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FM 34-1: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations



One of the surestways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?


Throughout history, military leaders have recognized the importance of intelligence. IEW operations are the commander's keys to victory in war and success in OOTW. Commanders use IEW to focus the combat power at their disposal to win decisively. Commanders also use IEW to protect and conserve combat power and resources during operations.

The Intelligence BOS described in Chapter 1 is a powerful tool. However, the commander, G2 (S2), MI unit commanders, and other leaders must work hard to explo it the full capabilities of the Intelligence BOS. IEW operations describe the execution of tasks related to the functions of intelligence and EW. This chapter describes the fundamentals of IEW operations.


IEW operations are a total force effort. IEW supports all soldiers from the commander to the individual soldier in combat, CS, and CSS units. All soldiers must appreciate the importance of intelligence and the role IEW plays in --

  • Applying and sustaining combat power.
  • Contributing to the effectiveness of combined arms operations.
  • Understanding the battlefield framework.
  • Facilitating quick and accurate decision making during combat operations.
  • Seeing, targeting, and simultaneously attacking the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield.
  • Conserving fighting potential of the force.
  • Supporting other combat functions (maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command).

MI soldiers and organizations specialize in conducting IEW operations in support of the mission and in concert with the commander's intent. While MI units provide dedicated IEW support, all units, by virtue of their mission and AOS, have implied information collecting and reporting tasks. The G2 (S2) must know the intelligence collection and production capabilities of all units in the combat force and at higher echelons to optimize the use of intelligence assets at their disposal.


The levels of intelligence correspond to the established levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Like the levels of war, the levels of intelligence serve as a framework in which commanders and MI personnel visualize the logical flow of operations, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks. The levels of intelligence are not tied to specific echelons but rather to the intended outcome of the operations which they support. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, echelons and levels of intelligence vary. The relationship is based upon the political and military objectives of the operation and the commander's needs.

The commander on the ground, regardless of echelon, is provided a mixture support from each level of intelligence. Strategic intelligence provides information on the host nation's political climate; operational intelligence identifies key objectives for the campaign; and tactical intelligence shows of where the enemy can be decisively engaged. Advances in technology and the requirements of the modern battlefield also make the demarcation between strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence resources indistinguishable. Collection assets which normally support strategic intelligence can and often are tasked to support operational and tactical intelligence requirements. This blending of levels and resources is a characteristic of intelligence in the post-Cold War era, a characteristic which the Intelligence BOS exploits.

Strategic Intelligence:

Strategic intelligence supports the formation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at the national and theater levels. Strategic intelligence --

  • Concentrates on the national political, economic, and military considerations of states or nations. It identifies the support for governments, the ability of states or nations to mobilize for war, the national political objectives, and the personalities of national leaders.
  • Identifies a nation's ability to support US Forces and operations (for example, ports and the transportation infrastructure).
  • Predicts other nations' responses to US theater operations.

Operational Intelligence:

Operational intelligence supports the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations, and reflects the nature of the theater ofwar itself. Intelligence at this level serves as a bridge between strategic and tactical levels. Strategic intelligence --

  • Supports friendly campaigns and operations by predicting the enemy's campaign plans, identifying their military centers of gravity, lines of communication (LOC), decisive points, pivots of maneuver, and other components necessary for campaign design.
  • Focuses primarily on the intelligence needs of commanders from theater through corps and task force.

Tactical Intelligence:

Tactical intelligence supports the execution of battles and engagements. It provides the tactical commander with the intelligence he needs to employ combat elements against enemy forces and achieve the objectives of the operational commander. Tactical intelligence is distinguished from other levels by its perishability and ability to immediately influence the outcome of the tactical commander's mission. Tactical intelligence normally supports operations by echelons corps and below (ECB) units.


