FM 6-20-10: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for The Targeting Process

CHAPTER 3 TARGETING IN A JOINT ENVIRONMENT

Integral to the JFC's concept of operations is his concept for joint fire support and interdiction. This concept describes the integration and synchronization of joint fire support and interdiction at tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Some fires support operational and tactical maneuver by land, air, and maritime forces. Other fires are independent of maneuver and orient on achieving specific operational and/or strategic objectives which supped the JFC's intent and concept of operations.

NOTE: The term fires in this chapter refers to joint fire support.

JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

Targeting occurs at all levels within a joint command. It is performed at all levels by forces capable of attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal means. Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict procedures and priorities between the different services or echelons or different nations in the same force. The joint force commander must synchronize attacks throughout all dimensions of the joint force.

TARGETING AND THE CAMPAIGN PLAN

The National Command Authority (NCA) or headquarters senior to the JFC provides broad guidance, priorities, and targeting support to JFCs. The joint force components--

Identify requirements.
Nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets.
Conduct execution planning.

The targeting process is cyclic. It follows a seven-step process consisting of the following:

Guidance and priorities issued by the JFC.
Identification of requirements by the components.
Prioritization of the requirements.
Acquisition of targets or target sets.
Attack of targets by the components.
Assessment of the effects of the attacks by the components and the JFC.
Continuing guidance from the JFC on future firms or attack of targets.

The JFC establishes broad planning objectives and guidance for the integration of joint fires. He provides guidance for the campaign as a whole and for phases or major operations within the campaign. Subordinate commanders recommend how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve joint force objectives. With the advice of subordinate commanders, JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, set objectives, and determine the weight of effort for various operations. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed--

In terms of percentage of total available resources.
By assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.
As otherwise determined by the JFC.

After the JFC allocates resources and approves a target list, components plan and execute assigned missions. The missions may be part of their own operations or they may be in support of other components.

TERMINOLOGY

The following terms are described to ensure a mutual understanding of their use within this chapter:

Joint Fire Support

This term refers to fires of the supporting force against targets or objectives which are in or sufficiently near the area of operations (AO) of the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the two. The fires may impact on either side of the FSCL within the joint force land component commander's (JFLCC) AO.

Joint fire support includes fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of CAS by both fixed-and rotary-winged aircraft, naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, and nonlethal operations such as electronic warfare.

To facilitate the integration of this support, each component establishes an element to coordinate fires. Joint Pub 3-09 provides guidance for planning, coordinating, and executing joint fire support.

Interdiction

This term applies to actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (See Joint Pub 1-02.) Interdiction and maneuver are mutually supporting. Interdiction may complement surface operations at the operational level or may be independent of it. Interdiction is a powerful tool for the JFC. Interdiction-capable forces include all of the following:

Land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers.
Ships and submarines.
Conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces.
Special operations forces.
Amphibious raid forces.
Surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines.
Artillery and naval gunfire.
Attack helicopters.
Electronic warfare systems.
Antisatellite weapons.
Space-based satellite systems or sensors.

Air Interdiction

Applies to air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.

Air interdiction (AI) is normally planned and executed by the joint force air component commander (JFACC). Air interdiction missions within the JFLCC's AO also assist tactical and operational maneuver. The JFLCC is responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction within his AO, including the area between his FSCL and forward boundary.

Air interdiction is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with fires and movement of friendly forces is not required. (See Joint Pub 1-02.) The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction efforts.

Close Air Support (CAS)

This term applies to air actions against targets which are close to friendly forces and require detailed integration of each mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (See Joint Pub 1-02.) It enhances surface force operations by providing the capability to deliver a wide range of weapons and massed firepower at decisive points. In addition, CAS can do the following:

Surprise the enemy.
Create opportunities for the maneuver or advance of friendly forces through shock action and concentrated attacks.
Protect the flanks of friendly forces.
Blunt enemy offensives.
Protect the rear of surface forces during retrograde operations.

CAS is a supplement to, not a substitute for, a ground commander's organic firepower. It is flown against targets chosen by the ground commander and requires positive or procedural controls to achieve the desired effects with minimum risk. Organic attack helicopter units can perform CAS and are controlled by the ground component commander. Often times, they can provide the same effects as fixed-wing CAS but with a quicker reaction time.

Fixed-wing CAS is an element of joint fire support and is apportioned by the JFC. The JFACC translates the CAS apportionment decision into an allocation of CAS sorties to supported commands. Supported commands may further distribute their allocated CAS sorties among subordinate commands or AOs.

Apportionment

This term applies to the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be developed to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. (See Joint Pub 1-02.) Apportionment helps the JFCs to ensure the weight of the JFACC air effort is consistent with the campaign phases and objectives. JFCs normally apportion air efforts by using the following considerations:

Priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas.
Against assigned mission-type orders.
Against target sets.
By categories significant for the campaign.

Interdiction target priorities within the boundaries of the land force are considered along with theaterwide interdiction priorities by the JFC. The JFACC will use the priorities to plan and execute the theaterwide interdiction effort.

Allocation

This term refers to the translation of the apportionment decision into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. The JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties to the functions, areas, and/or missions they support.

Distribution

This term refers to further assignment of apportioned and allocated CAS or direct support (DS) sorties to subordinate units to support operational and tactical priorities. Distribution is done by the land or Army component commander. Airlift, air reconnaissance, and air interdiction sorties are not normally distributed. They are provided on the basis of planning decisions and approved requests during execution of operation orders.

Air Tasking Order

The primary vehicle to execute joint targeting for air operations is the ATO. Other components performing missions in support of or in conjunction with the JFACC's ATO will normally be tasked by message or fragmentary order from the J3. Coordination between components is detailed in the special instructions section of the ATO. The JFACC's ATO is an OPORD to allow tasked units to plan and prepare missions. It is developed in coordination with both supported and supporting units. The ATO is developed to bring to bear the most combat air power possible on the enemy, where and when needed, as determined by the priorities. The ATO is used by current operations personnel in all components to monitor and help execute all missions tasked by the JFACC. (See the figure below.)

Battle Damage Assessment

BDA is a joint program to determine if the required target effects are being achieved for each of the components. The JFC assigns joint force reconnaissance assets to support combat assessment (CA) needs that exceed the capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J3 or designated representative.

JOINT TARGETING ORGANIZATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

J2, Intelligence

The J2 provides intelligence to all levels of command for planning, directing, and conducting operations. The J2 is involved in target prioritization, detection, validation, and combat assessment for all component operations.

Joint Intelligence Center

JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies to include the following:

National Security Agency (NSA).
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Central Imagery Office (CIO).
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA).

All the above agencies are coordinated in support of the JFC by the national military joint intelligence center (NMJIC). J2s integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center (JIC). Liaison personnel from all these agencies provide access to the full range of capabilities in their agencies and focus them on the JFC's intelligence requirements.

The JIC is the center of the intelligence activities supporting the JFC, J2, and components. JIC support to the components includes identifying and coordinating assignment or augmentation by specialized intelligence personnel and communications. J2 staff elements plan and direct joint force intelligence activities. The JIC engages in production and dissemination of intelligence for the command.

J3, Operations Directorate

The J3 provides input to the JFC concerning apportionment and target prioritization.

Joint Targeting Steering Group (JTSG)

The JTSG is not currently defined in joint doctrine, but is used in some unified commands. When the theater commander in chief (CINC) creates subordinate joint operations areas, he must balance the requirements for resources and support between JFCs and the needs of the theater. Subordinate JFCs may request resources or support beyond what was apportioned, allocated, or assigned. The CINC may establish a JTSG to help him or his J3 and/or J5 with reconciliation of competing requests in the theater. The CINC determines the composition and functions of the JTSG. The JTSG should have appropriate service component, special operations, national agency, coalition and joint staff representatives to recommend on theater strategic and/or supporting operational issues.

Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB)

The JFCs may organize in their staffs to oversee targeting functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize JTCBs. If the JFC designates a JTCB it maybe an integrating center or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it is a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs may task commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function on the basis of the JFC's concept of operations and the individual's experience and expertise.

The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB will do the following:

Review target information.
Develop targeting guidance and priorities.
Prepare and refine joint target lists.

The JTCB should not have a micro level focus. It should not be tasked to perform the same functions as the staffs of functional components or the JFC staff. The principal focus of the JTCB is on operational levels of war and operational fires. The JTCB helps the JFC develop and communicate priorities and apportionment decisions. It does not select specific targets or methods of attack. The JTCB also reviews restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. Before and during sustained operations, component commanders recommend to the JTCB priorities for BDA within their boundaries.

Joint Force Fires Coordinator

A joint force fires coordinator (JFFC) is not addressed in approved joint publications. If there is no JTCP, there is no single joint officer or agency to advise the JFC or coordinate all fires for the JFC during planning and execution. The JFACC plans, coordinates, and executes air power in support of the JFC but is not responsible for synchronizing interdiction with maneuver. Synchronization is the responsibility of the JFLCC or joint force Marine component commander (JFMCC) in his AO. The battlefield coordination element (BCE) relays synchronization requirements to the JFACC air operations center (AOC) during development of the master attack plan (MAP) and the ATO. The BCE is not responsible for synchronizing ground maneuver with interdiction. The JFC may establish a JFFC to fill the void in the absence of a JTCB or in conjunction with it. The JFC defines the role, organization, and functions of the JFFC. The JFFC would be organized with appropriate joint service and functional component representation to accomplish the following potential functions:

Act as J3 action officer for joint fire support issues.
Act as executive agent for setup, support and conduct of the JTCB.
Monitor and/or review component target nominations.
Coordinate joint fire support.
Monitor compliance with the joint task force (JTF) commander's guidance for targeting and joint fires.
Recommend targeting guidance and priorities, attack guidance, and permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) to the JTCB and/or JFC.
Coordinate surface-to-surface deep strike weapons through the BCE for the JTF.
Produce JTF plans for integrated joint fire support.
Draft and publish JFC and/or JTCB decisions and guidance on fires and targeting to the JTF staff and components.

Joint Force Air Component Commander

The primary purpose of a joint force air component commander (JFACC) is to provide unity in employing air power for the benefit of the joint force as a whole in support of the JFC's objectives. The JFC normally designates a JFACC when two or more services employ air assets within the same AO. The JFACC is normally the component commander having the most air assets and the best capability to direct joint air operations. If the AO is primarily maritime, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as the JFACC. Composition of the JFACC's staff should include representation from all components.

Joint Force Land Component Commander

A JFC may designate a JFLCC when major kind elements of more than one service or nation are participating in an operation. The JFLCC is responsible for planning and executing land operations as directed by the JFC. The JFLCC is normally the commander with the most ground forces in the theater and the means to exercise battle command over assigned forces.

Fire support of land operations is executed at both the operational and tactical levels of war. To ensure adequate fire support is provided to land forces, the JFLCC may establish any or all of the following:

Supporting and supported relationships between subordinate commanders.
Fire control measures.
Coordination procedures.
Targeting considerations.

The need for fire support must be balanced against that available while maintaining an operational level perspective.

Within his boundaries, the JFLCC is the supported commander responsible for synchronization of maneuver and interdiction. He does this by setting targeting priorities and effects and timing of interdiction operations. Interdiction target priorities nominated by the JFLCC are considered along with theaterwide interdiction priorities by the JFC. They are reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use the priorities to plan and execute the theaterwide interdiction effort.

Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander

The joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) is the SOF component commander and exercises operational control (OPCON) over assigned and attached SOF. At the theater level, the JFSOCC is the special operations command (SOC) commander. The JFSOCC for a JFC may be a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander. He advises, plans, coordinates, and accomplishes assigned missions. When an AO encompasses the joint special operations area (JSOA) and there is no JFSOCC, the commander manages SOF operations through the special operations command (SOC). The special operations command and control element (SOCCE) commander directly coordinates and controls any special forces (SF) in the AO. When Ranger and sea-air-land (SEAL) units are supporting, they will provide liaison elements to the SOCCE.

THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEMS

Personnel assigned to or working with the theater air-ground systems (TAGS) must understand the decision processes and problems that the senior echelons in their chain of command face. With this knowledge, solutions to operational or TAGS coordination problems will be clearer. Component and subordinate commanders and staffs will better understand the factors that effect the TAGS functions and how to work within the system to receive or give support. Actions at the joint force level establish the ground rules for the TAGS, including the following:

CINC's guidance, perspective, and area strategy.
JFC's theater strategy.
Command organization and relationships
The campaign plan.
Assignment omissions and tasks.
Apportionment of forces.

The figures below represent the TAGS for other services. See FM 100-103-2 for complete details. Discussion of targeting considerations are in the following appendixes:

Appendix E: Air Force Targeting Considerations.
Appendix F: Navy Targeting Considerations.
Appendix G: USMC Targeting Considerations.
Appendix H: Special Operations Forces Targeting Considerations.

COORDINATION

Supported and Supporting Relationships

Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful way to accomplish tasks. This concept applies equally to all dimensions of the joint force. As defined in Joint Pub 3-0:

Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take such actions to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. Normally, the supporting commander is permitted to prescribe the tactics, methods, communications, and procedures to be employed by elements of the supporting force.

The establishing directive indicates the purpose of the relationship in terms of the effect desired and the scope of the actions to be taken. It should include the following:

The strength of the forces allocated to the supporting mission.
The time, place, and duration of the supporting effort.
The priority of the supporting mission relative to other missions of the supporting force.
The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting mission in the event of an exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
The general or special authority for any operational or other instruction to be issued by the forces being supported or by other authority in the action areas.

The above are key considerations to be addressed by joint planners as they impact on component targeting recommendations and decisions.

Control and Coordination Measures

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and FSCMs to facilitate joint operations. The measures may include any and all of the following:

Boundaries.
Phase lines.
Objectives.
Coordinating altitudes.
Air defense (AD) areas.
Amphibious objective areas.
Submarine operating patrol areas.
Minefield.

Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

The JFC may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define operational areas for land and maritime operations. He can size, shape, and position the boundaries to enable land and naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces. Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries. However, since the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the force, the JFC establishes airspace control measures, to include coordinating altitudes, to deconflict the uses required of the space. (See Joint Pub 3-52.) If a land force commander desires to shoot or maneuver beyond his boundaries, he must first coordinate with the appropriate commander.

The JFC determines the size, shape, and positioning of the land or naval force boundaries. He does so on the basis of his concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's need for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within the boundaries, the operational force commander is designated the supported commander. He is responsible for the synchronization of maneuver and fires.

Boundaries may require frequent adjustment on the basis of actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment. The supported commander should state clearly his concept of operations to supporting commanders. They in turn apply joint fire support and interdiction within the supported commander's boundaries to attack targets or objectives. Supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in planning and executing operations. Supported commanders should state how they envision fire support and interdiction aiding maneuvers and what they want to accomplish. They should also state what actions they want to avoid. Actions they might want to avoid could include destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in specified areas.

Fire Support Coordinating Measures

Joint FSCMs and the procedures associated with them ensure all of the following:

Troop safety is not jeopardized.
Other attack means are not interfered with.
Operations of adjacent subordinate units are not disrupted.

