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CHAPTER 7

LOGISTICS


Logistical Operations on Urban Terrain
by MAJ William Carter, Military Analyst, CALL

1. GENERAL.

Combat Service Support (CSS) to military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) is a unique type of military operation and presents many challenges. Each urban area is different. The key to providing successful CSS to urban combat is with the ability for the logistician at all levels to properly plan for and anticipate requirements. The logistician must apply basic CSS characteristics, doctrine, and methodologies used in all military operations. The logistical planners should understand that urban combat is not a separate military task or operation, but a unique condition on the battlefield.

2. DOCTRINAL BASE.

To properly plan and execute logistical operations in an urban environment requires the logistician to have a thorough understanding of urban combat and CSS doctrine. The logistician should understand the concepts addressed in FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas. These concepts allow logisticians to understand techniques used in urban operations, thereby allowing them to accurately anticipate CSS requirements during urban operations. Additionally, the logistician requires knowledge of these combat skills for their own survival in MOUT. Chapter 7 of FM 90-10-1 outlines in more detail the unique CSS requirements for urban operations. The logistician should also review the CSS principles, characteristics, and functions outlined in FM 100-10, Combat Service Support. Of the five CSS characteristics (anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and improvisation)1found in FM 100-10, anticipation and improvisation are is the most important in supporting MOUT. Additionally, FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Appendix C, "Deception," provides the logistician with methods on how to conceal and secure supplies, a required skill that is a must for urban operations. Finally, the logistical planner should review FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, on the planning process (specifically Step two, Mission Analysis, for the military decision-making process [MDMP]).

3. PLANNING.

OBSERVATION 1: Units should integrate the logistical planners from the beginning of the orders process. The logisticians cannot accurately develop the CSS requirements and plan after the brigade or battalion operations order is finalized. The logistical planners cannot brainstorm ideas on how to support or make estimates for urban operations. The logistical planners are an important part of the orders process for the brigade or battalion and they can bring a unique combat multiplier to the fight. To provide the best support to the orders process, the logistical planners should be thoroughly familiar with the MDMP, specifically the mission analysis phase. To support the mission analysis phase of the MDMP, the CSS planner must provide the commander and staff with an accurate status of supplies, equipment, and personnel along with detailed and realistic estimates. Because of the time constraint associated with preparing for an operation, the logistical planners and their staffs must continually update this information.

DISCUSSION 1: The logistical planners must understand the needs of the commander and staff in the MDMP. In the mission analysis phase, the logistician should be able to answer these and other simple questions concerning logistics:

  • What supplies, equipment and personnel does the unit have?
  • What supplies does the unit need? (coordinate with S-3)
  • What critical equipment in the unit needs repair?
  • How does the unit get the supplies in and around the city?
  • What does the unit have to treat and evacuate casualties?

These basic questions provide the logistical planners with some of the information they need before going to a brigade or battalion level course of action (COA) development or wargaming meeting. A shortage of supplies, equipment or personnel will have an adverse effect on the mission. The job of the planner is to make the commander aware of CSS issues and provide solutions.

It is a historical fact that urban combat requires a high expenditure of certain supplies, especially small-arms ammunition. The logistical planner must plan for this increase in the usage of supplies. Chapter 7 of FM 90-10-1 outlines the types of supplies that will have a high-usage rate during urban combat. The field manual recommends an increased ammunition usage of four times the normal consumption rate. Other considerations:

  • What is the ammunition basic load for armor vehicles, for example, more HEAT rounds for tanks?
  • How much fuel is needed? (Determining fuel consumption rates for armor vehicles using time rather than distance, 300 gallons every 8 hours)
  • How close can the supplies be to a city?
  • What special supplies are required (goggles, gloves, kneepads, etc.)? How many?
  • How do supplies get to the soldier on the third floor of a building?
  • How do soldiers get medical care?
  • How will civilian refugees affect CSS for the mission?