To clearly describe MI, the various intelligence areas are divided into four intelligence disciplines: HUMINT, IMINT, measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and SIGINT; and two multidiscipline intelligence functions: CI and technical intelligence (TECHINT). These disciplines and functions are performed by personnel who specialize in one of the areas of intelligence operations. To be effective and minimize threat deception, every intelligence operation must attempt to use all disciplines. The disciplines themselves must complement and cue each other for maximum effectiveness. Rarely will separate disciplines produce a comprehensive picture of the threat. Instead each discipline will produce bits and pieces of information which analysts will synthesize to approach a total picture.

Human Intelligence:

HUMINT is the oldest of the intelligence disciplines. HUMINT is particularly important in force protection during OOTW. Although HUMINT can be a sole collection discipline, it is normally employed to confirm, refute, or augment intelligence derived through other disciplines. HUMINT is less restricted by weather or the cooperation of the enemy than technical means and does not require fire, maneuver, or communications to collect. HUMINT is restricted by access to targets and timeliness and, by its nature, can be risky to the safety of the collectors. HUMINT collection is well suited to the initial detection of emerging threats if placement and access are established early. The success of HUMINT in areas not previously targeted will be marginal in the early phases of a conflict or OOTW operation. Its effectiveness improves as HUMINT refocuses its efforts on the AO.

Interrogation and document exploitation are examples of HUMINT operations. HUMINT collection may also be conducted by long-range surveillance units (LRSUS), scouts, and patrols. Examples of other sources of HUMINT are pilot debriefings, refugees, and defectors. Furthermore, special operations forces (SOF) operating in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas, provide a unique HUMINT source. For more information on HUMINT, refer to FM 34-5(s) and FM 34-52.

Imagery Intelligence:

IMINT is the product of imagery analysis. Imagery is derived from, but is not limited to, radar, infrared, optical, and electro-optical sensors. IMINT and imagery systems increase the commander's ability to quickly and clearly understand his battle space and AI. IMINT is an important source of intelligence for intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), targeting, terrain and environmental analysis, and battle damage assessment (BDA). IMINT is often primary source of intelligence for the physical damage assessment portion of BDA. IMINT is subject to some limitations. Because most imagery requires ground processing and analysis, IMINT may be unable to respond to time-sensitive requirements. Imagery collection also be hampered by adverse the weather and the vulnerability of the platform. As with other intelligence sources, IMINT is subject to threat attempts at deception. IMINT is most effective when used to cue other collection systems or to verify information provided by other sources. Systems that provide IMINT include the U2R Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS), Joint STARS, UAV, and TENCAP systems. For more information on IMINT, refer to FM 34-25-1, FM 34-25-2, and TC 34-55.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence:

MASINT uses information gathered by technical instruments such as radar's, lasers, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, seismic, and other sensors to measure objects or events to identify them by their signatures. MASINT is critical for updating data on smart munitions. As future adversaries develop new technologies to evade some of the SIGINT and IMINT collection systems, MASINT will be used as another means of sensing the enemy. MASINT exploits other information that is not gained through SIGINT, IMINT, or HUMINT. The Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System (REMBASS) is an example of a MASINT collector. For more information on REMBASS, refer to FM 34-10-1.

Signals Intelligence:

SIGINT results from collecting, locating, processing, analyzing, and reporting intercepted communications and noncommunications (for example, radar's) emitters. SIGINT provides the commander with valuable, often NRT intelligence and targeting information on enemy intentions, readiness status, and dispositions by intercepting and locating enemy command, maneuver, fire support, reconnaissance, air defense, and logistics emitters. SIGINT operations require efficient collection management and synchronization to effectively overcome and exploit enemy efforts to protect his critical communications and weapons systems through emissions control, communications operating procedures, encryption, and deception. SIGINT is subdivided into: communications intelligence (COMINT); electronic intelligence (ELINT); and Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).

Examples of SIGINTground-based intercept and direction finding (DF) systems are the AN/PRD-12, the AN/TRQ-32A(V)2 (TEAMMATE), and the AIWRQ-I 52 (TRACKWOLF) systems. The GUARDRAIL Common Sensor (GRCS) is an example of an airborne intercept and DF system for both communications and noncommunications emitters. The AN/FSQ-144V (TROJAN) is the Army's remote collection system supporting in-garrison collection by tactical MI units.