Within their operational areas, land and naval force commanders employ permissive and restrictive FSCMs to enhance the following:

Expeditious attack of targets.
Protection of forces, populations, critical pieces of infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance.
Deconfliction of fire support activities.
Enhance future operations.

Maneuver commanders position and adjust FSCMs consistent with the following:

Location of friendly forces.
Concept of the operation.
Anticipated enemy actions.
Consultation with other affected commanders.

The primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack of targets. Permissive measures require no further detailed coordination for the engagement of targets with conventional means. Restrictive measures impose requirements for specific coordination before engagement of targets.

The FSCL is a permissive FSCM. It is established and adjusted by the appropriate land force commander within his boundaries in consultation with other affected commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL should inform affected commanders, time permitting, to allow them to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The FSCL is not a boundary--the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander to the limits of his operational area.

The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, it is located on the basis of estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander's estimate, as well as other factors deemed appropriate. It is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the defense than in the offense. However, the exact positioning depends on the situation.

By establishing an FSCL at sufficient depth so as not to limit high-tempo maneuver, attack operations within their boundaries by forces not under their control are eased. It applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. (The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.)

An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land force commander. Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL.

Timely coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to air, land, and SOF commanders. Their forces may now be operating beyond an FSCL or may plan to maneuver on that territory in the future. Such coordination is also important when attacking forces are employing wide-area munitions or those with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination helps avoid conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and could waste limited resources. Further discussion on procedures for coordinating operations between the FSCL and forward boundary can be found later in this chapter.

The land force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change frequently, such as every several hours. The establishing commander sends the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attacks are coordinated by the controlling agencies. Anticipated adjustments to the FSCL are sent to other elements of the joint force soon enough to reduce potential disruptions in their current and near-term operations.

COMPONENT TARGET PROCESSING

The following paragraphs discuss the joint force targeting process and target list development.

Joint Force Targeting Processing

All components are equipped with intelligence, targeting, and operational capabilities to support the JFC's campaign. All have established targeting tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for planning their individual operations. The figure on the next page provides a comparison of the joint and service targeting methodologies that exist today. Component procedures are generally similar and include the processes of IPB, determination of enemy center of gravity, and determination of HVTs and HPTs. The components identify requirements and nominate targets that are outside their boundaries, or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets, and conduct execution planning. The requirements and target nominations are made on the basis of the JFC's apportionment and sub-apportionment decisions. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions. Targets that are submitted to the JFACC or the JTCB require, as a minimum, the following information:

Component request number.
Description (type of target, for example, airfield, armored brigade, logistical facility).
Location (where the target will be at desired time of attack).
Target composition (specific elements to be attacked, for example, CPs, tanks, personnel carriers, storage sites, communication nodes).
Desired effects (destroy, neutralize, suppress, jam communications).
Rationale and/or justification.

Target List Development Process.

Targets may be selected from a standing target list developed during the course of deliberate planning, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data base containing the basic encyclopedia of targets, or may emerge as a contingency develops. Primary responsibility for the development and maintenance of intelligence and target data bases rests with the theater JIC. Facilities and installations are studied to identify critical nodes and those of importance in the military, political, and economic infrastructure (center of gravity). All joint force components develop OPLANS to support the JFC's campaign plan. The J2 staff and other component intelligence staffs maintain and update the theater or JFC targeting data base to reflect component operational planning requirements. These factors along with the JFC's guidance and priorities determine target priorities. The JFC designates the agency responsible for developing the joint prioritized target list (JPTL).

In some commands, as the situation evolves, the responsibility for maintenance of the JPTL shifts to the JTCB. Final prioritization is done by the JTCB based on the JFC's guidance. The JTCB submits the JPTL to the JFC for approval. Upon approval a joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL) is passed to the component commander for tasking and execution. The JFC will task each component to accomplish missions or target execution within their capabilities and direct coordination as required.

LAND COMPONENT COMMAND TARGETING

As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver. When maneuver is employed, JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater air assets. Joint Pub 3-0, pp. IV-19, 20

A U. S. land component commander (JFLCC) follows the decide, detect, deliver, assess targeting process previously described to provide input to meetings conducted under the joint targeting cycle. However, the JFLCC concerns himself with the following:

Isolating his subordinate commanders' surface battles.
Providing his subordinate commanders with the space in which to conduct operations.
Providing his subordinate commanders with the assets to support their needs for acquisition and attack systems.

The JFLCC targeting perspective is more planning than execution. His execution focus is primarily between his FSCL and the forward boundary of his area of operations.

In support of the JFC's campaign or operation plan and, more specifically, the JFLCC's surface operations, tasks in this area are predominantly of the following types:

Counterair and anti-air warfare.
Interdiction.
Strategic attack.
Intelligence gathering.

The JFC and component commander are challenged to develop and implement procedures to plan, coordinate, and execute operations in the area between the FSCL and forward boundary. These challenges include the following:

Establish joint targeting procedures which help nomination and integration of component priority targets into the JFC campaign and/or OPLAN.
Establish procedures for the transition of authority between commands during operations. The procedures must address general direction authority within surface areas of operation, airspace control, and FSCMs.
As the JFACC integrates target nominations into the overall theater interdiction effort ensure the supporting air interdiction in the JFLCC AO meets JFLCC targeting requirements.
Establish sensor-to-shooter links which support command and control requirements for acquisition and attack throughout the JFC area of responsibility (AOR) and eliminate the possibility of creating sanctuaries for opposing forces.
Provide the supporting commander flexibility in planning, coordinating, and executing the supporting effort to ease his concerns for safety and mission effectiveness.
Identify problems which may cause noncompliance with support requirements by supporting commanders or with FSCL coordination agreements.

APPORTIONMENT AND ALLOCATION

JFLCC planners must understand the apportionment and allocation processes to synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction in the JFLCC AO. This is an overview of those processes. Also discussed are JFLCC staff involvement in the process of ensuring JFLCC and air component commander concerns are addressed during the planning and target nomination process. Initial JFC analysis and assignment of component missions affects the apportionment process.

Where maneuver is part of the JFC concept, the JFC may synchronize maneuver and interdiction. Interdiction operations must conform to and enhance the JFC scheme of maneuver. To facilitate theater operations, the JFC may establish boundaries in the theater for the conduct of operations. Surface boundaries are not intended to complicate joint operations. They are intended to clarify responsibility for synchronization of operations in the boundaries.

JFC objectives, intent, and priorities given in mission assignments and coordinating requirements enable subordinates to exploit the capability of their forces while minimizing friction generated by competing requirements. Interdiction requirements will often exceed means, requiring the JFC to prioritize requirements.

Land and naval force commander responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within their AOs must be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. (See JP 3-0, p IV-20.)

Apportionment

Apportionment is the assignment of the total resources by percentage and/or priority that can be devoted to air operations and/or geographic operations for a time period. The total resources made available to the JFACC is determined by the JFC in consultation with subcommanders on the basis of assigned objectives and the concept of operations. JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage available to geographic areas, against mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include the following:

Strategic attack.
Interdiction.
Counterair.
Maritime support.
CAS.

After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes an apportionment recommendation to the JFC. (See the figure below.)

It is important that the JFLCC know which forum is designated for discussion of apportionment considerations. The forum may be in the agenda of specific meetings sponsored by the JFC such as planning meetings, or the discussion might be included in meetings sponsored by the JTSG (if established) or JTCB (if established). It could also be a topic for discussion in meetings sponsored by the JFACC such as a guidance, apportionment and targeting (GAT) meeting.

