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Chapter 3

Design Approach

Developing protective systems to protect assets depends on an effective partnership between engineers and physical-security personnel. Physical-security personnel need to understand the basic approaches the engineers will take in laying out protective systems. Engineers must understand the issues involved with ensuring that anything they lay out is compatible with security operations and the operations of the asset users. The best way to ensure a viable design is through teamwork. This chapter provides a summary of the basic approaches to protecting assets against threats (the design strategies). Understanding these strategies is critical to being an effective team member in developing protective systems.

Design Strategies

3-1. There are separate design strategies for protecting assets from each tactic described in Chapter 2. There are two types of strategies associated with each tactic—the general-design and specific-design strategies. The general-design strategy is the general approach to protecting assets against tactics. The specific-design strategy refines the general-design strategy to focus the performance of the protective system on a particular level of protection. (See TM 5-853-1 for more information.)

Protective Measures

3-2. Protective measures are developed as a result of the general- and specific-design strategies. These protective measures commonly take the form of site-work, building, detection, and procedural elements.

  • Site-work elements include the area surrounding a facility or an asset. Technically, they are associated with everything beyond 5 feet from a building. They can include perimeter barriers, landforms, and standoff distances.
  • Building elements are protective measures directly associated with buildings. These elements include walls, doors, windows, and roofs.
  • Detection elements detect such things as intruders, weapons, or explosives. They include IDSs, CCTV systems used to assess intrusion alarms, and weapon and explosive detectors. These elements can also include the guards used to support this equipment or to perform similar functions.
  • Procedural elements are the protective measures required by regulations, TMs, and standing operating procedures (SOPs). These elements provide the foundation for developing the other three elements.

Vehicle BOMBS

3-3. Vehicle-bomb tactics include both moving and stationary vehicle bombs. In the case of a moving vehicle bomb, the aggressor drives the vehicle into the target. This is commonly known as a suicide attack. In a stationary vehicle bomb, he parks the vehicle and detonates the bomb remotely or on a timed delay.

General-design strategy

3-4. Blast pressures near an exploding vehicle bomb are very high, but they decrease rapidly with distance from the explosion. The design strategy for these tactics is to maintain as much standoff distance as possible between the vehicle bomb and the facility and then, if necessary, to harden the facility for the resulting blast pressures. Barriers on the perimeter of the resulting standoff zone maintain the required standoff distance. The difference between moving and stationary vehicle-bomb tactics is that the aggressor using the moving vehicle bomb will attempt to crash through the vehicle barriers; the aggressor using the stationary vehicle bomb will not. Therefore, vehicle barriers for the moving vehicle bomb must be capable of stopping a moving vehicle at the perimeter of the standoff zone. For a stationary vehicle bomb, vehicle barriers must mark the perimeter of the standoff zone, but they are not required to stop the moving vehicle. They only need to make it obvious if an aggressor attempts to breach the perimeter.

Levels of Protection

3-5. There are three levels of protection for vehicle bombs—low, medium, and high. The primary differences between the levels are the degree of damage allowed to the facility protecting the assets and the resulting degree of damage or injury to the assets.

  • Low. The facility or the protected space will sustain a high degree of damage but will not collapse. It may not be economically repairable. Although collapse is prevented, injuries may occur and assets may be damaged.
  • Medium. The facility or the protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but the structure will be reusable. Occupants and other assets may sustain minor injuries or damage.
  • High. The facility or the protected space will sustain only superficial damage. Occupants and other assets will also incur only superficial injury or damage.

Site-work Elements

3-6. The two primary types of site-work elements for vehicle bombs are the standoff distance and vehicle barriers. The vehicle's speed must also be taken into consideration.

Standoff Distance

3-7. The standoff distance is the maintained distance between where a vehicle bomb is allowed and the target. The initial goal should be to make that distance as far from the target facility as practical. Figure 3-1 shows the distances required to limit building damage to particular levels (including the levels of protection described above) for a range of bomb weights. All bomb weights are given in terms of equivalent pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT), which is a standard way of identifying all explosives regardless of their composition. The example in Figure 3-1 below is a building of conventional construction (common, unhardened construction). Buildings built without any special construction at these standoff distances will probably withstand the explosive effects. Conventionally constructed buildings at standoff distances of less than those shown in Figure 3-1 will not adequately withstand blast effects. (Refer to TM 5-853-1 for information on hardening buildings to resist a blast.) Do not allow vehicles to park within the established standoff distances. Recognize that this restriction can result in significant operational and land-use problems.

3-8. Exclusive Standoff Zone. When an exclusive standoff zone is established, do not allow vehicles within the perimeter unless they have been searched or cleared for access. The zone's perimeter is established at the distance necessary to protect the facility against the highest threat explosive. All vehicles should be parked outside the exclusive standoff zone; only maintenance, emergency, and delivery vehicles should be allowed within the zone after being searched. Figure 3-2 shows an exclusive standoff zone.

