TA.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)
Positive Performance
SUBJECT: Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) maintenance
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Communications-electronics (C-E) and vehicle maintenance continue to improve within the MSE units.
DISCUSSION: Leaders have a clear understanding of MSE-peculiar maintenance and supply concepts as outlined in Chapter 6 of TM 11-5800-216-10-1, Appendix L of TM 11-5800-216-10-4, and task no. 43-2-C323 of ARTEP 11-067-30-MTP.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Operator maintenance is in accordance with the applicable Technical Manual and task no. 43-2-C322 of ARTEP 11-067-30-MTP.
2. C-E maintenance teams have matured along with the signal equipment. Many of the junior and senior C-E NCOs have been working with MSE for 5 or 10 years now, and this experience has proven to be invaluable in diagnostics and troubleshooting.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Tactical communications
OBSERVATION (TF 3): Units participating in the CPX simulation usually make effective use of tactical communications.
DISCUSSION: The tactical operations center (TOC) and company commanders are in constant contact via FM radio. Success is based on the close proximity of personnel to the radios, which in turn leads to good communication monitoring.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units need to train RTOs and rotate personnel on the radios to maintain alertness and remain successful.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Company command post (CP) operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2): Heavy teams have improved company (or troop) command post operations.
DISCUSSION: This includes providing the necessary material (shelter, radios, map board, etc.) and personnel to conduct 24-hour operations. The command post is especially critical during the low-intensity conflict (LIC) phase because of decentralized operations with the platoons/sections.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 2 above.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Field artillery CSS decision-making
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The field artillery decision-making process results in the production of a quality Field Artillery Support Plan (FASP).
DISCUSSION: The Military Decision-Making Process is being followed and is producing informative Field Artillery Support Plans (FASP). Good integration of staff elements are resulting in a detailed orders process.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Use of a matrix type of order is the preferred method.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: S-2 and analysis control team (ACT) integration
OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Every unit integrated the MI company ACT into their brigade tactical operations center (TOC) tent.
DISCUSSION: This brought additional analysts into the brigade TOC to help the brigade S-2 section track and analyze the enemy, plus it brought additional connectivity into the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) intelligence architecture. One unit chose to under resource their ACT with only one second lieutenant and two privates. This unit was consistently unable to analyze information coming from organic MI company assets and did not access the ASAS intelligence architecture at all. The remainder of the units resourced their ACTs and were able to reap significant benefits.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. During Home Station training, S-2s need to train themselves and their sections using a series of terrain walks, map studies, and historical case studies.
2. S-2s need to develop a keen sense of how the terrain will affect their unit. There are ample opportunities for the S-2 to leave the TOC and see the ground. For example, during the defense, while the battalion commander troops the line from the left flank, the battalion S-2 can walk it from the right flank. As he moves from right to left, he can adjust his analysis and also brief all the platoons on what he expects them to face in their sector.
3. S-2s must focus the terrain portion of their mission analysis brief on the results of their analysis; that is, the effects of the terrain on friendly and enemy forces as well as identification of key and decisive terrain.
4. Most commanders do not need to see all the terrain factors in extensive detail; however, they do need to receive the S-2s analysis.
(TA.4.3
Determine Actions)
SUBJECT: Motivation and flexibility of the Military Police platoons
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): The majority of the platoons possessed a tremendously positive attitude and desire to learn and practice new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well as develop new platoon standing operating procedures (SOPs).
DISCUSSION: Military police (MP) platoons demonstrated an incredible amount of flexibility and ability to accomplish missions.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue to train the MPs at Home Station for anticipated contingencies they may face when deployed.
(TA.4.4
Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)
SUBJECT: Mission planning
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Mission planning at the aviation company level is especially noteworthy.
DISCUSSION: Assault crews consistently show considerable determination towards in-depth planning and mission accomplishment regardless of time available and limited information from higher headquarters.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Continue to reinforce Home Station training in planning and in the Military Decision-Making Process.
2. Review CALL Newsletter No. 95-12, Military Decision Making: "Abbreviated Planning" Update, May 97.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Firing battery movement order
OBSERVATION (FS DIV): The use of the movement order by the battery leadership is being briefed in accordance with (IAW) the XO's handbook, addressing specific and implied tasks.
DISCUSSION: Battery leaders brief movement routes, utilizing start points, check points, and release points. When higher headquarters do not issue start points, check points and release points, the battery leadership identifies their own, facilitating movement command and control.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 7 above.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Production of NBC orders and rehearsals
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Brigade chemical cells continue to produce sound NBC annexes where there once were none, and brigade chemical officers now conduct NBC rehearsals during the brigade Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).