The JFLCC must understand JFC intent and be able to articulate JFLCC interdiction needs to support operational and tactical maneuver. The JFLCC must be able to present at the meetings the following:

Concept(s) of operational maneuver in support of the JFC plan and intent.
Associated general or specific HPTs as identified as critical to maneuver success.
Associated target priorities and timing of attack.
A rationale which provides the basis for target designation, priorities, and desired effects.

The JFLCC must be able to make the JFACC aware of the impact of attacking or not attacking JFLCC HPTs as requested. This is critical in a resource-constrained environment to support integration of JFLCC priorities by the JFACC into the overall theater interdiction effort. The JFLCC provides his targeting objectives, requirements (including timing and coordinating instructions), and the targets he wants attacked. The JFACC plans, coordinates, and executes the supporting effort as directed by the JFC.

Targeting objectives are normally discussed after presentation of the enemy situation, capabilities, and associated HVTs. Targeting objectives should be expressed in the form of mission type orders against general or specific targets. The JFLCC should not present and try to support a voluminous measle sheet target list. Good examples for targeting objectives which support JFACC planning, coordination, and execution include the following:

Delay southward movement and arrival of the 2d Shock Armored Division at EA Eagle until 1600Z D+ 22 to permit US 52d Infantry Division to establish area defense.

Divert the 2d Shock Armored Division to EA Eagle.

Disrupt the command and control capability of the Crasnian Army Group from D+10 to D+11 to degrade their ability to respond to the penetration of US X Corps along axis Strike.

Destroy the army command post vicinity of Crasnia between 0300Z and 0400Z D+25 to degrade their command and control during the counterattack by US X Corps.

Destroy POL and ammunition storage facilities and transport to degrade Crasnian Army Group resupply capability during its projected attack south on D+10 through D+14.

Disrupt the command and control capability of the insurgents, the People's Democratic Group (PDG), between 0100Z and 0600Z each day to degrade their ability to conduct nightly raids on the host nation (HN) radio, television, and power stations.

The targeting objective is easier to state than it is to measure successful accomplishment. The JFLCC must be able to answer the difficult question, How will I know when I have achieved the objective? The answer is critical when successful accomplishment establishes a condition supporting a command decision.

JFLCC requirements are stated in the above targeting objectives. These include the effect desired on the target and the timing of the target attack. Other requirements are implied in the above targeting objectives. These include coordination for airspace control, air defense, details of joint air attack team (JAAT) missions, and critical synchronization considerations. Additional JFLCC requirements may include restrictions or coordinating instructions for JFACC interdiction operations in the JFLCC AO. These may include restricting the following:

Attack of targets which may be important to future land operations (bridges, airfields, dams).
Use of cluster munitions in certain areas.
Air operations in certain areas to facilitate planned land-based deep operations (for example attack helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, air assault operations).

For operations in the JFLCC AO, this JFACC coordination takes place with the JFLCC headquarters via the AOC and/or BCE. This assumes that the JFLCC is an ARFOR commander. The discussion contained in the remainder of this chapter assumes that the JFLCC is an ARFOR commander as opposed to Marine, United Nations, combined, or other commander.

Specific targets to be attacked may be identified, but such requests should be limited to targets which are extremely critical to the success of ground operations. Once mission requests are given to the JFACC, his joint air operations center (JAOC) identifies specific targets based on intelligence to achieve JFLCC targeting objectives. The BCE can facilitate getting additional target nominations from the JFLCC G2 when necessary. This reduces the target management burden on the JFLCC staff monitoring JFACC supporting efforts and attack of a few specific HPTs.

To support planning an apportionment recommendation may address a period 96 or more hours into the future. However, the JFC apportionment decision is normally made after requests for air support have been passed from the JFLCC to the BCE. JFLCC planning also normally addresses a period 96 or more hours into the future. This means perceived requirements are based on projected enemy capabilities and actions. This highlights the importance of operational level intelligence preparation of the battlefield and joint war gaming to support JFLCC requirement forecasts.

When land operations are critical to the success of the JFC operations, the JFLCC recommends to the JFC priorities and timing for air support in the JFLCC AO.

Apportionment can be expected to change during the phases of force projection operations. For example, during forced entry operations, counterair will likely require a greater percentage of effort while CAS requirements are minimal. The reverse will be true during later decisive operations when the JFC may direct that land operations have priority of support and air superiority has been achieved.

Allocation

Following the JFC'S apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties to the fictions, areas, and/or missions they support. On the basis of the JFC's apportionment decision, internal requirements, and air support request (AIRSUPREQ) messages, each air component sends an allocation/request (ALLOREQ) message to the JFACC not later than 24 hours before the air tasking day. ALLOREQ messages contain the following information:

Number of sorties by assigned mission and type aircraft to be flown during the air tasking day.
Excess sorties not needed by the air component and available for joint or cross-force taskings by the JFACC.
Request for additional air support beyond the capability of the air component.

Allotment

The JFACC reviews each ALLOREQ and sends a sortie allotment (SORTIEALOT) message back to the component at least 19 hours before the tasking day or in accordance with established operations plans. The SORTIEALOT message confirms the ALLOREQ and provides general guidance for planning operations. The SORTIEALOT contains three kinds of instructions:

Revisions, if any, to the components planned allocation of sorties. With JFC concurrence, the SORTIEALOT message could convey revisions or redirection of missions outside of the apportionment guidance.
Approval or changes to the component requests and allotment of excess sorties from other components.
Revisions to mission data for component requests, such as a changed mission priority or time on target. Component liaison elements (for example, the BCE) and the JFACC usually coordinate such revisions in advance.

The figure below illustrates the procedure.

PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATING OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE FSCL AND FORWARD BOUNDARY

All procedures for operations and support should be agreed upon during mobilization or predeployment. If that is not possible, then they should be agreed upon no later than the deployment stage of force projection operations and sooner if on-the-shelf contingency plans permit. The starting arrangements may be refined later as required Supported units provide SOPs to supporting commands via liaison sections. Time permitting, they train appropriate command and staff personnel on joint staff procedures. The training addresses the following:

Mission-essential tasks, including coordination procedures for establishing and changing graphical control measures.
Establishing and changing FSCM and airspace control measures (ACM) (with emphasis on the FSCL).
Target nomination procedures.
Procedures for coordinating and/or informing target attack on either side of the FSCL.

This eases the transition of command and control as ground forces arrive in theater, conduct entry operations, and execute operation plans.

During deployment and forced entry operations, all components plan, coordinate, and execute operations supporting the JFC plan. An Army force structure may follow Navy, Marine, or Air Force forces in force projection operations. JFACC responsibility for planning and execution rests with either a designated NAVFOR commander or AFFOR commander, depending on who has a more suitable command and control infrastructure. The JFLCC provides liaison to the JFACC to monitor activities and provide planning support for forced entry operations. The liaison element takes advantage of JFACC staff work to further develop the intelligence estimate, noting BDA reports and combat assessment. If the NAVFOR is providing the initial JFACC and transition to the AFFOR is anticipate the JFC specifies how and when transition of JFACC authority occurs. JFLCC liaison must be prepared for this transition as well.

During forced entry operations, the JFLCC normally requires a small AO until the lodgment is established and conditions are met for decisive land operations. This transition is accompanied by an increase in the active dimensions of the JFLCC AO. JFLCC advance parties and liaison teams prepare for the transition to the associated increase in scope of the JFLCC's general direction authority within his designated AO. The JFACC has been planning, coordinating, and executing operations in depth to achieve the conditions required for decisive ground operations. The JFACC must be prepared to meet the increased targeting requirements and priorities of the JFLCC.

