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Military

Operations in Iraq:  First Reflections

Chapter 5 - People

5.1   The Iraq operation showed once again why the UK's Armed Forces are regarded as among the best in the world. The high quality of their training and professional expertise was demonstrated in the skill with which they performed their roles. Above this, good discipline, motivation, resourcefulness and courage were fundamental factors in their success. The tasks required of our Servicemen and women throughout the campaign and in the immediate aftermath of hostilities were numerous and complicated, and their impressive performance in achieving their military objectives so rapidly should not be underestimated.

5.2   Our Armed Forces have unique experience of urban operations - in Northern Ireland and the Balkans in particular - developing valuable skills that have served them well in Iraq. These go beyond combat training and include having to manage sometimes hostile populations at a time of great uncertainty and turmoil. In Basrah, quickly gaining the trust and co-operation of the local people was of critical importance.

Reserves and Civilians

5.3   Some 5000 reservists took part in operations in Iraq in a wide range of roles from infantry and logistics to more specialised roles such as doctors and air traffic controllers. The initial call-out was described in Chapter 2; up to a further 2700 reservists have been called out following the end of decisive combat operations to assist the stabilisation force and help with reconstruction. Some reservists served in formed Reserve units or sub-units, others within regular units. Some were Sponsored Reserves who served on the Roll on/Roll off ships to guarantee the delivery of equipment by sea through the combat zone.

5.4   The Armed Forces were also supported by a large number of UK civilians. Up to 200 MOD civilians were deployed to the Middle East in direct support roles such as political advisers, contracts and finance officers, scientists and operational analysts and firemen. In addition, many civilians were moved from their normal jobs to provide enhanced manning round-the-clock for PJHQ and MOD HQ, while others such as the RFA crews and staff in the Defence Logistics Organisation contributed critically to the support of the front line in their normal jobs. A number of issues were identified regarding current policy for the employment of civilians on operations that will guide future developments in this area.

5.5   Crucial support was also provided by UK contractors who, with the assistance of locally contracted workers, provided a wide range of services behind the front line, such as technical equipment support, interpreting, catering and porterage.Whilst civilian contractors have deployed into operational areas before, this was the first time they had a formal MOD policy to protect their interests, which was welcomed by industry. On average 150 civilian contractors were deployed at any one time. There was also a considerable number of locally employed civilian contractors supporting the UK catering and logistic effort.

Health

5.6   The health of all our people was of paramount importance, and they benefited from extensive medical support before, during and after deployment. A number of improvements have been implemented in important health-related areas since the 1991 Gulf Conflict. We have rationalised our immunisation policies, ensuring that immunisations are timely and appropriate, minimising the need for multiple injections on deployment. Personnel were given special briefings on health matters covering stress, personal hygiene and health threats. Guidance was issued on the use of pesticides and handling Depleted Uranium ammunition, and a new operational medical record form was used, ensuring that health events were recorded more systematically than before.

A British Army medic checks the health of an Iraqi child
A British Army medic checks the health of an Iraqi child
5.7   At the peak of the operation, British forces were supported by front-line medical capabilities embedded within each unit, two Close Support and two General Support Medical Regiments, three Field Hospitals (two fully established, with a third held in reserve in theatre), two Commando Forward Surgical Groups, and the Primary Casualty Receiving Facility in RFA ARGUS, which provided a 100-bed fully equipped hospital. Procedures were in place to move serious casualties (once stabilised) out of theatre to more sophisticated medical facilities, and sometimes back to National Health Service care in the UK. The medical component of the UK deployment was fully manned, with the 2800 medical staff including around 760 medical specialist reserve personnel. Trained psychiatric staff were also deployed. MOD liaised closely with the Department of Health to minimise any impact of this call-up of reserves on the NHS, spreading the load as widely as possible across the country to ensure as far as possible that no area was affected disproportionately.

