• Military
• WMD

• Intelligence Menu               

• Systems
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Imagery
• Links

• Homeland Security
• Space

Organization - Security Service MI5

The Security Service operates under the statutory authority of the Secretary of State (the Home Secretary), but it is not part of the Home Office. In a democracy there is an inherent tension between the existence of a Security Service with intrusive investigative capabilities and the preservation of individuals' privacy. As long as covert threats to the nation persist, the Service may need to invade the privacy of a very small minority in order to protect the security of the great majority. But there must also be safeguards. In addition to its own tightly drawn internal controls, the Service is subject to the following external oversight and accountability measures:

• The Director General is accountable under the Security Service Act 1989 to the Home Secretary. The Director General is appointed by the Home Secretary in consultation with the Prime Minister and is required to submit a report to them annually. The Director General is statutorily responsible for all aspects of the operations and efficiency of the Service, and for ensuring that it obtains and discloses information only in accordance with its functions under the Act.
• The Security Service Act provides for an independent Tribunal, supported by a Commissioner (a senior judge), to investigate complaints about the Service from members of the public. The Commissioner is also responsible for reviewing the issue by the Secretary of State of Property Warrants under the Intelligence Services Act 1994.
• The Interception of Communications Act 1985 also provides for a Tribunal, supported by a Commissioner (also a senior judge), to investigate complaints about interception of telephone or postal communications. The Commissioner is also responsible for reviewing the issue of interception warrants by the Secretary of State.
• Under the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Service, together with SIS and GCHQ, is overseen by the Intelligence and Security Committee, a committee of Parliamentarians, on matters of expenditure, administration and policy.
• The Service's performance, plans and priorities are subject to external scrutiny and validation by a senior Whitehall committee, known as SO(SSPP), reporting to Ministers.

The Director General has one Deputy who is responsible for overseeing intelligence operations. There are five branches, each headed by a Director: three branches are engaged in intelligence investigations and in advising on protective measures to counter the various threats; the other two are responsible for intelligence collection, production and information management, and for personnel, security, finance and facilities management. There is also a Legal Advisers' department. In addition, the Service fills the post of Director and Coordinator of Intelligence (Northern Ireland), who reports separately both to the Director General and to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

The Director General, Deputy Director General, the Directors and the Legal Adviser meet regularly as the Management Board of the Service to consider policy and strategic issues. In particular, the Management Board decides how the priorities and organisation of the Service should change to reflect shifts in the pattern and intensity of threats.

The Service currently employs around 1,900 people (a full-time equivalent strength of 1,860), who are mostly based at its headquarters at Millbank in central London. The Director General has a Deputy who oversees intelligence operations, and there are six Directors. The Service is divided into branches, each headed by a Director.

Oversight and Accountability

The Security Service Act 1989 sets out a number of statutory mechanisms for the accountability and control of the Service and its work. It:

• places the Service under the authority of the Secretary of State (the Home Secretary);
• sets out the responsibilities of the Director General; and
• provides for an independent Tribunal and Commissioner to deal with complaints about the Service from the public.

The Act also contained provisions, subsequently incorporated into the Intelligence Services Act 1994, for the issue of warrants by the Secretary of State authorising interference with property, and for the review by the Commissioner of the Secretary of State's exercise of this function. These statutory mechanisms have been considered and endorsed by the European Commission on Human Rights in a number of applications under the European Convention on Human Rights arising out of complaints to the Security Service Tribunal. The Service is also subject to various other forms of oversight and accountability, notably:

• the provisions of the Interception of Communications Act 1985, including a Tribunal to handle complaints about interception, and a Commissioner who is responsible for reviewing the Secretary of State's exercise of his functions in issuing warrants;
• oversight by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), a committee of Parliamentarians which was established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994;
• external review and validation of the Service's priorities and performance by a senior Whitehall committee (SO(SSPP))
• Ministerial oversight of the Service's funding arrangements;
• scrutiny of the Service's spending plans by the Permanent Secretaries' committee on the Intelligence Services (PSIS), as part of the budgetary process; and
• scrutiny by the National Audit Office, which has access to any of the Service's financial records it requires.

The mechanisms for oversight of the Service have undergone many changes throughout its history, as different Governments have addressed the particular requirements of the day. Originally established under the Prime Minister's authority, and later under the Home Secretary with the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive to the Service of 1952, the Service is now accountable for its work via the range of oversight arrangements described above.

The Roles of the Home Secretary and the Director General

The Director General is appointed by the Home Secretary, in consultation with the Prime Minister. The Director General is personally responsible for:

• the operations and efficiency of the Service;
• making an annual report on the work of the Service to the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister;
• ensuring that the Service is politically impartial; and
• ensuring that the Service obtains and discloses information only in accordance with its statutory functions, or (in the case of disclosure) for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or for the purpose of any criminal proceedings.

The Director General's responsibilities in this last area are met by means of arrangements through which the day-to-day work of the Service is controlled. These internal mechanisms are designed to ensure that the work of the Service adheres to the principles that:

• the rule of law must be paramount; and
• that methods of investigation must be proportionate to the threat and authorised at an appropriate level.