 

3-9. Nonexclusive Standoff Zone. A nonexclusive standoff zone is established in a location having a mixture of cars and trucks (with relatively few trucks). A nonexclusive standoff zone takes advantage of aggressors being able to conceal a smaller quantity of explosives in a car than they can in a truck. Therefore, a nonexclusive standoff zone includes inner and outer perimeters. The inner perimeter is set at a distance corresponding to the weight of explosives that can be concealed in cars. The outer perimeter is set at a distance associated with the weight that can be placed in trucks (refer to TM 5-853-1). With these two perimeters, cars can enter the outer perimeter without being searched but they cannot enter the inner perimeter. Trucks cannot enter the outer perimeter, since it is established based on what they can carry. Figure 3-3 shows a nonexclusive standoff zone. The nonexclusive standoff zone provides the advantages of allowing better use of the parking areas and limiting the number of vehicles that need to be searched at the outer perimeter.

Vehicle Barriers

3-10. Two types of vehicle barriers are used for vehicle bombs—perimeter and active barriers. The type of barrier used for a moving vehicle bomb differs from the barrier used for a stationary vehicle bomb. The barrier used for a stationary vehicle bomb does not have to stop a vehicle's motion. The goal for that barrier is to make anybody driving through the barrier noticeable. The assumption is that the aggressor's goal in the stationary vehicle bomb is to park the vehicle and sneak away without being noticed. Crashing through a barrier would be noticeable. Barriers for the moving vehicle bomb need to stop the vehicle's motion; they must be much more substantial.

3-11. Perimeter Barriers. Perimeter barriers are fixed barriers placed around the entire perimeter of a standoff zone. Anything that presents a fixed obstacle will work for the stationary vehicle bomb. Common applications include chain-link fences, hedges made of low bushes, and high (over 8 inches) curbs. Aggressors driving through such barriers are likely to be noticed. Barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles include chain-link fences reinforced with cable, reinforced concrete "Jersey barriers", pipe bollards, plantersditches, and berms. When barriers such as the Jersey barriers and planters are used to stop moving vehicles, they must be anchored into the ground to be effective. The cables in the reinforced fence also have to be anchored into the ground or partially buried. Spaces between barriers should be no greater than 4 feet. Figure 3-4 shows common perimeter barriers for stationary or moving vehicle bombs. Refer also to TM 5-853-1.

3-12. Active Barriers. Active barriers are placed at openings in perimeters where vehicles need to enter or exit. These barriers must be able to be raised and lowered or moved aside. For the stationary vehicle bomb, barriers can be as simple as chain-link, pipe, or wooden gates that can be raised and lowered. Aggressors crashing through any of these or similar obstructions will likely draw attention. For the moving vehicle bomb, the barriers are heavy structures and have many construction and operations considerations associated with them. These barriers may stop vehicles weighing up to 15,000 pounds and travelling 50 miles per hour. They commonly cost tens of thousands of dollars (refer to TM 5-853-1). Some common active vehicle barriers are shown in Figure 3-5. For temporary or deployed conditions, park a vehicle across an opening and move it aside to grant access.

 

 

Speed Control

3-13. It is important to control the speed of a vehicle approaching a barrier used for a moving vehicle bomb. The energy from a vehicle that a barrier must stop increases as its speed increases. The energy also increases with more weight, but the effect of speed is much greater. Therefore, decreasing the vehicle's speed results in smaller and less costly barriers. The best way to limit a vehicle's approach speed to perimeter barriers is to place or retain obstacles in potential approach paths. The vehicles are forced to reduce speed when going around these obstacles. The same principle applies for road approaches. Placing obstacles in a serpentine pattern on the road forces a vehicle to reduce its speed (see Figure 3-6). If the vehicle hits the obstacles instead of going around them, they are still slowed down. Other means to slow vehicles include forcing them to make sharp turns and installing traffic circles.

 

 

Building elements

3-14. Once the standoff distance is established and the site has been laid out, the designers can select the building components necessary to protect the assets against the threat explosives at the standoff distance. The building components include the walls, roofs, doors, and windows. Detailed design issues related to these building elements are covered in TM 5-853-1.

Walls and Roofs

3-15. If the distances shown for the desired damage levels in Figure 3-1 cannot be enforced, the building's walls and roofs will need to be strengthened. This can be achieved in new construction by using reinforced masonry or reinforced concrete in the walls and reinforced concrete in the roof. When the standoff distance is not available for existing construction, a more detailed analysis may be required to determine what the explosion's impact will be on the structure. When the construction is inadequate, more standoff distance should be investigated or the engineers should apply specialized techniques for retrofitting the construction to increase its strength.

Windows

3-16. Historically, glass fragments have caused about 85 percent of injuries and deaths in bomb blasts. There are two basic approaches to mitigating the effects of bomb blasts on glass—retrofitting the windows with film or curtains and using blast-resistant glazing.