5.8   Thankfully casualties suffered were relatively light. But more than 4000 British patients were treated in our field hospitals, and over 800 were evacuated back to the UK by air during the deployment and combat phases of the operation (the majority with non-battle injuries). In addition, around 200 Iraqi Prisoners of War and 200 Iraqi civilians were treated in UK medical facilities. UK and US medical teams worked closely together and treated each other's troops in their respective operational areas. The Princess Mary's military hospital in Cyprus was augmented to act as an aeromedical evacuation staging hub for both UK and US casualties, with a small US medical capability embedded within the UK facility.

5.9   Many regular field hospital medical staff have now returned home in order to recuperate, fulfil other commitments and, if required, prepare to deploy back to Iraq this summer.  This deployment will then enable the remaining reservists to be relieved and return home for demobilisation.

Bereavement

5.10   Regrettably the Armed Forces suffered a number of fatalities. In the period to 1 May, 33 UK Service personnel had lost their lives in the service of their country. Since then, there have been further fatalities. Our deepest sympathy goes to the families and friends of all who have lost their lives. Welfare support to bereaved families is taken very seriously, with well-established procedures in place which are adapted to the circumstance of each family. This operation saw the introduction of the policy to extend ex-gratia payments to unmarried partners of those who lost their lives. There was one regrettable incident where the next-of-kin was sent a letter containing incorrect financial advice, which caused distress at a very difficult time. MOD is reviewing bereavement procedures to take account of this and other lessons identified, and has already made changes.

5.11   Since the Falklands conflict, it has been usual practice to repatriate the bodies of those killed in action for burial in the UK. We believe that the ceremonial arrangements at RAF Brize Norton proved a fitting mark of respect and, although a new development for this country, very much in tune with the earlier traditions of our Armed Forces. Grants were available to families wishing to have a full military burial.

Operational Welfare Package

5.12   Our operational welfare package is an important means of providing for the emotional and physical well being of deployed Service personnel. Owing to the austere nature of the deployment and the lack of infrastructure in some locations, the welfare package was implemented in stages. Initially this consisted of Forces Free Air letters (commonly known as 'Blueys') delivered electronically, mail, welfare telephones, newspapers, radio broadcasting, limited Internet access and basic shop facilities. This is now being extended to provide additional Internet access, fitness equipment, TV broadcasting and free books. In conjunction with Royal Mail we also provided a free postal service for packets up to 2kg for family and close friends of personnel serving in the Gulf. This was introduced to supplement 'Blueys' as soon as the operational situation allowed, and was well received - initially doubling the volume of mail dispatched to theatre from 10 tons to around 20 tons daily. Overall, more than 100,000 bags of letters and packets have been despatched to the Gulf since early February.  The operational welfare package has also been extended to help home units look after the families of those deployed. The unit receives a sum based on the number of their people deployed, which can be used to improve communications and welfare for families, such as through the improvement of Internet access at unit community centres. This has been very favourably received.

Post-Operation Health

5.13   Our commitment to the physical and mental health of Servicemen and women does not end when combat operations cease. A programme of de-stressing and recuperation is in place to help reduce the risk of post-traumatic stress. MOD will also be conducting research into the physical and psychological health of those involved in the conflict - whether as Service personnel, supporting civilian staff, voluntary aid workers or journalists. Experts from King's College Hospital, London will conduct interviews and issue questionnaires to gather health data, so that this can be compared with data on personnel who did not deploy. The research will be monitored by an independently chaired board. In addition, regular and reservist Service personnel and deployed MOD civilians can be referred by their doctor to attend the existing medical assessment programme for Gulf veterans. This is run by MOD at St Thomas's Hospital to assess patients and recommend treatment as appropriate. Tests for exposure to Depleted Uranium are also available. It is too soon to know whether health concerns will emerge, but if they do MOD is committed to identifying and investigating them as soon as possible.

