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Operations in Iraq: First Reflections
Chapter 3: The Campaign
3.1 By 18 March the Government and its coalition partners had concluded that the diplomatic process had been exhausted and that, unless Saddam Hussein complied with a final ultimatum, there would be no alternative to military action against the Iraqi regime. The Government secured Parliamentary approval on that day for the use of "all means necessary" to ensure the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
Military Campaign Objectives
3.2 The Defence Secretary published the objectives for the military campaign in Parliament on 20 March (see Annex A). The overriding objective was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. To achieve this we would need to overcome the Iraqi security forces and remove the Iraqi regime, while denying them the ability to use weapons of mass destruction. It would also be essential to secure Iraq's key economic infrastructure from sabotage and wilful destruction by Saddam Hussein's forces, and deter wider conflict both inside Iraq and in the region. Moreover, this had to be accomplished with minimum impact on the Iraqi people, with whom we had no quarrel.
Operations begin
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UK Artillery in action | 3.3 Although some preliminary operations against Iraqi artillery missile and air defence systems had been carried out on 19 March to reduce the threat to coalition forces in Kuwait, the military campaign proper began in the early hours of 20 March some 90 minutes after the expiry of a US ultimatum for Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq. Following intelligence about the location of senior members of the Iraqi leadership, US F-117 stealth fighters and a number of cruise missiles struck regime targets around Baghdad. Iraqi forces responded by launching five missiles into Kuwait (and more subsequently), forcing our troops and Kuwaiti civilians to don Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) protective clothing as a precaution.
UK Operations
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A Royal Engineer clears a route through a minefield in Southern Iraq | 3.4 The coalition plan (described at para 2.4) envisaged simultaneous air and ground operations to overwhelm the regime. The land offensive began on 20 March, less than 24 hours after the first bomb was dropped. The UK planned to fight a joint campaign utilising sustainable, balanced forces that would provide commanders with the flexibility to respond to enemy actions and the emerging features of the conflict. Coalition aircraft maintained air superiority, provided Close Air Support and aerial reconnaissance and shaped the battlespace by disrupting enemy forces. Aircraft tasking was helped by embedding a network of air operation coordination and liaison cells in the land forces' chain of headquarters. Helicopters from the UK Joint Helicopter Command also provided crucial combat support to the ground operation from bases on land and at sea. UK Special Forces were active from an early stage; however, in accordance with established policy, this report does not comment on their activities.
3.5 The first objective was to seize the Al Faw peninsula and key oil installations, to secure access to the strategically important port of Umm Qasr. In an excellent example of joint and combined operations, coalition forces, led by 40 Commando (and subsequently 42 Commando) Royal Marines, launched an amphibious assault on the Al Faw peninsula, using helicopters from the Joint Helicopter Command and a variety of landing craft, supported by three Royal Navy frigates which provided Naval Fire Support. The securing of the Al Faw peninsula and the Rumaylah oilfields by UK and US forces, to whom UK NBC troops and engineer elements had been attached, was a key early success for the coalition. Although some oil wells had already been set alight, there was not the widespread sabotage that had been feared. Within 48 hours Umm Qasr had been captured and was being secured by the US 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit under the command of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.
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A Royal marine ashore on the Al Faw peninsular |
3.6 The Al Faw peninsula was now largely in coalition hands, allowing US forces to press on to Baghdad. It was important to prevent Iraqi forces using Basrah, the second largest city in Iraq, as a base for attacks on coalition lines of communication. Within four days UK forces had taken Basrah International Airport, despite encountering significant Iraqi resistance, and were expanding their area of control throughout the surrounding region. The original coalition plan did not require UK forces to capture Basrah: their objective was to protect the right flank of US forces as they advanced north by suppressing Iraqi resistance around the city, while monitoring the situation inside the city to ensure that Iraqi civilians did not suffer. Basrah was not entirely surrounded at any stage. Local civilians were free to enter and leave as they wished, though they came under fire from forces loyal to Saddam Hussein. As UK forces gathered intelligence on the ground, they were able to conduct precision attacks, from both the ground and air, against targets such as headquarters or meeting venues of the Ba'ath Party.