DISCUSSION: NBC annexes are key to ensuring the sound integration of NBC assets and synchronizing the brigade as well as battalion NBC fights. NBC rehearsals at brigade level are critical in order for all units to understand how the NBC assets are integrated and synchronized into the brigade mission and unit responsibilities in case of NBC attacks.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. FM 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, is a good reference, and many of the successful units are using it as a basis for their NBC annexes.
2. FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Appendix G, gives the definition and responsibilities for the conduct of rehearsals.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Doctrinal terminology
OBSERVATION (C2 EAD): The medical task force staff and subordinate leaders often cannot define or describe military terms used routinely in the war fight.
DISCUSSION: Medical units often do not understand the significance of task organization changes when defined in terms of assigned, attached, OPCON, TACON, etc. These terms provide critical command and control relationships that give commanders both specified and implied requirements in relation to those units. Seldom do corps-level units use backbrief methods to ensure subordinate leaders understand the message that was conveyed.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The backbrief is important - use it! The backbrief clarifies instructions which reduce confusion and increase clarity.
2. Leaders must understand that words mean different things to different people based on background, experience, and setting. For example, the term "secure the building" has entirely different meanings for a policeman, an infantry oficer, and a real estate agent.
(TA.4.4.1
Prepare Plans and Orders)
SUBJECT: Integration and synchronization of the brigade operations law team (BOLT) with the brigade staff
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SJA): Training with units enhanced the skills of the legal team operating as members of the brigade staff. The tracking and managing of these actions has improved greatly.
DISCUSSION: The brigade operations law teams (BOLTs) are faced with numerous legal significant actions (SIGACT) during deployment. Information management becomes more important with each additional legal SIGACT.
SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The brigade operations law teams are participating in field exercises at Home Station.
(TA.4.4.5
Synchronize Tactical Operations)
Needs Emphasis
SUBJECT: Use of the chemical officer
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): In many rotational units at both brigade and battalion level, the chemical officer is used as a battle captain or plans officer and the NCO is used as a TOC NCO or RTO (or a combination of other duties instead of NBC duties).
DISCUSSION: In the initial phase of operations this is acceptable, but as the NBC threat escalates, a transition must occur. Chemical personnel must be allowed to execute their duties as the brigade or battalion's NBC expert. Calling chemical personnel after an attack is too late. The major shortfall is that chemical personnel have not been allowed the time that other battle staff members have been allowed to plan, coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the NBC effort.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Brigade and battalion commanders must remain sensitive to the unique perspective that the chemical officer brings to the fight and give him the proper amount of time to develop the NBC effort.
2. Review FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 3-100, Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals. They both outline chemical duties and responsibilities.
(TA.4.1
Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)
SUBJECT: Use of off-the-shelf handheld radios
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): This communication technique is vulnerable to compromise while not guaranteeing receipt of messages within the chain of command.
DISCUSSION: Typically, units bring a multitude of Motorola handheld radios for their leaders. While information can be relayed quickly to a lot of people at remote locations, units tend to rely too heavily on radios as their primary means of internal communications. Two major problems are noted with this method.
1. Handheld radios are normally non-secure. Inexpensive scanners available at Radio Shack provide a simple method of compromising information passed via handhelds.
2. Units often draw a bad assumption that information passed as a net call is received by everyone holding a radio.
Units seldom exercise the chain of command to disseminate information to the lowest level. Consequently, critical information is held in pockets within the organization assuming it has been dispersed throughout the unit. Simple questions such as "What country are you in?," "Who are you fighting?," and "What does the enemy's uniforms look like?" are often met with blank stares. While handheld radios have their place, units must not make grand assumptions about their usefulness within a compound.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must avoid reliance on non-secure means of communications within the compound because of the risk of compromise and the tendency to avoid the chain of command as the conduit for information flow. Daily routine information should be transmitted via TA-312 or DNVT and through the chain of command.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Aviation liaison team communication
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Internal communications via aviation liaision teams is usually poorly done.
DISCUSSION: Aviation liaison teams are usually not staffed for 24-hour operations.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. In the JRTC environment, in an infantry brigade task force, the aviation LNO, at a minimum, should consist of a four-man team - two officers (commissioned or warrant) and two SPC/SGT, MOS 93P.
2. The liaison team should be equipped with a vehicle, dual-net SINCGARS, and UHF capability. They must have access to the TACLAN and, of course, a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phone.