The essence of the Army's CI mission is to support force protection. By its nature, CI is a multidiscipline (counter-HUMINT, counter-IMINT, and counter-SIGINT) function designed to defeat or degrade threat intelligence and targeting capabilities. MDCI is an integral and equal part of IEW. MDCI operations support force protection through support to operations security (OPSEC), deception, and rear area operations across the range of military operations.

Examples of MDCI support to OPSEC range from evaluating components of a unique signature for a particular unit's tactical command post (CP) to strategic level MDCI support to special access programs.

MDCI personnel advise deception planners on the vulnerabilities of threat foreign intelligence services (FISs) and associated battlefield collection systems to various friendly deception capabilities and techniques. This input is important because a deception plan cannot succeed if the enemy has no means to collect the details of the deception story. The MDCI estimate provides significant input to the deception estimate.

MDCI personnel support rear area operations through collection, analysis, and reporting of threats to the rear area. They work with military police, Civil Affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) elements to provide intelligence support to rear area security. They assist combat, CS, and CSS staffs in developing the MDCI estimate of the rear area threat for integration into OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs). Under the direction of the G2 (S2), MDCI personnel support the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) commander by assessing rear base vulnerabilities and recommending countermeasures. MDCI personnel also provide the RAOC commander with indications and warnings (I&W) on rear area threats and assist with the countermeasures to such threats. For more information on MDCI functions and activities, refer to FM 34-5(S) and FM 34-60.

Technical Intelligence:

TECHINT is a multidiscipline function which supports commanders by either identifying or countering an enemy's momentary technological advantage, or by maintaining a friendly technological advantage. TECHINT is obtained by collecting, analyzing, and processing information in foreign technological developments. It also results from studying the performance of foreign material and its operational capabilities. The two parts of TECHINT, battlefield TECHINT and scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) support commanders at all levels.

  • Battlefield TECHINT provides operational and tactical commanders with immediate and usable intelligence on the capabilities and limitations of captured threat equipment. Battlefield TECHINT also results in the identification and evacuation of critical items of threat materiel requiring detailed S&TI analysis.
  • S&TI provides detailed analysis on the technical characteristics of foreign systems and materiel. This results in the development of battlefield countermeasures to threat systems. S&TI also provides information on foreign developments in applied research which support Army Force Modernization.

Battlefield TECHINT frequently starts with one conscientious soldier who finds something new on the battlefield and takes proper steps to report it. The information or item is exploited at succeeding higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the technological advantage or exploit a vulnerability. While a single weapon or technology seldom means the difference between final victory or defeat, it can give one side a battlefield advantage.

There is a mutually dependent relationship that exists between the support the commander gets from the TECHINT system and the support the TECHINT system gets from the commander. Operational and tactical commanders provide the raw material analysts need to identify, capture, protect, and evacuate enemy equipment, documents, and other items. Commanders further ensure the success of the process by demanding TECHINT support for the tactical effort to defeat the enemy. The analysts then take the raw material and produce the countermeasures commanders need to overcome an enemy's technological advantage. For more information on TECHINT, refer to FM 34-54.


The effectiveness of intelligence is measured against the following standards:


Intelligence must be provided early enough to support planning, influence decisions and execution of operations, and prevent surprise from enemy action. it must flow continuously to the commander before, during and after an operation. Regardless of distance and time, intelligence organizations, data bases, and products must be available to develop estimates, make decisions, and plan operations.


Intelligence must support the commander's concept of operation and the unit's mission. It must be tailored to the capabilities of the unit and intelligence priorities of the commander. Intelligence must be in usable format which meets the specific needs of the requester and explains its own significance.


Intelligence must give the commander a balanced, complete, and objective pictureof the enemy and the operational environment. It should support and satisfy the priorities of the commander. To the extent possible, intelligence should correctly identify threat intentions, capabilities, limitations, and dispositions. It should be derived from multiple sources and disciplines to minimize the possibility of deception or misinterpretation. Alternative or contradictory assessments should be presented, when necessary, to ensure balance and bias-free intelligence.


