Military

R&S PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Integrate engineer reconnaissance (recon) teams (though not doctrinal, various units have created engineer recon teams) into the brigade R&S plan. Focus these teams on engineer targets such as landing zone denial, obstacles in the reduction area, enemy survivability on the objective, and obstacles on approach routes. The named areas of interest (NAI) assigned to engineers should have priority intelligence requirements (PIR) that determine the best reduction sites in the city and confirm or deny enemy fortification of key sites.

MOBILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Providing mobility support to a maneuver force in a MOUT environment normally will require engineers to support multiple combined arms breaching operations. The reverse planning process discussed in FM 90-13-1, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, applies to all terrain situations. The following considerations complement this process:

Suppress. Ensure that all personnel understand the location of support-by-fire positions and the pyrotechnic and radio signals to initiate obstacle reduction and indicate when the lanes are open (proofed and marked). The rehearsal site should have a full-scale lane-marking system visible to every soldier. All key leaders should understand the commitment criteria for the breach force.
Obscure. Rehearse triggers for artillery-delivered, hand-emplaced, and vehicle-generated smoke. Consider the position of the moon relative to the support-by-fire position, the percent of illumination, and the night-vision goggle window.
Secure. Hold a combined arms rehearsal of the breach force using the full-dress technique. This rehearsal includes engineers and attached maneuver elements dedicated to suppressing direct fires and destroying local counterattacks.
Reduce. The combined arms rehearsal should include handing over lanes from engineers to maneuver soldiers. The rehearsal should be "NCO to NCO" and discuss details of linkup and handover. Consider the need to back-haul casualties when planning the number of lanes.

COUNTERMOBILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Address these issues in the brigade-, battalion-, and company-level rehearsals. Plan to issue a scatterable mine warning (SCATMINWARN) to prevent fratricide.

SURVIVABILITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

• Perform this work concurrently with initial reconnaissance and "condition setting" by the brigade to support the brigade and division deception plans.

• Field Artillery. Determine positioning areas and plan counterfire radars and ammunition.

• Forward Area Refuel Point. Establish locations for stocking fuel and ammunition. Plan for multiple refueling sites to support the attack and lift aviation simultaneously.

• Battalion aid station. Locate forward treatment facilities and ingress/egress routes. The implied task is to establish helicopter landing zones for these sites.

SUMMARY

While the process for planning engineer support to a MOUT attack follows existing decision-making steps, engineer planners must understand how this diverse terrain impacts engineer operations. Terrain enhances the enemy's countermobility and survivability efforts and increases the friendly force's mobility requirements. Critical points include:

• Structures become key terrain.
• Below ground and multi-layered above-ground dimensions are added.
• Decentralized execution--while staying collectively synchronized--is required.
• MOUT-specific pre-combat checks, pre-combat inspections, and rehearsals must be conducted.

By accounting for these impacts, engineer planners can make sound decisions to set the stage for effective engineer support to the maneuver force in this demanding environment.

Note: This updated article was previously published in Engineer, July 1998, PB 5-98-3, US Army Engineer Center and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

"Force protection is a security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security operations security, personal protective services and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence and other security programs."

--Joint Publication 1-02,
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

The joint service definition of force protection directs that intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs will support force protection. Force protection is a multi-faceted, continuous mission. It is performed by all branches of the U.S. Army to develop countermeasures against the complete range of threats within the full spectrum of military operations. It is designed to provide the commander with information outlining potential weaknesses in his force protection effort. Commanders and staff can use this information to:

• Plan for passive and active operations security (OPSEC), physical security, counterreconnaissance, deception, and other security measures.
• Plan base cluster defenses, logistic operations, combat health support, and troop safety measures.
• Reduce probability of fratricide by accurately locating enemy forces.
• Contribute to hazard avoidance once a risk is identified.

The S-2's role in force protection is to provide information to the staff on the threat force. He should analyze his own force to determine those targets the enemy regards as high priority, and the most timely way the enemy will attack the targets. After the S-2 provides this information to the staff, the appropriate staff officer must assume responsibility for arranging force protection of these targets from exploitation, neutralization, or destruction.

OBSERVATION 1: Unit planning for use of CI/HUMINT teams. Upon initial arrival in the AO, CI/HUMINT teams were not tasked to collect information in the local area. When deployed in an AO, the local area information can be obtained from the populace. These teams can also gather a considerable amount of information at enemy prisoner of war (EPW) holding areas.

DISCUSSION 1: The bulk of information comes from interviews or observations of the area and local personnel and, in the case of the interrogators, from EPWs. Their observations can assist the brigade's intelligence collection effort as a force multiplier. According to FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, information gathered from CI/HUMINT teams will help:

• Further develop, update and refine personality lists.
• Acquire the current location of enemy troops and supply points.
• Acquire information regarding the threat's ability to employ weapons of mass destruction.
• Learn current attitudes of groups and organizations toward U.S. forces present.
• Identify enemy supporters and collaborators in the rear areas.
• Identify local leaders and their feelings about U.S. forces and enemy forces, if not already known.
• Confirm or deny information provided by other collection assets.
• Assist in the development of force protection plans.
• Establish liaison contacts for further information gathering.

CI/HUMINT teams are normally employed to counter the enemy's HUMINT collection effort. The failure to correctly employ CI personnel adversely affected OPSEC. Examples of OPSEC failures included but were not limited to the following-

• Command vehicles were readily apparent by the number of antennas they carried. Trained gunners automatically concentrate on those vehicles with the most antennas since these are command and control.
• Vehicle numbers were not covered. This aids identification of unit movements, location of units, and unit boundaries.
• Vehicle driver names painted on windshields were not covered. This allows enemy HUMINT collection assets to identify the names and locations.
• Operators and passengers in vehicles left operations plans and orders, signal data, and other information in vehicles or were carried forward to reasonably unsecured areas.

Brigade battle staff also failed to employ adequate signal security (SIGSEC) measures, including:

• Operators did not zero radios when capture was imminent.
• Failure to leave written signal operating instructions (SOI) behind in a secure area when on a specific mission into an unsecure area.
• The brigade signal officer failed to issue new SOIs and frequencies when the current SOI was captured or believed compromised.

TTP:

• OPSEC and SIGSEC procedures should be included in the unit training plan and practiced prior to deployment. When good OPSEC and SIGSEC procedures are used, the force protection posture improves.
• A CI/HUMINT team includes both counterintelligence and interrogator personnel in its organization. The team, when properly employed, can provide a considerable amount of information and support leading to effective force protection.

OBSERVATION 2: Deployment of CI/HUMINT teams and the use of a screening point near the urban attack site.

DISCUSSION 2: During the attack on the MOUT site, there was no forward CI/HUMINT team screening point established. This screening point could have obtained information such as:

• The enemy's defenses of the urban site.
• The location of enemy supplies.
• The enemy's strength and order of battle (OB) in the area.
• Local attitudes toward the enemy.
• Local attitudes toward U.S. forces.
• The enemy's ability to collect information on U.S. forces.
• Other requests for information (RFI) as directed to support future missions in the AO.

TTP:

• Information gathered from a screening point can reinforce the force protection plan, and such information can prevent fratricide, prevent injury to soldiers, identify location of supplies, and identify enemy strength, enemy order of battle, and local needs.
• Regardless of the mission, force protection remains a major factor in the successful outcome of the mission. When a hazard or threat is identified, the five-step risk management process, identified in FM 100-14, Risk Management, Apr 98, should be used.

Chapter 5: Fire Support

Chapter 7: Logistics