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Intelligence


Threats - Security Service MI5

At any one time there is a range of threats of differing types, which the Service must address with finite resources. A key task for the Service therefore is to ensure that resources are allocated according to the nature and comparative gravity of those threats. Annually, the Service's judgments on these matters are validated externally, including by Ministers. The chart below gives an idea of how the relative proportions of the Service's effort against the main threats have varied since 1990.

Security threats to the UK have changed greatly in recent years, most notably with the end of the Cold War, which in turn ended the Service's long-standing focus on the very substantial threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. In parallel, the threat to British parliamentary democracy from subversion diminished over a number of years and is now negligible. However, the fall of the Soviet bloc generated instability throughout the former Soviet Union and beyond; that instability and the loss of centralised control added to other threats, including the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of organised crime. Espionage against the UK has continued, although the overall level of threat has reduced. Terrorism has persisted throughout.

Terrorism

Since the late 1960s, the Security Service has been involved in combating terrorist threats to British interests, both within the UK and overseas. The proportion of the Service's resources devoted to countering both Northern Ireland-related and international terrorism has increased substantially over the years. In recent years terrorist attacks of all kinds worldwide have averaged almost 60 a month, so terrorism is likely to remain a focus of activity by the Service. Countering terrorism is a complex task, not least because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate information about the intentions and activities of secretive and sometimes highly organised groups, many of which are based in inaccessible areas overseas, sometimes under the protection of regimes whose interests they also serve. The collective effort - both nationally and internationally - as well as the techniques involved, have had to keep pace with the increasing sophistication of terrorists and their operating methods.

In an open and democratic society, the initial advantage is likely to lie with the terrorists. In particular, there are limits to what can be done to prevent attacks which are planned and launched from abroad. The Service's principal objective is therefore, over time, to erode the capacity of terrorist groups to initiate and sustain campaigns against British interests and those of Britain's allies. There have been significant successes - many of them invisible to the public - in preventing acts of terrorism both in the UK and abroad, in helping law enforcement agencies to arrest terrorists and in otherwise disrupting their activities.

Terrorism related to Northern Ireland

Between 1969, when the most recent phase of the Troubles began in Northern Ireland, and April 1998, more than 3,000 people lost their lives, and more than 30,000 were injured as a result of terrorist violence. Substantial economic damage has also been caused. In addition to the human casualties, the cost of city-centre bombings, such as those in the City of London in April 1992 and April 1993, in London's docklands in February 1996 and in Manchester in June 1996, was substantial.

The main terrorist organisations on the republican side - the Provisional IRA (PIRA), Republican Sinn Fein's 'military wing', which calls itself the 'Continuity IRA', and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) - have sought, by violent means, to create a unified republic in the island of Ireland. Although they have been most active in Northern Ireland, republican terrorist groups, especially PIRA, have carried their attacks to the British mainland and to the continent of Europe. Foreign nationals as well as British subjects have been killed and injured as a result. British politicians have been killed and on two occasions PIRA has attempted to kill members of the Cabinet: the bombing of the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in 1984 and the mortar attack on Downing Street in 1991.

Northern Irish loyalist paramilitary organisations, notably the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), have all been involved in a violent campaign in response to what they claim to regard as the threat posed to the protestant community in Northern Ireland by republican terrorism. Much of their activity has been essentially sectarian in character, often resulting in the random murder of Catholics who may have no connections of any kind with republican terrorism. Before the ceasefire declarations in August 1994, loyalist groups were murdering more people than PIRA. Both loyalist and republican groups, especially PIRA, have for some years sought support from outside the island of Ireland to sustain their campaigns of violence. Such support has included the provision of weapons and finance. PIRA's principal supplier during the 1980s was Libya, but the organisation has also acquired weaponry and related equipment via sympathisers in North America; through thefts; and from the arms black market in Europe.

