Were the deceased and injured non-commissioned members to blame for the injuries or deaths?
None of the deceased,
injured or other members of the 3 PPCLI BG who planned, coordinated or
participated in the subject live-fire exercise at the Tarnak Farms range can be
blamed in any way for the injuries or deaths that occurred as a result of the
subject incident.
| Disturbing Contradictions |
|
|
| Observations/Facts |
Board's Conclusion |
| Approximately 4 minutes prior to invoking self-defence, and prior to
splitting the formation, Coffee 51 Flight informs
that they have ordnance onboard. |
It is unusual for a fighter formation to make such a comment to the
controlling authority given the fact that they were proceeding home out of
the mission area. This comment is
inappropriate and the reason for it is unclear. |
| Approximately 90 seconds prior to invoking self-defence Coffee 52
requests permission to employ his gun against the observed ground fire
location. |
Based on the SPINS as well as numerous testimonies, such a request
seems to contravene accepted logic and procedures. Combined with the previous call to
Coffee 52's intentions are suspect. In addition neither of the aircraft in the
formation had taken appropriate evasive action to counter the perceived threat. |
| Coffee 51 Flight's description of the ground fire depicts significant
rapid fire activity up towards their position at
altitude. |
Actual ground fire consisted of
anti-tank rounds being fired individually every 30 to 45 seconds for a total
of 6 rounds. This was supported by small arms fire which included tracers.
All ground fire was directed in a level plane in a westerly direction
towards a single target about 200 meters away. |
| Both pilots of Coffee 51 flight
were highly qualified pilots with previous combat experience, which
included seeing hostile surface to air fire. |
As testified by a TF Rakassan
helicopter pilot flying in the local vicinity just prior to the incident, the
few ricochets that did occur never exceeded an altitude of approximately 1000
feet AGL. Given the unrestricted
visibility and experience of these pilots, it is surprising that their
perceptions (rate, direction and angle of ground fire) would be so
inaccurate. |
| Coffee 52 not only remains within the immediate vicinity of the perceived threat, but increases
the risk by descending lower to the threat while allowing his airspeed to
occasionally decrease below optimal maneuvering speed. |
It is quite surprising and contrary to both SPINS and accepted
defensive reactions that Coffee 52 would
willingly allow himself to be exposed to a higher threat envelope through
such actions. While the altitude minimums published may have permitted him to get this low to accomplish a
"mark", better airmanship would have dictated remaining at altitude or
performing the designation at a
greater distance from the perceived threat. |
| Throughout the 4 minute period prior to invoking self-defence, neither
pilot's voice reflect concern for their own safety. |
In reviewing their submitted statements as well as their post-flight
testimony, it seems very clear that the perceived threat was both immediate
and grave (perceived to be under ambush), that would have warranted concern
in their voice, directive defensive calls and aggressive defensive maneuvers. |
| Coffee 51 Flight remains in the
perceived threat area for an unusually long time, both before and after bomb
release, without ever attempting to escape the perceived envelope. |
It is particularly alarming that neither of these experienced fighter
pilots ever initiated a defensive reaction after the bomb had impacted, but
rather continued to circle within the perceived threat area until AWACS
directed to "Scram South". |
| Coffee 52 invokes
self-defence ROE based on his assessment that Coffee 51 was in imminent danger. |
Such an assessment defies the documented facts. Coffee
51 remains at a safe altitude and distance from the perceived threat
throughout entire incident. Furthermore, Coffee 51 is in
visual contact with the ground fire, yet never demonstrates (through calls or
maneuvers) that he feels personally threatened. Finally it is doubtful that Coffee
52 truly had continuous visual contact with his lead considering the
relative position of Coffee 51 to him (an average of above and over behind
his aircraft) as well as the other tasks he was performing
visually monitoring ground fire and flying his aircraft). |
| Coffee 52 never provides
a defensive directive call to his lead after deciding that self-defence of
the formation was essential. |
Despite repeated claims that the invoking of the self-defence ROE was
necessary to protect his lead, Coffee 52
never provided his lead with a directive call to take defensive action (ie:
break L/R) or provide description of the threat direction and range. |
| Both on and in recorded statements,
Coffee 52 attests to the existence
of an artillery piece firing towards them. |
Once Coffee 51 and Coffee 52 have focused their on the ground fire location,
only a few men are ever seen and no attempt is made by either pilot to
positively discern and identify the perceived artillery piece. |
| It is common knowledge amongst the
F-16 pilots, reinforced by their mission briefs, that KAF was an active
Coalition airfield with a large concentration of friendly troops
Coffee 51 becomes aware of the formations proximity to
KAF over 1 minute prior to the bomb release. |
It is unusual that Coffee 52
would not have visually acquired the KAF given the significant artificial
lighting at the camp on the runway.
Given the close proximity of the ground fire to this significant feature
should have given concern to the probable presence of "friendlies" (TF
Rakassan personnel, and
Afghanistan Military Forces) in and around the general area. Further complicating the issue was the
lingering concern amongst the F-16 pilots about the uncertain location of
"friendlies" in Afghanistan. |
| Throughout the period prior to and immediately after the bomb release
Coffee 51 does not take positive control of the formations actions. |
Not only is Coffee 51 the
flight lead for the mission, he is also the Commanding Officer of the 170th
Fighter Squadron. Despite the
extended period of exposure to the perceived threat, the calls and maneuvers
by his wingman, and his knowledge of their position relative to KAF, Coffee 51 fails to take control of the
situation. Given his position
throughout the incident, in reference to the perceived threat and Coffee 52,
he should have either directed the formation away from the threat or queried
Coffee 52's maneuvering into the higher threat envelope. |
| 17 seconds after the bomb impacts, Coffee 51 queries as to whether the perceived ground threat was "shooting at us?" |
It is extremely unusual that a fighter aircraft would make such a request of an AWACS that was
over away from the scene of
the incident, and could not have possibly seen the ground fire. Furthermore, given the fact that Coffee 52 was so convinced that his
lead was being fired at that he invoked self-defence ROE, this request demonstrates a significant
difference in appreciation of the perceived threat
between the two F-16 pilots, and is inconsistent with Coffee 51's post flight statements. |
It is the conclusion
of the Board that the pilot's actions were not consistent with either the
expected practice for a defensive threat reaction or the existing published
procedures, including the SPINS. This
represented a failure of leadership, airmanship and technique. Furthermore, their actions contravened the
published Commander's direction with respect to reaction to AAA and employment
of ordnance outside of engagement zones.
Finally, even though it is reasonable to believe that the ground firing exercise at Tarnak Farm might have been
perceived as enemy surface to air fire, a longer, more patient look from a safe
altitude and range, combined with a good knowledge of the airspace and the
threat in the area, should have confirmed that the event observed was neither a
direct threat to their formation or enemy activity of a significant nature.
