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FM 6-20-10: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Targeting Process

CHAPTER 1

PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSOPHY

According to Joint Publication (Pub) 1-02, a target is a geographical area, complex, or installation planned for capture or destruction by military forces. Targets also include the wide array of mobile and stationary forces, equipment, capabilities, and functions that an enemy commander can use to conduct operations. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them on the basis of operational requirements and capabilities. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage, then further identifying the subset of those targets which must be acquired and attacked to achieve friendly success. Denying these resources to the enemy makes him vulnerable to friendly battle plans. These resources constitute critical enemy vulnerabilities. Successful targeting enables the commander to synchronize intelligence, maneuver, fire support systems, and special operations forces by attacking the right target with the best system and munitions at the right time.

Targeting is a complex and multidisciplined effort that requires coordinated interaction among many groups. These groups working together are referred to as the targeting team and include, but are not limited to, the fire support, intelligence, operations, and plans cells. Representatives from these cells are essential to a comprehensive targeting process. Other members of the staff may help them in the planning and execution phases of targeting. Close coordination among all cells is crucial for a successful targeting effort. Sensors and collection capabilities under the control of external agencies must be closely coordinated for efficient and quick reporting of fleeting or dangerous targets. Also, the vulnerabilities of different types of targets must be attacked by the appropriate means and munitions.

This manual describes the targeting process used by United States (US) Army units operating as part of a joint force. It is descriptive and not prescriptive in nature and has applicability in any theater of operation. It offers considerations for commanders and staffs in meeting the targeting challenge, yet it is flexible enough to adapt to the most dynamic situation.

DOCTRINAL BASIS

The Army will not operate alone in the uncertain, ambiguous security environment described in Joint Pub 3-0 and FM 100-5. Operations involving Army forces will always be joint. The overarching operational concept is that joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize the action of air, land, sea space, and special operations forces (SOFs) to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. JFCs seek to win decisively and quickly and with minimum casualties and minimal collateral damage. Application of lethal and nonlethal fires is essential in defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. JFCs use a variety of means to divert limit disrupt, delay, damage, or destroy the enemy's air, surface, and subsurface military potential throughout the depth of the battlefield. The specific criteria of the above terms must be established by the commander and well understood by targeting team members. Conflicts will be dominated by high-technology equipment and weapons and fought over extended distances by highly integrated, joint and combined task forces (TFs). The characteristics of the future battlefield will challenge the joint force and service component commanders' ability to efficiently and effectively employ limited numbers of sophisticated acquisition and attack systems against a diverse target array.

TARGETING OBJECTIVES

The objectives of targeting must be articulated simply yet authoritatively. The objectives must be easily understood across the combined and joint environment of future operations. Targeting objectives must focus assets on enemy capabilities that could interfere with the achievement of friendly objectives. Originally, targeting objectives were expressed in terms of the fire support mission area analysis (FSMAA) responses of limit, disrupt, and delay. These terms are still appropriate. Interdiction objectives also express targeting objectives such as destroy, divert, disrupt, and delay. Interdiction objective definitions currently exist in Joint Pub 1-02 and Joint Pub 3-03. The figure below paraphrases the definition. and offers a comparison between the two publications. Terms such as limit, disrupt, delay, divert, destroy, and damage are used to describe the effects of attack on enemy capabilities. They should not be confused with the terms harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy (discussed in Chapter 2). These terms are used as attack criteria to determine the degree of damage or duration of effects on a specific target.

The terms are not mutually exclusive. Actions associated with one objective may also support other objectives.

Limit enemy capabilities applies to reducing the options or courses of action available to the enemy commander. For example, the commander may direct the use of air interdiction and fire support to limit the use of one or more avenues of approach available to the enemy. Also, he may direct the use of interdiction to limit enemy use of fire support capability.

To limit capabilities implies we also disrupt enemy plans by precluding effective interaction or the cohesion of enemy combat and combat support systems. In regard to Air Force interdiction doctrine, disrupt forces the enemy into less efficient and more vulnerable dispositions.

Delay alters the time of arrival of forces at a point on the battlefield or the ability of the enemy to project combat power from a point on the battlefield. In interdiction doctrine, delay results from disrupting, diverting, or destroying enemy capabilities or targets.

Divert is an interdiction objective which addresses the commander's desire to tie up critical enemy resources. Attack of certain interdiction targets may result in the enemy commander's diverting capabilities or assets from one area or activity to another. Divert indirectly reduces the capability of the enemy commander to continue his plans.

Destroy as an interdiction objective calls for ruining the structure, organic existence, or condition of an enemy target that is essential to an enemy capability. Describing destruction as an objective requires establishing specific quantities or percentages within the ability of the weapon system or systems. For example, artillery normally uses 30 percent as the criteria for destruction, whereas maneuver combat forces typically use 70 percent.

Damage can be used to reflect a subjective or objective assessment of battle damage or to describe nuclear targeting objectives (light) moderate, or severe). Light, moderate, or severe damage are terms associated with nuclear target analysis commander's criteria for desired affect on the enemy.