The relationship between the Home Secretary and the Director General is of great importance. The Home Secretary receives briefing from the Director General on threats to national security and economic well-being and discusses with him or her matters of policy affecting the Service - for example, regarding resources or legislation. The Home Secretary is briefed by the Director General on major current investigations and has a close knowledge of the most sensitive aspects of the Service's work through the procedure by which the Home Secretary personally authorises warrants allowing the Service to intercept letters or telephone calls, or to interfere with property. The Home Secretary also receives independent advice and information from officials in the Home Office, who maintain close working links with the Service.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)

The Intelligence Services Act 1994 established the Intelligence and Security Committee. Its remit is "to examine the expenditure, administration and policy" of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ. The Committee comprises nine Parliamentarians, drawn from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Committee is appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. No member may be a current Minister of the Crown. The Committee makes an annual report to the Prime Minister, who lays it before Parliament, subject to any exclusions on security grounds.

The Director General of the Security Service (as well as the Chief of SIS and the Director of GCHQ) has a statutory duty to provide the ISC with the information it requires. The agency heads may only withhold information from the Committee if it falls within certain categories of 'sensitive' information, as defined in the Intelligence Services Act. This includes details of sources, operations and methods, as well as information provided in confidence by allied foreign services. However, even such sensitive material may be made available to the Committee if the agency concerned considers that it would be safe to do so.

A decision by the head of one of the agencies to withhold sensitive information from the Committee is subject to review by the Secretary of State, who can order that it should be made available if he or she considers it desirable in the public interest.

The Security Service Tribunal

The Security Service Act 1989 provides for a Tribunal to investigate complaints about the Service from members of the public. The Tribunal consists of three senior members of the legal profession, appointed by Royal Warrant. Both the Tribunal and the Commissioner are independent of the Government. They visit the Service to examine its records as necessary. The Act states that anyone may complain to the Tribunal "if he is aggrieved by anything which he believes the Service has done in relation to him or to any property of his". The Tribunal must first establish whether the complainant has been the subject of enquiries by the Service. The Tribunal obtains this information directly from the Service, whose staff are under a legal duty to produce whatever information is required. They may also be interviewed by the Tribunal.

If the Tribunal finds that the Service has made enquiries about a complainant, it must establish whether the Service had reasonable grounds for so doing. Similarly, it may be alleged that the Service has disclosed information about the complainant for use in vetting for employment.

If this proves to be the case, the Tribunal must determine whether the Service had reasonable grounds for believing the information to be true. If a complaint is upheld the Tribunal must notify the complainant and report its findings to the Secretary of State and to the Commissioner. The Tribunal also has the power to order that enquiries be ended and records destroyed, and that compensation be paid to the complainant. Between the introduction of the Security Service Act in 1989 and the end of 1997 the Tribunal investigated 275 complaints. No complaint was upheld. In the great majority of cases, the complainants were unknown to the Service.

The Security Service Commissioner

The Security Service Act also established the office of the Security Service Commissioner. One of the Commissioner's responsibilities is to review the issue by the Secretary of State of property warrants under the Intelligence Services Act. It is also the Commissioner's function, if a complainant to the Tribunal alleges that the Service has interfered with his or her property, to investigate whether a property warrant was issued. If one was, he or she must also establish whether the Secretary of State acted properly in issuing it.

The Commissioner - a senior judge - has an important additional function. If, on investigating a complaint, the Tribunal concludes that it should not be upheld, but nonetheless decides that there should be an investigation into whether the Service has in any other respect acted unreasonably in relation to the complainant, it may refer the matter to the Commissioner. The Commissioner will then investigate and may report the findings to the Secretary of State, who has the power to take any appropriate remedial action. The Commissioner makes an annual report to the Prime Minister, who lays it before Parliament, subject to any deletions judged necessary on security grounds after consultation with the Commissioner.

A number of Security Service procedures, particularly concerning record-keeping, have been adjusted in response to issues identified by the Tribunal and subsequently investigated by the Commissioner. In his annual report for 1991, the Commissioner commented that:

"There can be no doubt that the very existence of the Tribunal as a body empowered to investigate complaints provides the Security Service with a strong additional incentive to ensure that its procedures are designed to eliminate the chance of a complaint being found justified."

The IOCA Tribunal and Commissioner

Similar arrangements exist under the Interception of Communications Act 1985 (IOCA), to which other agencies such as the police and HM Customs and Excise are also subject. IOCA established a Tribunal, supported by a Commissioner, to deal with complaints from anyone who believes their communications may have been intercepted in breach of the Act. The Tribunal, which consists of five senior members of the legal profession, investigates whether a warrant has been issued and, if so, whether the requirements of the Act have been met. If it is found that the Act has been breached, the Tribunal must notify the applicant and report its findings to the Prime Minister. The Tribunal may also quash the warrant, order the destruction of copies of intercepted communications and direct the Secretary of State to pay compensation. In none of the cases it has investigated has the Tribunal found against the Service.

The Interception Commissioner, also a senior judge, reviews the issue by the Secretary of State of warrants under the Act, and also assists the Interception Tribunal as required. He or she regularly visits the Service to examine the intelligence requirement for interception warrants and to discuss individual cases. The Commissioner reports annually to the Prime Minister and may report at any time if it appears that the requirements of the Act have not been met. As for the Security Service Act Commissioner, the IOCA Commissioner's annual report is laid by the Prime Minister before Parliament, subject to any exclusions judged necessary on security grounds.