The challenges are many in urban combat but by using common sense, basic CSS doctrine, and integration into the staff, the logistician will be a significant contributor and a combat multiplier to the combined arms team.

"If my men put any more ammunition into the city, we would have sunk it."2
--MG William F Garrision, Task Force Ranger Commander,
Mogadishu, Somalia

TTP: Cheat sheet

The company, battalion or brigade's logistician should determine their unit's special needs and requirements for urban combat before deployment to an area of operation. This logistical operation plan (OPLAN), or "cheat sheet," can help develop baseline estimates and requirements well before an urban operation takes place. This OPLAN can include the UBL (unit basic load) for soldiers, sections, platoons and vehicles. The plan could include the number and type of special equipment required, for example, the packing list of platoon urban combat kit boxes containing eye protection, gloves, and chain saw (see Appendix A). The logistical planner cannot determine these requirements in a vacuum and should solicit the expertise of others within the unit, such as the mortar platoon leader. The logistical requirements for urban and all operations will be dependent on METT-T. Below is a simple example of a "cheat sheet."

MOUT REQUIREMENTS FOR BATTALION MORTAR SECTION

DODAC/NSN
AMMO
STANDARD
QTY PER WPN
MOUT
QTY PER WPN
1330g90000000
Green incendiary
2
10
1315c27600000
81mm WP w/fuse
11
11

How the "cheat sheet" looks and the information it contains depends on the planners and their unit. The goal is to make it user friendly and to contain estimates as realistic as possible. With the advent of computer technology on the battlefield, the need for a "cheat sheet" or logistical operations plan like this may seem outdated. But when the hard drive crashes, the electronic pulse hits, or the computer is run over by a tank, logistical planners are still expected to determine logistical estimates using the old paper and pencil method. Having these numbers easily accessible in hard copy will help.

TTP: Logistical Battle Book

The logistical planner must quickly and effectively articulate the status of personnel, supplies, and equipment. A tool the logistician can use is easy-to-read and understood briefing charts that quickly show maneuver planners the status of supplies and equipment. The needs of the commander and staff will determine the detail of information. (Note: Express the "delta" column in both number and percentage.)

ITEM

ON-HAND

REQUIRED

DELTA (No./%)
WATER1000012000-200/-17%
JP8 (gals)10000100000
5.56 (rds)5600028000+28000/+150%

This table is simple and using it will help logistical planners accurately express concerns and issues to the commander and staff. The noncommissioned officers (NCOs) on the logistical staff can prepare the briefing chart for the planners before the meeting and keep it updated. The NCOs may want to use the planning factors in FM 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Volume 2) in preparing the briefing chart. Logistical planners should place these charts in a battle book or planners book that they bring to the planning meetings or any staff meetings. During CTC rotations there have been numerous times when logistical planners were trying to determine a logistical forecast during COA development using scraps of paper found in the pockets of their battle dress uniforms (BDUs).

OBSERVATION 2: Urban combat is equipment intense. The soldiers going into urban conditions need a multitude of equipment and supplies. The expected ammunition consumption rate for urban combat is four times higher than other normal operations.3Based on standard planning in the now obsolete FM 101-10-1/2 (Volume 2), a soldier assigned to an air assault division would use 124 rounds (about four 30-round magazines) of 5.56 on the first day of an attack.4For urban combat, that same soldier would require 496 rounds or sixteen 30-round magazines. That additional amount of ammunition may not seem significant until you consider other equipment. By doing the same projections for mortar rounds and grenades, not to mention the batteries, eye protection, ropes and other items specific for urban operations, the soldier's basic combat load of 69.37 pounds5can quickly increase. The British Army's experiences in Northern Ireland determined a need for soldiers not to be loaded down with equipment, allowing them to quickly react to situations.6The need for a soldier to be highly equipped, yet highly mobile and flexible, presents a unique challenge that must be addressed by leaders and logisticians in the planning phase of the operation.

