Divisions - World War I - Mobilization
Soon after Pershing's arrival in France, Pershing called for a force of approximately a million men to be sent to France before the end of 1918. This was the smallest number, Pershing noted, that would afford an independent fighting force, a full field army of 20 divisions and necessary supporting troops. The War Department in turn translated Pershing's recommendation into a plan to send instead by the end of 1918 a total of 30 divisions with supporting services, a total of 1,372,000 men. On 06 July 1917 the US estimated that America should have in France by May 1918, not less than 1,000,000 men. The original tentative program crystallized into a definite plan when in the early part of July, 1917, Gen. Pershing sent a confidential preliminary recommendations. His general organization project of July 10, 1917 contemplated shipment overseas during 1917 and 1918 of an American expeditionary force of 30 divisions.
The General Organization Project of July 10, 1917, was not a shipping project. The General Organization Project had as a basis a force of 30 divisions, which would amount to about 1,000,000 men for service at the front, and then an additional two hundred odd thousand, afterwards raised on account of auxiliaries to something more than that. In the general organization project it was stated that this force of 30 divisions, or its equivalent, men at the front was the smallest force that could be considered as a basis for organization and for fighting in modern war. There was nothing in the general organization project that modified in any way the cablegram of July 6, 1917, which recommended that a million men be in France by May 1918. The program of July 6 did not extend beyond May, 1918.
The cablegram of December 2, 1917, from the AEF Headquarters of General Pershing to the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, stated that "With Russia out of the war it is possible for the Central Powers to concentrate 250 to 260 divisions on the western front and still leave a certain number on the eastern front, and 26 divisions to hold the Italians.... In view of these conditions, it is of the utmost importance to the allied cause that we move swiftly. The minimum number of troops we should plan to have in France by the end of June [1918] is 4 army corps or 24 divisions in addition to troops for service of the rear."
On 21 March 1918, approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available - the First and Second then in line, and the Twentysixth and Forty-second just withdrawn from line after one month's trench warfare training. In addition to these troops, one regiment of the Ninety-third Division was with the French in the Argonne, the Forty-first Depot Division was in the Services of Supply, and three divisions (Third, Thirty-second, and Fifth) were arriving.
But so disastrous were the developments in Europe - the Nivelle offensive, Passchendaele, Caporetto, the Russian Revolution - that Pershing felt impelled to revise his estimate. At a meeting of the Supreme War Council held at Abbeville May 1 and 2, 1918, the entire question of the amalgamation of Americans with the French and British was reopened. An urgent appeal came from both French and Italian representatives for American replacements or units to serve with their armies. The follow-up conference which had been agreed upon at Abbeville was held at Versailles on June 1 and 2 (1918). The opinion of the allies as to the existing situation and the urgency of their insistence upon further priority for infantry and machine gunners was shown by the following message prepared bv the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and agreed to by Gen. Foch: "Gen. Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 allied divisions now oppose 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions... he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an Army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done."
On June 21, 1918, General Pershing transmitted a program which was based on what he thought could be accomplished by the troop ships that would probably be available. That June 21 program recommended that a total of 66 divisions or better if possible, together with the necessary service of supply troops and replacements, be sent to France prior to May, 1919. That would give an available force of about 3,000,000 soldiers for the summer campaign of 1919; and if this force were maintained - and of course augmented during the summer - it was believed there would be every hope of concluding the war before the end of 1919.
Then on June 25, which was four days later, Gen. Pershing had a conference with Marshal Foch and Mr. Clemenceau. As the result of that conference a joint recommendation was made which contemplated a total of 100 divisions by July 1919. In a cable reporting this, it was also reported that Mr. Clemenceau. who was then the prime minister of France, had given assurance that every possible effort would be made to supplement deficiencies in supplies and equipment, including munitions and aviation. The explanation of the increase in the program recommended on June 21, an increase which was made four days thereafter, is found in the assurance obtained from Mr. Clemenceau that they would be able to equip American troops.
If they had 100 divisions complete, with all auxiliaries, it would mean a total of 5,000,000 men, in round numbers. In that same cablegram 80 divisions were mentioned as being a desirable program for April 1919. In order to have the answer complete, one could multiply the number of divisions by 50,000 men. A division consisted, as it finally was adopted, of, in round numbers, 28,000 men. To that must be added corps troops, and to that again must be added army troops, and to that service of supply troops; so that the total force abroad per division amounted to from 50,000 to 52,000 men.
The 100 Division program, which embodied a material increase in the previous official program, contemplated 2,250,000 men in France by December 31, 1918, as compared with 1,372,399 contemplated by the program of October 7, 1917.
