Military

The Board examined the chronology of circumstances surrounding the friendly fire incident from two different perspectives; first from the ground and second from the air.  Initially, the Board focused its efforts and activities in examining the sequence of events on the ground that led to the tragic events on 17 April 2002.  As part of its investigative activities, the Board availed itself of the opportunity to visit the site of the incident and took testimony from individuals in the theatre of operations.  Having completed the initial examination of circumstances at the ground level, the Board turned its attention to determine the facts and sequence of events from the air perspective.

Although the Board had already interviewed American witnesses during its visit to the KAF in the late April time period, a message issued by United States Commander in Chief Central Command (USCINCCENT) on 01 May 2002 (enclosed as Vol 10, Tab 6) specified the terms of the protocol concerning the passage of information from the CIB and access by the Board to American witnesses.  In particular, the following key points were established:

• all information requested by the Board was only to be released through the CIB;
• the testimony of any US witness requested by the Board was to be provided through the transfer of sworn affidavits or transcripts of sworn testimony;
• information released to the Board was not to be publicly disclosed or provided to Canadian officials outside of the Board and reviewing chain without the prior written consent of the US Government;
• classified information released to the Board was to be safeguarded in the same manner and to the same degree as corresponding Canadian classified information; and
• the American CIB Co-President could prescribe such conditions and restrictions deemed appropriate, consistent with and subject to US laws and regulations.

The Board's first written request for specific information was forwarded to the CIB on 2 May.  The Board received the first delivery of documentation on 5 May.  Additional information was forwarded on 17, 27 and 30 May with the final acceptance of information and transcripts of testimony occurring on 7 June. 

By way of explanation, a board of inquiry may receive any evidence that it considers is sufficient to establish any relevant fact either taken alone on consideration with other evidence.  Direct evidence is preferred and in this regard witnesses who have first hand knowledge should normally be called to testify.  The testimony of a number of American servicemen was initially considered essential in order to fully appreciate the events of 17 April 2002.  With the knowledge that the Board would eventually have access to the transcripts of testimony given before the CIB, the Board initially considered it essential to request the voluntary attendance of certain American service personnel in order to properly weigh the testimony and draw the most appropriate conclusions.

Outside of Canada, the Board had no statutory authority to compel the attendance of American citizens.  By letter dated 12 May, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of the following persons from the AWACS aircraft crew:

At the same time, the Board requested the voluntary attendance of the two F-16 pilots involved in the incident.  In response, the CIB reiterated its intention to provide the transcripts of all testimony taken before the CIB.  As the two F-16 pilots had already attended before the CIB and declined to answer questions, the CIB did provide contact information for the legal counsel representing the two American service personnel.  A written request to attend was subsequently forwarded to each of the respective counsel. 

By letter, dated 5 June, counsel for Major          advised that his client was unwilling to testify but would consider responding to any written questions.  A list of questions was forwarded by facsimile on 12 June.  A facsimile response was provided by Major          on 14 June.  A copy of the written questions and Major          response are enclosed at Vol 13, Tab 48.  Major          the second pilot involved, declined the invitation to be interviewed or respond to written questions.    

Lastly, in order to thoroughly and accurately analyze the sequence of events leading to the incident on 17 April 2002, the Board also needed to develop an understanding of the air coordination and control procedures in effect at the time.  To do so, the Board was interested in visiting CAOC at                                and receiving an information brief on applicable air coordination procedures in the theatre of operations. While American authorities granted permission to visit the CAOC, the Board was not able to make arrangements to travel to the CAOC during any of its visits to the Middle East due to difficulties encountered in obtaining entry visas for                .  However, the Board did benefit from a video teleconference (VTC) brief provided by military authorities from the CAOC on 12 June.  Later that same day, Board members heard sworn testimony from Lieutenant-Colonel M. Simpson describing the procedures in place at the CAOC.