Chapter 2 - Planning and Preparation

Operations in Iraq: First Reflections

Chapter 2: Planning and Preparation

2.1 In order to be ready to undertake military action in the event that diplomacy failed, prudent military planning had to begin months beforehand. At that stage we did not know whether military action would be required, nor what form it might take. We therefore had to be flexible in approach.

Early Preparations and Decisions

2.2 Supporting diplomacy while preparing to use force if that diplomacy failed, presented difficult choices and required a fine balance to be struck. We did not wish to prejudice the UN process by making overt military preparations too soon. On the other hand, delaying planning until diplomacy had been exhausted would have given Saddam's regime months to prepare for war, or even have allowed him to conduct pre-emptive strikes against Iraq's neighbours and/or coalition forces in the region. Moreover, we hoped that measured military preparations would strengthen diplomatic efforts by demonstrating the resolve of the international community (experience having shown that Saddam Hussein was unlikely ever to comply with his obligations without a credible threat of military action).

2.3 As a matter of course, given the nature of its business, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) devotes significant effort to thinking about and planning for possible contingencies. This was particularly true in the case of Iraq, given that it was already an operational theatre with US and UK aircraft enforcing the No-Fly Zones. In relation to this specific operation, the Prime Minister stated on 24 September 2002 that "there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action" if diplomacy failed. Genuine preparedness involved many strands of action. In late November 2002 the Defence Secretary announced that an initial assessment of the possible requirement for reservists was underway. The need for additional military equipment and specific modifications was also reviewed. While the Armed Forces are equipped for a range of contingencies, it is not cost-effective to stockpile equipment and stores for every conceivable operation. We therefore look carefully at the needs of every operation or possible operation and fine tune our capability and fill gaps through the well established Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) process. This process was announced in Parliament on 25 November. Further preparations included approaching the shipping market in mid-December to tender for transportation vessels, and improving the readiness of our troops by undertaking specific training and reducing the notice to move of some units.

Planning

2.4 While overall planning for the operation was led by the United States, the UK was fully involved, including through personnel embedded in US Central Command in Tampa and elsewhere. The plan evolved over time, and was sufficiently flexible to respond to changing circumstances. Since our aim was to achieve Iraqi compliance by diplomatic means if possible, it was impossible to know whether or when operations might need to begin. Despite these variables, the essence of the plan remained consistent, with the focus on mounting a rapid, synchronised and precise campaign to overwhelm Saddam Hussein's regime and its security forces and minimise the risk of civilian casualties or damage to Iraq's essential services. We thereby aimed to prevent Saddam Hussein from putting into effect his most destructive options, such as using weapons of mass destruction, destroying civil infrastructure or creating humanitarian or environmental catastrophes (as he had done in Kuwait when he withdrew Iraqi forces in 1991).

2.5 As planning developed, the Government sought to provide a balanced, flexible and potent contribution to coalition forces, capable of playing a major role in any operation. Initial plans envisaged significant UK and US land and air forces operating from the north and deploying through Turkey as well as from Kuwait in the south. It became increasingly apparent that it would be difficult for the Turkish Government to secure parliamentary approval for such deployments. We therefore developed alternative plans, under which UK ground forces would play a key role in southern Iraq and enable US forces to advance more rapidly from south to north. Similarly, we devised alternative arrangements in the south for the UK air contribution. In the event, the decision to focus the UK role in the south, both in the opening assault and then in holding ground to facilitate a high-tempo US advance on Baghdad, resulted in our making a significant contribution to the overall success of the operation. The regime's resistance in northern Iraq, and the ability of its forces to manoeuvre in a coherent way, proved to be very limited.

Target Selection

A mortar team engages enemy targets south of Basrah

2.6 Planning for the air campaign included the development of a list of potential targets that would help the coalition to achieve its overall objectives. Over 900 potential target areas were identified in advance. All targets were derived from the campaign plan and were selected to achieve a particular military effect (such as the degradation of Iraqi command and control systems). Operating within parameters agreed by Ministers, Commanders taking targeting decisions had legal advice available to them at all times during the conflict and were aware of the need to comply with international humanitarian law, the core principles of which are that only military objectives¹ may be attacked, and that no attack should be carried out if any expected incidental civilian harm (loss of life, injury or damage) would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected from the attack. Extensive scientific support including detailed computer modelling was used in assessing potential targets. Strong coordination between the MOD, the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood and the in-theatre National Contingent Command helped ensure coherent target planning (a lesson from previous operations). The Department for International Development was also consulted on key humanitarian infrastructure issues. The process for approving all targets for UK aircraft, submarine-launched cruise missiles or for coalition aircraft using UK facilities was conducted with appropriate political, legal and military oversight at all levels. We also influenced the selection and approval of other coalition targets.

