FM 34-54: Battlefield Technical Intelligence
|THIS APPENDIX COMPLIES WITH STANAG 2044, EDITION 4
AND IMPLEMENTS STANAG 2084, EDITION 5
This appendix covers the procedures for handling and evacuating routine CEM as well as TECHINT CEM. CEM may or may not be of intelligence interest. Some basic guidelines and procedures on how to handle TECHINT interest items follow:
º CEM evacuation channels and handling procedures are usually the same as similar US items. For example, we will usually want to route captured petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) samples through our POL points.
º The echelon requiring the item is responsible for coordinating and tasking evacuation and handling.
º The capturing unit always notifies higher command of the capture and then safeguards the known or possible TECHINT item until higher command provides disposition instructions.
º Special handling and evacuation procedures are often situation dependent and cannot always be foreseen and included in SOPs and operation orders.
The plans, policies, and procedures for evacuation of foreign materiel are prescribed by joint, unified, and theater headquarters. These plans are based on DA and DOD policies and guidance. Each command echelon in theater Army must ensure that its plans comply with theater Army directives and the theater Army TECHINT plan. The final disposition of CEE and associated technical documents (ATD) rests with the capturing nation.
As stated before, the echelon wanting the captured item is responsible for coordinating and tasking its handling and evacuation. Routine CEM evacuation guidance, such as raw material found in railroad yards, is best established in advance in the command's various operation orders and SOPs. Special situations, as in the case of high priority TECHINT interest items, require active coordination among the command's different assets to get the job done.
Coordinating and tasking is the job of the echelon commander's staff. Their ability to coordinate between the logistic units that move the item and the specialists (such as TECHINT, EOD, and NBC) often required to do it safely, is the key to the reuse and intelligence exploitation of CEM. An overview of the coordination involved is shown in Figure D-1.
Logistic assets evacuate CEM. They do this according to available assets and the priorities set by the commander and staff. The G4 is the principal staff officer charged with coordinating the bulk of this task. The command surgeon, responsible for medical items, coordinates class VIII.
The G4 provides staff guidance to the MMC and the movement control office (MCO) or the movement control center (MCC). The MMC controls combat service support and maintenance inventories and is the management arm that ensures proper accountability. (See Figure D-2.)
The support commands are Divisional Support Command (DISCOM), COSCOM, and Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM). They exercise command and control over supporting units in carrying out the directives issued by the G4.
The division medical supply officer (DMSO) or the medical supply, optics, and maintenance (MEDSOM) elements manage the command's collecting, inventory, and evacuating procedures and functions for captured medical materiel.
The MMC manages the command's other collecting, inventory, and evacuating functions. This includes captured materiel. The MMC operations staff is organized by function and commodity. The division MMC manages classes I through VII, and IX materiel. Personnel in the division MMC keep the records for, as well as provide allocation and disposition instructions for, the class of supply they oversee.
The G4 coordinates logistic support to evacuation operations by developing a command transportation plan. (See Figure D-3). The command transportation officer and the movements control element use the transportation plan to task individual transportation units. (See Figure D-4). The transportation units carry out the missions tasked to them.
Simply because we acquire foreign materiel does not mean we own it. This is especially true of items acquired during belligerent or peacekeeping operations. For example, when captured or confiscated foreign materiel is regulated by international law or could be claimed by an ally, disposition must be coordinated with the SJA.
The Army transfers foreign air and naval materiel and ATDs to the Navy or the Air Force at the lowest practical level. Until the actual transfer, these item remain in Army channels.
We return items originally evacuated for Amy intelligence exploitation to logistic channels when exploitation is completed. This is done after TECHINT elements make sure that no other echelon or agency needs the item.
As stated in the introduction, we will usually want to evacuate CEM along the same channels as like US items. The system must, however, have the flexibility to evacuate high priority intelligence item directly from division collection points to the Theater CMEC. Routine evacuation channels are described below.
Abandoned or unserviceable US and captured foreign materiel is evacuated to collection points for classification, segregation, and disposition. Collection points operate wherever needed throughout the theater of operations.
In the corps area, at least one materiel collection point is established. Others are established in TAACOM. Collection points in the communications zone are generally operated by the collection and classification element of general support maintenance battalion.
In division areas, DISCOM maintenance companies operate materiel collection points. Figures D-5 through D-10 show the evacuation flow through the collection points for each class of supply. Captured items are handled and processed the same way as similar US items.
Salvage points established by related supply units are located near unit maintenance collection points (See Figures D-5 and D-6). These two points handle the collection, classification, inventory, and disposition of Classes II, VII, and IX materiel. The heavy division (armor and mechanized infantry) has the most suitable assets for evacuation of foreign materiel. It can handle large item such as tanks.