Intelligence should tell the commander what the enemy is doing, can do, and his most likely course of action (COA). It should anticipate the intelligence needs of the commander.


MI accomplishes its mission through six primary tasks which generate intelligence synchronized to support the commander's mission and intelligence requirements. The derived products assist the commander in focusing and protecting his combat power. Figure 2-2 illustrates how the six intelligence tasks aid the commander in decision making. The six tasks can be thought of as the METL for intelligence. As such, these tasks serve as a framework for intelligence training .The six intelligence tasks---

  • Provide I&W.
  • Perform IPB.
  • Perform situation development.
  • Perform target development and support to targeting.
  • Support force protection.
  • Perform BDA.

Indications and Warnings:

The commander uses I&W for early warning to prevent surprise through anticipation and reduce the risk from enemy actions that are counter to planning assumptions. This enables him to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and shape the battlefield by manipulating enemy activities. I&W helps a commander decide whether to maintain or increase unit readiness levels if hostilities are likely. In force projection operations, I&W provides the commander time to plan and surge the intelligence effort for the impending operation. Detection of developments which initiate force projection operations requires that intelligence readiness be developed and maintained through pre-crisis intelligence operations.

The commander and G2 (S2) integrate intelligence requirements to support I&W into the total unit collection plan. Collection plans and supporting SORs are developed during the decision making process. The G2 (S2) develops reporting procedures (for example, "FLASH" designation) in support of I&W requirements to ensure the commander can implement the appropriate OPLAN in a timely manner.

During war an OOTW, the G2 (S2) identifies those actions by threat and potential threat groups that would change the basic nature of the operations. Examples of such activities include --

  • First use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical [NBC] weapons).
  • First violation of international treaties.
  • Introduction of weapons to counter a specific friendly advantage or strength.
  • Unexpected commitment of threat forces into the battle space.
  • Unexpected changes in the threat's intent, will, or targets.
  • Changes in the population's support to friendly operations.

In all cases, I&W alerts the unit commander to move the unit from its current mission to a contingency, branch, or sequel operation.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield:

The commander uses IPB to understand the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. The process consists of four steps: defining the battlefield environment; describing the battlefield effects; evaluating the threat; and determining threat COAs. By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield.

The commander focuses the G2 (S2) effort and the IPB process by clearly defining his PIR. The G2 (S2) then uses the IPB process to continually assess threats to, and opportunities for, the friendly force. This assessment helps the commander initiate OPLANs, branches, and sequels. The IPB process and access to the intelligence system also allows logistics planners to develop the logistics preparation of the theater plan and other support plans.

Using the IPB process, the G2 (S2) predicts threat COAs and identifies the events that will enable them to confirm or deny each threat COA. The commandeer and staff use the results to wargame threat COAs against friendly actions, evaluate future threat actions, and perform situation and target development. This generates refined intelligence requirements which the G2 (S2) staff includes in the intelligence synchronization matrix as well as the decision support template (DST) produced by the G3 (S3). These products support the commander and staff in decision making by developing specific unit OPLANs or OPORDs. As shown in Figure 2-3, the G2 (S2) must have some basic IPB products ready before the staff begins each step of the staff planning process. For more information on IPB, refer to FM 34-130.

Situation Development:

The commander uses situation development to help understand the battlefield, thereby reducing risk and uncertainty while executing his plan. Situation development provides an estimate of the enemy's combat effectiveness. Based on the results of continuous IPB, it confirms or denies enemy COAs and explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the friendly F force commander's intent. Situation development helps the commander in his decisions to execute branches and sequels as the operation develops.

In situation development, the G2 (S2) and collection manager use the DST, collection plan, intelligence synchronization matrix, and SOR. The G2 (S2) uses these tools to state types of information needed, the degree of specificity, and the latest time information is of value (LTIOV). These products synchronize intelligence requirements to the decisions that the commander and staff expect to make during the upcoming operation. See Figure 2-4.