UK Force Contribution

2.7 Our maritime contribution to the coalition was the first to be announced, on 7 January 2003, and built on the standing Royal Navy presence in the Gulf. Naval Task Group 2003, led by HMS ARK ROYAL, which was already due to sail that month as a routine deployment to the Gulf and Asia/Pacific regions, was expanded to a much larger force totalling some 9000 personnel. It included submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles and a significant amphibious capability with the helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN, Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, 40 Commando and 42 Commando (some 4,000 personnel), and hospital facilities in RFA ARGUS. This was the largest amphibious force deployed since 1982. The Task Group would provide force protection, and conduct mine counter-measures operations as well as providing vital sea-based logistics in support of joint force operations on shore.

RAF aircraft such as this Harrier GR7 operated around the clock

2.8 On 20 January, the Defence Secretary announced the deployment of a major ground force including reservists, equipped with Challenger 2 tanks,Warrior armoured infantry fighting vehicles, AS90 self-propelled guns, and a range of helicopters. This force, which eventually totalled some 28,000, would be the largest land force deployment since the Gulf conflict in 1991, and was drawn from units based in the UK and Germany. At the beginning of operations, 16 Air Assault Brigade represented about half the coalition's air assault capability, and 7 Armoured Brigade provided a significant proportion of its tank forces.

2.9 The Royal Air Force already maintained a presence of some 25 aircraft and 1000 personnel in the Gulf, flying sorties over Iraq to enforce the No-Fly Zones and to restrict the regeneration of Iraqi air and Integrated Air Defence capabilities. On 6 February the Defence Secretary announced that the RAF contribution would be increased to around 100 fixed wing aircraft manned and supported by a further 7000 personnel. The Force would include E3-D Sentry aircraft for airborne warning and control, Nimrod and Canberra reconnaissance aircraft, VC10 and Tristar air refuelling aircraft, Hercules transport aircraft, Tornado F3 air defence aircraft, and Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 aircraft. The latter two aircraft types would be armed with precision-guided weapons, including the new Storm Shadow stand-off missile fitted to Tornado GR4, and would also provide the coalition with valuable tactical reconnaissance. In addition, the Joint Helicopter Command deployed more than 100 helicopters, including Puma and Chinook support helicopters.

2.10 Overall, the UK contribution amounted to some 46,000 personnel out of a total of some 467,000 coalition forces. Around 1000 of the UK personnel were located in the National Contingent Headquarters. UK Forces offered important specialist capabilities such as RN mine-clearance, Army explosives clearance and RAF tactical reconnaissance. In all, some 20 countries offered or provided military forces or use of military bases to the coalition. Many others provided crucial assistance with intelligence, logistics and the deployment of combat units. President Bush confirmed on 18 March that over 40 countries were supporting the coalition.

Working in a Coalition

Working in a coalition brings political, diplomatic and military advantages, including the aggregation of capabilities, flexible war-fighting options and the sharing of intelligence and risk. Indeed, the operation showed the importance of constructing a force package that allowed a greater range of operational options than the enemy. The importance of the UK's contribution to the coalition lay in the military capability we provided to the front line both in the core coalition disciplines and in unique specialist areas.

At the operational and tactical levels, the planning and conduct of the operation was facilitated by the close professional relationship that has grown up between the UK and US, not only as leading members of NATO, but also through numerous bilateral institutional and personal contacts at every level. Equally important were the benefits of training and operating together over many years, especially in the Gulf, Afghanistan and the No-Fly Zones over Iraq.

Given US technological and military dominance, we should continue to track, align with and integrate US developments in areas where our force balance and resources allow, particularly in terms of the organisation of enhanced HQs, communications and information systems, and Combat Identification (ID). We should also ensure that our command structures can engage and influence key US decision-makers with appropriate weight and at the right levels.

Based on recent experience, the UK must plan to work in "coalitions of the willing" for future operations as well as within established structures. This may result in the requirement to work with unfamiliar partners, with the attendant challenges associated with force packaging, training, and standardisation of procedures and equipment.

