MDMP anyway. The impact of these observations is that plans developed in a vacuum away from the JRTC seldom bear out their full potential in terms of BLUFOR success. The plans in general are sound and often audacious. But without analysis within the context of the current situation, without being challenged by success criteria, or without development against current staff estimates, the plans almost always fall short of reasonable success. A frequent example seen at the JRTC is that when units transition between phases, they seldom account for personnel and equipment casualties from the previous phase. Consequently, while the idea behind using a single COA in a time constrained environment is a sound concept, units are not gaining the full training benefit offered by the JRTC, mainly because they do not put the single COA into the present "in the box" context.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Do not write plans ahead of time (or make them OPLANs with attendant assumptions).
2. Use suitable/feasible/acceptable criteria to analyze the COA.
3. Provide time for the staff to develop current staff estimates and then present the results of the analysis to the commander during the mission analysis step of the MDMP.
(TA.4.3.2
Develop Course of Action)
SUBJECT: Air defense battery standing operating procedures (SOP)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Lack of air defense battery SOPs hamper unit planning and execution.
DISCUSSION: Although air defense batteries bring their own battalion TACSOPs, these tend to be too general. Units encounter specific problems that require their own unit SOP. Examples of unit SOPs are COMSEC compromise procedures, SHTU/HTU troubleshooting procedures, fire unit priorities of work, sensor management planning, and fire unit survivability/force protection standards.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Once the SOPs are developed, batteries and platoons must verify them in the field to ensure soundness and make changes as necessary. ADA leaders must enforce the SOPs and ensure soldiers follow them.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Often units deploy with a TACSOP that marginally addresses NBC matters and actions.
DISCUSSION: Repeatedly, units discover shortcomings in their TACSOPs such as patient decontamination procedures, CDE equipment reporting, and decontamination site setup.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must review the NBC portion of TACSOPS and ensure they address key and essential activities. Copies or extracts of these TACSOPs must be at all levels in the command, and NBC personnel must have access to them.
2. Brigade and battalion chemical officers must conduct rehearsals with subordinates to ensure that all required actions are understood.
3. Review FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination Operations, FM 8-33, Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, and FM 8-285, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Troop-leading procedures
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): The platoon leadership from a cross section of rotational units typically displays a limited understanding of troop-leading procedures.
DISCUSSION: A lack of integration into the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) at brigade with parallel planning conducted at the platoon is the primary cause for the shortfall. Missions not generated through the MDMP are usually an afterthought, tasked on short notice, which forces the platoon leadership to abbreviate their troop-leading procedures or ignore them altogether.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Chemical company commanders and first sergeants must mentor their platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders on combining the procedures for the execution of doctrinal missions.
2. Review FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, and FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Internal communications
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Information is diluted in transmission.
DISCUSSION: Solders want (and deserve) to know why actions are being taken. Soldiers who understand both the task and, more importantly, the purpose of their mission will execute their instructions with much more enthusiasm. The "why" imbedded in missions allows leaders at all levels to better understand how their piece fits into the big picture of the battle, and increases awareness of the importance of what may seem an insignificant job at first. Gate guards who understand they are ambassadors for the command and the key to protecting the entire compound (as the first point of contact with the public) have a tendency to be much more vigilant than those who are merely told, "You're the gate guard; don't let anyone in without a password."
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Internal communications must be driven by and through the chain of command. Only by enforcing this means of communication can leaders be sure everyone in the unit has the correct information. Clarity of messages must be ensured through proper feedback. Backbriefs are excellent tools as long as they do not become parroting sessions. As much as possible, include the purpose with the task so that soldiers know why actions are required.
(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 1
TA.4,
Part 3
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