TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS (cont)
SUBJECT: Medical unit pre-combat inspections
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Once established, inspections by leaders of teams and sections that leave the compound for external missions often are shoddy or nonexistent.
DISCUSSION: Ambulances depart without strip maps or briefings on road conditions, minefield locations, enemy threats, actions in case of ambush, frequencies of supporting or supported units (if they have communications capability), etc. FLAs depart without all necessary medical equipment, putting the driver and crew at a scene unable to provide necessary life support for patients at the scene or en route.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution. NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly prepared for mission execution.
2. Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established and carried out. SOPs can reflect requirements for PCIs but must be checked periodically to incorporate changes in equipment or missions to ensure the right information is contained in a checklist.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: TOC battle drills
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): TOC personnel do not routinely train and execute battle drills.
DISCUSSION: Reaction to enemy fire, enemy aircraft, NBC, indirect fire, patient movement to and from evacuation vehicles, tent erection, etc., can be reduced to drills.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: All battle drills and missions should be rehearsed as many times as possible at Home Station and not less than 24 hours prior to the need. The consistent and continuous practice of these actions makes the needed response automatic. Do not waste time figuring out what to do or how to do it in the middle of a battle.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Fire planning
OBSERVATION (DIV FS): Even though the brigade fire support planners integrated fires into the brigade battle plan from a top-down perspective, the bottom-up process was ineffective.
DISCUSSION: Brigade-directed targets are often left out of battalion plans as are battalion- directed targets from company plans. Consequently, brigade targets are seldom refined or executed. Each level, from brigade to company, was planning their own fires, without regard for the plan from higher headquarters. The result was a lack of focus for fire support assets. Often times there were more targets than sensors and shooters, which is indicative of poor target management and synchronization. The end result was more reactive fires as opposed to responsive fires.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Exercise the 2 - 2/3 rule for fire planning. Give subordinates 2/3 of the time to incorporate higher directed targets into the fire plans. Establish and enforce a hard target refinement cutoff time.
2. Use a multi-echeloned technical rehearsal, ensuring all higher changes in targets are delivered to a sensor and shooter.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Terrain planning
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): S-2s are not focusing on the terrain aspects of planning.
DISCUSSION: S-2s need to train themselves and their sections using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies. They need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain will affect their unit.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. S-2s must focus the terrain portion of the mission analysis brief on the result of their analysis; that is, the effect of the terrain on friendly and enemy forces. They must also identify key and decisive terrain.
2. Commanders do not need to see all the terrain factors in excessive detail, but they do need to receive the S-2s analysis.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Staff battle drills
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Staffs do not have adequate battle drills and standing operating procedures (SOPs) to facilitate efficient troop-leading procedures (TLPs).
DISCUSSION: Staff teamwork is not enforced. The XO is not forceful in requiring staff members to work together and integrate all their products. Staffs lack the knowledge and internalization of the orders process. They commonly fail to identify the decisive points and fail to nest the tasks and purposes of the subordinate units to the decisive points. Commanders fail to enforce the linkage between their intent and the concept of the operation. As a result, subordinate units execute missions without a clear vision of the operation.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Train all staff elements to do their own intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
2. Conduct frequent order drills with all primary staff.
3. Use a concept sketch as per doctrine when briefing the concept of the operation.
4. The battalion executive officer must enforce timelines, standard of work, and TLP.
5. Review FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.
6. Develop SOPs on how to set up a rehearsal site, who will brief/execute, what will be briefed/executed, and to what standard.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Light/heavy team integration
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Key leaders do not understand light/heavy tactics.
DISCUSSION:
1. Key leaders have a minimal understanding of the capabilities and limitations among light/heavy forces and a poor understanding of heavy team logistical requirements.
2. This results in a de-synchronized fight between dismounted and mounted forces. Units are not focused on their higher unit's decisive point.
3. Heavy task and purpose are not nested to support the company fight. There are no combined arms rehearsals and no direct fire control measures or engagement criteria established.
4. This creates poor communication and C2 relationships.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Mount/remount drills on Bradley vehicles.
2. Establish direct-fire control measures and marking SOPs.
3. Establish SOP for TC/BC communication with dismounted maneuver forces.
4. Conduct combined arms rehearsals on breach, clear defile, provide local/flank security, linkup operations, and MOUT operations.
