|
Contents
Executive
Summary
Methodology
Introduction
The
Contradictions of Globalization
Rising
Powers
New
Challenges to Governance
Pervasive
Insecurity
Policy
Implications
|
|
|
 |
|
|
Report
of the
National Intelligence Council's
2020 Project
|
| |
Policy Implications
The
international order will be in greater flux in
the period out to 2020 than at any point since
the end of the Second World War. As
we map the future, the prospects for global prosperity
and the limited likelihood of great power conflict
provide an overall favorable environment for coping
with the challenges ahead. Despite
daunting challenges, the United States, in particular,
will be better positioned than most countries
to adapt to the changing global environment.
As our scenarios illustrate, we see several ways in which major global changes
could begin to take shape and be buffeted or
bolstered by the forces of change over the next
15 years. In a sense, the scenarios
provide us with four different lenses on
future developments, underlining the wide range
of factors, discontinuities, and uncertainties
shaping a new global order. One lens
is the globalized economy, another is the security
role played by the US, a third is the role of
social and religious identity, and a fourth is
the breakdown of the international order because
of growing insecurity. They highlight
various "switching points" that could shift developments
onto one path or the other. The most
important tipping points include the impact of
robust economic growth and the spread of technology;
the nature and extent of terrorism; the resiliency
or weakness of states, particularly in the Middle
East, Central Asia, and Africa; and the potential
spread of conflict, including between states.
-
On
balance, for example, as the hypothetical
Davos World scenario
shows, robust economic growth probably will
help to overcome divisions and pull more regions
and countries into a new global order. However,
the rapid changes might also produce disorder
at times; one of the lessons of that and the
other scenarios is the need for management
to ensure globalization does not go off the
rails.
The evolving framework of international politics in all the scenarios suggests that nonstate
actors will continue to assume a more
prominent role even though they will not displace
the nation-state. Such actors range
from terrorists, who will remain a threat to global
security, to NGOs and global firms, which exemplify
largely positive forces by spreading technology,
promoting social and economic progress, and providing
humanitarian assistance.
The
United States and other countries throughout the
world will continue to be vulnerable to
international terrorism. As
we have noted in the Cycle of Fear scenario,
terrorist campaigns that escalate to unprecedented
heights, particularly if they involve WMD, are
one of the few developments that could threaten
globalization.
Is
the United States' Technological Prowess at
Risk?
US investment
in basic research and the innovative application
of technology has directly contributed to US
leadership in economic and military power during
the post-World War II era. Americans,
for example, invented and commercialized the
semiconductor, the personal computer, and the
Internet with other countries following the
US lead.a While the United
States is still the present leader, there are
signs this leadership is at risk.
The number
of US engineering graduates peaked in 1985 and
is presently down 20 percent from that level;
the percentage of US undergraduates taking engineering
is the second lowest of all developed countries. China
graduates approximately three times as many
engineering students as the United States. However,
post-9/11 security concerns have made it harder
to attract incoming foreign students and, in
some cases, foreign nationals available to work
for US firms.b Non-US
universities-for which a US visa is not required-are
attempting to exploit the situation and bolster
their strength.
Privately funded industrial research and development-which accounts
for 60 percent of the US total-while up this
year, suffered three previous years of decline.c Further,
major multinational corporations are establishing
corporate "research centers" outside of the
United States.
While these signs are ominous, the integrating character of globalization
and the inherent strengths of the US economic
system preclude a quick judgment of an impending
US technological demise. By recent
assessments, the United States is still the
most competitive society in the world among
major economies.d In a
globalized world where information is rapidly
shared-including cross-border sharing done internally
by multinational corporations-the creator of
new science or technology may not necessarily
be the beneficiary in the marketplace.
a "Is America Losing
Its Edge? Innovation in a Globalized World." Adam
Segal, Foreign Affairs, November December
2004; New York, NY p.2.
b "Observations on S&T
Trends and Their Potential Impact on Our Future." William
Wulf (President, National Academy of Engineering). Paper
submitted to the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in support of the National Intelligence
Council 2020 Study, Summer 2004.
c "Is America Losing
Its Edge?," p.3.
d Global Competitiveness
Report 2004-2005, World Economic Forum,
http://www.weforum.org.
