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Operations in Iraq: First Reflections Chapter 6 - Processes Coalition Planning 6.1 In the months preceding the operation in Iraq, our diplomatic efforts were concentrated in the UN process. As the prospect of military action grew more likely, there were increasing contacts with coalition partners and other nations willing to offer assistance to a military campaign. As the planned role and geographical disposition of UK forces became clear, British Embassy staff and officials in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) and MOD intensified contacts with regional states to secure basing for them. 6.2 The overall military campaign was US-led, as was the planning process. Although the UK did not make final decisions on the composition and deployment of its force packages until early 2003, we were able to work closely with the US and influence the campaign from initial planning to execution through high-level political contacts and regular dialogue at official level, as well as by the presence of a significant number of embedded UK officers in key US headquarters. 6.3 The coalition recognised the strategic importance of the post-conflict phase. Planning for this began as it became clear that Saddam Hussein was unlikely to comply with the key UN Security Council Resolutions. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) was established by the Pentagon to provide the transitional civilian authority for post-conflict Iraq, under coalition military control, with the ultimate objective of restoring full governmental responsibility to the Iraqi people. ORHA deployed into Baghdad in mid-April, as soon as coalition control was judged to be in place. In early June, ORHA was subsumed into the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under Ambassador Paul Bremer, bringing together the political and UK Decision-Making 6.4 Political direction was provided at the highest level by the Cabinet, which discussed Iraq regularly in the months leading up to, and during, the operation. On most days from mid-March to the end of the campaign phase, there were also ad hoc Ministerial meetings attended by the Secretary of State and by the then Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, as the principal military adviser to the Government. The Secretary of State and CDS also briefed the Prime Minister on a regular basis during the campaign. 6.5 At official level, a well-established process of inter-departmental consultation, led by the Cabinet Office, was put into place for the duration of the operation. This facilitated contacts across Government, including with domestic Departments, and worked well. 6.6 Within MOD, the Defence Secretary normally met twice daily with CDS and others in the direct chain of command for the operation. The Permanent Secretary advised regularly on policy issues. The Chiefs of Staff also met most days, including with officials from other relevant Departments and agencies, to assist the Chief of the Defence Staff. 6.7 As it became clear that military action was likely to prove necessary to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions, UK planning for the post-conflict phase was centralised in the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based in the FCO. The IPU was led by a senior FCO official and worked closely with the Government's central co-ordinating machinery in the Cabinet Office. It included MOD military and civilian staff as well as officials from FCO, the Department for International Development and the Treasury; and quickly became established as an integral element of the Whitehall process. The IPU played a critical role in supporting Ministers, CDS and the Chiefs of Staff in preparations for the post-conflict phase. 6.8 Legal advice was available to political and military decision-makers at all levels during the campaign. The Attorney-General attended ad hoc Ministerial meetings; MOD legal advisers attended the briefing meetings held by the Defence Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff; there was legal support to the Permanent Joint Headquarters from its embedded legal cell; and deployed Service lawyers were available to advise commanders in theatre. Command Arrangements 6.9 Drawing on experience from previous operations, planning and oversight of the operation was led by MOD and PJHQ, which jointly form the Defence Crisis Management Organisation. CDS appointed the Chief of Joint Operations at PJHQ, Lieutenant General John Reith, as the Joint Commander. He delegated command authority through the 3-star National Contingent Commander in theatre, Air Marshal Brian Burridge, to the UK 2-star Contingent Commanders, who conducted operations as part of a coalition effort under US 3-star tactical control. This command and control structure facilitated the integration of UK forces into the overall US structure, while allowing the UK to reserve national direction of our forces, ensuring The UK Base 6.10 The UK was engaged in limited (rather than total) conflict with the Iraqi regime and there was no tangible Iraqi military threat to the UK. However, it has been apparent since 11 September 2001 that the UK itself could be a target for specific hostile attack or disruptive action by terrorists, especially when it is engaged in operations abroad. In this respect, it was essential that key enablers and infrastructure should remain free to sustain the campaign, particularly the Military Port at Marchwood and operational air bases such as RAF Fairford. This aspect is likely to remain a key consideration for future operations. Indeed, risk assessments and additional measures to protect military infrastructure are currently under way, including consideration of how best to co-ordinate responses through a more unified decision-making and implementation structure. 6.11 It is significant in this respect that up to 19,000 other personnel were available and trained for Operation FRESCO (the response to the firemen's dispute) at the time in addition to the commitments in Iraq, Northern Ireland and elswhere.
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