Venezuela - Background
Venezuela is oil. Venezuela provides the United States with about 15 percent of its oil, the third largest supplier behind Saudi Arabia and Canada. The Government of Venezuela had opened up much of the hydrocarbon sector to foreign investment, promoting multi-billion dollar investment in heavy oil production, reactivation of old fields, and investment in several petrochemical joint ventures. Almost 60 foreign companies representing 14 different countries participated in one or more aspects of Venezuela's oil sector. The Venezuelan national oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and foreign oil companies had signed 33 operating contracts.
Hugo Chavez Frias, an avid admirer of Cuba's Fidel Castro, once remarked, on one of his many visits to the Cuban capital, Havana, that the two countries were sailing towards what he called "the same sea of happiness". Ever since then, the accusation that Venezuela's leftist president wanted to copy Fidel Castro's communist system had been a constant of opposition speeches and rallies. Fidel Castro was a very good friend of Hugo Chavez, who he visited frequently. To Venezuela's entrenched elite, Chavez was a palurdo, a lower-class wannabe upsetting the old order.
The US initially adopted a "wait and see" posture in the aftermath of Hugo Chavez's landslide victory in Venezuela's presidential elections. But by 2002 George Friedman, chair of the intelligence organization, Stratfor, suggested that Venezuela's Hugo Chavez was next on Bush's military agenda. "You've got a team in the White House that is unafraid of world public opinion because they know it is unreliable, self-serving and hypocritical.'' he said. Neil Clark wrote in 2017: "This is a movie we've seen many times before. Think of the "pro-democracy" US-backed anti-government protests in Yugoslavia in 2000, which toppled the Socialist-led administration there, and the "pro-democracy" US-backed-ones in Ukraine in 2014. On both occasions, the "target" governments — and their leadership — were placed in a very difficult position. If they responded to what were clear attempts to usurp power by force — by using force themselves — they knew they would be condemned by the War Party and its media stenographers as "dictators, human rights abusers, war criminals, Nazis, Stalinists" — take your pick. If they did nothing and allowed the protesters to act with total impunity, they'd lose power."
Since the overthrow of Gen. Marcos Perez Jimenez in 1958 and the military's withdrawal from direct involvement in national politics, Venezuela had enjoyed an unbroken tradition of civilian democratic rule.
In 1989, the prevailing political calm was shattered when Venezuela experienced rioting in which more than 200 people were killed -- the so-called Caracazo, in response to an economic austerity program launched by then-President Carlos Andres Perez. Subsequently in February 1992, a group of army lieutenant colonels led by future President Hugo Chavez mounted an unsuccessful coup attempt, claiming that the events of 1989 showed that the political system no longer served the interests of the people.
A second, equally unsuccessful, coup attempt by other officers followed in November in 1992. Lieutenant-Colonel Hugo Chavez led the unsuccessful military coup in 1992 against the democratic government in Caracas. That effort earned him two years in prison.
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was born in the town of Sabaneta, State of Barinas, Venezuela, on 28 July 1954. The son of provincial schoolteachers, he is what Venezuelans call a bachaco, a man of mixed race. Accepted into the Venezuelan Military Academy in 1971, he obtained a College-level degree in Military Sciences and Arts, Engineerign Branch, Ground Specialty. Graduating as a Second Lieutenant on 05 July 1975, he began a quick ascent through the ranks of the army. In 1982, he joined other young officers in forming the "Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement," named for Simon Bolivar, the 19th century father of Venezuelan independence. The young officers were nationalists angered by the corrupt, two-party system that had dominated their country for generations.
In 1993 Congress impeached Perez on corruption charges. Deep popular dissatisfaction with the traditional political parties, income disparities, and economic difficulties were some of the major frustrations expressed by Venezuelans following Perez's impeachment.
When Chavez got out of prison in 1994, he began campaigning with his Movimiento V Republica [MVR], and Castro gave Chavez a hero's welcome when he visited Havana that year. In 1998 the Movimiento al Socialismo party announced its support for Chavez's presidential bid, and a group of leftist parties allied around his MVR won 34 percent of the seats in Congress.