3-17. Retrofitting Windows. One of the most common means of decreasing the hazards from broken glass is to install fragment-retention film on the glass. The film is a plastic (polyester) sheet that adheres to the window glass with a special adhesive. The film does not strengthen the glass; but when the glass breaks, it keeps the fragments from spreading throughout the room. The glass fragments stick to the film, and the film either stays in the window frame or falls into the room in one or more large, relatively nonhazardous pieces instead of many small, lethal pieces. Another retrofit approach is to install a blast curtain or a heavy drape behind the window. The curtain or drape catches the glass fragments. The curtains are generally used with fragment-retention film. Another retrofit technique is to use fragment-retention film with a metal bar placed across the window. This "catcher bar" catches the window. The designs for this and other types of retrofit devices are complicated and require specialized engineering-analysis tools. The retrofit techniques are generally thought of as providing a lower level of protection than the glazing replacement techniques. For deployed locations, removing the windows and covering them with plywood minimizes the danger.

3-18. Blast-Resistant Glazing. To achieve higher levels of protection, the window glass must be replaced and the window frame should be reinforced. Because of its expense, this procedure is generally limited to new construction and major renovations. Special blast-resistant glazing and frames are available that use either tempered glass or a plastic glazing (such as polycarbonate). Another promising type of blast-resistant glazing is laminated glass, in which several layers of common glass are adhered together with a special interlayer. The resulting laminated construction is usually stronger than common glass while retaining the same thickness. The interlayer acts similarly to fragment-retention film. For deployed locations, a means of minimizing the danger of windows is to remove them and replace them with plywood.

Doors

3-19. Doors are another building component particularly vulnerable to an explosive blast. Common metal and wood doors provide little resistance to a blast. The two ways to address the problem of doors is to install them in foyers or to replace them. Glass doors or doors containing windows should be avoided.

Foyers

3-20. Door hazards can be reduced by installing doors in foyers during construction or by adding foyers to existing buildings. When a door is located in a foyer and the outer door fails, the outer door flies into a wall instead of the building's interior (see Figure 3-7). The inner door then has a greater chance of remaining intact. This option generally provides a low level of protection.

 

3-21. Another option is to replace the doors with specially constructed blast-resistant doors and frames. These doors are commercially available and can provide a high level of protection, but they are very expensive and heavy. The doorframe must be made of the same type of material and provide the same level of protection as the door.

Detection Elements

3-22. Detection elements for vehicle bombs are limited to the use of guards to control access into standoff zones. The guards search vehicles seeking entry into the perimeter through an entry-control point. The recommended levels of searches depend on the required level of protection (see TM 5-853-1). Guards can be stationed at entry-control points continuously, or they can be summoned to an entry-control point when access is needed. The latter is commonly the case for the inner perimeter of exclusive standoff zones where only delivery and maintenance vehicles need access.

Exterior Attack

3-23. An exterior attack is a physical attack using weapons such as rocks, clubs, improvised incendiary devices (IIDs) such as Molotov cocktails, explosives such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and hand grenades. The explosives can be thrown at or placed near a facility's exterior. Examples of IEDs for this tactic range from pipe bombs and hand grenades to briefcase-sized explosives.

General-Design Strategy

3-24. Because the exterior attack is directed at a facility's exterior surfaces, the general-design strategy is to keep aggressors away from the facility (at a standoff distance) and, if necessary, to harden the facility's exterior components to resist the effects of weapons and explosives. A standoff distance from the facility reduces the degree of hardening required to resist weapons effects. When briefcase-sized bombs are a threat, an obstacle-free zone should be established around the facility and the explosives placed within should be detected and disarmed.

Levels of protection

3-25. The levels of protection for exterior attacks are similar to those for vehicle bombs. Levels of protection vary based on the level of building damage and asset injury or damage allowed. However, due to the limited sizes of explosives involved in this tactic, the damage to the building will be much more localized and injuries or damage to assets will be confined to smaller areas.

Site-work elements

3-26. Site-work elements for exterior attacks are relatively limited because the explosive weights are more limited. Large standoff distances are not a consideration. The common approach to site-work elements is to lay out a standoff zone of about 50 feet and to provide a fence or perimeter barrier about 7 feet high. The purpose of the standoff is to make it harder for aggressors to throw pipe bombs and hand grenades at targets inside the perimeter. Trees can be left around the perimeter to make it harder for aggressors to throw explosives over the fence. The remaining component of site-work elements is a clear zone around the facility. A clear zone is applied so that anything placed in that area can be detected visually. This limits the aggressor's ability to place explosives near the target facility.

Building elements

3-27. Building elements for exterior attacks are similar to those for vehicle bombs. For small IEDs and IIDs, the building-element requirements do not increase the cost of the building significantly. For larger, briefcase-sized bombs, the measures are more significant than for incendiary devices but less than for vehicle bombs.