The JFC provides his vision for accomplishing his mission. He provides planning guidance and establishes an AO large enough for the JFLCC to maneuver rapidly and operate at extended ranges. Also, following discussion of functional command support of campaign and/or operational objectives, the JFC makes his apportionment decision. The decision considers JFACC recommendations, ACC capabilities and requirements, and JFLCC combat air requirements. Following the JFC apportionment decision, the JFACC translates the apportionment decision into allocation of sorties. The allocation provides a set number of CAS sorties to support the JFLCC throughout his AO. AI sorties support the JFACC throughout the theater, including the JFLCC AO. CAS allocation and AI sorties within the JFLCC AO can be projected overtime (days) to support JFLCC future operations planning.

BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION ELEMENT

The organization that provides the interface between the ARFOR commander and the JFACC (or MCC perfoming as JFACC) is the BCE. In a multicorps environment each corps provides an LO to the BCE. In a single corps environment, the BCE is assigned to the corps headquarters and collocated with the JFACC AOC. The AOC is normally the JFACC's command post. It will often be designated the JAOC. The AOC is the operational facility in which the JFACC has centralized planning directing, and controlling tactical resources. The BCE can be tailored to support the requirements of a contingency force headquarters. If appropriate, a Marine LO, a NALE, and a Navy surface operations liaison element will join the AOC structure. The following functions make the BCE important to planning coordinating, and executing operations between the FSCL and forward boundary.

The BCE collocates with the ACC AOC (or MCC counterpart) to perform the following functions:

Monitor and analyze the land battle for the AOC.
Provide the interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data and support requirements.
Coordinate and integrate JFLCC requirements for ACM, FSCM and tactical airlift.

The BCE can establish an automatic data processing (ADP) interface from its standard theater Army command and control system (STACCS) terminal (if available) to both the AOC contingency tactical air control system (TACS) automated processing system (CTAPS) terminal and the Army force STACCS terminals.

The JFLCC plans and synchronizes fires throughout his AO by using the top-down planning, bottom-up refinement methodology. This process--

Correlates all facts and assumptions regarding the JFLCC mission and AO.
Analyzes the impact of the facts and assumptions on the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of potential courses of action.
Identifies supporting tasks and the timing for accomplishing the tasks.

JFLCC staff products include the following:

Identification of JFLCC HPTs in priority.
Target acquisition requirements via the intelligence collection plan.
Target attack guidance.
BDA requirements.

These are produced for each phase or critical event of the JFLCC operation plan. During scheduled Staff meetings, they are updated as required.

Planned targets beyond the FSCL which the JFLCC has the capability to acquire and attack must be sent to the AOC combat plans division via the BCE plans section. This keeps the AOC informed of significant ground operations in that area and minimizes duplication of effort. Planned JFLCC targets short of the FSCL must be communicated to all affected commanders.

Planned targets must be coordinated to provide positive and/or procedural control to resolve conflicts in airspace use in the JFLCC AO. Often, details of ACM such as exact grid locations of targets or firing positions cannot be projected accurately. JFACC and JFLCC planners should provide for flexibility. Details of positive and procedural controls may be refined and coordinated in a reasonable time frame before attack. The use of ATACMS to provide SEAD protection during a JAAT provides one of many possible examples.

A JAAT mission entails a series of interdependent actions, one of which is SEAD support for aircraft during both ingress and egress. SEAD maybe provided by both JFACC package design and JFLCC lethal and nonlethal systems. SEAD targets along flight routes may or may not be known. Also, the trigger event to initiate the JAAT may depend on a specific enemy action. Thus, planners must allow flexibility for timing of the SEAD strikes and locations of previously unknown SEAD targets.

For known SEAD targets, an ATACMS attack window can be established on the basis of expected time of attack and/or liftoff of aircraft. Also, to reduce risk to aircraft, a restricted operations zone (ROZ) (an air coordination measure) may be established around the firing point and target grid. The effective time for the ROZ correlates to the ATACMS launch window. This information must be provided to the AOC via the BCE. The AOC will ensure the appropriate AWACS or ABCCC is aware of the planned mission. When the trigger event is observed, the JFLCC notifies the BCE and/or AOC that the JAAT is being initiated a specified time. Normally, control is accomplished by the following:

Corps ASOC.
Associated FACs and ABCCC.
Attack helicopter air mission commander.
Corps deep operations coordination center.

SEAD targets of opportunity will occur during aircraft ingress and egress. Direct and immediate threats to the aircraft must be countered by the aircraft. SEAD targets which do not pose an immediate threat, such as a radar system which radiates, may be countered as directed by the ASOC or ABCCC or by ATACMS. If planners recognize this possibility, time for required coordination during execution can be minimized. ATACMS firing units may be earmarked to provide support against targets of opportunity. The ATACMS firing positions should be identified in advance. The GLO on board the ABCCC must be aware of the plan and the contingency provisions. When the SEAD target of opportunity is acquired, the ABCCC or ASOC should make the decision to counter with available air or to use the ATACMS earmarked for the on-call mission. If ATACMS is selected, then at the same time the launcher-to-target line is determined. Aircraft are warned (on the basis of ATACMS trajectory considerations) by using JFACC-developed procedures. The ATACMS firing unit is directed to occupy firing positions and given a firing window (or at my command). When conditions are met, the ABCCC can pass clearance to fire to the ASOC and corps DOCC.

JFLCC-approved planned targets for which ACC support is necessary are sent by the JFLCC staff to the ACC via the BCE plans section. It is possible that the JFACC AOC may be planning attacks in the JFLCC AO that support both the JFC targeting guidance and the JFLCC targeting objectives. Placement of the FSCL and the BCE to AOC relationship both impact on JFACC integration of JFLCC-specific target nominations.

JFACC does not focus on interdiction targets short of the FSCL because of the strict coordination requirements for positive and procedural control in this area. The JFACC does plan other missions short of the FSCL, but the targets are typically requested by the ground commander. Therefore, the greater the distance between the FSCL and the FLOT, the greater the burden on the establishing commander for planning coordinating, and executing attacks short of the FSCL. A distant FSCL may overload ground staff capabilities and TACS ability to monitor or execute positive and procedural controls.

JFLCC targets are nominated in priority sequence with the following information:

Description.
Location (projected for mobile targets).
Time window for attack (to ensure synchronization and synergy with JFLCC ground operations).
Desired effects.

The BCE coordinates with the AOC to minimize duplication and ensure JFLCC nominations which are already being planned by the AOC reflect JFLCC timing and do not conflict with land operations. JFLCC requests already planned by the AOC are identified by the BCE. The remaining nominations are cross-leveled to ensure JFLCC higher priority nominations are integrated into the AOC ATO. The BCE advises the JFLCC of AOC inability to integrate requests.

The number of specific target nominations should be limited to those deemed absolutely critical to ground operations. Once the JFACC (AOC) knows the importance of the JFLCC targeting objectives and associated requirements, the AOC should not need a voluminous list of interdiction targets to provide support. In effect, this is like telling a commander what his mission is and then telling him the specifics of how it will be done. When the AOC does not know the specific HPTs which support JFLCC accomplishing mission type orders of disrupt, delay, destroy, damage, divert, or limit, then the JFLCC should provide targeting support through the BCE. This support may provide general target sets or specific target nominations. Also, the support may include an assessment of enemy capabilities for protection and movement to assist AOC planning.