3.7 After several days of raids into the town of As Zubayr, south-west of Basrah, UK forces entered the town. By 6 April, it was judged that conditions were also right to enter Basrah in strength. UK forces launched assaults from three directions, encountering only patchy resistance, and stormed the Ba'ath Party headquarters. Careful timing minimised casualties on both sides. UK forces were welcomed by the local people, and although there was some looting during the first few days as the population seized the opportunity to demonstrate its hatred of the Ba'ath regime, the city soon began to return to something resembling "normal" life. UK commanders quickly established contacts with local leaders and assisted in restoring a functioning police force. The first joint UK-Iraqi police patrols took place just one week after Basrah had been liberated.
3.8 The remit of UK forces included making secure the whole of Basrah province and then Maysan province around Al Amarah. In the early days of the campaign UK bomb disposal experts worked with specialist engineering teams to clear access to key areas of the Rumaylah route through a minefield oilfields so they could be returned to operating capability as soon as possible. By 1 April, UK in southern Iraq forces in As Zubayr had exchanged combat helmets for berets. Less than two weeks after the start of the operation, schools and markets had started to re-open in some of the areas where UK forces were operating, local hospitals were offering treatment for non-regime patients, and overt Iraqi militia presence had significantly reduced. By 22 April, Basrah province was sufficiently safe for non-military organisations to begin their own humanitarian work.
Asymmetric Operations
Clearly, despite their numerical advantage, the Iraqi armed forces could not expect to match the coalition in regular combat. Even so, the failure of Saddam's regime to employ its conventional military capabilities to best effect was striking. This may reflect the undermining of its command and control mechanisms early in the coalition campaign, as well as the reluctance of regular forces to fight in defence of an unpopular regime.
The full range of the Iraq experience will need to be reflected in future training and equipment provision. The Iraqi regular army put up stiff resistance in places, but mostly either surrendered or fled, abandoning their equipment and clothing. The greater threat to the coalition, particularly to lines of communication and rear areas, was from paramilitary and irregular forces closely associated with the Saddam regime. Such forces were also probably responsible for much of the resistance encountered from regular army units that did fight, whose soldiers in some cases appeared to have been coerced by threats against themselves and their families.
The Iraqis used suicide bombers in the attack on a checkpoint north of An Najaf, which killed four US soldiers. Combatants who were not in military uniform could not be distinguished from civilians, while others showed the white flag when still harbouring intent to fire. While such tactics did not have a significant impact, they showed a disregard for the provisions of the Geneva Convention, put the Iraqi population at risk, and presented the coalition with a challenge as to how to respond. The UK's experience of asymmetric tactics in Northern Ireland proved invaluable and contributed to the early successes our forces enjoyed in southern Iraq. However, the implications for, and limitations on, conventional forces fighting in urban environments will need to be considered - most training is conducted in clear, simple battle-space and needs better to reflect the complexity of modern engagement. Overall, it would appear that UK forces need to continue to be configured, trained and equipped to move from war-fighting to peacekeeping (which may include internal security duties). Above all, the operation highlights the value and potential of agile light forces in responding to asymmetric approaches.
Current and emerging asymmetric threats mean that the risk to coalition shipping needs assessing for all stages of transit. The RN committed significant resources to protect from potential terrorist attack some 60 UK chartered merchant ships bringing in over 95% of all UK military equipment, as well as 16 high value RN and RFA vessels, over a 5000 mile route. Over 50% of the deployable fleet was engaged in escorting duties in known threat areas and choke points. |
The push for Baghdad
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British troops of the 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, Battlegroup enters Iraq |
3.9 UK forces' control of south-east Iraq helped US troops to push swiftly towards Baghdad. Within four days of the start of the operation the US Army was at An Najaf, some 60 miles from Baghdad, while US Marines were pressing north along a different route towards Al Kut. After several days of consolidating their position while attacking Iraqi forces with artillery and aircraft, US forces engaged the Republican Guard divisions around Baghdad. By 4 April they had seized the city outskirts, including the International Airport, and began to make a number of successful forays within the city boundaries.
3.10 On 7 April, while the city approaches were being secured, the US made an air strike on a building in Baghdad following intelligence that it was being used by senior Iraqi officials including Saddam. The following day saw remarkable news footage of US troops visiting Saddam's palaces in central Baghdad, and that night US troops maintained positions in central Baghdad overnight for the first time. On 9 April, sensing they were finally free, crowds gathered in Baghdad to welcome coalition forces and destroy icons of the Saddam regime. By now the west and north of Iraq had largely been secured. A few days later the northern cities of Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk fell to coalition troops. On 14 April the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that "less than four weeks after the commencement of the war, the regime of Saddam is gone, the bulk of Iraq is under coalition control, and the vast majority of Iraqis are rejoicing at Saddam's departure." And by 1 May President Bush was able to announce the end of major combat operations.