The process is much the same in light divisions. However, evacuation, especially of heavier items, depends on COSCOM assets. This is because light divisions do not have the transportation assets that heavy divisions do.
POL units establish their own section and sites to handle captured POL materiel. Supply units also establish POL sites and sections. Commanders test and use captured POL at the lowest echelon possible. Only samples of POL items are evacuated to TECHINT analysts. (See Figure D-7.)
Class V ordnance, including missiles, is evacuated through conventional ammunition supply points (ASPs). Ammunition supply units establish their own sections and sites to handle captured Class V. (See Figure D-8.)
Class VIII medical items are evacuated through established medical supply points, the DMSO, and the MEDSOM elements. (See Figure D-9.) Medical materiel must never be destroyed. If unable to evacuate, it will be left in place and unharmed.
Captured aviation items, especially airframes, are evacuated through aviation maintenance channels or with assistance from aviation maintenance units. (See Figure D-10.)
In a low-intensity conflict environment, large and heavy items are evacuated on an ad hoc basis.
Except for NBC hazardous materiel, foreign materiel requiring evacuation to CONUS is eventually shipped to the Transportation Officer, Foreign Systems Division, Army FSTC.
The personnel, activities, and elements responsible for the recovery and evacuation of CEM are usually the same as those responsible for handling like US items. A good example is the MP responsibilities.
MPs are responsible for US prisoners; they, therefore, have similar evacuation responsibilities for captured enemy personnel and any documents and equipment found on them. MI interrogators and TECHINT analysts exploit these sources of intelligence along the evacuation chain.
The capturing unit always is responsible for reporting, safeguarding, and initiating accountability of CEM. The capturing unit reports the capture with either a SALUTE report or a PRETECHREP. (See Appendix E). It safeguards the item within mission parameters, until relieved. It initiates accountability by marking and tagging the item according to established procedures. (See Figures D-11 and D-12).
The capturing unit usually is tasked to move captured items wanted for intelligence exploitation to a collection point. If the capturing unit is tasked with evacuation, it coordinates any assistance required with the command responsible for direct support maintenance at their echelon.
The capturing unit may be tasked with the destruction of the item. This may require combination with either EOD or NBC assets to do it safely. The command orders destruction of CEM to prevent its reuse by the enemy. The one case where it is illegal to destroy captured enemy materiel involves captured enemy medical materiel. The staff surgeon always determines the disposition of medical materiel. According to the Laws of Land Warfare, if friendly forces cannot use it for EPWs, refugees, and indigenous population, we must leave it in place and unharmed.
The capturing unit must report the discovery of unusual mechanisms used as booby traps through intelligence channels to the CMEC and EOD by SALUTE report. Countermeasures must be coordinated with EOD personnel. EOD personnel are responsible for the final disposition of explosive components or hazardous materials associated with such devices and recovered ammunition.
As already discussed, TECHINT units have a profound interest in foreign explosive ordnance. The assistance of EOD personnel in the examination, movement, and evacuation of explosive ordnance cannot be overemphasized. All item of foreign ordnance should first be rendered safe by EOD personnel. If this is not feasible, the item should be rendered safe in place by any destructive method that minimizes damage to the item. For more information on EOD assistance to evacuation operations, see Appendix C.
Collection of TECHINT data may require dismantling of ordnance and stripping fuses and other dangerous components. These operations will be performed only by experienced personnel. Dismantling and stripping are conducted only in response to a specific requirement for such action. The request must be placed through TECHINT and EOD staffs.
Only trained weapons and munitions specialists should analyze or test captured mines and booby traps. Exercise extreme caution when taut wire and pull releases or similar devices are encountered.
All CB hazardous items are handled and shipped in accordance with command SOP and national policy. Evacuation is best handled after coordination with either an NBC reconnaissance team, NBC qualified TECHINT team, or a task organized medical element. NBC samples, after theater tactical exploitation, should be shipped to: US Army Chemical and Biological Agent, Technical Evaluation Board, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 21005. (See Appendix H.)
When evacuation is either unnecessary or can be delayed, TECHINT personnel may be tasked to perform on-site analysis. This can provide immediate tactical information and countermeasures vital to the combat force commander. On-site analysis also ensures the recovery of intact components which become useless once wires are clipped and subcomponents have been disturbed. This type of analysis is limited by the battlefield situation and available assets.
During on-site analysis, TECHINT teams look for--
º Equipment operational characteristics, performance, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.
º New weapons and devices.
º Possible countermeasures.
º Identification and proper handling of radioactive materiel.
º Specific orientation and siting of equipment.
º Recovery and evacuation of explosive ordnance and NBC munitions.
At times, a large number of like item will be acquired. The TECHINT collection teams must have the opportunity to examine the materiel thoroughly. They will be especially interested in lot numbers, dates of manufacture, and factory markings. When a sufficient number of items are gathered, they are processed through normal evacuation or salvage supply channels and are no longer needed by MI.