DISCUSSION 2: Leaders at all levels should determine what equipment is necessary using the commander's intent, METT-T, and an understanding of urban combat. By determining what equipment is needed, the leader can then determine what soldiers can carry without being overly burdened. According to FM 7-10, The Infantry Company, a soldier's load should not exceed 72 pounds or 48 pounds when in contact. Depending on the mission, this may not be achievable. Once the leader determines what the soldiers will carry into the urbanized area, it is up to the logisticians (to include company 1SGs or executive officers) to bring the other required supplies into the area. The challenge for leaders and logistical planners is in how to get those supplies to soldiers located within a city on multiple floors of high-rise buildings. If there is no plan, it will not occur.

TTP: CSS overlay

Leaders and logistical planners must work hand-in-hand before urban operations occur in determining supply requirements, transportation requirements, the method of getting supplies into the city, and where supplies are going. Planning this out in detail can be as important as determining the high-priority target by the fire support officer. Dissemination of logistical plans must occur at all levels in the unit. A CSS overlay with locations and call signs (see Figure 1) is a proven method at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). A good logistical plan in urban combat requires the involvement of the unit providing the support, whether it is a support platoon, forward logistical element, or corps asset. Ideally, the leaders and planners incorporate the logistical or CSS plan with the combat health support (CHS) plan. There should be full integration of the CHS and CSS into the logistical plan. For example, a truck from a forward logistical element (FLE) will deliver supplies to a company's caches. That same truck will then back-haul routine or non-urgent stable casualties and other equipment that require repair to the rear. It is also a good idea for logistical supply points to move periodically within the city when possible to avoid targeting by snipers.

Figure 1
CSS OVERLAY

4. PREPARATION.

OBSERVATION 3: The benefits of proper preparation for urban combat or any other type of military operation speaks for itself, yet leaders fail to properly plan and execute this stage of the operation. This is the ideal time before the operation to complete logistical coordination, rehearsal of the CSS plan, and "top off" logistical elements, men and equipment.

DISCUSSION 3: Leaders and logistical planners must properly prepare soldiers in a tactical assembly area before urban operations. Properly preparing a soldier for urban combat is very important, not only to increase his efficiency on the battlefield, but to decrease the chance of combat stress associated with urban combat.

TTP: "Soldier Top-Off Point"

Leaders and logistical planners working together should develop a plan that prepares the soldiers physically and mentally for the upcoming operation. To achieve this, the leaders should establish a "soldier top-off point" that provides simple services that will meet this objective. How elaborate this type of operation becomes will depend on the availability of assets, time, and the tactical situation. This type of operation is time and manpower intense. It could involve corps support assets depending on the scope of the operation. These services are in addition to the unit level pre-combat inspections and rehearsals. These events can take place at a tactical assembly area (TAA), brigade support area, or combat trains. Security considerations and location of soldier population will determine where the "soldier top-off point" occurs. What occurs at this point and what is available is solely dependent on METT-T. In conjunction with this operation, units can issue Class I (food/water), Class V (ammunition), and other equipment items to the soldier.

TASKS FOR A "SOLDIER TOP-OFF POINT"

1. RECEIVE MAIL/NEWSPAPERS
2. HOT FOOD (with fresh fruit and cold/hot drinks)
3. CHAPLAIN SERVICES/SUPPORT
4. SHOWERS
5. COMBAT HEALTH SUPPORT (to include re-stock of aid bags and combat lifesaver bags)
6. SUPPLY ISSUE POINTS (water, MRE, ammunition, etc.)
7. A-BAG DISTRIBUTION (allows the soldier to change into dry/clean clothes)
8. SLEEP/REST AREA (tent)
9. BRIEFING AREA (tent)

Having soldiers well-fed, informed, supplied and mentally prepared can only make for a better soldier. Additionally, the "soldier top-off point" should help decrease the possibility of combat stress-related injuries, though not eliminate them. From the Russian experience in Gronzny, combat stress can easily degrade the unit's ability to perform its mission, making this "top-off point" critical in long-term urban operations. Additionally, leaders and logistical planners should have a "soldier top-off point" available outside an urban area during the battle to decrease the chance of combat stress and revitalize the soldiers. Even during the war in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen knew the benefit of rotating soldiers in and out of battle.7

"A poor plan thoroughly rehearsed has a greater chance for success than an excellent plan that is never rehearsed."--General George S. Patton, Jr.