Other groups have been less ambitious, relying mainly on small scale purchases from dealers and criminal contacts. Funds have frequently been obtained through criminal activities in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but they have also been obtained further afield - for example by loyalist groups in Britain and by republican groups from sympathisers overseas. In Northern Ireland the Security Service works in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in respect of Irish-related terrorism. On the mainland of Great Britain, the Security Service was given lead responsibility for intelligence work against Irish republican terrorism in 1992. This role was in addition to its existing work against loyalist terrorist activity on the mainland and against all overseas manifestations of Irish-related terrorism (such as weapons procurement and PIRA attacks in Europe).

Between 1992 and April 1998, the Service's work with the police against Irish republican terrorism resulted in 18 convictions for serious terrorist-related offences. Many intended attacks, including large city-centre bombings, were prevented. In addition, various attempts by loyalist terrorists to obtain weaponry from the mainland have been disrupted in joint operations with the police.

The Service's work on the threat from terrorism relating to Northern Ireland is set against the backdrop of political developments, including, significantly, the agreement reached in April 1998 which set out the basis for a political settlement, subject to referendums North and South of the border. As with all of its work, the Service monitors closely any changes in the nature and level of the threat, including that posed by groups opposed to the peace process (such as the recently created 32 County Sovereignty Committee), and makes adjustments to the effort deployed accordingly.

International Terrorism

For many years the UK has also been exposed to the threat of terrorism originating overseas. British interests, and the interests of its friends and allies, have been threatened and attacked at home and abroad. Nationalist or separatist struggles in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East have given rise to such terrorism, while minorities, religious extremists and others have used violent methods to advance their causes. As an illustration, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) has been responsible for widespread massacres in Algeria itself, as well as a series of bombs in France in 1995; the Palestinian group HAMAS mounted a series of suicide bomb attacks in Israel; and Egyptian terrorists carried out three major attacks on tourist buses between 1995 and 1997, as well as an attack on tourists in Luxor in November 1997 in which 58 people (including six Britons) were murdered. These and other similar groups have supporters in the UK. Britain's involvement in multi-national peacekeeping and similar international initiatives - such as in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia - has also resulted in a terrorist threat to British interests. For example, buildings used by British and allied forces were the targets of large vehicle-bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996.

British citizens and businesses are vulnerable to terrorism, both as targets in their own right and as bystanders to others' quarrels. British soldiers, officials, business people and tourists have all been the victims of terrorism. As well as widely-reported events such as the July 1994 bomb attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in London, recent years have seen Britons involved in terrorist-related kidnappings in Kashmir, Indonesia, Colombia, Chechnya, Yemen and Cambodia, and caught up in the terrorist seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima in December 1996. In addition, some terrorist groups and their supporters have sought to use Britain as a place to raise funds, procure equipment and recruit new members - activities which are in themselves usually non-violent, but which can often contribute significantly to terrorism elsewhere.

Some states have used - and some continue to use - terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, either by means of their intelligence services or through sponsorship of surrogate terrorist groups. For example, the investigation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988 resulted in warrants being issued for the arrest of two Libyan officials, believed to have been involved in the attack. The targets of state terrorism have also included their own dissidents and émigrés. State sponsorship has included the provision of weapons, training, finance and refuge to terrorists.

Like other industrialised states, the UK has been affected by developments in technology, and particularly in information technology and military weaponry, which give terrorists access to greater sophistication and know-how than a generation ago. The Security Service needs to keep abreast of these developments in order to continue to counter the threat posed. In addition, the Service investigates any indications that terrorists or other extremists might be developing or trying to obtain chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological materials as terrorist weapons.

As in the field of Northern Ireland-related terrorism, the Security Service works closely with UK law enforcement agencies and with overseas security and intelligence services to disrupt terrorist activity - not only specific attacks, where pre-emptive intelligence permits, but also the procurement of weapons and funds. Recent years have seen both kinds of disruption successfully employed against UK-based terrorists or their supporters. In responding to terrorist attacks against British interests overseas, the Security Service works closely with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and with both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the British mission in the country concerned. The Service also advises the FCO and other relevant government departments on the changing terrorist threats to British interests abroad.