Hugo Chavez won the presidency in December 1998, after campaigning for far-reaching reform, constitutional change, and a crackdown on corruption. Chavez won by a landslide margin that left the two-party system that had previously dominated national politics in ruins. Until the 1998 elections, the Democratic Action (AD) and the Christian Democratic (COPEI) parties dominated the political environment at both the state and federal level. His programs alienated much of the upper and upper-middle class while retaining the enthusiastic support of poorer Venezuelans. His platform called for the creation of a National Constituent Assembly to write a new constitution for Venezuela. Chavez's argument that the existing political system had become isolated from the people won broad acceptance, particularly among Venezuela's poorest classes, who had seen a significant real decline in their living standards over the previous decade and a half. The National Constituent Assembly (ANC), consisting of 131 elected individuals, convened in August 1999 to begin rewriting the Constitution. In free elections, voters gave all but six seats to persons associated with Chavez's movement. Venezuelans approved the ANC's draft in a referendum on 15 December 1999.
With a new Venezuelan constitution adopted in 1999, the country renamed "the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela." There was a new presidential election that Chavez won, and allowed him to stay in power for six more years. On 30 July 2000 Hugo Chavez won reelection with 60% of the popular vote. The national election, the fifth in 18 months, pit Chavez against his 1992 military coup d'etat comrade, Francisco Arias Cardenas. Mr. Chavez' Patriotic Pole party also won a controlling majority in the country's new unicameral legislature. Chavez' six-year term runs through 2006, but Venezuela's constitution allows for a referendum at the mid-point of his term in August 2003.
Chavez opponents said the nation's economic problems began when he took office and started implementing a leftist strategy that they say is modeled after the Cuban communist system. Mr. Chavez had openly praised Cuban President Fidel Castro and had sold oil to Cuba at preferential prices. President Chavez constantly speaks of his government as "revolutionary," though he was elected democratically.
Chavez continued to deride his opponents in public. He called them coup-plotters, and accuses them of trying to re-establish a system of government that favors the wealthy classes. He rejected what he called the "neo-liberal" policies of past governments, and also condemned the "capitalists" and "oligarchs" who privatized some industries. There are vast gaps between rich and poor in Venezuela. Too many in the elite are enmeshed in political corruption.
On 10 August 2000 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez made the first visit by a foreign head-of-state to Iraq since the Gulf war 10 years ago. The visit was part of a tour by the Venezuelan president of major oil exporting countries prior to an OPEC summit in Caracas on 27 September 2002. The Venezuelan president met with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, during which they criticized Western pressure on the Venezuelan leader to cancel his visit. The Iraqi news media hailed the visit as a breakthrough and a weakening of the international isolation of Iraq. The visit was part of a tour by the Venezuelan
In October 2001, the US State Department recalled Ambassador Donna Hrinak for "consultations" after Chavez criticized the US war in Afghanistan as "fighting terror with terror" and met in Tripoli with Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. By November 2001, communications between US officials and dissident officers had become so frequent that Ambassador Hrinak took the unusual step of asking the American military attache to cease contacts with the dissidents.
In December 2001 the first national strike against Chavez, lasting just one day. This successful strike united workers with businessmen and allowed the opposition to discover its strength as a political presence. However, Chávez did not recognize the strike and reinforced his original style, repeatedly calling the year 2002 as "the year of his revolution's consolidation".
After a period of modest economic growth in 2000 and 2001, the Venezuelan economy entered into recession in 2002. A loss of business confidence and the devaluation of the Venezuelan Bolívar started the country's economic downturn. Political conflict, particularly the nationwide strikes last December and January, further compounded the dire situation of the country's economy. As a result, Venezuela's real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2002 fell by an estimated 8.9%.
US President Donald Trump confirmed on 15 October 2025 that he had authorized CIA operations on Venezuelan soil. The New York Times earlier reported that the decision would allow intelligence operatives to carry out lethal operations against Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, whose government Trump has accused of running “narco-terrorist” cartels and flooding the US with cocaine and fentanyl.
A reporter asked Trump in the Oval Office, “Why did you authorize the CIA to go into Venezuela?” “I authorized for two reasons, really. Number one, they have emptied their prisons into the United States of America. They came in through the border. They came in because we had an open-border policy. And as soon as I heard that, I said, a lot of these countries… They're not the only country, but they're the worst abuser. And they've allowed thousands and thousands of prisoners, people from mental institutions, insane asylums emptied out into the United States. We're bringing them back, but that's a really bad… And they did it at a level that probably not… Many, many countries have done it, but not like Venezuela. They were down and dirty. The other thing of drugs, we have a lot of drugs coming in from Venezuela. And a lot of the Venezuelan drugs come in through the sea, so you get to see that. But we're going to stop them by land also.” Trump declined to clarify whether the CIA is authorized to “take out Maduro.” “I don't want to answer a question like that. That's a ridiculous question for me to be given. Not really a ridiculous question, but wouldn't it be a ridiculous question for me to answer? But I think Venezuela is feeling heat, but I think a lot of other countries are feeling heat too.”