OBSERVATION 4: Units fail to conduct effective CSS rehearsals for urban operations because they were not fully prepared. For example, after the CSS rehearsal some of the logistical planners, mainly the medical planners, met to refine their plan a few hours before the operation.

DISCUSSION 4: Units should conduct a thorough rehearsal of the CSS plan, especially for urban combat, because of the high rate of casualties, high usage of ammunition, and numerous distribution challenges faced in this type of environment.

TTP: "Follow the manuals."

FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Appendix G, and CALL Newsletter No. 98-5, Rehearsals, outline the methods on how to conduct a rehearsal.

5. EXECUTION.

OBSERVATION 5: The challenge for leaders and logistical planners in MOUT is getting supplies to soldiers. The standard TTP is to place the supplies in an M113 armored personnel carrier (APC) and drive to a cache or unit distribution point within the urban area. Under most urban operation scenarios, this technique would work well. The challenge occurs when the streets are filled with rubble from buildings, abandoned cars, and broken glass (where small elements of "hunter/killer" teams like those faced by the Russian Army in Grozny armed with RPGs are awaiting for a target to kill). Through thorough planning and innovation, leaders and logisticians can easily meet the needs of the soldier.

DISCUSSION 5: Listed below are several techniques to assist in resupplying the soldier at the battalion level and below. The trick to resupply is detailed planning, coordination, and imagination. One's own imagination is the only limitation on the number of techniques for resupply. Most of these techniques listed below were used in a MOUT exercise and have been observed repeatedly at the CTCs. When a leader or logistical planner develops a technique for resupply, he must remember the environment of MOUT, the ability to perform this technique, and security. Usually the best source for new techniques comes from the soldiers who move supplies or the soldiers who are receiving them.

TTP: Plastic bags

Units should pre-package or pre-configure loads of supplies outside an urban area or in a safe location. Ideally, the units should configure these loads down to the soldier level. This load could include pre-filled magazines for soldiers, meals ready-to-eat (MREs), bottled water, and first-aid dressing. (If the unit cannot provide pre-loaded magazines, the unit should ensure there are plenty of speed loaders with the ammunition.) Placing a pre-configured soldier's load in durable plastic bags (probably double or triple-sacked), such as those found in the post exchange, presents a few benefits. It will eliminate the time a soldier has to spend at a supply point; he can run in, grab the bag and go. If a soldier is engaged on the upper floors of a building, someone can easily carry the bag to the soldier. Plastic protects the supplies; however, the amount of supplies a bag can carry may be limited and filling the bag will be manpower intensive. Found in most cities, these plastic bags can act as a form of camouflage for supplies. They are cheap, easy to find, expendable, and do not require back-haul.

TTP: Milk blivet

Plastic milk blivets used in milk dispenser machines in most military dining facilities are excellent water containers. These blivets hold approximately five gallons of liquid, have a spout for easily filling canteens, and will fit into a rucksack or any other container. These blivets will survive a 60-foot drop from a hovering helicopter when placed inside an empty MRE box. Additionally, all components are expendable. A box of 100 milk blivets costs approximately $10.

TTP: Water bottles

In most operations in today's Army, from the Balkans to Haiti, providing bottled water is a standard for supplying water to the soldier for individual consumption. In urban operations, this type of water distribution can be a benefit and a challenge. The benefit is obvious: plastic water bottles are easy to transport for individual soldiers and can be thrown away, eliminating back-haul requirements. The downside is that they are expensive, require a contract with a commercial provider, and, in bulk, come in less than durable cardboard boxes. Nevertheless, the plastic water bottle is an ideal method of getting water to the individual soldier. This method eliminates the need for the soldier to wait to fill his canteen from a 5-gallon water can; he can quickly grab it and go. Using bottled water eliminates the need to back-haul containers (5-gallon water cans or 500-gallon water blivet) to resupply the soldier.