3. This team would have the capability to function 24 hours a day, conduct split operations if the TAC deploys, and maintain the capability to conduct face-to-face coordination with the aviation task force and subordinate ground units when required.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Information management
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Brigade aviation LNOs have trouble keeping the brigade staff current about aviation task force specifics (i.e., aircraft maintenance status, crew cycle/availability, FARP locations/status, mission status, aviation unit locations, etc.).
DISCUSSION: This is due to many factors, including lack of personnel to man the aviation LNO section for 24-hour operations, fog of war, and the absence of established reporting procedures in unit TACSOPs regarding aviation operations. In addition, many aviation task force staffs funnel an inordinate amount of information through the LNO that more appropriately should be passed from staff to staff using established reporting procedures.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should establish a formal reporting format for more routine information, and require the subordinate aviation task forces to pass tactical information through normal channels, such as the subordinate maneuver units, as opposed to using the aviation LNO as the primary contact at brigade. This will, in turn, free the LNO to assist in mission planning and coordination with the brigade staff.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: NBC warning and reporting
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Repeatedly, warning and reporting systems in rotational units are dysfunctional.
DISCUSSION: During chemical attacks it takes one or more hours to receive the initial NBC report with any type of useable information. Chemical personnel often delay taking any action until this report is received.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The key is, don't delay reporting. If the chemical officer has conducted a thorough IPB and a strike has occurred in a templated area, he can then start taking action in response to the attack.
2. One tool that assists tactical operations centers (TOCs) and chemical personnel in dealing with chemical attacks is the "battle drill." This provides focus for everyone in the TOC and causes a preselected number of actions to be executed with the chemical officer being the center of focus. One condition of the battle drill is the submission of an NBC 1 report to higher headquarters. The NBC 1 report will provide the chemical officer the necessary information to identify the hazard that confronts him.
3. FMs 3-7, NBC Field Handbook, and FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, are two manuals that address the required information for a good NBC 1 report.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Communications in the tactical operations center (TOC)
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Brigade and battalion S-6 officers focus on communications in the TOC and not on overall communications for their respective element.
DISCUSSION: Many maneuver S-6s have allowed themselves to become the TOC communications officers, focusing only on installing and troubleshooting equipment, and do not fulfill their doctrinal duties and responsibilities to the commander, staff, and subordinate elements. This leads to poor planning, coordination, and synchronization, and poor execution of signal aspects in support of the unit's mission.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The duties and responsibilities of the S-6 are defined in FM 11-43, Signal Leader's Guide, and FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.
2. The S-6 is the principal staff officer for all matters concerning signal operations, automation management, network management, and information security across the task force. In accordance with FM 11-43, the communications chief (NCO) should be responsible for maintaining and troubleshooting communications at the TOC, leaving the S-6 free to recognize and anticipate battlefield activities.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Transmission of information at the tactical operations center (TOC) for medical units
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Units have a hard time relaying information within a unit.
DISCUSSION: Typically, EAD medical units coordinate with the supported brigade during initial planning and while the unit is staged in the ISB. Once deployed into the maneuver area, however, little communication takes place between division and corps-level troops. This shortfall results in poor planning for support, inefficient use of assets across the battlefield, and a high died-of-wounds rate.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Units must consistently communicate with supported units and consistently share information between units.
2. Corps-level units may want to place an LNO at the brigade TOC to ensure both mission requirements and planning factors are relayed. If all else fails, the myriad of vehicles (air and ground) that move throughout the battlefield can provide courier service between critical nodes.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Battle-tracking
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Corps staffs fail to share information or include supporting elements in the planning process.
DISCUSSION: Seldom do corps-level units follow up with the maneuver brigade in terms of battle-tracking once the brigade leaves the ISB. Because of the non-secure LOCs, OPTEMPO of the exercise, and difficulty in obtaining and maintaining clear communications, units put communications with adjacent and supported units in the "too hard to do" category and assume the missions are going as planned in the initial meetings. Consequently, requirements change without the knowledge of those that must support the mission. Corps units are unaware of threats such as minefields, enemy locations, and assets that will significantly disrupt the unit's ability to support the maneuver force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 7 above.
(TA.4.1.2
Manage Means of Communicating Information)
SUBJECT: Information flow and management
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Battle-tracking in the various command posts is insufficient.