Espionage

During the Cold War the Security Service devoted much of its effort to countering the skilful and well-resourced intelligence services of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. The collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought fundamental changes to this area of the Service's work. Most Central and East European Intelligence Services, formerly little more than Soviet surrogates, were reformed to serve new, democratically elected governments. The Security Service, along with other western security and intelligence agencies, took the opportunity to assist many of them in their efforts to reorganise and reorientate their work and functions. This assistance included advice on how to integrate their intelligence machinery within the framework of a democratic system of government. These new relationships have developed to allow the exchange of information on subjects of shared concern, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

A range of countries seek to advance their political, economic and military objectives using covert methods against the UK, and the spectrum of interests on which they are seeking to gather information is wider than in the past. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia and the UK have developed a new and increasingly cooperative relationship. Despite this, however, Russia has retained its substantial and active overseas intelligence collection effort. After a period of retrenchment in the early 1990s, both the civilian and military Russian intelligence services renewed their efforts to send intelligence officers to London. A number of cases illustrate the continuing Russian espionage threat in the 1990s: in the UK, Michael John Smith, who worked for electronics companies engaged in sensitive government work; in the US, Aldrich Ames (CIA), Harold James Nicholson (CIA) and Earl Edwin Pitts (FBI); and Francis Temperville, a former employee in the Directorate of Military Affairs at the Atomic and Energy Commission in France. All of these were convicted of spying for Russia.

The Security Service's counter-espionage work is focused on:

  • investigating leads that may result in the identification of spies who are providing foreign countries with sensitive information damaging to the UK's national security or economic well-being; and
  • disrupting the activities of those foreign intelligence officers who 'talent-spot' and recruit as agents individuals who have access to British secrets.

A few of the spies who have been identified in the UK in the past were controlled directly from abroad, but the great majority have been run by foreign intelligence officers based in this country. Historically, the Government has insisted that nationals of certain countries obtain visas before being allowed to enter the UK. This allows the Service to recommend, where necessary, that a visa be refused on national security grounds. Over the years, this precaution has severely hampered foreign intelligence services in their efforts to place intelligence officers in the UK to recruit and run agents.

As well as those who work under cover of postings in the diplomatic community, foreign intelligence officers have also tried to gain access to sensitive information in the UK by masquerading as trade officials, businessmen or members of scientific delegations. The greater flexibility of modern travel and the growing emphasis on the acquisition of sensitive commercial, economic and technical information, mean that foreign intelligence services may increasingly use short-term visits of this sort as cover for their intelligence operations. On their home ground, or in other countries where they encounter little opposition from the local security agencies, foreign intelligence services are able to be far more aggressive in their espionage efforts against British interests. Consequently, for many years the Service has worked with other government departments, especially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, to protect government personnel and premises overseas from espionage attack.

Proliferation

Since 1992, the Service has played a part in countering the threat posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), namely nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their strategic means of delivery (usually ballistic missiles). The collapse of the former Soviet Union has led to increased dangers in this area. The sale of WMD components and missiles is an attractive source of revenue for economically hard-pressed countries. There are ready buyers, particularly in the Middle East, for materials either to rebuild confiscated stocks or to provide a deterrent against an aggressive neighbour. More than 20 countries are currently seeking to evade international controls to develop WMD capability. Some are hostile to the UK and its allies; some have unstable regimes. Iraq's use of chemical weapons in the past has been well publicised.

There is therefore a substantial threat from proliferation which goes far wider than the UK. The response of the international community in seeking to prevent proliferation is expressed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which the UK, as a signatory, has a duty to act against proliferators. The direct threat to the UK is twofold: first, that UK armed forces will be exposed to the threat of WMD when deployed overseas; and secondly, that the UK will itself come within reach as longer-range missiles are acquired by potentially hostile or unstable countries.

Much of the material, technology and expertise required for WMD programmes can be found in the UK. Although the UK has stringent export 18 controls in place, the countries that are trying to procure equipment and know-how use increasingly sophisticated, covert and devious methods to circumvent these controls. These include the use of front companies and middlemen, and of students sent to the UK for postgraduate study. There are also increasing indications of the use of non-proliferating countries as apparent destinations for WMD-related materials, which are then shipped on to their true customers.