As the battle, operation, or campaign progresses, the G2 (S2) uses the intelligence synchronization matrix and DST to anticipate which decisions the commander and staff will soon make. The G2 (S2) and collection manager implement the intelligence synchronization and collection plan by issuing SORs to Intelligence BOS units, including non-Ml units. SORs explicitly state the information required, where to focus collection, the LTIOV, and where to report the information. The G2 (S2) must anticipate future COAs to allow time for Ml assets to be tasked and repositioned. The G2 (S2) monitors and, when required, redirects intelligence operations to deliver the intelligence required for each decision in a timely manner.

Situation development is especially demanding for Ml units. As an asset manager, the Ml commander must anticipate and wargame the collection positions for each of his IEW systems throughout the operation. Based upon the results of this wargaming, the Ml unit commander may prompt the supported unit's staff to reconsider select elements of its plan.

Target Development and Support to Targeting:

The commander uses intelligence in target development to effectively employ nonlethal electronic attack (EA) and lethal fires. Target development provides targets and targeting for attack by fire, maneuver, and electromagnetic means. Our ability to broadcast target information to multiple echelons in NRT makes the detect function of targeting almost instantaneous. This demands that the "decide" phase of targeting be accomplished in detail as an integral part of the commander's concept of operation.

Intelligence support to target development provides targets and targeting to unit attack systems and collection assets for exploitation. The G2 (S2) uses the same techniques as described in the IPB and Situation Development sections above. Additionally, during wargaming, the G2 (S2) participates in the targeting process led by the fire support officer (FSO). During the "decide" function of the targeting process, the G2 (S2) will identify the high-value targets (HVTs) which are critical to the enemy commander's COA. Through wargaming, the targeting team or board reduces this set of targets to the high-payoff targets (HPTs). HPTs are HVTS which must be acquired, tracked, and successfully attacked in order for the commander's mission to succeed. The G2 (S2) advises the commander on the viability of collection against each HPT.

As required, the G2 (S2) establishes procedures for the direct "sensor to shooter" dissemination of targeting information from collection assets to the fire support element (FSE) and targeting cell. Direct dissemination enables the FSE and targeting cell to rapidly pass identified HPTs and other targets directly to the FSE of the supporting unit or, if authorized by the commander, to the firing unit. The G3 (S3) and FSO must identify the requirements for direct dissemination during the" decide" phase of the targeting process. The G2 (S2) and FSO must also establish controls in the "detect" phase to revalidate planned targets. The G2 (S2) must incorporate these requirements into the SOR and establish a system to track the status of each request. These procedures require considerablecoordination between the commander, G3 (S3), G2 (S2), electronic warfare officer (EWO), FSO, field artillery intelligence officer, MI unit, and firing unit to be effectively executed. Additionally, targeting information relating to deep attack must be disseminated to elements such as the Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC). The ACE is a crucial interface with the DOCC for intelligence support to the deep battle.

Commanders, G3s (S3s), G2s (S2s), and fire support personnel must realize that risks are inherent when acting upon NRT targeting information, particularly in an automated environment. Criteria should be established for using and confirming NRT targeting information to reduce the possibility of engaging the wrong enemy target or, worse, friendly forces. In addition, automation in the targeting process should not replace the human check and balance system needed to reduce the possibility of fratricide, For more information on the targeting process and intelligence, refer to FM 6-20-10.

Force Protection:

The commander uses the Intelligence 80S to support force protection. Intelligence operations-MDCl operations in particular-identify, locate, and target an enemy's ability to target and affect friendly forces, facilities, and operations. Intelligence support to force protection must --

  • Identify and counter enemy intelligence collection capabilities.
  • Assess, through MDCI, friendly vulnerabilities and the threat's ability to exploit those vulnerabilities.
  • Identify the enemy's perception of friendly centers of gravity and how he will attack or influence them.
  • Identify potential countermeasures to deny the enemy access to friendly critical areas.
  • Conduct threat and risk assessment.