October 2004.
Counterterrorism
efforts in the years ahead-against a more
diverse set of terrorists who are connected more
by ideology and technology than by geography-will
be a more elusive challenge than focusing on a
relatively centralized organization such as al-Qa'ida. The
looser the connections among individual terrorists
and various cells, the more difficult it will
be to uncover and disrupt terrorist plotting.
- One
of our scenarios-Pax Americana-envisages
a case in which US and European consensus on
fighting terrorism would grow much stronger
but, under other scenarios, including the hypothetical
New Caliphate, US, Russian, Chinese
and European interests diverge, possibly limiting
cooperation on counterterrorism.
"The
US will have to battle world public opinion, which
has dramatically shifted since the end of the
Cold War."
The success
of the US-led global counterterrorism campaign
will hinge on the capabilities and resolve of
individual countries to fight terrorism on their
own soil. Efforts by Washington to
bolster the capabilities of local security forces
in other countries and to work with them on their
priority issues (such as soaring crime) would
be likely to increase cooperation.
- Defense
of the US Homeland will begin overseas. As
it becomes more difficult for terrorists to
enter the United States, they are likely to
try to attack the Homeland from neighboring
countries.
A
counterterrorism strategy that approaches the
problem on multiple fronts offers the greatest
chance of containing-and ultimately reducing-the
terrorist threat. The
development of more open political systems, broader
economic opportunities, and empowerment of Muslim
reformers would be viewed positively by the broad
Muslim communities who do not support the radical
agenda of Islamic extremists. A
New Caliphate scenario dramatizes
the challenge of addressing the underlying causes
of extremist violence, not just its manifest actions.
- The
Middle East is unlikely to be the only battleground
in which this struggle between extremists and
reformers occurs. European and other
Muslims outside the Middle East have played
an important role in the internal ideological
conflicts, and the degree to which Muslim minorities
feel integrated in European societies is likely
to have a bearing on whether they see a clash
of civilizations as inevitable or not. Southeast
Asia also has been increasingly a theater for
terrorism.
Related to
the terrorist threat is the problem of the proliferation
of WMD and the potential for countries
to have increased motivation to acquire nuclear
weapons if their neighbors and regional rivals
are doing so. As illustrated in the
Cycle of Fear scenario, global efforts
to erect greater barriers to the spread of WMD
and to dissuade any other countries from seeking
nuclear arms or other WMD as protection will continue
to be a challenge. As various of our
scenarios underline, the communications revolution
gives proliferators a certain advantage in striking
deals with each other and eluding the authorities,
and the "assistance" they provide can cut years
off the time it would take for countries to develop
nuclear weapons.
How the World Sees the United States
In the six regional conferences
that we hosted we asked participants about their
views of the role of the United States as a
driver in shaping developments in their regions
and globally.
Asia
Participants felt that
US preoccupation with the war on terrorism is
largely irrelevant to the security concerns
of most Asians. The key question
that the United States needs to ask itself is
whether it can offer Asian states an appealing
vision of regional security and order that will
rival and perhaps exceed that offered by China.
US disengagement from
what matters to US Asian allies would increase
the likelihood that they would climb on Beijing's
bandwagon and allow China to create its own
regional security order that excludes the United
States.
Participants felt that
the rise of China need not be incompatible with
a US-led international order. The
critical question is whether or not the order
is flexible enough to adjust to a changing distribution
of power on a global level. An inflexible
order would increase the likelihood of political
conflict between emerging powers and the United
States. If the order is flexible,
it may be possible to forge an accommodation
with rising powers and strengthen the order
in the process.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan African leaders
worry that the United States and other advantaged
countries will "pull up the drawbridge" and
abandon the region.