TTP: Take from your buddy

Though an emotional subject and not discussed openly, a technique that should be used is taking supplies from seriously wounded, injured, or killed soldiers. Common sense must prevail when relieving a wounded or injured soldier of his supplies. Soldiers must be aware of this resupply technique. Otherwise, these supplies will be back-hauled with the casualty to the rear. In the battle of Stalingrad, wounded Russian soldiers "would try to take off the white coverall (used for camouflage in the snow) before it became bloodstained."8

TTP: Foraging and scavenging.

FM 7-10 addresses foraging and scavenging, but this technique, though partial, can present leaders and logistical planners with numerous concerns:

  • Are the items safe to use?
  • Have they been booby trapped?
  • What are the legal ramifications?

The unit's leadership should address these concerns as part of the rules of engagement (ROE) for operations. The techniques should only apply in long-term urban operations and if the military logistical system has failed.

TTP: Speed balls.

The use of helicopters within the city is another means for transporting supplies to soldiers. Unfortunately, the limited availability of landing zones/pick-up zones and the enemy's increased advantage to engage aircraft from the upper floors buildings will limit the use of helicopters in the resupply role. One technique is to use rooftops or a wide area, such as a junkyard, as a drop-off point for supplies. These sites must be in secured locations within an urban area. CSS personnel pre-package supplies in aviation kit bags or duffel bags. The helicopter will fly as close as possible to the site, reduce speed, and drop the supplies and rapidly egress the area to decrease exposure time (see Figure 2). This technique is similar to the "speed ball" technique used by Rangers. Supplies should be packaged in commercial packaging material (for example, bubble wrap) or with material available from a rigger detachment to limit damage to the supplies. For example, placing a piece a thick cardboard on the bottom of an aviator kit bag could help decrease damage at impact.

Figure 2
Speed Ball

TTP: Fast rope

Another similar method of resupply using a helicopter is to take a 5-gallon water can and tie it to the end of a rope, then slowly lower the rope to a secure location. Connect the water cans, "speed balls," or the supplies to the rope with a carabiner (snap link) and slide them down the rope. The benefit of this method is that the helicopter does not have to get close to the roof or to a secure site. Additionally, the extract point where the unit receives the supplies is more precise than kicking the supplies out the door. Once the soldiers receive the supplies, this same rope can back-haul empty water cans and other items. The trick is to ensure that the water can, or weight at the bottom of the rope, remains to prevent the rope from flapping in the wind and catching the propellers of the helicopter. The downfall to this method is that damage will occur to some of the supplies when they make contact with the ground. A 5-gallon water can weighs 40 pounds.

TTP: SKEDCO

At the squad and platoon level, using a SKEDCO litter to move supplies within an urban area is a technique worth considering. The primary purpose of the SKEDCO is to evacuate casualties from the battlefield. This same litter can move supplies and equipment, especially mortar rounds, effectively through the rubble of an urban area or through a sewer system. Additionally, by using basic mountaineering techniques, the SKEDCO can haul supplies along the side of a building, through elevator shafts or destroyed stairwells, to the upper floors of a building using simple ropes and pulleys.

TTP: Body bags

A unique technique to move a squad's worth of basic supplies is by using a "Human Remains Bag" (body bag), NSN 9930-01-331-6244 Type 2. Clearly stencil the word "supplies" in bright colors on the bag so as not to confuse it with other body bags. These bags are useful because they are rugged, have built-in carrying handles, have a capacity to hold a squad's worth of supplies, and can be folded and carried in a rucksack. The advantage over using a duffel bag or aviator kit bag is:

  • The bag remains sealed and is waterproof.
  • Two soldiers can easily carry a loaded bag.
  • There is a greater availability, which reduces back-haul requirements.

