Operations in Iraq: First Reflections Chapter 4 - Equipment Capability and Logistics Introduction 4.1 The success of operations in Iraq demonstrated the effectiveness and extensive capability of the modern equipment and logistics support available to our Armed Forces. In the air, we had at our disposal a range of sophisticated weapons, as well as reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling facilities. At sea, our capability included modern Mine Counter-Measure vessels, the assault capabilities of the Amphibious Task Group and submarine-launched cruise missiles. Our land forces comprised both light, highly mobile units as well as more heavily armoured elements, equipped with small arms, mortars, anti-tank weaponry, artillery, and a wide array of armoured and light vehicles including the highly effective Challenger 2, as well as a range of surveillance and target acquisition assets. These front-line forces were supported throughout by an enormous logistic effort. 4.2 Experience from previous operations and exercises had a notable impact on logistics and equipment performance throughout this campaign. For example, after Kosovo, we improved our allweather bombing capability, which was used to significant effect in this operation. Equally, recent experience in Afghanistan influenced decisions on equipment procurement. Exercise SAIF SAREEA II in 2001 proved especially beneficial by providing a rigorous test in the desert for our equipment and logistics capabilities in expeditionary warfare. In particular, a number of lessons relating to Challenger 2 were successfully implemented. 4.3 Initial reports suggest that our equipment and logistics support performed well overall, although improvements are required in respect of asset tracking and distribution within theatre. Further analysis will continue over the coming months to ensure that we draw the right conclusions. However, some details and preliminary assessments are set out below. UOR Process 4.4 The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process was described in Chapter 2. For this operation, MOD approved over 190 UORs at a value of around £510M (a small number of additional UORs have since been progressed to support continuing UK operations in Iraq). In some cases, this meant that equipment had to be supplied by industry at extremely short notice, and we will wish in future to ensure that the balance of risk inherent in our readiness profile is accurately assessed and monitored. Some UORs involved accelerating existing programmes such as the procurement of the Temporary Deployable Accommodation and the Head Mounted Night Vision System. Others, in particular the measures to enhance interoperability with coalition allies, were new procurements made in short timescales. Industry responded magnificently to the surge of requirements in the build up to the operation, proving the value of the partnering approach that the MOD has developed over recent years. Although some long lead times presented significant challenges, most UORs that were procured were delivered and fitted before combat operations began. Despite units having had limited time in which to train and become familiar with the new equipment, our initial assessment is that they added valuable capabilities during the operation. The UOR process inevitably involves the risk that not all requirements will be met in time, but it would be inefficient and unaffordable to buy and maintain equipment for every imaginable contingency in every climate. However, we will undertake further analysis to improve our understanding of the likely timescales within which different capabilities could be procured, delivered and fitted, to help inform the process of prioritisation within MOD's Equipment Plan. 4.5 Some UORs were aimed at countering specific threats. Our intelligence indicated that Iraq would try to repeat its tactic from the 1991 Gulf conflict of deploying hundreds of sea mines to deny freedom of manoeuvre to coalition forces in Iraqi and Kuwaiti coastal waters and rivers. The RN's ability to counter this threat, especially in shallow waters, was reinforced by new equipment, developed in conjunction with QinetiQ, in addition to the hiring of acoustic equipment from Australia. These and existing systems were needed to clear the Umm Qasr waterway of Iraqi mines in support of the humanitarian aid mission and to prepare the port for commercial use. 4.6 For the land campaign, we needed to take into account environmental factors such as the dusty, sandy terrain and high temperatures of Iraq. Challenger 2 tanks were modified accordingly, including the fitting of specialist filters and skirting to reduce dust ingestion. These measures were successful, with early reports suggesting that average availability for each major land vehicle was 85-95%, with that of Challenger 2 over 90%. Subject to confirmation, it represents a significant improvement over availability levels achieved in Oman during Exercise SAIF SAREEA II. This was not unexpected, given the inevitable artificialities and limitations inherent in an exercise scenario as distinct from operations. Unfortunately, UOR equipment to provide AS90 self-propelled artillery with an enhanced air-conditioning unit could not be fitted until late in the operational phase. Most units operating in Iraq were supplied with the modified SA80 A2 rifle, which performed extremely well in the hot and dusty conditions. Solutions to difficulties associated with maintaining the rifle which were identified in Afghanistan had been quickly implemented, and the modified rifle rapidly gained the confidence of units in theatre. Weapons and Munitions