The ACC plans, coordinates, and executes supporting combat air for the JFLCC. The AOC integrates JFLCC requests for air reconnaisance, airlift, and targets for CAS and AI into the overall air support scheduled in the daily ATO. The AOC must have the flexibility to design air packages to accomplish the mission while providing protection to the air crews. Situations may arise which affect the number of sorties required to acquire or attack targets (for example, air defense vulnerability, competing demands for sortie generation exceeding ACC supportability). These situations may result in JFLCC targeting requirements or priorities not being supported as requested. Conflicts affecting JFLCC CAS or AI targets must be brought to the attention of the JFLCC operations/plans staff immediately by the BCE. Conflicts which cannot be resolved at BCE or AOC level may be elevated by the commanders for adjudication by the JTCB. Daily JTCB meetings may not be timely for adjudication of time-sensitive, mission-essential targeting requirements of the JFLCC. These must be resolved by direct coordination between the JFLCC and JFACC.

Other products of the military decision-making process include control and coordination measures which address use of airspace and employment of all fires. ALOs are present in the JFLCC tactical operations center. The ALO participates in the war-gaming process to advise on Air Force concerns for use of airspace and positioning of FSCM and ACM. He is aware of the rationale for synchronization, placement of FSCM and requests for ACM. This includes initial FSCM and ACM to support the JFLCC plan and the conditions which dictate changing them to planned subsequent locations.

After approval of the action by the JFLCC, the ALO sends the information to the supporting ACC AOC. The JFLCC staff also provides the information to the appropriate BCE sections. The BCE plans and ADA/Army airspace command and control (A²C²) sections inform the AOC of the location of FSCM. This facilitates addition of FSCM and/or ACM to the ATO and airspace control order (ACO). It also facilitates change of FSCM and/or ACM when conditions are met which forecast the need for change.

The decision on whether to use and where to place an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. When making his estimate, the commander uses all of the following:

Location of enemy forces.
Anticipated rates of movement.
Weapons capabilities.
Tempo of the operation.
Other factors deemed appropriate.

The FSCL is established and adjusted by the land force commanders (normally the JFLCC or corps commander) in their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. The FSCL is not a boundary. Synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land force boundary. The following are some considerations for placement of the FSCL.

The FSCL must complement the JFLCC concept for operations in depth and simultaneous attack. This can take several forms to include:

Fires to canalize, divert, or delay enemy forces.
Airborne or air assault operations.
Attack helicopter operations.
Deep ground maneuver.
Interdiction to destroy enemy potential and/or capabilities before they can be used against friendly forces.

The depth of subordinate units' AOs is a key consideration in the placement of the FSCL. The FSCL placement in turn influences the allocation of target acquisition and fire support assets. Placing the FSCL at greater depths than subordinates can acquire and attack targets requires support from the JFLCC or other supporting commanders. Aerial platforms such as the ABCCC, JSTARS (with appropriately located ground stations), and other systems can extend the JFLCC and subordinate command ability to perform these tasks.

The JFLCC views the FSCL as a permissive FSCM which facilitates delivery of fires beyond the FSCL with minimal coordination (for example, must inform or should coordinate). This is the intent of the FSCL. However, from the ACC's perspective, the FSCL is a constraint on air strikes short of the FSCL because sorties there must be under JFLCC control to ensure clearance of fires. The JFLCC must consider this perspective. When the FSCL is positioned at greater depth, there is greater strain placed on the TACS' ability to coordinate control of air sorties short of the FSCL. This increased coordination requirement could result in delays for combat air support.

The FSCL must support operational tempo. If the JFLCC ground operations support rapid maneuver and focus on operations at extended ranges to support maneuver, then he must consider placing the FSCL at greater depth from the FLOT. He must also project the locations of subsequent FSCLs and the conditions that make them effective. This facilitates continued rapid forward movement, operations at extended ranges, and efficient change to on order FSCLs. Again, an FSCL at greater depth requires consideration of subordinate unit capabilities and allocation of resources.

The FSCL is normally placed closer to the FLOT in the defense than in the offense; exact positioning always depends on the situation. In offense or defense, key considerations are the type and scope of deep operations and the JFLCC perception of the degree of control required. This implies a suitability test for the FSCL: The more the JFLCC (or commander establishing the FSCL) requires control over operations beyond the FSCL, the less utility there is in the FSCL. Another consideration results from placing the FSCL further from the FLOT. As the distance from the FLOT to the FSCL increases, the strain on the commander's command and control capability for operations short of the FSCL increases. This applies to situations where no FSCL is employed. The impacts on the establishing commander and supporting commander must be considered.

The establishing commander must identify deep ground operations beyond the FSCL critical to his success (for example, special operations, HPT attack, deep attack helicopter operations, deep airborne and/or air assault operations). He must communicate his intent for these operations to supporting and affected commanders. He must also communicate those actions he does not want to occur (restrictions). This may be accomplished during planning meetings attended by affected commanders.

Whenever possible, restrictive fire areas (RFAs), no-fire areas (NFAs), and ACM are used to restrict fires so the FSCL can be placed to expedite fires to the maximum extent. In situations where the FSCL is at a greater depth (for example, beyond the range of cannon and rocket artillery), free-fire areas (FFAs) may be used to expedite fires short of the FSCL.

Varying capabilities for acquisition and attack may exist among adjacent commanders in a multicorps environment or coalition operations. Normally, corps commanders may establish an FSCL to support their operations. The JFLCC (US or allied) must not allow establishment of layered FSCLs (more than one FSCL layered in depth within the JFLCC AO). Layered FSCLs and multiple, separate noncontiguous corps FSCLs at varying depths create a coordination and execution problem for the supporting ACC. Whenever possible, the JFLCC should consolidate the deep operational requirements of subordinates to establish a single FSCL within the JFLCC AO. The JFLCC FSCL may be noncontiguous reflecting the varying capabilities of subordinate commands. A single JFLCC FSCL--

Facilitates ACC support.
Accommodates subordinate deep operations requirements.
Eases coordination of FSCL changes across the JFLCC AO.

The change of JFLCC established FSCM and/or ACM is initiated by the JFLCC operations cell with approval of the JFLCC (or designated authority). The operations cell informs the BCE operations cell of the change and effective time. Conditions which dictate the change should be posted in the JFLCC and BCE and coordinated with the AOC. This facilitates timely change. As conditions are met, the new FSCM and/or ACM effective time can be projected and announced. The AOC advises affected sorties of the effective times and locations of the new measures. When the change is made, the operations cell confirms with the BCE operations section that the AOC has informed all TACS nodes. This ensures affected sorties are aware of new FSCM and/or ACM locations, associated control measures are being followed, and the risk of fratricide is reduced.

Normally, the ACC also serves as the joint force airspace coordination authority (ACA). ACM are nominated from JFLCC subordinate headquarters through the A²C² elements. They are consolidated at JFLCC A²C² and forwarded to the BCE ADA/A²C² for coordination with the AOC plans and operations divisions. ACM apply to indirect fires trajectories and UAV because they are airspace users. The JFLCC A²C² ensures ACM nominations support and do not conflict with ground operations before forwarding to the BCE. The ACC, as the ACA, approves formal ACM nominations within the JFLCC AO and includes them in the ACO.

Normally, ACM such as low-level transit routes (LLTR) will terminate in the vicinity of the FSCL. However, the situation may require establishing ACM beyond the FSCL to facilitate rapid change of both the FSCL and ACM. ACM should be established to facilitate deep operations between the FSCL and JFLCC forward boundary. Ground infiltration and aerial insertion and extinction of SOF or long-range surveillance teams and attack helicopter maneuver illustrate this consideration.

Changes to within the JFLCC AO are initiated by the JFLCC A²C² element with JFLCC approval. The JFLCC A²C² element informs the BCE ADA/A²C² section of the desired change and effective time. The BCE ADA/A²C² section coordinates the change with the AOC combat plans and operations divisions.