DISCUSSION: Friendly unit locations are not normally updated and disseminated to subordinate companies. Units habitually file critical information without any analysis or dissemination. Most often the reason for this is the lack of a tactical operations center standing operating procedure (TOCSOP) or the failure to follow an already existing SOP.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must develop systems for battle-tracking in the TOCSOP and properly train their battle captains and NCOs in using these critical documents.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Aviation element liaison activities
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Units do not allocate the proper assets or understand the duties of liaisons (LNOs).
DISCUSSION: Brigades economize on the aviation LNO because they misunderstand his duties or have low expectations of his contributions. In many cases, there is not enough room in the TOC for the LNO.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The aviation task force must ensure adequate 24-hour representation. What does it take to resource and train this team and what will you get for your efforts?
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Resourcing and use of aviation liaison officers (LNOs)
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation units do not augment their planning efforts.
DISCUSSION: During particularly large missions such as battalion air assaults, the aviation task force must further augment with a planning cell direct to the supported unit to assist in the development/refinement of the air assault. Placing the LNO in that role removes him from other future planning efforts and current operations management.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Same as trend 10 above.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: LNO use
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The aviation LNO is not being used properly.
DISCUSSION: The LNO represents a key advisor to the commander. He should be from where the fight is managed -- the TOC or TAC. He must have unrestricted access to the aviation task force commander, and regular updates should be scheduled in advance.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Properly resourced, trained, and employed, the LNO represents the most versatile aspect of maneuver -- the aviation task force.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Brigade-level planning of aviation support for CSS operations
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The principal CSS planner in the brigade task force is the brigade S-4, who too often fails to sufficiently coordinate with aviation LNOs.
DISCUSSION: The S-4 is usually assisted by the aviation LNO and the support operations officer (SPO) at the forward support battalion/main support battalion (FSB/MSB). At the JRTC, this entire responsibility is often delegated to the FSB/MSB commander and his SPO. Unfortunately in these cases, the loss in coordination and synchronization across all Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSs) results in little CSS moved by air.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S-4 should be the primary planner for support operations, and he should use the LNOs to focus on using all air assets available in the resupply and support role.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Army airspace command and control (A2C2) responsibilities
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The brigade A2C2 elements rarely function doctrinally.
DISCUSSION: The S-3 (Air), the chief airspace manager for the brigade, normally does not synchronize all elements and users of brigade airspace: ADA weapons control status, ADA/FA battery locations, flight routes, CAS and airlift mission schedules/routes, and rotary-wing missions. The preponderance of airspace management and air mission requests is relegated to the brigade aviation LNO. Subsequently, the lack of synchronization routinely results in fratricides and airspace conflicts.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The brigade must formally establish the A2C2 element and ensure the S-3 (Air) is firmly in charge.
2. Establishing the A2C2 element in its entirety prior to deployment to the JRTC is often difficult due to the geographic separation of sister service elements (e.g., ALOs and ANGLICOs). The key is putting the S-3 (Air) back in charge of airspace management instead of focusing him on deployment issues and joint inspections (JI).
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Aviation company command post (CP) battle-tracking
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): Aviation company command posts are a major hurdle for company-level units.
DISCUSSION:
1. Very little battle-tracking or updating of friendly/enemy situations occurs in company CPs. This results in aircrews departing with outdated information.
2. Most companies have systems in place to facilitate these functions, yet, with the exception of large-scale air assaults, they fail to update them.
3. Units rarely track missions at the company level and only infrequently track aircraft diverted to follow-on missions or in-flight mission changes. Contributing to the general disorganization of most company CPs is the choice of personnel to work in the CP.
4. Personnel are often chosen simply due to availability or by rotational basis rather than by qualification and training.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Personnel should be selected for duty in the company CP based on their performance and training at Home Station to a standard that will reinforce success.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: MEDEVAC work cell
OBSERVATION (AV DIV): The forward support medical team (FSMT) is not fully integrated into planning, battle-tracking, and communications.
DISCUSSION: MEDEVAC units need to place an operational work cell in the aviation tactical operations center (TOC) when collocated with the aviation task force.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The forward support medical team (FSMT) work cell needs to track mission graphics, frequencies, aircraft status, and number of patients moved.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Battery and battalion command post (CP) operations
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Battery and platoon CP crews are untrained prior to deployment. The tactical operations center (TOC) crews do not understand their duties and responsibilities within the TOC and the role they play in fighting the current or future fight.