3.11 The continuing operations to stabilise the country and root out pockets of resistance are covered in Chapter 7.
Air Campaign
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A VC-10 Air to Air refuller tanker, refueling Tornado F3s |
3.12 The achievement of coalition land forces was assisted by the most precise air campaign ever, in which the RAF played a significant part, flying almost 2,500 sorties - some 6% of the coalition total. RAF aircraft released over 900 weapons, of which nearly 85% were precisionguided, while support assets played a pivotal role in the maritime, land and air campaigns. The RAF also made important contributions to airspace control, reconnaissance and transport capabilities. Our tanker fleet in particular was highly valued by the US and dispensed some 19 million lbs of fuel, over 40% of which was given to US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, significantly enhancing their operations. The air campaign began in earnest on the evening of 21 March, with precision strikes using cruise missiles and guided bombs on several hundred military targets throughout Iraq. Precision strikes continued at lower intensity for several weeks, whilst direct support to ground forces became an increasing proportion of the overall air effort. The combat power of the Republican Guard Divisions defending Baghdad was considerably reduced by precision air attack before they were engaged by coalition ground forces. Up to 700 sorties per day were flown against Iraqi ground forces, with the RAF making a major contribution. The main tasks of the air campaign were:
- to neutralise the Iraqi air force and Integrated Air Defence system;
- to conduct strategic attacks against regime targets;
- to provide air support to coalition land forces;
- to deter and counter the threat from theatre ballistic missiles, especially in the west of Iraq;
- to destroy the Republican Guard divisions.
Every care was taken in the targeting process and the selection of weapons to minimise incidental civilian harm. Our target was the Iraqi regime's military capability, not the Iraqi people.
The Role of Intelligence
The Saddam Hussein regime was secretive and based on fear. It was therefore a very difficult intelligence target with few sources of information. Assessments of Iraq's military capability depended on intelligence gleaned over more than a decade of surveillance and containment, as well as direct familiarity from frequent engagement with elements of it in recent operations. Although we knew much about the broad structure and disposition of Iraqi land and air forces, very little was known about how they planned to oppose the coalition or whether they had the will to fight. Objective analysis had to take into account Iraqi bluster and misinformation. Little opposition was expected from the run down Iraqi navy, but the air force and army remained substantially intact and were organised to resist the coalition, although the levels of training were not assessed to be high. The most determined resistance was expected from the Republican Guard formations and the Integrated Air Defence network. However, many formations, units and systems were dispersed and concealed in Iraqi anticipation of a sustained coalition air campaign prior to a ground assault. It was judged that the regime might use theatre ballistic missiles and possibly weapons of mass destruction if it could make the capabilities available for operational use and secure the obedience of subordinate commanders.
The lack of clear information meant that the coalition did not anticipate that Iraqi organised militaryresistance would collapse so quickly and completely. This left much of the determined, largely uncoordinated opposition in the hands of army remnants, irregular Feda'yeen, groups of foreign fighters and Ba'athist die-hards, with access to extensive stocks of locally held weapons and ammunition. Only with hindsight was it possible to assess the true state of Iraq's infrastructural, organisational and social collapse, caused by years of official neglect, criminal activity, international sanctions and war damage (some dating back to the war against Iran); hence the critical dependence of the people on the regime and its agents for every element of their daily lives.
Tactical intelligence from a wide diversity of technical and other sources played an invaluable part inthe campaign itself. The remarkable tempo and effects generated by land, sea and air operations were directly attributable to the quality, availability and timeliness of the intelligence product, which was significantly enhanced by access to US and other coalition allies. Modern Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets helped to provide urban situational awareness as did the effective use of human intelligence. 'Real time' targeting information including Collateral Damage Assessment could be passed back to headquarters and the resulting precision munitions strikes were extremely accurate and successful.