Reserves Call-out

2.11 Initial call-out notices for reservists were issued in early January, and by the time operations began, over 5000 reservists from all three Services had been accepted into service - by far the largest call-up since the Suez crisis of 1956. The 1991 Gulf conflict highlighted the importance of having structured and systematic mobilisation and demobilisation procedures. These lessons were first put into practice in the mobilisation for service in the former Yugoslavia and have been further refined since then. Work is in hand to review mobilisation and employment issues. That said, the timely way in which reservists were accepted into service highlights the improvements we have made in the process in recent years.

The Deployment Phase

A British military camp in Kuwait

2.12 The build-up of military force in the Gulf region was conducted in a rapid but measured fashion, in the hope that the growing pressure would convince Iraq to comply peacefully with its international obligations. UK deployments to theatre began in earnest in early January. The Naval Task Group and Amphibious Ready Group arrived on 12 February, integrating with US and coalition maritime forces in theatre and was ready for operations by 15 February. They joined a UK force of four Mine Counter-Measure (MCM) vessels and RFA SIR BEDIVERE which had been in theatre since November on a routine training deployment. Land force deployments began with the flow of enabling equipment and stores by sea and air. The first troops began arriving in theatre in late January. By 18 March the deployment of the combat forces was complete, together with their supporting infrastructure, including accommodation (mostly tented), welfare telephone facilities to keep in touch with families, equipment and stores. The additional RAF air assets began to flow into theatre in February and had achieved full combat effectiveness by 16 March.

2.13 By 18 March, we had deployed a formidable joint force of 46,000 men and women and their supporting equipment over 3,400 miles to theatre. This had to be done in significantly less time and with a larger force than the planning targets assumed by the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). This massive logistic effort was achieved using 670 aircraft sorties and 62 ship moves in half the time it had taken to deploy a similar sized force during the 1991 Gulf Conflict. In all, the UK's logistics organisation shipped enough vehicles of all types to have stretched 82 miles from London to Southampton if laid end-to-end. This required a large volume of chartered shipping and air assets.

In-theatre training

2.14 By 3 March, in theatre training had begun, with newly-deployed RAF aircraft patrolling the Southern No-Fly Zone and, from 11 March, additional Royal Navy assets were taking part in the antismuggling, patrolling and surveying operations. The Royal Marines conducted initial amphibious training in Cyprus, and subsequently completed integration training with US forces in the Gulf.

Planning - First Reflections

The successful deployment of a joint force of some 46,000 personnel confirmed the coherence and validity of the UK's expeditionary strategy and was an exceptional achievement in the short timescale for its generation.
It was decided, in view of the importance of the operation, that we wanted to make available UK forces whose size exceeded the parameters previously set in the SDR, given other commitments at the time.
Mobilisation of the Reserves and auxiliaries proceeded smoothly, although in future there is a need to consider further the time gap between call out and reporting for duty. The need for structured mobilisation and demobilisation procedures was confirmed by our experience in the 1991 Gulf conflict and reinforced by subsequent reservist deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan. The establishment of the Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre at Chilwell did much to streamline mobilisation procedures.
The experience gained in planning recent operations in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, and Exercise SAIF SAREEA II in Oman, proved invaluable in planning this operation.
Planning for coalition operations with the US underlined the importance of close liaison at all levels of the military chain of command through the early embedding of UK personnel in key US HQs.
It is important to develop a range of planning options to cater for possible uncertainties ahead of operations: for example, as a result of difficulties associated with access, overflight or basing.
Host Nation Support cannot be taken for granted.
Despite the challenges experienced in securing overflight or basing rights, many countries assisted coalition access into theatre, particularly our established friends in the Gulf region. Most notably, Kuwait offered the ability to build-up significant land, air and logistic support, the pre-positioning and basing of substantial amounts of combat power and a mounting point for combat operations.
UORs formed a key part of the planning process, and it is clear that they played an important role in operations. The role of UORs will be reviewed further as in depth analysis becomes available.
Planning focussed on providing military options in support of the diplomatic process. This reflected the need to avoid appearing to be already committed (which could undermine the diplomatic process), and the need to deploy in the required timescale should force be necessary.
While a substantial humanitarian crisis did not eventually arise in Iraq, it was important to plan with the Department for International Development and others to be ready to meet immediate humanitarian needs during and following the conflict should the need arise.

Chinook helicopters landing and taxiing at an RAF base in the Gulf

¹ Military objectives are objects which, by their nature, purpose, location or use make an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

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Chapter 3: The Campaign

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