Ultimately, the articulation of targeting objectives in an era of limited manpower and resources will require a command analysis, as much for what the targeting objective does not mean as for what it does.

TARGETING METHODOLOGY

Targeting methodology is time-tested and is based on the decide, detect, deliver, and assess functions performed by the commander and staff in planning and executing targeting. Details of each function are presented in Chapter 2. This methodology organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to accomplish key targeting requirements.

The targeting process supports the commander's decisions. It helps the targeting team decide which targets must be acquired and attacked. It helps in the decision of which attack option to use to engage the targets. Options can be either lethal or nonlethal and/or organic or supporting. For example, they can be maneuver, electronic attack (EA), psychological operations (PSYOP), attack helicopters, surface-to-surface fires, or a combination of these. In addition, the process helps in the decision of who will engage the target at the prescribed time. It also helps targeting teams determine requirements for combat assessment to assess targeting and attack effectiveness.

TARGETING AND PLANNING

Targeting is an integral part of the planning process, also called the command decision cycle, described in FM 101-5.

Command Decision Cycle

The command decision cycle depicted in the next two figures begins with receipt of the mission and mission analysis by the commander. The commander is responsible for mission analysis but may have his staff conduct a detailed mission analysis for his approval. The mission analysis considers intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the enemy situation, and potential enemy courses of action (COA).

The commander provides his initial planning guidance and intent for further development of possible COA. A warning order is sent to subordinate units to allow them to begin planning, providing them as much lead time as possible.

The plans cell develops potential friendly COA. These are usually checked by the commander or chief of staff to ensure they comply with the commander's initial guidance and intent and meet considerations for COA development.

Once approved for further development, friendly COA are war-gamed against the most likely and/or most threatening enemy COA to determine their suitability, acceptability, and feasibility. The results are normally briefed to the commander in a decision briefing. Following a decision by the commander, adjustments are made, if necessary, to the selected COA and orders preparation begins. A warning order is sent to subordinate units which provides them as much information as possible to expedite their planning.

The OPORD is completed and approved by the commander and then issued to subordinates. Subordinate units continue their planning process, modifying supporting plans as necessary. Rehearsals should be conducted before execution. The order is executed, and the commander and staff assess activities and results. The assessment provides them with feedback for modifying current plans or identifying new missions.

Targeting and the Command Decision Cycle

The decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting methodology depicted in the figure below is an integral part of the command decision cycle from receipt of the mission through OPORD execution. Each part of the methodology occurs at the same time and sequentially. As decisions are made in planning future operations, current operations staff elements execute detection and attack of targets on the basis of prior decisions. Staff elements are also involved in detecting and attacking targets on the basis of prior decisions.

Decide

The decide function is the most important and requires close interaction between the commander and the intelligence, plans, operations, and fire support cells. The staffs must clearly understand the following:

• Unit mission.
• Commander's intent and concept of the operation (scheme of maneuver and scheme of fires).
• Commander's initial planning guidance.

With this information, the staff officers can prepare their respective estimates. From the standpoint of targeting, the fire support, intelligence, and operations estimates are interrelated and must be closely coordinated among the cells. Key staff products include the intelligence officer's IPB, target value analysis, and the intelligence estimate. The operations officer, intelligence officer, and fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) participate in war-gaming and develop the products of the decide function, The decide function gives a clear picture of the priorities that apply to the following:

• Tasking of TA assets.
• Information processing.
• Selection of an attack means.
• Requirement for combat assessment.

The resulting OPORD addresses key points of the DST. The order contains commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to include the following:

• Priority intelligence requirements.
• Information requirements.
• Intelligence collection plan.
• Target acquision taskings.
• High-payoff target list.
• Attack guidance matrix.
• Target selection standards.
• Any requirements for BDA.

Detect

The detect targeting function is conducted during the execution of the OPORD. During detection, the collection manager supervises the execution of the collection plan, focusing on the commander's PIRs. TA assets gather information and report their findings back to their controlling headquarters, which in turn pass pertinent information to the tasking agency. Some collection assets provide actual targets, while other assets must have their information processed to produce valid targets. Not all of the information reported will benefit the targeting effort, but it may be valuable to the development of the overall situation. The target priorities developed in the decide function are used to expedite the processing of targets. Situations arise where the attack, upon location and identification, of a target is either impossible (for example, out of range) or undesirable (outside of but moving toward an advantageous location for the attack). Critical targets that we cannot or choose not to attack in accordance with the attack guidance must be tracked to ensure they are not lost. Tracking suspected targets expedites execution of the attack guidance. Tracking suspected targets keeps them in view while they are validated. Planners and executers must keep in mind that assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition. As targets are developed, appropriate attack systems are tasked in accordance with the attack guidance and location requirements of the system.

