Military

Air operations in the modern battlespace are extraordinarily complex by any measure, and require constant coordination between line operational aircrew and their chain of command at all levels.  In this particular instance, as much as the F-16 pilots bear final responsibility for the fratricide incident, there existed other systemic shortcomings in air coordination and control procedures, as well as mission planning practices by the tactical flying units, that may have prevented the accident had they been corrected.  In light of these systemic deficiencies, the Board has submitted several corrective recommendations, some of which have already been implemented

In this regard, the Board has concluded that oversight of a number of factors implicated in this incident properly reside within the existing command structure.  For example, at the level of the 170^th Fighter Squadron, it appears that failures with regard to leadership in terms of training, standards, and expectancy occurred, in that no process appeared to have been in place to confirm that all aircrew read and understood all applicable documents prior to mission execution.  This shortfall extended as far as the CFACC organization, which did not appear to have a defined process in place to familiarize incoming aircrew with the theatre organization, the existing command and control facilities, or the overall Commander's Intent.  These processes, important in any operation, were even more critical in this case, given the relatively short (six week) rotation period for units (reserve and regular) moving in and out of the theatre.

Additionally, the 170^th Fighter Squadron is implicated in regards to leadership, organization and expectancy, in that some confusion existed with the mission planning responsibilities of the mission planning Chief, or his representatives, and those of the Intelligence section of the unit.  Such confusion led to significant differences in opinions regarding the surface-to-air threat level in Afghanistan between the following key individuals: the Commander of the 332^nd Fighter Wing                                  , the Expeditionary Operational Support Squadron Commander                                , and the Intelligence Officer of the 170^th Fighter Squadron                                 .

The general nature of this shortfall is revealed by the gap between what aircrews in the region were ultimately briefed, and the actual air control measures that had been properly requested by the airspace managing authorities of TF Rakkasan.

As is now clear, much of the information concerning ground force movements, perceived spans of airspace control, and live fire intentions were edited or truncated from flight briefings and mission packs in an effort to keep the air and ground picture manageable.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             . In this particular instance, the information supplied to Coffee 51 Flight regarding the existence of the Tarnak Farm Range, as well as its projected use on the night in question (as duly requested and authorized through TF Rakkasan) was either completely lacking, or was not presented in such a way as to alert the aircrew of a potential area of interest. 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Nevertheless, Afghanistan has only two significant airfields, so it is not unreasonable to assume that transiting aircraft (even those not able or expected to recover at the field in question) would have at least a passing familiarity with the region.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

In essence, there were multiple airspace control measures in place in and around the KAF.  Though the aircraft were unlikely to penetrate the established Terminal Management Area (TMA) which was topped at                , the fact that a TMA existed should have been a reminder of the proximity of transiting aircraft to friendly ground forces.  There was a        that was permanently established and was identified as "in effect" in the ACO          .  This should have caused the pilots to question at least their weapon employment, if not their positioning.