4.8 Following operations in Kosovo, MOD acted quickly to enhance the RAF's precision attack capability in air-to-ground munitions by procuring anti-armour Maverick missiles and Enhanced Paveway bombs that can hit targets using GPS guidance. The number of Tornado GR4s and Harrier GR7s capable of carrying such weapons was also increased. This built on MOD's existing laser-guided bombing capability provided by Paveway bombs. Around 85% of air launched weapons used by UK forces in Iraq were precision guided, compared to about 25% in Kosovo. This helped achieve the coalition's objectives more quickly, while minimising civilian casualties and the risk to our own personnel. Precision weapons also included inert Paveway II bombs for use against targets in densely populated areas, where the aim was to destroy single targets while leaving neighbouring buildings intact. 4.9 However, precision weapons were not appropriate in all circumstances. Weapons such as cluster bombs also played an important role against dispersed military targets in the open. RAF aircraft dropped a total of 70 cluster bombs during the operation, mainly in the vicinity of Baghdad against troops and armour in the open. In addition, the UK fired some 2000 artillery-delivered extended range bomblet shells, mostly around Basrah. Without these weapons, disproportionately powerful munitions would be needed to achieve the same effect, increasing the devastation caused. 4.10 UK forces deployed with Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions for their penetrative capability against heavy armour. In total, some 1.9 tonnes of DU were expended by Challenger 2 tanks in Iraq. Although there is no reliable scientific or medical evidence to suggest that DU has previously been responsible for post-conflict incidences of ill-health, all UK personnel who served in Iraq will have access to health monitoring (see para 5.13). Furthermore, strict guidelines were issued prior to operations commencing to minimise the risk to UK personnel who need to work in the vicinity of armoured vehicles that may have been destroyed by DU munitions, and a detailed scientific research programme will be undertaken on Iraqi tanks damaged by DU. 4.11 The UK has a long tradition of providing practical and financial help with munitions clearance, and in Iraq we take very seriously our responsibilities as an occupying power to do all we can to create a safe and secure environment. MOD is currently providing information to nongovernment clearance organisations about the weapons used at different locations, so that the clearance of all types of unexploded ordnance that might pose a risk to civilians can be achieved quickly and effectively. Post-Kosovo, new procedures have been put in place to expedite the provision of such information. The unprecedented scale of abandoned Iraqi munitions represents an enormous challenge in terms of security and subsequent disposal. Education campaigns are under way using integral information support assets, and local campaigns in schools and colleges in conjunction with UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross to warn locals of the dangers of unexploded ordnance. Communications and Information Systems 4.12 The UK has a wide range of communications and information systems performing different functions. These were not all compatible with each other or with US systems, which led to interoperability difficulties. As a result, reliable, secure, timely and effective communication between all stakeholders could not be guaranteed. 4.13 The concept of Network Enabled Capability (NEC), introduced in the SDR "New Chapter", involves the integration of sensors, weapons and decision-makers in order to deliver rapid, controlled and precise military effect. Shortening the time between targeting decisions and execution, as described in para 4.7, is a prime example of this. Many new capabilities introduced through the UOR process in this operation were designed to improve the passage and exploitation of information as first steps in the development of NEC. Interoperability is another important factor: for example, certain UK and US forces were provided with the capability to track each other's locations, thus improving situational awareness at all levels of command. This led to more effective battle management and an increase in operational tempo in all weather conditions. 4.14 It has long been recognised that the Army's main tactical communication system, the ageing Clansman radio, suffers significant limitations. A new system, Bowman, will be introduced into service from 2004. As an interim improvement, Clansman was supplemented by the purchase of items such as lightweight tactical satellite communications systems, ensuring our forces had maximum operational flexibility. In addition, the Bowman Personal Role Radio, trialled in Afghanistan, was available to all combat troops for the first time. This short-range radio is designed to facilitate communications within small infantry teams. The US Marines have subsequently bought some 5000 sets. Combat Identification
4.16 While our aim is to provide UK forces with as effective a Combat ID system as possible, regrettably no system is 100% failsafe, no matter how sophisticated the technology. Sadly, a number of UK and US Service personnel were killed in so-called "friendly fire" incidents. These are still under investigation, but experience in this and previous campaigns indicate that we cannot relax our efforts or underestimate the importance of training, tactics and procedures in this vital area. Clothing, Food and Accommodation 4.17 Clothing, food and accommodation all contribute to combat effectiveness. Significant investment has been made in recent years to improve the quality of such equipment, and new Temporary Deployable Accommodation is being sent to theatre to enhance conditions in the more permanent locations now that the security situation has stabilised. A new type of boot better adapted to desert conditions had already been purchased. However, one area we need to look at is the quantities of boots, clothing and other personal equipment we routinely hold. Under SDR planning assumptions there was sufficient personal equipment to equip both the Joint Rapid Reaction Force and the Spearhead Battalion (a total of 9000 personnel) for desert operations. In the case of this operation, the numbers deployed were significantly higher, and whilst most materials were sent out in time, difficulties with in-theatre tracking meant that there were some problems with distribution. These are being investigated (see para 4.23). That said, front-line forces were equipped as a first priority.