However, in an operation of this scale and complexity a vast amount of information has to be processed and interpreted before it can be used. The recent trend, particularly apparent in this operation, towards a significant increase in the demand for intelligence and a need to service the requirements of rapid, decisive and multi-layered campaigns, has the potential to test severely even the most sophisticated intelligence organisations. Consequently, we will wish, with potential allies and partners, to review our structure and specialist and deployed manning, to ensure their suitability and resilience to meet this challenge. This also implies greater connectivity between the various national and allied elements and access to sufficient robust and reliable communications. Moreover, our work will need to recognise the increased tempo required of intelligence in an era of Network Enabled Capabilities, and the particular requirement for human intelligence, linguistic, imagery and technical skills. We will also wish to ensure that personnel at every level are properly trained and capable of accessing and contributing fully to standard intelligence processes and that we can analyse the full range of battlefield effects as rapidly as possible. |
The Role of the Media
The operations in Iraq attracted unprecedented levels of media interest, both at home and across the world. 24 hour news broadcasts dominated the airwaves, with established Western broadcasters such as CNN and the BBC being joined by Arabic broadcasters including Al Jazeera. Building on the experience gained in previous conflicts, the UK and the US each had a system of accredited war correspondents. Some 700 journalists were "embedded" with coalition forces. Advances in technology meant that for the first time, these broadcasters were able to report in real time from the battlefield. While this enabled the public to witness a perspective of conflict seldom seen before, it placed a heavy responsibility on the media to make the correct judgements on what to show - and what not to show. The National Contingent HQ Media Centre and press information centres, all of which had MOD spokesmen attached, helped provide context.
A number of media organisations deployed journalists who worked independently of coalition forces. This raised serious safety issues, and several journalists found themselves caught up in the battle, sometimes with tragic consequences.
The primary aim of MOD's media effort was to provide accurate and timely information about UK military involvement. We judge this to have been largely successful. MOD's intention from the outset was to enable UK personnel in theatre to brief the media on operational issues, leaving overarching strategic and political issues for London. During the campaign, theatre commanders and their spokesmen gave press briefings and interviews daily (and frequently more often) to UK and international media. In London, Ministers gave over 100 radio and television interviews to the UK, international and Arabic media and, with the Chiefs of Staff, held several Press Conferences.
Generally, the practice of embedding reporters was regarded as positive. For journalists to be exposed to the first-hand experience of war-fighting should help their understanding and they were on hand to report and confirm coalition success at every stage. Inevitably, the presence of embedded journalists sometimes resulted in disjointed reporting, based on snapshots of individual events and locations, and there were occasions when the media tempo outran the ability of commands and spokesmen to ascertain and confirm details through their own structures. Less significant events risked acquiring an importance that could distort perceptions of the campaign as a whole. Ministerial statements and briefings accordingly needed to set the overall context. Recognising that the media commit significant investment and have a legitimate part to play during operations, we will wish to work more closely in future to ensure that the requirements of both the media and the military can be met, without compromising either role or the safety of our forces. On 23 June, MOD participated in a seminar at the Royal United Services Institute with journalists, broadcasters and academics to examine the media campaign and consider how things might better operate in the future. There are many challenges ahead, and over the coming months MOD will be working with all parties to ensure that future arrangements take account of the lessons from Iraq. |
Maritime Operations
3.13 The Royal Navy's main roles were to: ensure the safe transit of sea-borne men and materiel to theatre, conduct training ahead of operations and undertake surveillance of the potential area of operations. Once in theatre, the physical, operational and tactical situation had to be shaped to our advantage, in order to ensure access for joint forces, project combat and other power ashore, and help sustain and supply both joint and maritime forces. There was no major Iraqi opposition at sea, either from air or surface forces. However, provision had to be made against random mining, suicide boats and surface-to-surface missiles. Nearly 200 mines were seized on two captured tugs, and six Iraqi patrol craft in Umm Qasr. There was also the possibility that Iraq might use aircraft or weapons of mass destruction against the coalition.
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HMS Ark Royal leaves Portsmouth to lead Britains maritime taskforce |
3.14 In addition to the successful landing described at para 3.5, UK maritime forces contributed to a broad range of coalition activities. Leading the surface coalition mine-clearance effort, the UK MCM Commander, with four US and six UK MCM vessels, completed the key task of clearing a 200 yard channel through the Khawr Abd Allah waterway to the port of Umm Qasr on the 28 March. This allowed RFA SIR GALAHAD to deliver the first of many aid shipments into Iraq and for the UN Oil-For-Food programme to re-commence. This specialist mine detection and clearance capability, including the Royal Navy divers who cleared ship berths inside the port, were key assets for the coalition. Meanwhile, UK RFA fuel tankers replenished coalition ships at sea, a contribution valued by the US Fleet. The use of recently upgraded Sea King Mark 7 helicopters as reconnaissance platforms in support of land operations also yielded excellent results, while Lynx and Gazelle helicopters supported 40 and 42 Commandos, destroying a number of enemy tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers. Throughout, US warships and Royal Navy submarines launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at high value targets across Iraq as part of the integrated air campaign.