The Security Service, acting in cooperation with other government departments and agencies, aims to counter proliferation activity in the UK by:

  • investigating attempts by proliferator countries to procure materials and expertise from the UK which could aid WMD programmes;
  • investigating the potential benefits to WMD programmes that students and academics from countries of concern may obtain from study in the UK (the intangible transfer of technology). When necessary the Service may advise that such students and academics should be refused entry to the UK; and
  • visiting UK companies, chambers of commerce, universities, and professional and trade associations to raise their awareness of the activities and requirements of proliferator countries, and to obtain information on their dealings with them. For instance, more than 700 companies have been visited since the start of the programme in 1992.

Serious Crime

On 14 October 1996 new legislation extended the Service's statutory remit to include supporting the law enforcement agencies in work on serious crime. This change in the Service's remit reflected the Government's intention that Security Service expertise should also be deployed in the fight against serious crime. The Service's work in this area has been financed from within existing Service resources. The 1996 legislation makes it clear that the primary responsibility for work against serious crime remains with law enforcement agencies. Close working relationships with those agencies, including the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) are therefore central to the way that the Service carries out its work in this area. The legislation requires there to be arrangements governing how the Service fulfils its role in serious crime work. Under these arrangements, the Service is tasked to take on investigations on a case-by-case basis, where it is agreed that its particular skills, knowledge or capabilities are likely to help the investigation. The Service will then bring to bear its investigative capabilities as required, with a view to assisting the law enforcement agency to collect the necessary intelligence.

Subversion

Subversion in the UK is essentially an historical phenomenon. The Security Service Act does not use the term 'subversion', but provides a definition of it by reference to actions which are "intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, 19 industrial or violent means". The concept of subversion was therefore focused on hostility to the democratic process. It embraced both extreme left wing (Communist, Trotskyist) and extreme right wing (Fascist) subversive groups, and included those whose allegiance lay with countries hostile to the UK. Historically, Britain faced a very real threat from subversive organisations which sought to undermine parliamentary democracy - and had the capability to do so - most notably during the Cold War. Indeed some of these organisations made no secret of their intentions. Their activities were of concern to successive governments and were an important subject of attention by the Security Service. A particular focus of this work was to deny members of such groups access to sensitive government information. This was achieved through the vetting process announced in 1948 by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. Subversive groups (including, in the past, Communist organisations) have sought to infiltrate and manipulate bona fide organisations, such as trade unions or pressure groups, as a way of exercising influence out of proportion to any support they could achieve through the ballot box. The Service investigated the activities of the subversive groups, but not the organisations they sought to penetrate. The Service never investigated people merely because they were members of trade unions or because they campaigned on particular issues such as nuclear disarmament.

Since the late 1980s, and particularly following the end of the Cold War, the threat from subversive organisations to British parliamentary democracy has declined and is now insignificant.

Protective Security

The Service also works to reduce the vulnerability to those threats through its contribution to the protection of government assets and the UK's critical infrastructure. This aspect of the Service's work is integral to its function of protecting national security.

Protective security is concerned with protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and other important assets. It encompasses such problems as how to protect against acts of terrorism; against unauthorised access to buildings or computer systems; and against eavesdropping or interception of sensitive communications. The work has many aspects, including advising on locks and cabinets, passes and passwords, building structures, guards, fences, walls and intruder detection systems. It includes vetting arrangements for those who are authorised to have access to the protected assets, making them aware of threats and encouraging them to act securely. It also includes contingency planning, for when things go wrong. The Security Service provides specialist advice to Government on all of these matters. Its role is threefold: assessing the threats, advising on policy and practice and assisting with the security planning of major projects or important installations.

Protective measures must be appropriate to the threat. The Service's intelligence branches identify and, as far as possible, take action to counter specific threats to national security. They also study the ways in which hostile organisations operate: for example, the modus operandi of terrorist organisations and the kind of weapons they employ; and the methods used by foreign intelligence services, together with the types of intelligence they are trying to acquire. Such information provides the basis for assessments of the level and type of threat to individual departments and the assets they hold. Taking into account additionally the number of security incidents, such as computer viruses and hacking, theft or accident, the Service is able to provide assessments of the nature and extent of different kinds of threat which need to be protected against.