4.19 For expeditionary operations, temporary accommodation avoids the unnecessary cost and time of constructing permanent camps. The US, with significant numbers of troops already based in Kuwait, had permanent camps with high quality facilities available. Where appropriate, the UK took advantage of these facilities, and used the US logistics chain during the deployment stages. Most UK troops were accommodated in tented camps contracted through the US, which were already in theatre. We are now commissioning the first 500-man Temporary Deployable Accommodation camps, with more to follow promptly. They are of a very high standard and have been built very quickly. However, there were early problems with the contracts for portaloos, and sourcing problems with refrigerated containers and air conditioning units, which caused some hardship for our soldiers. These shortcomings have been addressed. 4.20 The provision of high quality and satisfying food is fundamental to physical and mental well being and is a key element in maintaining morale. The mainstay of catering for UK troops was the Operational Ration Pack. This provides three full meals per day and a snack, with a variety of menus, and contains substantially more calories than the NATO minimum requirement. Where practical, troops are now provided with meals prepared using fresh provisions. Up to ten litres of bottled drinking water/day was also provided. In total some three million ration packs were issued to theatre, and 745 ISO containers of fresh food and water were delivered. Logistics 4.21 The enormous logistics effort involved in mounting this campaign was a major contributionto its success. In total, a similar size land force was deployed in less than half the time achieved during the 1991 Gulf conflict - a credit to all those involved. 4.22 The focus for logistic support in theatre was the Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters, an initiative tested during Exercise SAIF SAREEA II and in Afghanistan. This HQ, based on HQ 102 Logistics Brigade and augmented by staff from all three Services, successfully supported UK force elements in theatre. It ensured a smooth flow of materiel into theatre, with over 15,000 personnel deployed in logistics roles alone, and many more involved in logistics support back in the UK. They dealt with over 190,000 demands placed on the supply system, while the daily air resupply operation reached a maximum of 254 metric tonnes at its peak. Our four C-17 aircraft and other air transport assets deployed some 50% of the personnel and stores that were required to go by air, again proving their worth as essential, capable and hard-worked assets for rapid and assured deployment. Sea lift benefited from the recent introduction (some 20 months early) of four new Roll On/Roll Off vessels under the Private Finance Initiative. These deployed 15,000 lane metres of equipment (some 11% of the total requirement), including critical port establishment equipment, ahead of the main force. There is nevertheless a need to charter substantial additional air and sea lift to ensure that the UK can deploy large-scale forces rapidly. 4.23 However, the logistic task is not complete once the equipment arrives in theatre. The complex process of distribution throughout the theatre of operations - often over hundreds of miles - then begins. The ability to track accurately the movement of stock, both whilst in transit and in theatre, is key to this process. MOD had identified the requirement for better stock visibility as an important lesson from previous operations. However, finding an affordable solution to meet this requirement has not proved easy. Elements of the US Total Asset Visibility (TAV) system were purchased as a UOR for the operation. Integrating this system into the UK's supply chain and providing sufficient training for operators in the space of three months was a challenging 26 undertaking. In the time available, only a limited capability was fielded. The system was not available for the early phases of the deployment, and full visibility of stores only reached as far as the entry point into Kuwait. With limited logistics information systems as well, it was therefore difficult to determine in-theatre the rate of consumption of critical spares (and thereby the need for reprovision) or to track down specific equipments. In the light of our experience, we need to examine the requirement for a common, robust tracking system to track equipment and stocks in fastmoving operations. However, the introduction of TAV did represent a substantial leap forward in capability and contributed to the logistic efficiency of later phases of the operation.
Logistics - First Reflections
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