Participants opined that
the United States and other Western countries
may not continue to accept Africa's most successful
"export," its people. The new African
diaspora is composed overwhelmingly of economic
migrants rather than political migrants as in
previous eras.
Some participants felt
that Africans worry that Western countries will
see some African countries as "hopeless" over
the next 15 years because of prevailing economic
conditions, ecological problems, and political
circumstances.
Participants feared that
the United States will focus only on those African
countries that are successful.
Latin America
Conference participants acknowledged
that the United States is the key economic,
political, and military player in the hemisphere. At
the same time, Washington was viewed as traditionally
not paying sustained attention to the region
and, instead of responding to systemic problems,
as reacting primarily to crises. Participants
saw a fundamentalist trend in Washington that
would lead to isolation and unilateralism and
undercut cooperation. Most shared
the view that the US "war on terrorism" had
little to do with Latin America's security concerns.
Latin American migrants are
a stabilizing force in relations with the United
States. An important part of the
US labor pool, migrants also remit home needed
dollars along with new views on democratic governance
and individual initiative that will have a positive
impact on the region.
US policies also can have
a positive impact. Some participants
said the region would benefit from US application
of regional mechanisms to resolve problems rather
than punitive measures against regimes not to
its liking, such as that of Fidel Castro.
Middle East
Participants felt that
the role of US foreign policy in the region
will continue to be crucial. The
perceived propping up of corrupt regimes by
the United States in exchange for secure oil
sources has in itself helped to promote continued
stagnation. Disengagement is highly
unlikely but would in itself have an incalculable
effect.
Regarding the prospects
for democracy in the region, participants felt
that the West placed too much emphasis on the
holding of elections, which, while important,
is only one element of the democratization process. There
was general agreement that if the United States
and Europe can engage with and encourage reformers
rather than confront and hector, genuine democracy
would be achieved sooner.
Some Middle East experts
argued that Washington has reinforced zero-sum
politics in the region by focusing on top Arab
rulers and not cultivating ties with emerging
leaders in and outside the government.
Although the Middle East
has a lot to gain economically from globalization,
it was agreed that Arabs/Muslims are nervous
that certain aspects of globalization, especially
the pervasive influence of Western, particularly
American, values and morality are a threat to
traditional cultural and religious values.
Europe and Eurasia
Participants engaged in
a lively debate over whether a rift between
the US and Europe is likely to occur over the
next 15 years with some contending that a collapse
of the US-EU partnership would occur as part
of the collapse of the international system. Several
participants contended that if the United States
shifts its focus to Asia, the EU-US relationship
could be strained to the breaking point.
- They
were divided over whether China's rise would
draw the United States and Europe closer or
not.
- They also differed over the importance of
common economic, environmental, and energy
problems to the alliance.
In our Eurasia workshop,
participants agreed that the United States has
only limited influence on the domestic policies
of the Central Asian states, although US success
or failure in Iraq would have spillover effects
in Central Asia. Countries in western
Eurasia, they believed, will continue to seek
a balance between Russia and the West. In
their view, Ukraine almost certainly will continue
to seek admission to NATO and the European Union
while Georgia and Moldova probably will maintain
their orientation in the same direction.
"A
counterterrorism strategy that approaches the
problem on multiple fronts offers the greatest
chance of containing-and ultimately reducing-the
terrorist threat."
On the more
positive side, one of the likely features of the
next 15 years is the greater availability of high
technology, not only to those who invent
it. As we try to make clear in our
Davos World scenario, the high-tech
leaders are not the only ones that can expect
to make gains, but also those societies that integrate
and apply the new technologies. For
example, our scenario points up the beneficial
effects of possible new technologies in Africa
in helping to eradicate poverty. As
we have noted elsewhere in this paper, global
firms will play a key role in promoting more widespread
prosperity and more technological innovation.
The dramatically
altered geopolitical landscape also
presents a huge challenge for the international
system as well as for the United States, which
has been the security guarantor of the post-World
War II order. The possible contours
as several trends develop-including rising powers
in Asia, retrenchment in Eurasia, a roiling Middle
East, and greater divisions in the transatlantic
partnership-remain uncertain and variable.