Trump imposed sweeping sanctions on Venezuela during his first term and has recently raised the bounty for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to $50 million. The US has deployed a naval armada to the eastern Caribbean, and since September has destroyed at least five boats allegedly smuggling drugs from Venezuela. Maduro has denied the allegations of aiding cartels and accused the US of seeking to topple him, adding that the Venezuelan military is ready to repel a potential invasion.
President Donald Trump's confirmation that his administration authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to conduct covert operations inside Venezuela markedg an extraordinary public acknowledgment of classified intelligence activities. Speaking at a White House news conference on October 15, Trump stated that he greenlit the CIA operations for two primary reasons. First, he alleged that Venezuela had emptied its prisons and sent criminals into the United States through what he characterized as an open border. Second, he cited drug trafficking, claiming that significant quantities of narcotics were flowing from Venezuela through Caribbean sea routes, though his administration has yet to provide substantive evidence to support these assertions.
The CIA authorization represents a significant escalation in United States pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and comes alongside a broader military campaign in the Caribbean region. The intelligence directive reportedly grants the CIA lethal authority to conduct operations across the Caribbean and potentially inside Venezuelan territory itself. When pressed by reporters about whether the CIA had authority to target or remove Maduro directly, Trump deflected, calling it a question he wouldn't answer but adding that Venezuela was feeling the heat from American actions. The authorization was first reported by The New York Times, with officials indicating that regime change is the ultimate objective of the Trump administration's Venezuela strategy.
This covert action directive exists within a wider context of escalating military operations. Since early September, the United States military has conducted at least five publicly acknowledged strikes on boats in Caribbean waters, killing a total of twenty-seven people. Trump has characterized these vessels as drug-trafficking operations run by terrorist organizations, particularly pointing to the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua, which his administration has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. The first strike occurred on September 1, killing eleven people aboard a vessel that allegedly departed from the northeastern Venezuelan state of Sucre. Subsequent strikes followed on September 15, September 19, October 3, and October 14, each resulting in multiple fatalities.
The administration's legal justification for these operations rests on a controversial framework. In early October, Trump formally notified Congress that the United States considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict with designated drug cartels, treating smugglers as unlawful combatants subject to military force under the law of armed conflict. This represents the first publicly acknowledged United States airstrikes in Central or South America since the 1989 invasion of Panama. However, serious questions have emerged about both the legal basis and the factual premises of these operations. The administration has not provided hard evidence to lawmakers that the targeted vessels actually contained narcotics, relying instead on unclassified video clips posted to social media by Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.
The strikes have drawn criticism from legal experts and lawmakers across the political spectrum. International law scholars argue that the operations violate both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Charter, which require consent from sovereign states for law enforcement operations on their territory or cooperation mechanisms for maritime interdiction. Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen warned that the authorization of covert CIA action, combined with lethal strikes on boats and hints at land operations, slides the United States closer to outright conflict with no transparency, oversight, or guardrails. Even some Republican lawmakers have expressed concern about the legal authority and strategic wisdom of the campaign, though others like Senator Jim Risch have defended Trump's approach.
The military buildup supporting these operations has been substantial. In August, the United States deployed more than four thousand Marines and sailors aboard the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group to waters around Latin America and the Caribbean. This naval presence, unprecedented in recent decades for the region, has been accompanied by increased fighter jets and military equipment at bases including those in Puerto Rico. Trump has indicated that if smugglers stop using sea routes, his administration would consider moving operations onto Venezuelan land, effectively threatening ground operations inside the sovereign territory of another nation.
Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has responded forcefully to these developments, characterizing them as an undeclared war and an attempt at regime change orchestrated by Washington. During a televised event with the National Council for Sovereignty and Peace, Maduro invoked historical CIA interventions in Latin America, referencing the thirty thousand disappeared during Argentina's military dictatorship and the 1973 coup in Chile. He specifically rejected what he called regime change operations reminiscent of failed interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The Venezuelan government filed a formal complaint with the United Nations Security Council and Secretary General, asserting that American actions constitute serious violations of international law and the UN Charter. Maduro's administration argues that the true purpose of United States actions is to legitimize a regime change operation with the ultimate goal of seizing control of Venezuela's vast oil resources.