Walls and Roofs

3-28. Walls and roofs are not a problem with small explosives. Conventional construction normally provides adequate protection. Walls with 6-inch reinforced concrete or 8-inch, grout-filled, reinforced masonry will withstand the effects of typical pipe bombs or hand grenades. The corresponding roof construction is 6-inch reinforced concrete. In the case of briefcase-sized bombs, considerations similar to those discussed for vehicle bombs need to be employed.

Windows

3-29. A significant goal when constructing windows is to make them difficult to throw an explosive or incendiary device through, especially when considering smaller explosives. This is accomplished by constructing smaller windows or making narrow windows (see Figure 3-8 below). For existing windows, parts of the windows can be covered to achieve a narrow effect. These windows still may be susceptible to breakage due to explosive effects, even from the smaller explosives. This problem is solved by installing 3/4-inch-thick plastic (polycarbonate) glazing or by raising the windows over 6 feet high to develop a small standoff distance (as shown in Figure 3-9 below). A 3/4-inch glazing will also stop grenade fragments. Fragment-retention film, a blast curtain, or a heavy drape as described in vehicle-bomb tactics are also good applications for small bombs.

 

Conventionally Constructed Doors

3-30. Doors are not a significant problem with small bombs and incendiary devices. Generally, metal doors are adequate for incendiary devices, and doors placed in foyers (as shown in Figure 3-7) are adequate for pipe bombs and hand grenades. A similar application for briefcase-sized bombs would provide only a low level of protection. To achieve higher levels of protection for briefcase-sized bombs, blast-resistant doors must be installed.

3-31. The requirements to meet the levels of protection for larger explosives are similar to those described for vehicle bombs, but they will not stop grenade fragments. Fragment-retention film and drapes or curtains can provide a low level of protection, but blast-resistant glazing is required to achieve a higher level of protection.

Detection elements

3-32. Other than awareness of aggressor activity on or outside the site, detection is only a specific design goal where briefcase-sized bombs are anticipated. When that is the case, the clear zone around the building must be visually monitored so that any objects placed in it are detected. At higher levels of protection, visual surveillance is augmented by IDSs.

Standoff Weapons

3-33. The standoff-weapons tactic includes the use of AT weapons and mortars. In both of these tactics, the aggressor fires weapons at assets located in the protected facility from a distance. An AT-weapon attack requires a clear LOS to the target, while mortars can fire over obstacles and only need a clear line of flight.

General-Design Strategy

3-34. Standoff-weapons attacks cannot be detected reliably before they occur. Protective design to resist these tactics relies on blocking LOSs to protected areas of a facility or hardening the facility to resist the particular weapon's effects. The approaches to protection against mortars and AT weapons differ from each other and will be discussed separately. Detection measures are not applicable for these tactics.

Levels of Protection

3-35. There are two levels of protection against both mortars and AT weapons. For AT weapons, the low level of protection depends on detonating the AT round before it hits the target facility. The high level of protection avoids the risk associated with that and hardens the building to resist the direct impact of the AT round.

3-36. For mortars, the low level of protection involves allowing some areas of the facility to be sacrificed. Those spaces provide a buffer to the assets to be protected. The assets within the sacrificial areas and the areas themselves may be destroyed. At the high level of protection, the building's exterior fully resists the mortar rounds and there are no sacrificial areas.

Site-work elements

3-37. The primary site-work element for standoff weapons is to obstruct LOSs from vantage points outside of the site. With AT weapons, the aggressor cannot hit what he cannot see. This is not true with mortars, but blocking LOSs from mortar firing points helps to make targeting more difficult. The LOSs are blocked by using trees, other buildings, vehicle parking areas, or fences. Another site-work element, a predetonation screen, applies only to an AT weapon. When using a predetonation screen, the AT round is detonated on the screen and its effects are dissipated in the distance between the screen and the target (see Figure 3-10). Any screen material (such as a wooden fence) will detonate the round unless it has spaces in it. The screen distances vary from less than 10 feet to almost 40 feet, depending on the building construction (see TM 5-853-1). This measure only applies to the low level of protection.

Building elements

3-38. Building elements for AT weapons and mortars involve the building's layout. This includes the materials used in the construction.

Layout

3-39. A building's interior layout is only an issue for the low level of protection against a mortar round. The layout issue involves designating sacrificial areas in which unimportant assets are located. The assets to be protected are located in a hardened interior layer. Figure 3-11 includes a plan view (from above). The sacrificial area has to be both around and above the protected area in case a mortar round comes from above. If such a layout is not feasible, other options include going to a higher level of protection and either hardening the entire building or building the facility underground (which are both very expensive).