The Information Campaign
The UK information campaign was designed to influence the will of the Iraqi regime and the attitudes of ordinary Iraqi people in support of overall campaign objectives. It also articulated the Government's strategy to our allies and partners, and others in the region and elsewhere who were either non-aligned or opposed to coalition policy on Iraq. This multi-level approach, in conjunction with the US and other allies, required an integrated, agile campaign based on open reporting and transparency. Most effort was devoted to opinionforming media, including terrestrial television, the press, satellite and cable bearers, Internet and interactive media and ultimately bulk leaflet drops over Iraq itself.
During the conflict it proved difficult to measure the effectiveness of the information campaign and even now it is not easy to make definitive judgements. However, the largely quiescent reaction of the bulk of the Iraqi population and the disappearance or surrender of most of the Iraqi armed forces may indicate its positive effects in tandem with a military campaign whose overwhelming, rapid success created its own information impact and momentum.
Future efforts in this area will concentrate on streamlining the means of assessing the effects of the information campaign and confirming the truth about events from our commanders in the front-line as quickly as possible. |
Military Campaign - First Reflections
Overall, this operation confirmed the vision of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) that the UK Armed Forces should evolve an expeditionary-based strategy, providing ready, balanced forces capable of applying decisive effect in scenarios of varying intensity, frequency and character in an uncertain and unpredictable world. The SDR, and last July's SDR "New Chapter" based on analysis of the implications of 11 September 2001 and subsequent operations against terrorism, took into account the growth of asymmetric threat and the need to be able to operate with allies and partners.
The operation confirmed that our war-fighting doctrine, broadly based on the tenets of manoeuvre warfare and decisive effect, was sound, albeit capable of further refinement. Similarly, despite some issues, our readiness posture had permitted a flexible, rapid response, coherent deployment and direct theatre entry into a hostile environment. Our equipment generally coped with the environmental demands and allowed us to maintain sufficient firepower, mobility, protection and technological advantage over the opposition. At the same time, our support infrastructure, although rigorously tested in fast moving combat, and with limited access to host nation support, sustained us in carrying out all assigned tasks.
This was overwhelmingly a US shaped and led operation. The UK contribution was taken into the US plan where it could best complement and enhance US capabilities, both political and military. Most of what UK forces achieved took place under the umbrella of US dominance of every warfare environment. The coalition had naval and space dominance from the start, moved from air and information superiority to dominance and thereby quickly overcame Iraqi opposition on the ground. Coalition forces had technical superiority in virtually every area of combat and could operate through most conditions of visibility and weather and at night. In sum, the coalition dominated the political, diplomatic, military and economic levers. The operation was conducted at a time of its choosing, using unhindered lines of communication, without interference from Iraq at any stage up to the start of hostilities.
Strategic agility and access were defining features of this campaign, ranging from the maintenance of extended sea, surface and air lines of communication and attack to a major re-positioning effort when substantial coalition forces were deployed to the south instead of the north. At the operational and tactical levels, light but high impact forces and air power shaped and exploited the battlespace and achieved specific missions ahead, and sometimes independent of engagement by main forces. Their inherent agility allowed rapid re-tasking, especially of ground forces, through the use of highly mobile armoured capabilities and helicopters enabled by instant communications and directed logistics.
Another critical aspect was coalition forces' steadily increasing confidence in the protection they enjoyed against Iraqi weapons, based on counter-measures in the air, the robustness of protection, and Iraqi tactical and equipment weaknesses. This allowed rapid, bold and aggressive attacks to take place and enabled momentum to be sustained in the face of counter-fire.
Implications for Future Joint Operations
The UK force contribution had to be generated within very tight timelines, using mechanisms and pragmatic solutions that in some cases by-passed established readiness profiles and resourcing assumptions. Given the unpredictable nature of future operations, this may be inevitable, and we need to review how we prepare for operations in such complex politico-military environments.