The TTPs listed above are just a few techniques to deliver supplies to soldiers in the fight. The recurring theme for the above techniques is that resupply operations must be fast, soldier friendly, and minimize the requirement for back-haul of resupply material. Additionally, pre-configuring loads is an important technique to use in resupply during urban operations.

"What we have is a failure to communicate." --from the movie Cool Hand Luke

OBSERVATION 6: Communications in urban areas is a known problem. The inability to communicate will surely sever the ability of the logistician to support the soldier. Without communications, the logisticians cannot track the battle. Therefore, they cannot anticipate the CSS/CHS requirements of the soldiers within an urban area and "push" needed supplies forward. Without proper communication, the logisticians are blind.

DISCUSSION 6: Depending on the location and available infrastructure, logisticians should consider using cellular telephones and beepers to coordinate supply requests. Most cities throughout the world have a cellular telephone infrastructure available. Cellular phones can be easily obtained from numerous sources worldwide. There are even companies, through the use of satellite technology, that claim they can provide cellular phone coverage anywhere in the world. The Chechens used cellular phones with great success against the Russians.9

TTP: Beepers and cellar telephone codes

Since these communication sources are not secure, the logistician needs to use brevity codes for requesting supplies. All parties involved in CSS/CHS operations must know theses codes. Additionally, a communication exercise using beepers, cellular telephones, and these codes should occur before the operation. Logisticians can use code words, like "power bars," for water on cellular telephones. For the beepers, the logistician can use number codes. The first five numbers used could be meaningless. The next three numbers could represent the amount of supplies needed and the last three numbers can represent a specific item or class of supply. These telephones and beepers are lightweight and easy to carry, but can be easily detected with off-the-shelf technology, therefore possibly compromising the location of the user. Unfortunately OPSEC will suffer using these apparatus and every opportunity should be made to disable or jam all repeaters supporting cellular communications. But recent examples, documented with the Russian experience in Grozny, have shown these systems will work in extremes when used.

OBSERVATION 7: Having a soldier or a supply point overburdened with excess supplies can hinder the logistical system just as much as the lack of supplies.

DISCUSSION 7: Once operations have begun in an urbanized terrain, the logistician needs to "push" supply based on the situation. Situational awareness for the logistician in support of urban operations is invaluable in providing the right amount of supplies at the right time. Reliance on resupply based on forecast consumption should be minimized to prevent accumulation of excess stockage in both units and support caches with consequent limitation of decreased mobility and increased vulnerability to the supplies.10

TTP: Caches

A system of small "caches" operated by a minimum number of logisticians and located in a secure location may be the preferred method in supporting engaged in MOUT.11The caches, besides being located in secure locations, should be easily accessible by resupply vehicles or personnel, and defendable. They should be established within the building or caches using techniques found in FM 90-10-1, paragraph E-2, subparagraph c, "Other Construction Tasks."

"CSS leaders and staff must anticipate future missions. They do this by understanding the commander's plan and translating current developments into future requirements."12

TTP: Battle Tracking

The logisticians at every level, to include first sergeants and company executive officers, must track the battle to provide or "push" supplies in a timely fashion to the soldier in a foxhole. Below are some recommended tracking techniques from the CTCs:

  • Track units along with supporting and adjacent logistical element locations with grids and symbols (a CSS/CHS overlay should provide the initial location of these elements).
  • Track unit status with a combination of number and color codes.
  • Ensure tracking charts are self-explanatory and updated.
  • Monitor the appropriate radio nets (command or operation intelligence nets).

Proper battle tracking alone will not provide the soldier on the ground with the right amount of supplies at the right time. The information should be analyzed and translated into future support requirements. Having staff huddles to review past actions and projected upcoming events is one method of determining these requirements.