Walls and Roofs

3-40. Walls and roofs must offer protection against both AT weapons and mortar rounds. The design of walls that protect against AT weapons varies with the level of protection. For the low level of protection where the round is predetonated, the walls can be of conventional construction, varying with the standoff distance from the predetonation screen to the wall. For higher levels of protection, the walls must resist the full effect of the round, requiring the walls to be 24-inch-thick reinforced concrete. Roofs are not an issue in protecting against AT weapons because it is difficult to get direct LOSs to roofs. If such LOSs are possible, the roof should be designed like the walls.

3-41. To provide protection against mortar rounds, walls and roofs should be designed to resist the explosive effects in the rounds at the standoff distance that the sacrificial space provides. In the case of sacrificial areas, the walls can be of common construction. The interior protected-area walls are then designed of reinforced concrete or reinforced masonry for the standoff distance those sacrificial walls provide. When the walls must resist the full effect of the rounds (as in the higher level of protection), they are likely to be very thick (up to 30 inches of reinforced concrete for some improvised mortars). Similar considerations should be made for roofs. Roofs are designed to take the direct effects of the round or to take the round at the standoff distance provided by the sacrificial area.

Doors and Windows

3-42. It is impractical to provide doors and windows that are resistant to mortar rounds and AT weapons. Windows should only be used in sacrificial areas where there is a mortar threat. When there is an AT weapon threat, windows can only be used where the round is predetonated. The windows should be narrowed or raised to present a smaller target (see Figures 3-8 and 3-9). Doors should be placed in foyers (see Figure 3-7) for protection against AT rounds and to achieve a low level of protection against mortars. Blast-resistant doors are necessary to achieve a high level of protection against mortar rounds.

Ballistics

3-43. In a ballistics tactic, aggressors fire small arms at assets from vantage points outside of the target facility's control. Ballistic attacks cannot be detected reliably before they occur.

General-design strategy

3-44. Protective measures to resist these tactics rely on blocking LOSs to protected areas of a facility or by hardening the facility to resist the ballistic effects. This strategy focuses on assets within buildings. Protecting people or property in the open is difficult and can only be addressed through operational measures. Detection measures are not applicable for this tactic.

LevelS of protection

3-45. There are only two levels of protection for this tactic. The low level of protection depends on blocking LOSs to assets. This strategy assumes that the aggressor cannot hit what he cannot see. The risk of an aggressor firing into a building randomly and hitting something is what makes this the low level of protection. The high level of protection involves hardening building components to resist the ballistic effects. These strategies can be thought of as either hardening or hiding.

Site-work elements

3-46. Site-work elements are of limited use for the ballistics tactic. When they are applied, they are used to obstruct LOSs from vantage points outside of the site, which is consistent with the low level of protection. The LOSs can be blocked using trees, other buildings, motor pools, or fences.

Building elements

3-47. Building elements are the principal means of protecting assets against a ballistics attack. They can be applied to achieve either the low or high level of protection.

Walls and Roofs

3-48. Walls and roofs are inherently opaque, so it is easy to achieve the low level of protection (hiding) with them. Achieving the high level of protection (hardening) for walls and roofs can be done within conventional construction using reinforced concrete, concrete-masonry units (CMUs), or clay brick. The material's required thickness is shown in Table 3-1 below. The thicknesses of CMUs and clay brick are nominal, meaning they do not represent the actual thickness of the material; they represent the thicknesses at which those materials are commercially available. Steel plates (mild steel and armor steel) and bullet-resistant fiberglass can be used to retrofit existing building components that would not provide the needed bullet resistance.

    Table 3-1. Required Thicknesses, in Inches

Ballistics Type

Reinforced Concrete

Grouted CMU*

Clay Brick*

Steel Plate

Bullet-Resistant Fiberglass

Mild

Armor

.38 special

2

4

4

1/4

3/16

5/16

9 mm

2 1/2

4

4

5/16

1/4

7/16

7.62 and 5.56 mm

4

6

6

9/16

7/16

1 1/8

7.62-mm AP

6 1/2

8

8

13/16

11/16

N/A

*Nominal thicknesses

Windows

3-49. Windows can include openings in walls and skylights, although skylights are only an issue where there are LOSs to them. When skylights require protection, treat them like windows. Achieving the low level of protection (hiding) for windows requires making it difficult to see through them, such as installing reflective film on the glass. An aggressor cannot see through the windows during daylight while it is lighter outside than inside, but he may see through them at night when the opposite might be true. Drapes or blinds that can be closed at night address that vulnerability. To achieve the high level of protection requires bullet-resistant window assemblies. These are commercially available for a wide range of ballistics types. They are purchased as manufactured-and-tested assemblies (including glazing and frames, both of which are equally bullet-resistant). The glazing materials and thicknesses and the framing details are proprietary to their manufacturers. The manufacturers make them according to industry test standards to ensure an effective product.

Doors

3-50. Doors without glass easily meet the requirements for the low level of protection. Meeting the high level of protection requires the installation of bullet-resistant door assemblies. Doors can be installed in foyers so that there is no direct LOS into assets within the building (see Figure 3-7) .