The overwhelming success of rapid, decisive operations in Iraq reflects the deployment of fast moving light forces, highly mobile armoured capabilities and Close Air Support, which made use of near real-time situational awareness by day and by night. The US ability to combine land and air operations and support them from the sea and from friendly bases at very high tempo enabled the mix and impact of joint assets to be adjusted to operational need or events across the whole theatre of operations. This is likely to shape US doctrinal development and impact on potential partners. The implications of maintaining congruence with an accelerating US technological and doctrinal dominance need to be assessed and taken into account in future policy and planning assumptions.
Experience gained on other expeditionary operations, most recently in Afghanistan, was invaluable in Iraq. Beyond that, twelve years of enforcing the No-Fly Zones had conditioned coalition aircrews to the Iraqi environment. Exercise SAIF SAREEA II which took place in Oman was of particular benefit in rehearsing expeditionary operations in the Gulf area to practise real time land/air co-ordination. This underlines the need to train as realistically as possible.
Maritime Operations
The performance of UK maritime forces in successfully meeting their objectives demonstrated the development of the RN's joint and expeditionary credentials since the SDR. Our forces showed linkage with the US in virtually every maritime warfare discipline, and we expect to draw a number of lessons from the US experience in using large carriers and powerful amphibious groups in both the pre-combat and combat phases of the operation.
The operation confirmed the flexibility of sea-borne forces for manoeuvre and for the application of combat power, theatre entry and power projection, in the form of sea-based aviation, cruise missiles, amphibious forces and Naval Fire Support. It also showed the possibilities of afloat support for sea-based sustainment of joint forces.
Land Operations
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A soldier observes the front line as the sun goes down just outside Basrah |
In addition to the quality of our people, the reliability, mobility and protection offered by Challenger 2, Warrior and AS90 contributed to the coalition's success on land. The operation confirmed that protection is vital when an enemy (regular or irregular) is using direct or indirect weapon systems. Where the terrain constrained movement, UK combat engineers rapidly delivered significant engineering solutions to cross obstacles. It also highlighted the flexibility of the force package deployed, and the potential for light and heavy forces to operate together in an urban environment. Both 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines and 16 Air Assault Brigade requested armour assets to boost their combat power.
The framework of UK military doctrine enabled swift and focused effort at all levels, so that planning and execution were deliberate and effective. Orders were clear but allowed considerable scope for initiative at Junior Officer and NCO levels. Recent operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan have built a core of experience that enabled our soldiers to switch instinctively from warfighting to peacekeeping duties with comparative ease. This was particularly noticeable after the seizure of Basrah and other southern towns.
Coalition Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, were used extensively to provide real time targeting information to cue air assets and artillery. Armour was consequently able to move quickly through urban areas without forward screening by infantry patrols and easily defeated isolated concentrations of small arms and hand-held anti-tank weapons. Weapon-locating radar enabled accurate targeting of enemy guns and mortars thereby minimising incidental damage.
US experience with its Apache and Cobra helicopters will provide valuable lessons on the role of Attack Helicopters.
Air Operations
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An RAF Chinook flying vehicles ashore from HMS OCEAN |
The RAF's extensive contribution to the air campaign demonstrated how far it has embraced the new expeditionary culture. It included a coherent array of combat and combat support platforms, and valuable specialist capabilities such as tactical reconnaissance and air refuelling assets. The operation demonstrated the potentially devastating effect of integrated land/air co-ordination. The overall performance and adaptability of UK air assets and personnel reflected our important investment in individual and collective training and the RAF's considerable experience of coalition operations with the US in the Gulf region.
The campaign also showed that coalition aircraft needed to be able to identify and target mobile, camouflaged and underground assets and facilities and to achieve discrimination in urban areas. This requires improvements in data transfer, tactical reconnaissance and high definition imagery systems to deliver shorter sensor to shooter times for time-sensitive and 'find and destroy' missions.
The operation also highlighted that the integration of Close Air Support aircraft requires further refinement and practice. It demonstrated the advantages of multi-role aircraft and long-range, high payload platforms. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles have the potential to play an increasing role in the joint battle, both for surveillance and strike and may offer opportunities against time sensitive targets.
Further investment is required in Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure, Temporary Deployable Accommodation and personal equipment, which should be designed to support expeditionary air operations.
Targeting
Future targeting work will concentrate on improving precision and reducing the time taken to guide weapons on to targets including weapons fired from the sea and long-range, indirect land systems. |
 Table of Contents
Chapter 4 - Equipment Capability and Logistics
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