5. Review CALL Newsletter No. 98-10, Fighting Light/Heavy in a Restricted Terrain.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Mutual support
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Maneuver units routinely fail to achieve mutual support within the company in both offensive and defensive operations.
DISCUSSION:
1. The failure of mutual support at the company allows the enemy to mass at their decisive point with a superior force achieving their task.
2. Company commanders often fail to do their own IPB.
3. Company commanders often lack the internalization of the orders process, which hampers development of a quality operations order. Commanders routinely fail to determine a decisive point, develop an intent, "nest" platoon tasks and purposes, or develop sufficient maneuver graphics. The result is that platoons are deployed without a clear vision of what they should achieve and how that relates to the company.
4. There is a lack of mutual support during offensive operations which prevents the company from fixing and destroying the enemy once in contact.
5. Lack of mutual support during the defense prevents the company from destroying enemy reconnaissance elements and achieving its purpose for the main battle area fight.
6. Companies often fail to conduct any type of rehearsal prior to execution. Those that are conducted are usually ineffective.
7. Leaders also do not know the capabilities and limitations of their organic and attached weapons systems.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Leaders at the company and platoon level must do their own IPB.
2. Leaders and soldiers must understand their elements task and purpose and how it relates to other friendly units.
3. Rehearsals are key to synchronizing the plan (at company, platoon, and squad). This can also be done at Home Station in the form of TEWTs or other exercises to gain an appreciation of what looks "right" prior to execution in an intensive, time-constrained environment like the JRTC.
4. Review Chapters 4 and 5 of FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company.
5. Reference Appendix H of FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.
6. Review FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, page 1-107.
7. Reference CALL Newsletter No. 97-8, Search and Attack! Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.
8. Reference CALL CTC Quarterly Bulletin No. 95-4, Mar 95, "Rehearsals: A Key to Success."
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Planning a combined arms breach
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ARMOR/MECH): Before the heavy team is employed to conduct a combined arms breach, it must be task-organized with sufficient dismounted infantry and engineers to conduct the mission.
DISCUSSION: The heavy team must also have sufficient time to plan and rehearse breaches.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations, provides detailed information on the employment of CME in mechanical breaching, as well as the use of mine-clearing line charges (MICLIC) and manual techniques.
2. A fundamental principle with obstacles employed by the OPFOR during low-intensity conflict: when you find an obstacle, you have found the enemy. The OPFOR will cache additional mines near an obstacle to reseed, and he will overwatch with indirect and/or direct fires.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Medical unit use of map graphics
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The CHS graphics should show the positions of the brigade's medical assets, all air and ground evacuation routes, and primary and alternate methods for requesting MEDEVAC.
DISCUSSION: The brigade should include the CHS graphics with the brigade's operation order to ensure maximum distribution and dissemination of the plan.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: This allows the commanders to raise any concerns about the MEDEVAC plan at the brigade level.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Planning aviation tasks
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Commanders do not have a clear understanding of the aviation tasks necessary to support a search and attack mission.
DISCUSSION: Often, the mission translated at the troop level is to "conduct a search and attack" which does not equate in common terms that the aviator can understand. In other words, "conduct a zone reconnaissance from this phase line (PL) to this PL oriented on finding the enemy" makes more sense to aircrews. Using aviation missions also will facilitate the planning necessary for search and attack. Telling a crew to plan a zone reconnaissance within specified boundaries will force them to plan the aviation tasks necessary to recon the zone in a methodical method. More often than not, the aircrews launch with this kind of guidance: "Conduct search and attack vicinity the BDE TOC" or "Sweep the area around the brigade support area (BSA)." This results in aircrews flying around an area with no methodical search techniques that ensure a systematic movement through a specified zone. Aircrews end up conducting "911" missions with no pre-planned integration with ground units.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Aviators need some consistency in how they operate with certain missions. Rehearsals are essential in practicing the mission no matter what mission is assigned. Other tasks an aviation unit can expect to perform during search and attack operations are area reconnaissance and hasty attacks.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Aviation unit engagement area planning
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): During the defense phase, troops/companies have the opportunity to conduct detailed engagement area (EA) planning on the proposed EAs generated by brigade to support the defense.