Deliver

The main objective of this function is the attack of targets in accordance with the attack guidance. The tactical solution (the selection of an attack system or a combination of systems) leads to a technical solution for the selected systems. The technical solution includes the following:

• Specific attack unit.
• Type of ordnance.
• Time of attack.
• Coordinating instructions.

Assess

The commander and staff assess the results of mission execution. If combat assessment reveals that the commander's guidance has not been met, the detect and deliver functions of the targeting process must continue to focus on the targets involved. This feedback may result in changes to original decisions made during the decide function.

These changes must be provided to subordinate units as appropriate, because they impact on continued execution of the plan.

The targeting process is continuous and crucial to the synchronization of combat power. The identification and subsequent development of targets, the attack of the targets, and the combat assessment of the attacks give the commander vital feedback on the battle.

JOINT AND SERVICE TARGETING METHODOLOGY

Each service has established unique doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures for targeting. Several emerging joint doctrinal publications also address joint targeting procedures. Where the habitual integration of resources from one or more services support the targeting requirements of another service, multiservice arrangements have been developed. Chapter 3 discusses current and emerging joint targeting.

Targeting at all levels of the joint force is a complex and coordinated process. Existing service procedures for the acquisition, selection, and attack of targets have four things in common:

• Deciding in advance what is to be targeted.
• Locating the target.
• Attacking the target.
• Assessing the results of the attack.

This common approach to targeting mirrors the decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting functions presented in this manual. The targeting process is accomplished by the components applying service-developed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) within a joint framework established by the JFC. The organizational challenge for the JFC is to meld existing service component architecture into an effective joint targeting team for operational level targets without degrading their primary mission of targeting support to their respective components.

From the JFC's perspective, a target is selected for strategic and/or operational reasons. A decision is subsequently made whether to attack the target and, if it is to be attacked, which system will attack it. The targets selected or nominated in this process must support the JFC's campaign plan and contribute to the success of present and future major operations. The JFC relies on his tactical level commanders to effectively orchestrate the targeting process. Control measures, such as a fire support coordination line (FSCL), must be repositioned as needed to take fill advantage of all assets available to the joint force commander. The JFC best influences the outcome of future tactical battles by setting the conditions for those battles and allocating resources to the service components.

JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS RELATIONSHIPS

Capabilities of the ground component commander and the air component commander overlap. Both have deep intelligence collection assets and attack system capabilities, and the capabilities of the systems of one service complement the capabilities of the other. Therefore, both air and ground systems must be synchronized to gain the greatest efficiency and technological advantage. This requires air and ground component commanders and their staffs to share the effort in acquiring and attacking targets throughout the battlefield.

Staffs at all echelons must understand the coordination requirements and measures to acquire and attack targets safely and effciently in a joint warfighting environment. The battlefield is five-dimensional. The five dimensions are width, length, altitude or depth, time, and electromagnetic spectrum. Current coordination and control measures permit the complementary, simultaneous attack of targets by air and ground systems.

PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Key targeting team members are members of the commander's coordinating and special staffs. They perform the targeting process as part of their normal responsibilities within the military decision-making process. From their initial estimates and analysis to their supervision and execution of the plan, they continue to revise and update their estimates. The relative formality of the decision-making process depends on time available and the level of the command.

The commander is responsible for the targeting effort. The intelligence, operations, and fire support officers form the core of the targeting team at each level. Normally, the chief of staff at corps and division and the executive officer (XO) at brigade and battalion oversee the routine activity and coordination of the targeting process.

Targeting is enhanced by the commander organizing his primary operations, intelligence, and fire support advisors into an informal targeting team. Typically, the team is composed of representatives from the following:

• G2 or S2 section.
• G3 or S3 section.
• Fire support element (FSE).

As required other representatives within the tactical operations center (TOC) may also be members of the targeting team. Examples include the following:

• Staff weather officer (SWO).
• Aviation officer.
• Chemical officer.
• Electronic warfare staff officer (EWSO).
• Engineer officer.
• Field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO).
• Air liaison officer.
• Air defense officer.
• Naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO).
• Civil affairs officer.

• Staff judge advocate (SJA).
• Liaison officers (LOs) of major subordinate commanders.

The targeting team has three primary functions in assisting the commander:

• Helps synchronize operations.
• Recommends targets to acquire and attack. The team also recommends the most efficient and available assets to detect and attack these targets.
• Identifies combat assessment (CA) requirements. CA can provide crucial and timely battlefield information to allow analysis of the success of the plan or to initiate revision of the plan. See Chapter 2 for more details on CA.

The targeting effort is continuous at all levels of command. Continuity is achieved through parallel planning by targeting teams from corps through battalion TF. Targeting is not just a wartime function. This process must be exercised before battle if it is to operate effectively. The members of the targeting team must be familiar with their roles and the roles of the other team members. That familiarity can only be gained through staff training.

The following chapters describe the targeting functions required to successfully plan and engage targets by use of the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology. As mentioned earlier, the degree of formality with which the targeting process is pursued depends on the level of command and the time available.