Lacking carefully calculated analysis, Pershing's recommendation appears to have been inspired simply by an impulse to have as many divisions as possible and by the knowledge that he would probably get less than he asked for. Even 80 divisions, he conceded, would probably overtax AEF transportation and supply facilities. After a study, US Army Chief of Staff Major General Peyton C. March concluded that a 100-division program was impossible and that the best he could possibly hope to achieve was 80 divisions.
On 23 July 1918 March sent this information to General Bliss, the American military representative on the Supreme War Council at Versailles. March did not send such amessage to Pershing. Perhaps he assumed that Bliss would tell him.
The organization of twelve new divisions was announced by General March, Chief of Staff, in statements made on July 24 and July 31. These divisions were numerically designated from 9 to 20, and organized at Camps Devens, Meade, Sheridan, Custer, Funston, Lewis, Logan, Kearny, Beauregard, Travis, Dodge, and Sevier. Each division had two infantry regiments of the regular army as nucleus, the other elements being made up of drafted men. The new divisions moved into the designated camps as the divisions already trained there moved out.
Pershing certainly knew about March's decision by the first week of August, when Lloyd George cabled Clemenceau that America had abandoned the 100-division program and was shooting for only 80. Clemenceau gave a copy of the cable to Pershing a few days later. Yet the AEF commander continued to urge the 100 division program as a minimum. "This is the very least American force that will insure our victory in 1919," he cabled Washington on 17 August."
But what was meant by "a division"? Was it a combat division, or did it also include what was called a depot division, which provided replacements to keep combat divisions going? On 20 August 1918 Pershing told his staff that the 80-division program meant 80 combat divisions. With the necessary depot divisions to go along with them (one for every five combat divisons), that made a total of 96 - very near the 100 that Pershing had requested. The War Department was not thinking this way and confusion was being compounded. Pershing was calling for 100 divisions as a "minimum," without expecting to get them and possibly not even believing they were needed. The War Department was planning on 80 divisions, without, however, telling its field commander, who was officially in the dark for two months after the decision was made. And that same field commander, knowing unofficially through Bliss and Lloyd George that 80 divisions was the official program, tried to hedge by stating that 80 was really 96. Furthermore, different people calculated differently as to the number in a division. For Foch, Clemenceau, and Bliss, 100 divisions meant 4,160,000; for March, 4,260,000; for Pershing, "at least 5,000,000." It was a strange way to run a war.
The General Staff in the War Department studied three plans - 60 divisions, 80 divisions, and 100 divisions. The study showed that the Army could do better than 60 divisions. In the 100-division program, one of the first obstacles encountered was the fact that even if the Army got this force to France, it could not supply it. There were not enough harbors, and not enough berths for ships in France. There were also many other apparently insurmountable difficulties, but this alone was enough. Eighty divisions, therefore, came very near to being ourmaximum effort. In addition to the 80 divisions to be in France, there were also to be 18 divisions maintained under training in the United States.
When Secretary of the Army Baker arrived in France in September 1918, he was surprised to find Pershing calculating on having many more men there by July 1919 than March was planning. Informed of this, March cabled Pershing on 25 September, over two months after the decision had been made, that a 100-division program was out of the question. The most that could be accomplished was 80 divisions, and that meant a total of 80 divisions, both combat and depot, with a division being calculated at 40,000 men.
The appropriation for the fiscal year 1918-19 was analyzed and based upon a military program of 44 divisions and as such was divided up and segregated to the different activities required of the Signal Corps. The testimony of the Chief of Staff was to the effect that the program submitted at the time the Army act was passed was for 42 divisions abroad with 12 divisions at home, which would make a total of 54, constituting an army, in round figures, of 3,000,000 men.
That military program was very much enlarged by September 1918. The program contemplated 80 divisions abroad, with 18 divisions at home, constituting an army of 4,850,000 men. It was proposed to raise and equip 80 divisions, to be in service in France at the end of the fiscal year, and in addition the equivalent of 25 divisions in the United States, 18 of which would be organized and seven in various other States and camps. While the new Army program contemplated 98 divisions, containing 4,850,000 men in round figures, yet in order to maintain that maximum strength, after it was once reached, it would be necessary to call to the colors considerably in excess of that number. The 80 divisions abroad would be kept at the maximum strength by being fed from the 18 divisions at home.
As it turned out, neither 80, 96, nor 100 divisions were needed in Europe in 1919,although few could have predicted this. When someone asked Pershing in early October 1918 when the war would end, he answered, "I do not know.""
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