The development and coordination of the Government's central policy framework on protective security is the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. The Service provides specialist advice on the practical development of that policy. Where security of IT systems is concerned, the Service operates jointly with the Communications-Electronics Security Group in GCHQ. Within the Government's central framework each department is responsible for the security of the assets it holds and is required to identify the risks to those assets, drawing on the threat assessments provided by the Service. They then implement security measures to reduce vulnerability to these risks in the most cost-effective way. The Service is able to provide guidance on how to do this, but responsibility for identifying risks and implementing security measures rests with the department itself.

The Service also advises certain organisations outside central government. For example, it advises those parts of industry which are involved in sensitive government defence and other contracts. It also advises those elements of commerce and industry whose services and products are of critical national importance: those which, if damaged, would cause unacceptable economic disruption, widespread loss of services or serious hazard to the public. The industries concerned include air, rail and sea transport, oil, gas, water, telecommunications, power generation and distribution, and banking.

Vetting

The purpose of personnel security measures, of which vetting forms a part, is to provide an acceptable level of assurance that people with authorised access to sensitive government information or valuable assets will not abuse that access - for example, by passing secret information to a foreign government, or using it for personal financial advantage. As with protective security as a whole, overall policy in this area is set by Government, while individual departments have responsibility for their own security within the framework of that policy. This means that departments conduct their own background enquiries (such as police record checks, references, interviews etc) on applicants to sensitive posts and make their own decisions on whether or not to employ particular individuals. The Security Service does the same for its own staff. The vetting process is overt: security clearance cannot be sought for an individual without his or her consent.

Since before the Second World War, the Security Service has assisted government departments and organisations by providing a service of record-checks on candidates for sensitive posts.

In 1948, the Attlee Government formally introduced security vetting aimed at excluding both communists and fascists from positions where they might damage the security of the state. In support of this policy, during the Cold War the Service sought to identify members of subversive organisations. The ending of the Cold War has substantially altered the view that is taken of individuals with a record of involvement in various subversive organisations, and in recent years the main emphasis has been on protecting government information and important installations from individuals with terrorist connections. The policy of vetting for sensitive positions in government was reaffirmed in 1994 by the Prime Minister, John Major.

The Security Service Act 1989 stipulates that the Service may disclose information for use in deciding whether someone should be employed only if it does so in accordance with arrangements approved by the Home Secretary. Under those arrangements, if the Service finds that it has a relevant record on a candidate for a sensitive post, it will make a brief summary assessment of the suitability of the individual purely on security grounds. In the vast majority of cases, the Service has no record of the individual concerned. The existence of a record does not necessarily imply that an adverse assessment will be submitted. In 1997, the Service gave assessments in fewer than 0.1% of the vetting cases submitted by departments for checks, the majority relating to some degree of connection with terrorism or espionage.

The Security Service's role in the vetting of an individual by a government department is based solely on its records - the Service does not investigate or interview candidates for sensitive posts, nor does it look into aspects of their character or behaviour. Even where the Service does disclose information in response to a vetting check, its assessment may contain the judgment that the information need not on its own prevent the candidate from having sensitive access. In those cases the department considers whether it has other grounds for doubting reliability before reaching a decision. In respect of the Service's contribution to vetting by departments, the oversight arrangements that form part of the Security Service Act 1989 provide recourse to the Security Service Tribunal. The Tribunal's responsibilities include the investigation of complaints from individuals who believe that the Service has improperly disclosed information about them in a vetting context:

"If and so far as the complainant alleges that the Service has disclosed information for use in determining whether he should be employed, or continue to be employed, by any person or in any office or capacity specified by him, the Tribunal shall investigate whether the Service has disclosed information for that purpose and, if the Tribunal finds that it has done so, they shall determine whether the Service had reasonable grounds for believing the information to be true."




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