DISCUSSION: Troops/companies are weak in this area for several reasons. One trend is for troops/companies to take the graphics from higher at face value without a detailed map analysis that takes into consideration weapon ranges, fields of fire, and other important information needed to engage targets.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations, discusses EA development in great detail. Specifically, eight steps are outlined that if followed ensure adequate detail in the planning process. Additionally, a list of 16 requests for information (RFI) is listed that a commander and staff should be able to answer when reviewing the EA development to ensure the appropriate amount of detail. They are as follows:
1. What are the mission and endstate?
2. Where is the enemy and how will he enter the AO? What does his IPB say?
3. Where are his key weapons? What are their capabilities?
4. Where are we going to kill the enemy?
5. Where will we engage him from? Are the ranges realistic? Are the positions too restrictive?
6. Which enemy systems do we want to engage first?
7. How will we initiate fires?
8. Which weapon systems will fire first? On what signal?
9. What is the desired effect of fires from each system?
10. How will fires be distributed (laterally and in depth)?
11. How will we mass fires? Do we have the required volume? Do we have the time and assets to do the job in the space given?
12. Where will C2 be? Can the commander see the battlefield?
13. How do we shift fires? How do we refocus fires? Why do we shift? Does everybody know the "key event" to cause shifting?
14. How do we deal with enemy reactions to our fires?
15. Have we planned for flank and rear security in the BP?
16. Does the plan follow the principles of direct fire?
By answering these RFIs, the commander can be ensured of "covering all the bases" for EA development. A typical unit may address two or three of these RFIs and consider the plan sound! Based on the terrain at JRTC, which does not support large EAs, it is even more imperative to plan the EA integration in detail. This checklist of questions is an excellent tool to use. In addition to a detailed map analysis, aviation units often do not set aside time for the troops/companies to conduct reconnaissance of the EAs in order to:
1. Confirm proposed ABFs.
2. Confirm fields of fire from the ABFs.
3. Develop alternate ABFs that support the EA.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Aviation unit use of graphic control measures
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): A common trend is for aircrews to execute missions without graphic control measures on their maps.
DISCUSSION: Graphics, to include unit boundaries, phase lines, named areas of interest (NAI), target reference points (TRP), obstacles, friendly locations, etc., are often missing on maps. Kiowa Warrior (KW) crews rely heavily on AMPS and the internal cockpit display, which is limited to the amount of information that can be input for display. Aircrews must maintain situational awareness, and having correct and complete graphics will go a long way in fostering awareness. The "new aviator" is technically proficient and relies heavily on technology imbedded in the advanced airframes now on the battlefield. Many aviators are losing the "old school" of doing things; i.e., using a map to navigate and using a map with graphics posted are two examples. A perfect scenario to highlight this point occurred on a rotation where a team of KWs was given an in-flight mission change to move to the BSA and provide AA security. At the time, the KW team was only 4 kilometers from the BSA (which was located 1 kilometer from the aviation AA). They had to stop and ask for a grid to the BSA and then program the grid into the aircraft to get the steering cursor to the BSA.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Aircrews must have situational awareness. They must be proficient with a map and with graphics they are provided. Graphics must be doctrinal and accurate.
2. Review FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Combat Health Support (CHS) rehearsals
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Units normally conduct CHS rehearsals as a portion of the combat service support (CSS) rehearsal. This de-emphasizes the focus needed on the plan to evacuate casualties.
DISCUSSION: This may then result in an increase in the died-of-wounds (DOW) rate. Additionally, not all key personnel are present for the rehearsal.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The brigade S-1 should schedule separate CHS rehearsals as critical events on the brigade timeline. Participants should include, but are not limited to: brigade surgeon; brigade S-1; Forward Support Medical Company (FSMC) commander; medical platoon leaders; FSB commander; FSB S-1; FSB support operations officer; corps-level medical unit LNO; division medical operations cell (DMOC) representative; line company 1SGs; brigade S-3 air; aviation LNO; designated CASEVAC pilots; FSB or brigade S-2; brigade signal officer.
2. The CHS rehearsal is conducted in the following manner:
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Home Station leader training
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Home Station leader training in tactical skills requires significant improvement.
DISCUSSION: Officer professional development and NCO professional development (OPD/NCOPD) is negligent in how to conduct movement to contact, rehearsals, IPB, task and purpose, defense, modern weapons and their capabilities, and the essentials of OPORDs.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Conduct tactical exercise without troops (TWET) at Home Station.
2. Conduct sand table exercises with the unit leadership.
3. Use "what now" leader exercises to train leaders on how to respond to various situations.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Officer and NCO professional development
OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units are not sufficiently using OPD and NCOPD in preparing themselves for the JRTC.