DISCUSSION: TOC crews do not have the information/battle-tracking tools necessary to manage the vast amount of information within brigade and task force TOCs. More importantly, they have difficulty analyzing the information, developing a course of action, and disseminating the information to their subordinates and fire units. Task force air defense officers (ADOs) are not integrated with their supported units. They have difficulty communicating with the staff and sharing information because most platoon leaders (PLs) are remoted into TOCs from their command vehicle. When operating from their vehicles, PLs miss an enormous amount of information. Most critical to situational awareness are information management, analysis, and dissemination. PLs cannot clear fires, routes, and obstacles for moving fire units and relay current battle information by sitting inside their vehicles. Battle-tracking is lost because TOC crews do not have the tools necessary to operate.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. ADOs should understand the importance of establishing a battle rhythm. This affects their ability to plan, command and control, and execute the current fight.
2. Radio telephone operators (RTOs) are not effectively used. RTOs are used strictly as drivers, yet they can contribute a great deal to command and control if trained properly.
3. Platoon sergeants (PSGs) must be used to assist platoon leaders. PSGs should remain situationally aware of platoon and task force operations.
4. TOC charts, journals, and message transmittal forms need to be organized, updated, and used to analyze situations and disseminate critical information to fire units.
5. TOCs must facilitate information management, analysis, and dissemination. Train RTOs and PSGs in basic TOC operations to achieve situational awareness and facilitate command and control. Conduct exercises (TOCEXs) that stress battle-tracking techniques and procedures to achieve crew efficiency. TOCs should develop scenarios that include alternate CPs taking over the current battle.
6. Develop a TOC SOP that outlines each soldier's duties and responsibilities, and cross-train to provide redundancy. Develop a battery/platoon battle rhythm that allows ADA leaders to be at critical planning meetings, and allow them to position themselves on the battlefield where they can command and control efficiently.
7. Review CALL Newsletter No. 95-7, TOC Operations, for ideas on how to organize a TOC or CP and on what kind of functional charts and tools can be used.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Situational awareness
OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Many maneuver platoons experienced difficulty with situational awareness because they did not have a system in place to properly battle-track and manage information.
DISCUSSION: Battle-tracking in platoon command posts was not to the resolution necessary to provide squad leaders with visibility of enemy locations, friendly unit dispositions, and the current status of combat operations throughout the battlefield. Inversely, squad leaders rarely provided route or area reconnaissance overlays and did not report information in a manner that "painted a picture" for the platoon leaders. During operations, the platoons did not always use control measures (e.g., phase lines, checkpoints, or rally points) to internally track progress or did not report locations to their higher command and control element.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The platoons must provide the bridgade combat team (BCT) with the information necessary to have resolution of location, current status, and missions of the MP units on the battlefield.
2. The platoons should be considered during the BCT's clearance of fires drills.
3. The platoon command post must track the current brigade operation to the resolution necessary to provide squad leaders with information to plan and conduct operations and prevent fratricide. The platoon command post must also disseminate and provide feedback on the priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIR).
4. Platoon leaders must require squad leaders to submit timely situation reports (SITREPs) and route reconnaissance reports.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Reserve component staffs
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Reserve component corps support groups and corps support battalion staffs are not, for the most part, familiar with battle-tracking and how this process, in conjunction with asset visibility, can enhance customer support.
DISCUSSION: Most staffs have trouble assimilating and translating intelligence and operational products into valuable information that can assist in anticipating requirements. The support operations section, if working properly, will track all assets provided by the companies.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. The S-2 will provide the latest intelligence on the threat and what impact threat actions can have on the unit and its ability to support.
2. The S-3 will provide the latest update reflecting the supported customer's next operation. When combined and analyzed, these elements will provide enough information on current requirements, possible future requirements, and assets on hand to satisfy those requirements. This will enable the unit to anticipate and be proactive versus reactive.
(TA.4.1.3
Maintain Information and Force Status)
SUBJECT: Medical staff battle-tracking
OBSERVATION (EAD DIV): Failure to track events causes decreased situational awareness, a key component for survival on the battlefield.
DISCUSSION: Few medical staffs have any expertise in tracking and analyzing events to discover trends that may indicate pending hostile actions against the unit. Simple analyses may show hostile forces approaching from the same direction or the same general time and allow the unit to take additional protective measures against the threat.
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:
1. Soldiers must learn all common tasks appropriate for their grade.
2. Leaders must understand the fundamentals of defense and use appropriate measures to protect facilities.
3. A review of STP 21-1 would greatly enhance a medical unit's ability to protect itself against a threat.
4. A review of basic defensive perimeter techniques in FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, would assist in the preparation of obstacles and fighting positions and in the effective use of limited engineer assets.
(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)
TA.7
Combat Service Support BOS
TA.4
Command and Control BOS, Part 2
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