The military decision-making process is conducted as a matter of SOP during commander and staff meetings at all JFLCC echelons. Meetings are orchestrated to facilitate vertical coordination between echelons (JFLCC-corps-division) and horizontal coordination between each echelon's operations centers.

JFLCC requests for changing FSCM and ACM or request for information regarding attack of targets between the FSCL and the forward boundary is eased by joint service LOs in the JFLCCs staff. Normally, enough time is available in the JFLCC planning cycle to keep affected commanders aware of operations and changes. In any case, JFLCC requests for ACM in the JFLCC AO should not be disapproved by the ACA without justification and coordination. This coordination maybe done through the BCE.

During coalition operations, planners must not assume that the coalition force decision-making process is similar to that of US forces. Some differences that may exist are as follows:

Degree of centralized control of decision making.
Considerations made during the war-gaming process.
Values associated with application of force.
Staff training.
Command, control, communication, and intelligence (C³I) capability.
Organization and procedures.

Furthermore, the JFC and/or JFLCC may be provided by a coalition force headquarters with US forces subordinate to or in support of the JFC or JFLCC. Identify the differences through liaison, and establish appropriate measures to improve interoperability. Ensure coalition liaison is integrated effectively into the US military decision-making process. For a more detailed discussion of the BCE, see Appendix I.

EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE FSCL AND FORWARD BOUNDARY

Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and SOF. Their forces may now be operating beyond an FSCL or may plan to maneuver on that territory in the future. Such coordination is also important when attacking forces are employing wide area munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination helps avoid conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide or waste limited resources. The Army command and control node primarily responsible for controlling current operations between the FSCL and forward boundary is the TOC. The TOC is often referred to as the main command post.

The TOC plans cell develops operations plans. When execution is ordered, the tactical command post has primary responsibility to control current close operations. At US Army corps and army level, the G3 current operations cell in the TOC is responsible for monitoring and synchronizing the following:

Support to current (close, deep, rear) operations.
Deep maneuver operations.
Combat, combat support, and combat service support of deep operations.
Current operations situation.

(The figure below illustrates this concept.)

With liaison, the current operations cell monitors the It also coordinates current operations as required with the status of SOF operations. It maintains the current tactical information picture. Thus, agencies requiring information on the FLOT or friendly positions and activities forward of the FLOT should consult the TOC current operations cell. Current operations should periodically provide this information to higher, adjacent, and supporting headquarters.

When approved by the commander, current operations can direct coordinated changes to boundaries and control measures, ensuring all affected headquarters are informed.

Current operations obtains clearance of fires information and provides it to the fire support cell for deep fires. Current operations, as necessary, is supported by or coordinates with the following:

Fighter liaison officer (FLO).
Corps ALO.
Elements of the ASOC.
A²C² element.

It also coordinates current operations as required with the BCE operations section. Current operations works closely with the intelligence, fire support, and combat service support cells. More details on these cells are in FM 100-15.

Major functions of the fire support cell include the following:

Ensuring adequate fire support to current operations.
Controlling all lethal and nonlethal JFLCC deep fires.
Controlling counterfires if not managed by subordinate units.
Coordinating of current combat air requests through the ASOC, TACP, or USMC direct air support center (DASC).
Coordinating JFLCC SEAD and/or J-SEAD operations.
Coordinating fire support combat aviation employment.

The fire support cell monitors and coordinates execution of all JFLCC deep fires as part of the delivery function of deep targeting. It coordinates the JFLCC use of airspace with the corps A²C² element which is collocated with the fire support cell. It also coordinates combat air requests through the ASOC and/or TACP. The fire support cell knows the status of available fire support systems and is the point of contact for agencies requesting fire support for both current and future operations. This information should be periodically provided to higher, adjacent, and supporting headquarters. Coordination of current fire support matters with the BCE operations section is conducted through the current operations cell. These deep operations functions of the six primary TOC cells may be centralized in a deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). The DOCC is a collocation of selected staff members from the six TOC cells. They are either physically or electronically under the supervision of a designated DOCC officer in charge (OIC). The DOCC is formed to more efficiently plan, coordinate, and execute critical deep operations. The DOCC is not a separate structure whose activities may be in conflict with activities of the six primary TOC cells. DOCC members provide the essential coordination interface with their parent TOC cells. DOCC responsibilities reflect the deep operations responsibilities of their parent cell.

The entire staff participates in the military decision-making process and supporting command estimate process. These result in the commander's approval of critical operations, including those deep operations which become the focus of the DOCC. The commander identifies the HPTs associated with deep operations and the resources available and directs the DOCC OIC to develop the detailed plan.
The DOCC OIC is designated by the commander, but is typically the chief of staff or FSCOORD. The DOCC OIC is given the requisite coordinating authority to plan and coordinate deep operations and, with command approval, execution authority through operational control of designated assets.
In units with available personnel and equipment and when the TOC is in massed configuration, the DOCC may be established in a separate vehicle( s) as another cell. The member's workstations are connected by a local area network (LAN). In units with limited personnel or equipment or when the TOC is organized in dispersed configuration, the DOCC members remain with their parent TOC cells. As discussed previously, they are linked by using a LAN to reduce life support communication, and security requirements. (The two figures below illustrate the concepts.)
The automated deep operations coordination system (ADOCS) provides internal automation terminals for use by DOCC members on the deep operations LAN. DOCC's interface with higher and subordinate headquarters is accomplished through standard command channels and communication nets. The DOCC is not a separate command and control node with which external agencies must establish communications or liaison. DOCC members may coordinate with or exchange information with external agencies in accordance with (IAW) unit SOP.

The DOCC provides a focused, centralized activity for planning and coordination of all JFLCC deep operations. When the division and corps headquarters act as the JFLCC, the DOCC integrates deep operations with joint agencies to provide near real time information exchange and expedite command and control. The DOCC centralizes the functions of the current operations, intelligence, and fire support cells in the TOC for the purpose of executing JFLCC deep operations in a timely manner. The DOCC does not replace the functions of other cells. DOCC personnel must work closely with other cells during planning, coordination, and execution of operations.

The DOCC may consist of members of the following sections or staff elements:

Targeting team.
FSE.
Intelligence cell.
A²C² element.
G3 air.
Electronic warfare.
ALO.
Army aviation.
NALE.
SOCCE.

The DOCC is supported by other TOC elements including plans cell, engineer, air defense, and logistics elements.

The DOCC is supervised by an officer knowledgeable of fire support systems; experienced in planning coordinating and executing fire support for maneuver forces; and of sufficient rank to exercise coordinating authority with supporting agencies. The supervisor--

Oversees planning, coordination, and execution of JFLCC deep operations and serves as the chair person for targeting team meetings.
Provides recommendations for the commander's concept of fires, targeting guidance, and objectives. Recommends the HPTL and attack guidance developed during the planning cycle.
Coordinates the use of deep attack assets by division, corps, or Army retained to include maneuver, ATACMS, attack helicopters, SOF, EW, and other attached or available assets.
Publishes the deep operations annex of the OPORD or OPLAN in coordination with the G3.
May represent the JFLCC at JFC or JFACC meetings as desired.
Monitors interface with and support from the BCE. Coordinates with the BCE chief as necessary.

The DOCC configuration varies depending on TOC manning levels and equipment authorizations. Current DOCCs have limited and varying automated support capability. Manual procedures are used until automated support becomes available. Automation will eventually link the DOCC to the TOC and externally to supporting agencies and adjacent and subordinate units. ADOCS is under development to support Army automation requirements.