DISCUSSION: Same as trend 59 above.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 59 above.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Rehearsals after the intermediate staging base
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Once units depart the intermediate staging base (ISB), rehearsals are poorly conducted and seldom provide benefit to the unit on the operation.
DISCUSSION: Fire supporters are not integrated into the "maneuver" rehearsal as recommended in FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, and most fire support rehearsals result in only a confirmation of the planned target list. Rehearsal techniques listed in FM 6-20-1, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for theField Artillery Cannon Battalion, are not being used.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Develop a sound standing operating procedure (SOP) to cover the essential elements of a rehearsal.
2. Integrate fire support into the "maneuver" rehearsal. Each commander and FSO should succinctly describe the actions as each unit fights with maneuver and fires. The FSO must be able to describe what enemy or maneuver action will trigger a specific fire support task/event. A walk-on terrain model is usually worth the required time to construct it.
3. FM 6-20-1, pages 3-12 through 3-15, provides an excellent overview of key rehearsal elements.
4. A solid SOP, checklist, or agenda, reinforced by Home Station training, would greatly improve rehearsals.
5. Review CALL Newsletter No. 98-7, Rehearsals, for techniques on conducting rehearsals.
(TA.4.4.1.1
Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Chemical asset integration
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): While there is demonstrated improvement in the integration of NBC assets within units at the JRTC, it still remains a weakness.
DISCUSSION: Many brigades are not giving NBC assets a clearly defined task and purpose. Decontamination, smoke, and reconnaissance assets are repeatedly left performing missions such as convoy escort, ROWPU security, manning TCPs, and troop transportation missions. These are non-METL missions that NBC elements can accomplish when they are either not conducting flame field expedient or smoke operations and there is a very low NBC threat. But as the situation changes and the threat increases, NBC assets must be employed in their doctrinal roles enhancing force protection. There are many instances where smoke assets could be combat multipliers but are often omitted. Most of the reluctance seems to come from either a lack of comfort by senior leaders on how to employ NBC assets (due to a lack of Home Station training with these assets) or a lack of confidence in their chemical staff.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Senior leader training and unit execution prior to the rotation would help solve this.
2. There are instances of units being slow in relinquishing control of chemical assets (platoon is a part of the FSB perimeter and the commander not wanting to give up the asset) when directed. This hinders the NBC fight. By the time a persistent chemical strike occurs, decontamination response is slow because the decontamination plan never matured. The plan did not include the creation of clean or dirty routes in the area and the brigade did not execute "proactive" decontamination site reconnaissance and setup.
3. Chemical officers must stress the proper use of NBC assets during the planning of operations, and then must check to ensure that the assets are being used as intended and are still capable of executing tasks assigned. Furthermore, decision-makers, such as brigade and battalion commanders, executive officers, and S-3s, must listen to chemical personnel and the advice that they provide.
4. Situational awareness by chemical officers and NCOs is paramount, and a complete understanding of upcoming operations is the key to the integration of NBC assets as well as the synchronization of their activities.
5. FM 3-100, Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals, gives a good basis for the doctrinal employment of NBC assets.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
SUBJECT: CSS staff coordination
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): For CSS, unit support operations are essential. A common mistake is to run support operations in a vacuum.
DISCUSSION: Missions come and go without the benefit of interrelating with other staff sections. It is not unusual to have support operations sections not coordinate with the S-3 or S-2.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Support operations personnel must be aware of what other staff sections can provide to enhance service support to the customer. Do not operate in a vacuum. Develop a mission brief system that captures this important information and pass it down to the supporting element that will accomplish the mission.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
SUBJECT: Mutual support
OBSERVATION (TF 1): Mutual support during search and attack operations and mutual support between maneuver elements is often not considered.
DISCUSSION: Search and attack operations in zones focused on finding the enemy but did not adequately address how to fix and finish the enemy in a timely manner. Companies and platoons were often separated by distances that prevented any rapid movement of maneuver forces to assist in the destruction of an identified enemy force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Increased attention to planning operations that facilitate mutual support between forces would greatly increase the battalion's ability to fix and finish the enemy.
2. The battalion and companies should conduct time/distance analysis to ensure that forces operate within supporting distances of one another. Task organization of find, fix, and finish forces with a clear task and purpose which addresses each function would also greatly increase the ability of the battalion to destroy the enemy.
