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1993 - Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP)

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) supports the Army's strategy for providing a rapid deployment capability for Army contingency forces based in the Continental United States (CONUS) to meet regional commitments. The present National Military Strategy calls for forward presence, but with primary reliance on CONUS-based contingency forces. Only four of the Army's Divisions are stationed outside CONUS; the remaining Army divisional force is stationed in CONUS. The Army's global prepositioning strategy calls for 7 prepositioned brigade sets (two in Central Europe, one in Italy, one in Korea, two in SWA, and one afloat.). ASMP is key to ensuring these forces possess a credible power projection capability.

The ASMP Action Plan, published on 2 March 1993, resulted in the Army's developing the capability to provide a crisis response force of up to corps size with the following mobility standards:

• A light or airborne brigade-size force to be inserted into a theater by C+4, with the remainder of that division to close not later than C+12. The force, including its personnel, equipment, and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.
• An afloat heavy combat brigade with support to close in the theater and be ready to fight not later than C+15.
• The Army Preposition Afloat [APA] brigade force would be a 2x2 heavy brigade: two armored and two mechanized battalions plus support. APA also provides theater-opening CS/CSS units and sustainment stocks for the first 30 days of contingency. This force would be organized into force modules tailored to meet the CINC's needs.
• By C+30, two heavy divisions-a mix of mechanized infantry, armored, or air assault forces, depending on the theater commander's priorities, including the logistical support structure-would close in theater. The equipment for the heavy force would transit by sea.
• The remaining force - two divisions and support - would close by C+75.
• Air transport would be the preferred mode of travel for all contingency force personnel.

For this program to be successful, three key mobility initiatives are critical: the acquisition of fast sealift shipping, the creation of an APA capability, and the infrastructure and procedures necessary to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces from their locations through CONUS ports.

A key aspect of ASMP is continued support of airlift and sealift acquisition programs. For airlift, this means support for building the Air Force's C-17 fleet to 120 aircraft as validated by the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS). For sealift, this means support for the acquisition of the nineteen large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships and expansion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) roll-on/roll-off [RORO] fleet to 36 ships as recommended by the MRS. As of 1995 twenty-nine ROROs were in RRF status, and two more were purchased and were modified to RRF standards with FY96 funding. The last 5 ROROs were unfunded as of August 1995.