Forced Entry

3-51. In the forced-entry tactic, an aggressor tries to forcibly gain access to assets. He may use tools or explosives to breach building components or other barriers.

General-design strategy

3-52. The general-design strategy for forced entry is to detect the aggressor early in the forced-entry attempt and delay him long enough for a response force to intercept him. The combination of detection and defensive measures must provide sufficient time for a response force to intercept the aggressor before he reaches the asset or before he escapes with it, depending on the protective goals for the asset. The first goal would apply where the asset is likely to be destroyed or where access to it is not acceptable. The second goal would be applied when the idea is to prevent it from being stolen.

Levels of protection

3-53. Several levels of protection apply to forced entry. These levels vary in terms of system design, delay time, and response-force arrival time.

Site-work elements

3-54. Site-work elements do not normally play a major role in protecting against a forced entry. However, the site should be laid out and maintained so that an aggressor does not have a hiding place nearby that will conceal his attempts to break into the building. Another site-work element is the application of perimeter barriers, most commonly fences. Fences are effective at delineating a boundary and at keeping honest people honest, but they are ineffective for preventing a forced entry. The design strategy for forced entry is based on delaying the aggressor, and any serious aggressor could climb a fence in less than 4 seconds or can cut through a fence in less than 10 seconds. Therefore, fences are not used as delay elements, but they are used to establish boundaries and as platforms on which to hang sensors. The final site-work consideration is securing utility-access ports such as manholes. If there are utility tunnels through which aggressors can enter a building, those accesses should be locked using padlocks or locking bolts.

Building elements

3-55. Building elements are the principal construction elements of a system for protecting against a forced entry. The building elements are used to provide delay. The process for designing to resist forced entry involves laying out concentric "rings" of delay (called defensive layers). These defensive layers can include the facility's exterior, interior rooms within that layer, and containers within the interior rooms. The individual building components for each of the layers (walls, doors, windows, floors, ceilings, and roofs) provide the delay time (see TM 5-853-1).

Detection elements

3-56. For a protective system to be effective against a forced entry, the aggressors must be detected at a point of adequate delay. Detection at that point can be achieved by using an IDS. Once a sensor detects an aggressor, the alarm annunciator communicates that event to security personnel, who then dispatch a response force. The alarm can be assessed through a guard response or via CCTV. Chapter 6 and TM 5-853-4 provide detailed discussion of IDSs, CCTV systems, and other elements of ESSs.

Covert entry and insider compromise

3-57. In the covert-entry tactic, an aggressor who is not authorized to be in the facility attempts to enter using false credentials. In the insider-compromise tactic, personnel with legitimate access to a facility try to compromise an asset. The insider may or may not have legitimate access to the asset itself. The purpose of the entry in either case can be to steal or otherwise compromise the asset or to destroy it. In the latter case, the aggressor may bring IEDs or IIDs.

General-Design Strategy

3-58. The general-design strategy for both the insider-compromise and covert-entry tactics is to keep people from entering areas they are not authorized to enter. For covert entry, aggressors are denied access to controlled areas. For insider compromise, aggressors are denied access to assets within controlled areas based on their need to have access to them. The general-design strategy also includes detecting aggressors removing assets from protected areas and detecting aggressors carrying tools, weapons, and explosives into protected areas.

Levels of protection

3-59. The levels of protection for these tactics address different issues, depending on whether the aggressor's goal is to steal or otherwise compromise an asset or to destroy it. When the goal is to steal or compromise an asset, the levels of protection vary with the number and sophistication of the access controls required to verify personnel access into a controlled area. When the goal is to destroy the assets, the levels of protection vary with the amount of damage the building (and the assets inside) are allowed to sustain and the sophistication of detecting weapons or explosives at entry points.

Building elements

3-60. Building elements vary with an aggressor's goal. To protect against theft or compromise of assets, building elements are used to establish and maintain controlled areas into which only authorized personnel can enter. For insider compromise, there may be an additional requirement that access be further limited among personnel otherwise authorized access to the controlled area. That access is based on the need to have access to a specific asset. The result is that the controlled area may be compartmentalized, and each compartmentalized area may have separate access requirements. There are no special construction requirements for these tactics if the goal is theft of compromise. The only requirement is that the building elements of controlled areas should provide enough resistance to require aggressors to force their way through them to gain entry and to provide evidence of the forced entry if it is attempted. Forcing entry would be contrary to the aggressor's assumed goal to be covert. In addition, a common design goal would be to limit the number of entrances into controlled areas because there will need to be access control at each entry.

3-61. To protect against the destruction of assets, building elements are used to shield assets from the effects of explosives going off at access-control points. The basic approach is to lay out areas at access points in which guards can search for carried-in weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. The construction of that area is designed to limit damage to the rest of the building if an explosive is detonated in that area. Those levels of damage are similar to those discussed in relation to vehicle bombs. The walls and doors between the access point and the protected area will be hardened, and the walls and doors to the outside will be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building. At the higher level of protection, the access-control area is located in a separate facility and the target building is hardened to resist an explosion in that separate facility.