3. Detailed planning on the employment of all available combat multipliers is vital to mission success.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
SUBJECT: Unified maintenance
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Maintenance units have difficulty understanding the concept of maintenance in operations other than war.
DISCUSSION: One AVUM is assigned responsibility in the OPORD for task force maintenance of all the attached assets. In a normal rotation, this generally will include three to four different types of airframes. Most AVUMs have difficulty unifying the maintenance effort, which results in poor status reporting to the task force commander and, in most instances, higher NMCM and NMCS rates.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The task force commander should unify the maintenance effort by attaching the maintenance test pilots, mechanics, and technical inspectors for each type of airframe to the AVUM who is delegated the responsibility for maintenance operations IAW the TF OPORD.
(TA.4.4.1.2
Coordinate Support)
SUBJECT: Troop briefings
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): A recurring trend at the JRTC is the total disregard of troop- level briefings and rehearsals.
DISCUSSION: Troops rarely follow the troop-leading procedures once they enter the maneuver box. This is often a function of inadequate planning time allocated from squadron level, but more often than not, it is a function of commanders being satisfied with minimal information to conduct a mission. In other words, "Go to this grid, at this time, and kill whatever you see." Commanders opt to send teams to the TOC to get their mission brief from the S-3 or S-2 instead of planning and briefing a mission. Commanders that do brief at the troop level often "gloss over" the detail that should be discussed.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Commanders must go back to the basic "blocking and tackling" needed to thoroughly brief missions.
2. Leaders must use the troop-leading procedures as an outline to follow in preparation for the mission, then use the OPORD format to brief the mission.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
SUBJECT: Mission projection
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission projection continues to prove difficult for units at the company level.
DISCUSSION: Typical missions such as CASEVAC and CSS are often passed to assault companies within one hour of execution. This normally results in a crew flying a mission without proper preparation. Normally crews sacrifice an update on the enemy and friendly situation to ensure they meet critical time requirements. Standby crews often fail to PCI aircraft and receive updates prior to assuming standby status which tends to exacerbate problems.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The fix for this is to ensure the proper level of command stresses to aircrews the importance of conducting preflight, PCI, and S-2/S-3 update briefings prior to assuming their shifts. With minimal effort, commanders can adjust duty periods for crews that allow these steps to occur and still remain within their fighter management cycle.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
SUBJECT: Rules of engagement (ROE) training
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 OPLAW): Brigade trial counsel are not training unit personnel on mission-specific ROE at Home Station or the intermediate staging base (ISB).
DISCUSSION: ROE must be mission-specific.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Get the mission-specific ROE from the operation order (OPORD) as soon as it is available. Review it for ROE items that should be trained at the "shooter" level. Determine what elements are deploying with your unit, including slice elements. Coordinate with these elements for ROE training prior to deploying.
2. Conduct classroom and STX lane training for the best possible effect.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
SUBJECT: Pre-deployment and pre-combat inspections (PCI)
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Invariably, units arrive missing vital pieces of equipment or parts necessary to put equipment into operation.
DISCUSSION: The absence of things as simple as computer disks, or electrical connectors, or keys to oxygen cylinders, or extension cords for key areas can cripple a unit. ISO shelters and their contents are often not inspected prior to deployment, resulting in unexpected problems once the units begin to set up. PMCSs are seldom accomplished on medical equipment until after the unit has established in the field, again resulting in the late discovery of non-mission capable status of vital equipment. In too many instances, users knew of the shortfalls but had taken no action to remedy the problem before deployment.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must establish clear checklists for pre-deployment and pre-mission execution. NCOs must take responsibility for ensuring subordinates have been properly prepared for mission execution.
2. Officers must follow up on guidance given to ensure priorities have been established and carried out.
3. SOPs can reflect requirements for PCIs but must be checked periodically to incorporate changes in equipment or missions to ensure the right information is contained in the checklist.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
SUBJECT: Treatment of civilians on the battlefield
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 OPLAW): Soldiers show a lack of skill interacting with civilians.
DISCUSSION: In almost every rotation, soldiers are confronted with civilians and do not know how to deal with them.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Schedule and conduct unit laws of war and human rights training as soon as notice is received of an impending deployment. Conduct both classroom and STX lane training for the best possible effect.
(TA.4.4.4
Maintain Unit Discipline)
SUBJECT: Staff integration and synchronization
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Many platoon leaders do not fully understand where and how in the planning process they provide their input to integrate and synchronize military police (MP) support with the brigade combat team (BCT) operation.