- With
the lessening in ties formed during the Cold
War, nontraditional ad hoc alliances are likely
to develop. For example, shared interest
in multilateralism as a cornerstone of international
relations has been viewed by some scholars as
the basis for a budding relationship between
Europe and China.
As
the Pax Americana
scenario suggests, the transatlantic partnership would be a key factor in Washington's
ability to remain the central pivot in international
politics. The degree to which Europe
is ready to shoulder more international responsibilities
is unclear and depends on its ability to surmount
its economic and demographic problems as well
as forge a strategic vision for its role in the
world. In other respects-GDP, crossroads
location, stable governments, and collective military
expenditures-it has the ability to increase its
weight on the international stage.
"For
Washington, dealing with a rising Asia may be
the most challenging of all its regional relationships."
Asia is particularly important as an engine for change over the next 15 years. A
key uncertainty is whether the rise of China and
India will occur smoothly. A number
of issues will be in play, including the future
of the world trading system, advances in technology,
and the shape and scope of globalization. For
Washington, dealing with a rising Asia may be
the most challenging of all its regional relationships. One
could envisage a range of possibilities from the
US enhancing its role as regional balancer between
contending forces to Washington being seen as
increasingly irrelevant. Both the Korea
and Taiwan issues are likely to come to a head,
and how they are dealt with will be important
factors shaping future US-Asia ties as well as
the US role in the region. Japan's
position
in the region is also likely to be transformed
as it faces the challenge of a more independent
security role.
"A
key uncertainty is whether the rise of China and
India will occur smoothly."
With the rise of the Asian giants, US economic and technological advantages may be vulnerable
to erosion.
- While
interdependencies will grow, increased Asian
investment in high-tech research coupled with
the rapid growth of Asian markets will increase
the region's competitiveness across a wide range
of economic and technical activity.
- US dependence on foreign oil supplies also
makes it more vulnerable as the competition
for secure access grows and the risks of supply-side
disruptions increase.
In
the Middle
East, market
reforms, greater democracy, and progress toward
an Arab-Israeli peace would stem the shift towards
more radical politics in the region and foster
greater accord in the transatlantic partnership. Some
of our scenarios highlight the extent to which
the Middle East could remain at the center of
an arc of instability extending from Africa through
Central and Southeast Asia, providing fertile
ground for terrorism and the proliferation of
WMD.
Realization
of a Caliphate-like
scenario would pose
the biggest challenge because it would reject
the foundations on which the current international
system has been built. Such a possibility
points up the need to find ways to engage and
integrate those societies and regions that feel
themselves left behind or reject elements of the
globalization process. Providing economic
opportunities alone may not be sufficient to enable
the "have-nots" to benefit from globalization;
rather, the widespread trend toward religious
and cultural identification suggests that various
identities apart from the nation-state will need
to be accommodated in a globalized world.
The interdependence
that results from globalization places increasing
importance not only on maintaining stability
in the areas of the world that drive the global
economy, where about two thirds of the world's
population resides, but also on helping the poor
or failing states scattered across a large portion
of the world's surface which have yet to modernize
and connect with the larger, globalizing community. Two
of our scenarios-Pax Americana and
Davos World-point up the different roles
that the United States is expected to play as
security provider and as a financial stabilizer.
Eurasia, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus, probably will be an area of
growing concern, with its large number of potentially
failing states, radicalism in the form of Islamic
extremism, and importance as a supplier or conveyor
belt for energy supplies to both West and East. The
trajectories of these Eurasian states will be
affected by external powers such as Russia, Europe,
China, India and the United States, which may
be able to act as stabilizers. Russia
is likely to be particularly active in trying
to prevent spillover, even though it has enormous
internal problems on its own plate. Farther
to the West, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova could
offset their vulnerabilities as relatively new
states by closer association with Europe and the
EU.