Detection elements

3-62. Detection elements for these tactics also vary based on the aggressor's goal. For theft, the detection elements are mainly related to access control. For destruction, the detection elements are used to detect weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices.

3-63. The main detection elements for theft or compromise are access-control devices. These can include procedural systems (such as guards checking ID), mechanical systems (such as keyed or combination locks), or electronic entry-control elements (such as electronic card readers, keypads, and biometric devices). Chapter 6 provides detailed discussion of electronic devices. The sophistication of these elements and the number used varies with the level of protection. For example, achieving the higher levels of protection requires the application of multiple forms of access-control elements such as a card reader and an electronic keypad for electronic-entry control or a badge check and badge exchange for a procedural system.

3-64. When destruction of the assets is the goal, detection is oriented toward detecting weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. At the lower levels of protection, it is sufficient for guards to search for carried-in items. Achieving higher levels of protection requires the application of such equipment as metal detectors, X-ray machines, and explosive detectors.

Surveillance and eavesdropping

3-65. Surveillance and eavesdropping tactics include visual surveillance, acoustic eavesdropping, and electronic-emanations eavesdropping. In these tactics, aggressors remain outside of controlled areas and try to gather information from within those areas. The tools used for these tactics include ocular devices for the visual-surveillance tactic and listening devices and electronic-emanations-eavesdropping equipment for the eavesdropping tactic.

General-design strategy

3-66. The general-design strategy for these tactics is to deny aggressors access to information assets. The kind of information (objects, operations, or files; secure conversations; or electronically processed data) and how it can be compromised differs for each tactic as do the specific protective strategies. Therefore, each tactic is addressed separately.

Levels of protection

3-67. Each of these tactics has only one level of protection. Either one protects or fails to protect against these tactics.

Site-work elements

3-68. Site-work elements play a minor role in protecting assets from all surveillance or eavesdropping tactics. The main issue is to eliminate or control vantage points from which aggressors can surveil or eavesdrop on assets or operations. In addition, for the visual-surveillance tactic, a design goal can be to block LOSs from vantage points. Items used to block LOSs include trees, bushes, fences, and other buildings (see Figure 3-12).

 

Building elements

3-69. Building elements are the principal components of the protective strategies for surveillance and eavesdropping tactics. For visual surveillance, the building elements must block LOSs from outside the building. Walls and roofs perform this function effectively. Doors are only a problem when they have windows in them or are made of transparent materials. When this is the case, they can be treated like windows or they can be placed in foyers so that there are no direct LOSs through them. Windows can be treated with reflective film and drapes or blinds as described in the ballistics tactics. When there are LOSs through skylights, they should be treated like windows.

3-70. Building elements for acoustic eavesdropping relate to the construction of areas (preferably separated from the building exterior) that minimize the sound that can be transmitted through them. This requires specialized construction that has a sound-transmission-coefficient (STC) rating. Walls, floors, and ceilings can be constructed to achieve specific STC ratings using conventional construction materials as described in TM 5-853-1. Doors and windows that are STC rated are commonly manufactured and tested as assemblies. This type of design and construction can be expensive.

3-71. Protection against electronic-emanations eavesdropping involves the application of Terminal Electromagnetic-Pulse Emanation Standard (TEMPEST) guidance, most of which is classified. The protection is based on a TEMPEST assessment done for the Army by the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and on guidance in AR 380-19. The results of a TEMPEST assessment will commonly lead to countermeasures from one or more of the following categories:

  • Follow information security policies and procedures recommended during the assessments.
  • Provide controlled space both inside and outside the facility.
  • Provide TEMPEST-shielded equipment.
  • Provide separation between electronic circuits that handle classified information and those that do not. This is commonly called red/black separation.
  • Provide TEMPEST-shielded enclosures. This is specialized, metal-shielded construction that is very expensive.

Mail and supplY Bombs

3-72. In mail- and supply-bomb tactics, aggressors place bombs in materials delivered to a facility. Explosives used in supply bombs are significantly larger (briefcase size) than those in mail bombs (pipe bombs or smaller). Mail bombs are usually directed at individuals, while supply bombs may be used to target larger numbers of people. These tactics assume that the facility containing the asset has a mail-handling area or a supplies-handling and -receiving area. These tactics do not apply if mail or supplies are handled and screened in a different facility.

General-design strategy

3-73. A bomb exploding within a building has more severe effects than the same size bomb exploding outside of the facility because the blast pressures cannot dissipate inside. Also, there is no standoff distance between the explosive and the facility to mitigate blast effects. The general-design strategy for mail and supply bombs is to detect delivered bombs before they explode and to harden the area where the explosion takes place. This minimizes the damage to the remainder of the facility. Occupants and contents within the mail room or supplies-handling area are likely to be killed or destroyed if an undetected bomb explodes.