TECHINT teams may also be tasked with on-site supervision of the item's handling and evacuation. The CMEC will coordinate with appropriate staffs to evaluate the need to use TECHIINT personnel to--
º Supervise the evacuation.
º Arrange necessary technical escorts to the CMEC or to sites in CONUS.
TECHINT teams are capable of coordinating the handling and shipping with the necessary medical, intelligence, NBC, and strategic-level elements for captured CB items.
Labeling CEM properly is vital to the timely exploitation of the item. It speeds up the often slow process of producing effective countermeasures for the soldier in combat. Proper labeling provides the analyst team information necessary for the item's timely exploitation. It also allows interrogators and TECHINT teams to match up knowledgable prisoners with the documents or equipment they were captured with; since sometimes they become separated in the evacuation process.
There are two procedures for marking and tagging CEM. The acronym CEM includes CEE and ATDs. The procedure used depends on whether the captured item is associated with a captured person or not.
For CEM captured with personnel, tag the captured person and any associated CEM with the three-part tag shown in Figure A-6. Be careful to use this tag 0NLY to label items either captured with or known to be associated with a particular captured person. (See Figure D-11).
For CEM captured by itself, tag the piece of equipment or associated document with the tag shown in Figure A-5. Furthermore, label all documents believed to be of a technical nature such as operator manuals, with the flag word "TECHDOC." (See Figure D-12.)
These responsibilities must be clearly established by command SOP. The equipment and document tags accompany the materiel to its final destination. Article 103 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is printed on the reverse side of the tag to prevent indiscriminate tampering.
As part of core training, all personnel should be instructed in how to tag. They should know the consequences when personnel and equipment are not properly tagged. Training should stress protecting and preserving the original markings on materiel at the time of capture.
The first unit that performs exploitation for intelligence purposes will tag CEE with the serial number and any ATD with the serial number. In addition, the flag word "TECHDOC" will be affixed to the ATD in a way that will not deface the document.
The capturing unit is responsible for tagging items of foreign materiel. Weather-resistant equipment tags facilitate the segregation, collection, analysis, and evacuation of materiel. These tags are normally produced within the theater. They are securely attached to the item itself and to the shipping container. If weather-resistant tags are not available, use any materiel (for example, rations packing) on which pertinent capture data can be recorded.
The CMEC is responsible for retagging, marking, and arranging the preparation of captured materiel for shipment to CONUS. The preservation and packaging platoons in COSCOM supply units prepare item for shipment.
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by US forces and determined to be of TECHINT value require safeguarding in storage as well as during evacuation. Such items may be sensitive due to their criticality or because of a US classification assigned. At all stages during the intelligence exploitation process, CEE and ATDs will be placed under guard to prevent looting, misuse, or destruction.
Initially, the capturing unit is responsible for safeguarding materiel, based on instructions from the next higher headquarters. The materiel must be protected from looting, loss, destruction, or recapture. When foreign materiel is sensitive or of special value, MP elements normally provide physical security during its storage and evacuation.
Particular attention must be paid to the peculiarities of nuclear weapons' escort and the technical escort requirement for NBC materiel.
Technical publications and manuscripts of concern to TECHINT relate to the technical design or operation of the materiel. Such documents may be acquired separately from the materiel they refer to. Therefore, it is essential that TECHINT personnel coordinate with interrogation elements to exchange information about related documents.
All enemy documents captured on the battlefield are sent immediately to the first intelligence staff officer in the chain. The S2/G2 routes all enemy documents to the nearest interrogation element for tactical exploitation. Interrogators screen the documents for immediate information and forward them to higher command, as required.
In any case, all known or suspected technical documents are marked "TECHDOC" and treated with highest priority and forwarded by way of the intelligence officer up through the higher command until their value is determined.
Under certain circumstances an ATD is both exploited and evacuated at the same time to allow a thorough document exploitation of technical data as well as a translation. Under these circumstances, photograph the ATD or make a suitable facsimile, and forward the original. An exception is engraved materiel, such as manufacturer's plates, permanently attached to the CEE. This not considered a document.
Documents obtained through liaison with interrogation elements should be accompanied by pertinent interrogation reports. These reports will be in the form of--
º A SALUTE report.
º A tactical interrogation report.
º A special interrogation report.
º An intelligence information report.
º A biographic report in accordance with DIAM 58-13.
º A knowledgeability brief.
TECHINT units use special procedures for handling captured C-E equipment and documents. These items are tagged and evacuated to the nearest target exploitation element as soon as possible after initial tactical exploitation.
Foreign equipment is frequently a target of souvenir hunters. An effective war trophy policy must be established to ensure that these items are not retained or destroyed unnecessarily by the capturing unit.
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