Parts
of Africa share a similar profile with the
weak states of Eurasia and will continue to form
part of an extended arc of instability. As
the hypothetical Davos World scenario suggests, globalization
in terms of rising commodity prices and expanded
economic growth may be a godsend where good governance
is also put in place. North Africa
may benefit particularly from growing ties with
Europe.
Latin America is likely to become a more diverse set of countries: those
that manage to exploit the opportunities provided
by globalization will prosper, while those-such
as the Andean nations currently-that do not or
cannot will be left behind. Governance
and leadership-often a wild card-will distinguish
societies that prosper from those that remain
ill-equipped to adapt. Both regions
may have success stories-countries like Brazil
or South Africa-which can provide a model for
others to follow. The United States
is uniquely positioned to facilitate Latin America
growth and integration stemming the potential
for fragmentation.
In
that vein, the number of interstate and internal conflicts has been ebbing, but their lethality
and potential to grow in impact once they start
is a trend we have noted.
- While
no single country looks within striking distance
of rivaling US military power by 2020, more
countries will be in a position to contest the
United States in their regions. The
possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear
weapons by more countries by 2020 would increase
the potential cost of any military action by
the United States and its coalition partners.
- Most US adversaries, be they states or nonstate
actors, will recognize the military superiority
of the United States. Rather than
acquiesce to US force, they will try to circumvent
or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived
weaknesses, using asymmetric strategies, including
terrorism and illicit acquisition of WMD, as
illustrated in the Cycle of Fear
scenario.
".no
single country looks within striking distance
of rivaling US military power by 2020."
As
our Pax Americana
scenario
dramatizes, the United States probably will continue
to be called on to help manage such conflicts as Palestine, North Korea, Taiwan, and Kashmir to
ensure they do not get out of hand if a peace
settlement cannot be reached. However,
the scenarios and trends we analyze in the paper
suggest the challenge will be to harness the power
of new players to contribute to global security,
potentially relieving the United States of some
of the burden. Such a shift could usher
in a new phase in international politics.
- China's
and, to a lesser extent, India's increasing
military spending and investment plans suggest
they might be more able to undertake a larger
security burden.
- International and regional institutions also
would need to be reformed to meet the challenges
and shoulder more of the burden.
Adapting
the international order may also be increasingly
challenging because of the growing number of other
ethical issues that have the potential to divide worldwide publics. These
issues include the environment and climate change,
cloning and stem cell research, potential biotechnology
and IT intrusions into privacy, human rights, international law
regarding conflict, and the role of multilateral
institutions.
Many
ethical issues, which will become more salient,
cut across traditional alliances or groupings
that were established to deal mainly with security
issues. Such divergent interests underline
the challenge for the international community,
including the United States, in having to deal
with multiple, competing coalitions to achieve
resolution of some of these issues.
- Whatever
its eventual impact or success, the Kyoto climate
change treaty exemplifies how formerly nontraditional
policy issues can come to the fore and form
the core of budding new networks or partnerships.
- The media explosion cuts both ways: on the
one hand, it makes it potentially harder to
build a consensus because the media tends to
magnify differences; on the other hand, the
media can also facilitate discussions and consensus-building.
The
United States will have to battle world public
opinion, which has dramatically shifted since
the end of the Cold War. Although some
of the current anti-Americanism is likely to lessen as globalization
takes on more of a non-Western face, the younger
generation of leaders-unlike during the post-World
War II period-has no personal recollection of
the United States as its "liberator." Thus,
younger leaders are more likely than their predecessors
to diverge with Washington's thinking on a range
of issues.
Finally, as the
Pax
Americana scenario suggests, the United
States may be increasingly confronted with the
challenge of managing-at an acceptable cost to
itself-relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle
East and others, absent a single overarching threat
on which to build consensus. For all
the challenges ahead, the United States will nevertheless
retain enormous advantages, playing a pivotal
role across the broad range of issues-economic,
technological, political, and military-that no
other state can or will match by 2020. Even
as the existing order is threatened, the United
States will have many opportunities to fashion
a new one.
|
|
|