Levels of protection

3-74. The levels of protection for mail and supply bombs are based on the amount of damage allowed to the building and, therefore, the occupants of the building. They also vary based on the sophistication of the detection measures used.

Building elements

3-75. The purpose of building elements in relation to these bomb tactics is to shield assets from the effects of explosives going off at supply areas, receiving points, or mail rooms. The basic approach is to lay out either a mail room or a supplies-receiving area in which people can search suspicious packages for explosives or incendiary devices. Constructing this type of area will limit the damage to the rest of the building if an explosive is detonated there. Those levels of damage are similar to those discussed in relation to vehicle bombs.

Mail Rooms

3-76. Mail rooms should be located on the facility's exterior, away from any critical assets. The walls and ceiling between the mail room and the remainder of the building are hardened to keep the blast effects out of the facility. The exterior walls and doors should be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building. There may be an explosives container in the mail room where suspicious packages can be placed. If the package explodes, the container will keep its effects from causing damage or injury. The hardened construction will protect assets outside of the mail room if the explosion occurs outside of the container. Check with EOD personnel to determine the local policy for using explosive containers. At higher levels of protection, the mail room is constructed to completely contain the effects of an explosion either through hardened construction or by using a specialized construction called vented suppressive shielding. Mail rooms should not have windows into protected areas. Doors between the mail room and the rest of the building should be avoided, placed in foyers, or replaced with blast-resistant doors, depending on the desired level of protection.

Supplies-Handling Areas

3-77. Supplies-handling areas should also be on the building's exterior, away from critical areas of the facility. Walls and doors between the handling area and the protected area should be hardened, and the exterior walls and doors should be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building. There should be no windows between the handling area and the protected area. At the higher level of protection, the handling area is located in a separate facility and the target building is hardened to resist an explosion in that separate facility.

Detection elements

3-78. Detection for these assets varies with the level of protection. At the lower levels of protection, bombs are detected by inspection. As the level of protection goes up, the sophistication of the detection increases. At the higher levels of protection, equipment such as X-ray examining devices, metal detectors, and explosives detectors can be used. Explosive-detection dogs are an alternative to explosive detectors.

Chemical and biological contamination

3-79. When using chemical- and biological-contamination tactics, aggressors introduce contaminants into the air or water supply to a facility or a group of facilities. Both airborne and waterborne contaminants include chemical, biological, and radiological agents. Aggressors may also forcibly enter a facility to contaminate water or air using the forced-entry tactic.

General-design strategy

3-80. Both chemical and biological agents are difficult to detect in water and air supplies. Radiological agents are relatively easy to detect in water, but they are not commonly included in water-quality examinations. It is unlikely that all agents will be detected, so the general-design strategy for these tactics is to filter out suspected airborne contaminants or to shut off suspected waterborne contaminants. Also, because contaminants can easily be entered into the environment from inside a facility, the strategy includes limiting access to the facility (especially mechanical rooms, water intakes, and so forth).

Levels of protection

3-81. The levels of protection for each of these tactics differ only in the frequency with which some protective measures are exercised. For the low level of protection, they are exercised only in response to a known threat. In the high level of protection, they are exercised continuously.

Site-work elements

3-82. Site-work elements are only significant for waterborne contamination. They include protecting water-treatment plants and water-storage structures. This protection may include constructing perimeter barriers (such as chain-link fences) and controlling access to the plant site. These measures are used because most contaminants require quantities on the order of truckloads to contaminate a water supply, so the focus of security is to keep such large vehicles under control. The perimeter barriers do not need to stop the vehicles because the assumption is that the aggressor wants to be covert. An overt act would alert people to avoid the water supply.

Building elements

3-83. Building elements for both tactics include controlling access so that aggressors cannot sneak in and plant devices in the building. Protection against airborne contamination at a facility involves making elements of the air-handling system (including air intakes) inaccessible and laying out toxin-free areas for people to be protected. A toxin-free area is an area in which the internal air pressure is higher than the external air pressure. Therefore, if a chemical, biological, or radiological device is set off outside, its contaminant will not be able to penetrate the protected area. Achieving that "net positive pressure" requires a significant air-handling system with air filters to filter contaminants out of the air. It also requires an air-lock entrance into the area so contaminants cannot enter through the door. At the low level of protection, the filters and the air-handling system are only used in response to a credible threat. At the high level of protection, that risk is not acceptable and the filters are run continuously.

3-84. The building-element issues for waterborne contamination are limited to providing protection against forced and covert entries into water-treatment plants and water-storage areas. These methods have been previously described. The only additional issue is the provision for alternative water sources. If it is suspected or detected that the water is contaminated, a backup water source should be in place (such as bottled water). For the high level of protection, bottled water should always be used for drinking.

 



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