6. CONSIDERATIONS.

OBSERVATION 8: Today's major urban areas are home to millions of people. During a conflict within an urban area of any size, the military will have to plan for dealing with the mass exodus of displaced civilians living in and around an urban area.

DISCUSSION 8: Although this is a major operational concern, displaced civilians from an urban area will stress the logistical system. Depending on the size of the operation and the number of displaced civilians, the logistical requirements for displaced civilians can include transportation, food, water, shelter, medical treatment, and preventive medicine support. This will drain the unit's logistical system, and, without proper planning, possibly deplete the units of their supplies and assets, therefore possibly halting combat operations.

FM 90-10-1, Change 1, states:

"Commanders at all levels automatically assume the burden of ensuring the bare necessities of life to all civilian noncombatants that fall under their control during MOUT. Depending on the situation, protection, food, water, shelter and medical care may be provided in special refuges established for that purpose, or they may be provided in place by some other organization. Whatever the final arrangement, U.S. commanders should expect to exercise control and provide support until long-term arrangements can be made."13

TTP: Plan and Coordinate.

At all levels within a unit, there must be a plan to handle displaced civilians. If a group of civilians walks up to a battalion's combat trains or supply caches, the soldiers at that location need to know what support they can provide, (food, water, medical care), and then where to send them. The logisticians must have a thorough picture of the displaced civilians they can expect to support (how many, the expected age, gender, and cultural considerations). The logisticians, along with the unit's S-2/G2 (Intelligence), S-3/G3 (Operations) and S-5/G5 (Civil-Military Operations), should coordinate directly to develop a detailed and supportable plan on how to deal with displaced civilians. The S-5/G5 will coordinate with host nation and non-governmental organizations for support of the displaced civilians. Logisticians must be proactive when it comes to dealing with displaced civilians. Ignoring the situation can result in displaced civilians overwhelming the unit's logistical system, in turn degrading the combat effectiveness of the unit.

7. CONCLUSION.

This chapter only addressed some of the logistical issues and TTPs needed to be successful in urban operations. Providing logistical support in urban combat requires detailed planning, coordination, and imagination. The two biggest challenges faced by the logistical planner will be communications and the distribution of supplies at the lowest level. A tall building will create a man-made valley of steel that will hamper the logistician's ability to communicate, therefore hinder his ability to battle track, forecast, and anticipate the supply requirements of the soldier on the ground. The possibility of having lines of communication within a city blocked by abandoned cars, fallen structures, rubble, and broken glass will impede the logistician's ability to "push" supplies to soldiers within the city. These are the many challenges that a logistician may face in urban combat. The logistical planners must consider all facets of METT-T since all will dramatically affect the logistical plan in urban operations. There have been many battles fought throughout history where the momentum of the battle has stopped and changed hands because of the lack of supplies on the front lines.

__________________

Endnotes:

1. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-10, Combat Service Support (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 3 October 1995), 1-2.

2. Mark Bowden, "Blackhawk Down," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 21 March 1999 [online at http://www3.phillynews.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp].

3. US Army Field Manual 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 May 1997), 7-1.

4. US Army Field Manual 101-10-1/2, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data Planning Factors (Volume 2) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 July 1990), 2-133.

5. US Army Field Manual 7-10, Infantry Company (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 December 1990), 8-10.

6. USMC Intelligence Film.

7. Ali Ahmand Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The other side of the mountain: Mujahedin Tactics in the Soviet War (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1995), 308.

8. Beevor, Anthony, Stalingrad-The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943, Penguin Group, NY, 174.

9. Foreign Military Studies Office, Chechen Brief to MOUT Focused Rotation Team, 24 February 1999, Tim Thomas.

10. Urban Warfare Logistics Study and Analysis (Draft Final Report), 5 February 1999, 32.

11. Ibid.

12. US Army Field Manual 71-3, The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 8 January 1996), 8-1.

13. US Army Field Manual 90-10-1, Change 1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 May 1997), G-5.


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