DISCUSSION: There are also problems taking information received from the BCT and producing timely combat orders for the platoon so that junior leaders can begin their troop- leading procedures and parallel planning. Many platoon leaders fail to ensure that MPs are included in the brigade's TACSOP. Platoons are plagued with 911 missions. Proper integration, synchronization, and mission prioritization of MP assets will prevent many of the 911 missions which are uncoordinated, unplanned, and unrehearsed. These unrehearsed missions lead to many unnecessary casualties and lost critical assets.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. At Home Station, the Provost Marshal, commander, and platoon leader should conduct continuous leader/staff training at brigade on MP capabilities and employment. The platoon leader, with help from the BCT commander, must ensure that MPs are included in the BCT's TACSOP.
2. The MP annex to the TACSOP should describe capabilities, employment considerations, doctrinal missions, prioritization, and specific collective tasks that support the brigade mission essential task list (METL) tasks.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
SUBJECT: Commander's guidance for fire support
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The commander's guidance for fire support is usually vague, does not focus fire support assets, and is not supportable with the fire support assets available.
DISCUSSION: Most commanders are using the format of FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire support for the Combined Arms Commander, while writing their guidance for fire support, using Purpose, Priority, Allocation and Restriction (PPAR). Recently, some commanders have started using Task, Purpose, Method and Endstate. Although FSOs are using the correct formats, many are poorly conveying the commander's guidance for fire support. The terms destroy, neutralize, suppress, and harass are not being used properly at the JRTC.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. FM 6-71, page 3-5, lists the information commanders should provide their FSOS. FSOs must clearly understand the commander's intentions and guidance for the use of fires.
2. FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, states that the effects of fire can be to harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy the target. The subjective nature of these terms means the FSO must ensure the commander's interpretations of this terminology are correct and that fire support assets are available to achieve the attack guidance.
3. FSOs must fully understand the concept of operations and the commander's intentions for the use of fires. FSOs must translate this into clear, concise, and understandable terms.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
SUBJECT: Logistical synchronization
OBSERVATIONS (FS DIV): There is a lack of a logistical synchronization in the ALOC.
DISCUSSION: This lack of synchronization has resulted in support that was not integrated within the field artillery (FA) battalions of FSB or within the brigade combat team.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Conduct a deliberate planning and synchronizing meeting projecting 72-96 hours out with the battalion XO, S-1 and NCO, S-4 and NCO, SPL and NCO, HHS BC and first sergeant, PA chaplain, battalion motor officer and battalion motor technician (BMO and BMT), commo sergeant, and RSO.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
SUBJECT: Tactical drop zone (DZ) survey
OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Units are experiencing difficulities with the timely submission of the Tactical Drop Zone Survey (AF Form 3823).
DISCUSSION: Units are required to submit their survey NLT 24 hours prior to the scheduled drop. Units who fail to submit the survey within that time period will have their container delivery system (CDS) dropped into the alternate drop zone. The unit's battle rhythm becomes de-synchronized, as they now have to plan for a larger movement to the drop zone than was orginally expected.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must submit their tactical drop zone survey at least 36-48 hours prior to the first scheduled drop. This type of proactive planning will enable the unit to react if a survey is disapproved.
2. Units must ensure the approved survey is on the brigades's maneuver graphics. This will reduce the terrain management problems within the brigade sector and will also inform all units within the sector where the drop zone is located.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
SUBJECT: Fire support targeting synchronization
OBSERVATION (TF 1): While battalions aggressively use attack aviation, mechanized and armored assets, and indirect fire to synchronize combat power on the battlefield, the effectiveness of indirect fire as a combat multiplier suffers from a lack of detailed planning.
DISCUSSION: Efforts to get rounds on target typically resulted in delays while fires were cleared, communications established, or appropriate fire control measures delineated. As an illustration: Of 104 defensive targets planned by three different battalions, only six were refined, covered by an observer, tied to an obstacle, and had a trigger. In terms of target management, only 7 percent of all targets planned met the criteria of the FSO plotting the target, the battalion mortars and field artillery FDCs having the target, and a unit designated to observe the target.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Refer to FM 6-71, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander, for more detailed discussions on fire support for the combined arms commander and techniques for observed fire.
2. Review FM 6-30, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Observed Fire, for more detailed discussions on fire support for the combined arms commander and techniques for observed fire.
(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 2
Acknowledgements
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