The Trump administration's Venezuela policy is being driven primarily by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe, both of whom have long advocated for Maduro's removal from power. The administration has labeled Maduro a narcoterrorist and placed a fifty-million-dollar bounty on his head for drug trafficking charges. This strategy frames the Venezuelan government itself as essentially a criminal cartel operation, with Trump officials claiming that Maduro controls the Cartel of the Suns, a purported transnational drug organization. However, a classified United States intelligence report from April found no evidence of direct links between senior Maduro officials and the Tren de Aragua gang, though it noted that Venezuela's permissive environment enables criminal organizations to operate.
The factual basis for the administration's claims about Venezuelan drug trafficking has been challenged by multiple sources. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, approximately ninety percent of cocaine bound for the United States transits through the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean, not near Venezuela's coast. Most coca cultivation occurs in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, with main trafficking routes running through those countries rather than Venezuela. The Drug Enforcement Administration has reported that eighty-four percent of cocaine seized in the United States originates from Colombia and that fentanyl entering America is produced in Mexico using precursor chemicals from China, not Venezuela. These facts complicate the administration's narrative that Venezuela represents the primary drug threat justifying military action.
The covert CIA operations now authorized could take various forms based on historical patterns of American intelligence activities in Latin America. Such operations might involve working with opposition figures inside Venezuela to foment internal instability, gathering intelligence for targeted military strikes against regime figures, facilitating defections from the Venezuelan military or intelligence services, or supporting opposition movements with training, funding, and coordination. The CIA has extensive historical experience with regime change operations throughout Latin America, from Guatemala in 1954 through Nicaragua in the 1980s to attempted interventions in Cuba spanning decades. Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, who was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize, has publicly called for greater American support in what she describes as removing Maduro's criminal narco-terrorism structure, though her endorsement of foreign intervention has proven controversial.
The domestic political dimensions of this confrontation are complex. Maduro has used the American military pressure to rally nationalist sentiment and consolidate his domestic political base, portraying Venezuela as defending its sovereignty against imperial aggression. Political analysts note that Trump's public acknowledgment of CIA operations, while highly unusual, serves as political theater aimed at demonstrating toughness to his domestic audience regarding border security and drug trafficking issues. The Venezuelan government has responded by increasing internal surveillance mechanisms and preparing for potential military escalation, with Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino announcing that 4.5 million militia members stand ready to defend Venezuelan territory.
International reaction has been mixed, with many Latin American governments expressing concern about unilateral American military action in the region. Critics warn that escalation could worsen Latin America's largest modern displacement crisis, as millions of Venezuelans have already fled the country's economic collapse and political repression. Human rights organizations have condemned the strikes as violations of the right to life and due process, noting that alleged drug traffickers targeted in international waters have been killed without trial or definitive proof of their activities. More than sixty United States-based human rights, faith, and policy groups sent a letter to Congress warning that Trump's expansion of military operations in the Caribbean could result in a full-blown limitless war with one or more countries in the region.
The strategic implications of openly authorizing CIA covert operations are significant. Historically, such activities remain classified precisely because public acknowledgment can undermine intelligence relationships, expose methods, and create diplomatic complications. Trump's decision to confirm the authorization breaks with decades of practice regarding intelligence operations. Some analysts suggest this reflects the administration's desire to project strength and send deterrent signals to Maduro, while others argue it represents reckless disregard for intelligence protocols and international norms. The authorization also raises questions about congressional oversight, as covert action findings typically require notification to congressional intelligence committees under the National Security Act, though the extent and nature of such notification in this case remains unclear.
The economic dimensions of the conflict cannot be ignored. Venezuela possesses the world's largest proven oil reserves, and American policy toward the country has long been intertwined with energy security considerations. While the Trump administration frames its actions in terms of border security and counternarcotics, the Maduro government insists that control of Venezuelan oil resources represents the true American objective. Trump ended diplomatic talks with Maduro and has made regime change a central policy goal, contrasting with previous administrations that maintained channels for negotiation even while imposing sanctions. The complete breakdown of diplomatic engagement leaves military pressure as the primary tool of American policy.
Looking forward, the situation appears poised for further escalation. Trump's comments about potentially moving operations onto Venezuelan land suggest that airstrikes within Venezuela's borders could be forthcoming. The Pentagon is reportedly preparing multiple options for the president, including strikes on targets inside Venezuelan territory that the administration characterizes as part of narcoterrorist networks. Such operations would represent an even more dramatic violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and could trigger responses from Maduro that might include attacks on American interests in the region or increased cooperation with American adversaries like China and Russia, both of which have substantial investments in Venezuela. The risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation into broader military conflict remains significant, particularly given the lack of diplomatic channels for crisis management.
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