Prisoners of War

5.14   The UK has been responsible for 2203 Prisoners of War (POWs) and others captured and detained by UK forces. We worked closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross both in theatre and in Geneva. Guarding responsibilities were split between the coalition partners: the UK took the lead in guarding Iraqis captured by coalition forces in the opening phase of the campaign, until large, equally well-maintained US-run camps had been set up within Iraq. Although the US guard these camps, the UK retain responsibility as Detaining Power for all UK-captured POWs. We are required to treat Prisoners of War in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and to treat unlawful combatants humanely and decently. Some allegations have been made of misconduct by individual UK Service personnel and are currently under formal investigation. The release of our POWs began in early May.  By the beginning of July only one POW remained, pending further investigations, together with a small number of recently detained persons.


People And Health Issues - First Reflections
  • The success of the operation was only possible through the skill, courage and dedication of our Servicemen and women, who accomplished an extraordinary job of the highest quality. They deployed expecting to operate in a highly hostile and demanding environment, possibly in the face of weapons of mass destruction, but uncertain whether the operation would proceed at all. They were more than equal to the immediate task. Their individual and collective training, both single Service and joint, coupled with recent operational experience and bilateral links to the US, meant that they were quickly able to match US aspirations and integrate with their forces.
     
  • The quality of our reservists was proven beyond doubt, and we believe on first analysis that the right number were called out. Their employment was in accordance with the SDR rationale for a useful and useable force, relevant to modern conflict and capable of integration with regular forces.
     
  • Reservists fill many specialist and key niche capabilities (such as medical services and psychological operations). Capability gaps (which only the Reserves could man) were only filled after mobilisation was authorised and predeployment training was complete. We will need to examine the balance between regular and Reserve forces, particularly for such key roles and for the roulement of personnel for enduring operations.
     
  • The mobilisation from the Territorial Army (TA) of large numbers of individual reinforcements, rather than formed units, runs counter to TA ethos and unit cohesion. We need to identify how the reservists' chain of command can be more dynamically utilised, and to examine ways of creating linkages with regular units in order to exploit specialist skills more efficiently.We will want to explore ways of providing a sustainable managed path for those reservists who undertake frequent operational tours.
     
  • There were some organisational issues we will need to consider relating to reservist pay, call-out experiences (see Chapter 2) and the provision of active support to families of deployed reservists. A review of reservist pay procedures should eliminate inefficiencies and take into account the financial and career implications likely to be experienced by reservists as a result of mobilisation.
     
  • There was a need to augment headquarters and formations within the UK and abroad. The diversion of some 1200 personnel to operational tasks led to a number of pinchpoints in some specialist areas.
     
  • Industry and civilian support to the operation was of great value. Deployed contractors played an important role and the value of MOD's partnering approach was acknowledged. However, contractual support could not always be guaranteed, and pragmatic administrative arrangements, robust insurance, adequate pre-deployment training, and balanced threat assessments for contractors are important considerations.
     
  • UK personnel benefited from extensive medical support. Facilities were well equipped for all eventualities, and plans for dealing with serious casualties proved robust. The scale of effort was only possible by the use of almost all medical Volunteer Reserves, most of whom worked in the NHS. We will need to examine in further detail the future provision of medical cover for operations of this size and its impact on the NHS.
     
  • Casualty reporting is a very sensitive area which was generally handled well, not least by the Service visiting officers, in difficult circumstances. One regrettable error was made, and in future all letters sent to bereaved families will be subject to additional scrutiny. Bereaved families will be able to stay in Service accommodation for as long as they feel they need to in order to assess their longer term housing requirements. A tri-Service review of bereavement policy is in hand to determine whether further changes are appropriate.
     
  • Provision of adequate welfare support and the maintenance of morale are essential to the maintenance of operational capability. The operational welfare package is judged to have worked well. But we will need to ensure that Service personnel continue to have access to reasonable life and accident insurance while on operations.
     
  • The handling of Prisoners of War appeared to run smoothly; they have been detained in well-managed camps and generally well treated, although there are ongoing investigations into alleged instances of mistreatment.
     
  • Demands on the Armed Forces have been very high in recent years. At the peak of operations in Iraq, some 62% of the Army was committed to operations. This was manageable, but we must always be aware of the pressures such demands place on our Servicemen and women and their families.

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