Automation support links may vary between commands as different contract support is used to develop them. The links may be composed of hardware and software of the following:

STACCS.
TMDA.
Maneuver control system (MCS).
The all-source analysis system (ASAS) for which the intelligence community is the proponent.
Field Artillery advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS)

In addition, the DOCC automation has connectivity with the following:

Air Force CTAPS.
Naval tactical command system afloat (NTCS-A).
Marine advanced tactical air control center (ATACC).

ADOCS provides interface between AFATDS, MCS, ASAS, CTAPS, NTCS-A, and ATACC.

The voice communications needs of the DOCC are met by collocation of elements and use of the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) system. Data and written communications requirements are met by the ADOCS.

At corps and above, targeting organizations may have the mission to conduct deep attack as a component of Army theater missile defense (TMD). These operations would be a preemptive strike designed and executed to prevent the launch of enemy ballistic missiles. When the commander desires, an Army theater ballistic missile defense element (ATMDE) will be established at the appropriate echelon and linked to a targeting element. The ATMDE may be positioned at the theater level or at the corps if it is organized as a joint TF.

As an example, artillery organizations may have the following responsibilities:

Attacks against theater missile launchers and support facilities within range of ATACMS.
Counter-RISTA fires targeting ARK-5s.
Counterfire against enemy short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).

The ATMDE element requires links to targeting elements to provide rapid engagement of short duration strategic or operational ballistic missiles.

Linkage to the ATMDE must be planned for and executed. One asset this linkage provides to artillery targeting cells is the joint tactical ground station (JTAGS). JTAGS will provide direct down-linked data from the defense support program (DSP) sensors. JTAGS disseminates warming, alerting, and cuing information on TBMs. JTAGS will provide near real-time information on tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs) launched and TEL locations which would then be nominated as targets.

ATTACK OF JFLCC PLANNED OPERATIONS DEEP TARGETS BETWEEN THE FSCL AND FORWARD BOUNDARY

This section assumes that planned deep targets have been identified on the HPTL and decisions made either to task internally for acquisition and attack or to request external support. Each echelon of command is aware of the limits of their area of operations and area of interest. The division of deep operations responsibility between the JFLCC and subordinate commands is established for both acquisition and attack. Also, trigger events are identified with associated attack times or windows. The intelligence collection plan reflects internal HPT acquisition taskings. The G2 is aware of associated approved reconnaissance support requests. The ACE is monitoring reports for HPT information and trigger events. G3 current operations and the fire support cell are aware of the attack guidance. Specific units are tasked to engage HPTs at projected times and/or windows. Current operations and the fire support cell are aware of approved requests for combat air support. They are monitoring employment of combat air assets through the ASOC, BCE, and appropriate ALOs. Finally, all appropriate sensor-to-shooter links are established, whether centralized or decentralized. All these conditions can be more easily monitored by an automated DOCC. For this section, the term DOCC is used to designate the centralized functions of intelligence, operations, and fires to support synchronization of maneuver, fire support, and interdiction between the FSCL and forward boundary.

If operations are proceeding as planned, then acquisition and attack of targets are executed without further coordination. Designated or alternate acquisition systems acquire the HPT or associated trigger event. After targets are acquired, they must be tracked until attacked or handed off to another acquisition or tracking system. This facilitates target validation before initiating attack. Normally, target validation for planned combat air should be accomplished 4 hours before the designated attack time or window. (This should be an SOP item established on the basis of C³I capabilities. Systems operators pass acquisition information either directly to the designated system (as directed in the coordinating instructions of the order) or to the ACE for further correlation and dissemination to the systems. Attack systems managers monitor the call for fires and ensure planned fires are still clear. After attack, the G2 initiates planned actions for developing BDA information on selected targets and CA on the enemy.

If planned operations are not on schedule, then only two outcomes are possible. They are either proceeding better than expected (ahead of time tables; targets in projected locations at predicted times) or proceeding worse than expected.

If operations are very successful, the DOCC will suggest methods of taking advantage of potential situations of opportunity as the enemy's cohesion is disrupted. Current operations directs adjustment of timelines as appropriate to ensure movement keeps pace with higher operational tempo. Acquisition and attack systems must be in the proper place at the appropriate times. The DOCC continues to monitor and execute acquisition and attack.

If operations are proceeding worse than expected, the DOCC informs other staff cells and offers insights as to the reasons. Targets may not be in projected locations at predicted times, or friendly movement and maneuver may not be proceeding at predicted rates. Indications are that the enemy is operating at a slower or higher operating tempo (OPTEMPO) or may be pursuing a different course of action.

The current operations section coordinates modifications to the current order, including attack guidance, as appropriate. The intelligence cell modifies the intelligence collection plan as appropriate.

The DOCC coordinates with the BCE to release combat air sorties for which planned targets cannot be validated in enough time. If planned targets are not validated or are not found, sorties may be diverted by the AOC or ASOC in accordance with (in priority)--

JFLCC targeting objectives.
Other immediate requirements.

Diversion of combat air sorties is not a simple task. The diverted sortie package must be appropriate for the target in question, flight patterns must be cleared, and SEAD support must be modified. These points emphasize that control of diversions rests with the AOC or ASOC.

Specific targets for diversions may be recommended by the JFLCC through the BCE. However, to expedite diversions, the BCE is be authorized to coordinate directly with the AOC. The BCE tracks diversion of combat air sorties planned for JFLCC support.

Attack of Current Operations Deep Targets of Opportunity Between the FSCL and Forward Boundary

During the course of planned target acquisition and other operations in this area, acquisition of targets whose locations were not predicted is expected. If the target is an HPT, then the acquisition system passes it immediately to the shooter (if directed by the coordinating instructions of the order) or to the ACE for further analysis and dissemination. If the target is not an HPT, it is passed as order of battle information to the ACE for further analysis and dissemination as appropriate. Acquisition and attack systems should not focus on or be distracted by non-HPTs.

Depending on the depth of the FSCL, most targets of opportunity in this area will be acquired by Air Force or national systems. Depending on the sensor, acquisition information is either processed on board or sent to a processing system to determine the nature of the target. The corps ACE has intelligence terminal links to the following:

National and Air Force associated processing systems (electronic processing and dissemination system (EPDS).
Imagery processing and dissemination system (IPDS).
JSTARS ground station module (GSM).

In-flight reports are another source of target information. The AOC and ASOC monitor in-flight reports and pass validated key HPT information to the ground commander via either the BCE or corps DOCC respectively.

Timely response is key to successful target attack. The BCE should have authority to coordinate directly with the AOC for attack of HPTs provided them by the AOC. The BCE is aware of the operational situation and provides information reports to the JFLCC DOCC. Similarly, the corps DOCC is aware of the tactical situation and coordinates target attack with the BCE. If the BCE directs attack of targets of opportunity in a subordinate or adjacent commander's AO, even if beyond the FSCL, then that commander must be informed.

If the HPT is acquired by national or supporting command systems (JFACC, MCC, allied) and immediate engagement is possible, the AOC may direct engagement. The AOC ensures that an attack does not violate restrictions imposed by JFLCC or general direction for activities within his AO. Such an attack should not divert planned sorties en route to designated HPTs, unless this is the only timely method of attack. Diversion requires coordination with the BCE, the affected commander, and replacement of the lost sorties equal to the commander's synchronization requirements if possible. Exigent circumstances in which this coordination would not be required is the absolute criticality of the target (for example, NBC-capable missile in launch configuration). These exigent circumstances are situation-dependent and should be identified during joint planning. The AOC must inform the JFLCC of such attack through the BCE operations section.

Commanders must keep the BCE and DOCC informed of ground operations activities near or beyond the FSCL. While it is desirable to coordinate attack of such targets, their attack will not be delayed to perform coordination.

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