With this intelligence, the commander decides which countermeasures must be used to shield his intentions, present false images to the enemy commander, and protect his force, Commanders and staffs use force protection intelligence to --

  • Enable the commander to plan for passive and active OPSEC, counterreconnaissance, deception, and other security measures.
  • Plan health service support, logistics operations, and troop safety measures.
  • Reduce the probability of fratricide by accurately locating enemy forces through timely IPB and situation development.
  • Contribute to threat avoidance once the risk is identified,

Force protection prompts the commander and staff to develop countermeasures against the threat's best opportunities. These are usually in the form of preventive measures (for example, levels of readiness) and reactionary measures (for example, quick reaction forces), The preventive measures do not require support by a new intelligence requirement, but the reactionary measures might, The G2 (S2) also establishes appropriate reporting procedures (for example, FLASH precedence reporting) for force protection intelligence similar to those used for reporting I&W intelligence. Additionally, the G2 (S2) should periodically prompt a review of friendly vulnerabilities and the threat's ability for exploitation.

Users of force protection intelligence support vary widely across the battlefield. For example --

  • Commanders and G3s (S3s) need to know the effectiveness of deception operations.
  • G2 (S2) and G3 (S3) staffs use it to plan aggressive force protection measures such as deception and counterreconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (C-RISTA).
  • OPSEC and deception managers need to know where enemy intelligence assets are focused.
  • Leaders of all units need to know which OPSEC countermeasures are effective and necessary, and which measures can be eliminated.
  • Headquarters commandants, Level II response forces, and rear area commanders need to know the likelihood of Levels I and II threats to the rear area so they will know which security measures are necessary and which are unnecessary. For more information on threat levels, refer to FM 34-52.
  • CA and PSYOP personnel use force protection intelligence to ensure that their activities support deception and Cl operations.

Battle Damage Assessment:

Intelligence supports the assess phase of the targeting process through the BDA process. The commander uses BDA to determine if his operational and targeting actions have met his conditions for initiating subsequent COAs or beginning the next phase of an operation. If the desired operational conditions have not been met, BDA gives the commander the information necessary to decide if, when, and how the targets should be reengage. It also estimates the enemy's remaining military capabilities and potential at different points throughout the mission or operation.

BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against an objective or target. BDA includes physical and functional damage assessments as well as target system assessment. The most accurate BDA is derived from multiple sources and the results of all-source analysis. Although producing BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, it requires extensive coordination with operational elements to be effective. It also requires that common procedures and methodology be established which synchronize and integrate Army BDA with those at joint and national levels.

The commander, supported by the G2 (S2), must decide what critical areas require BDA to determine if the targeting effect for operational success has been achieved. These areas form the commander's BDA-related PIR and must be prioritized against his other PIR developed during the targeting process. The G2 (S2) integrates the commander's BDA-related PIR into the intelligence collection plan and synchronizes their collection with the target engagement windows. Since allocating collection resources for acquiring and tracking damage could divert IEW assets from other missions, BDA-related PIR should only address the commander's most critical requirements. The G2 (S2) ensures intelligence collected on BDA-related PIR is integrated into the targeting process, specifically the G3 (S3) combat assessment.

BDA is a complex and dynamic process which seldom falls out of routine intelligence collection. Commanders and staffs must conduct front-end analysis and establish criteria to identify the precise operational and targeting effect required to support specific decisions. Success in the BDA process and the combat assessment function of the targeting process are achieved when the commander has the information necessary to quickly decide --

  • When to proceed with his original concept of operations and schedule of fires.
  • When to restrike a target to ensure the desired effect is accomplished.
  • When to execute a branch to the operation because the desired effect


Intelligence operations follow a five-step process known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is focused on the commander's mission and concept of operation. The overarching principle of the cycle is intelligence synchronization. Each step within the cycle must be synchronized with the commander's decision making and operational requirements to successfully influence the outcome of the operation. See Figure 2-5.

Plan and Direct

IPB is the primary intelligence task which helps the G2 (S2) focus and direct this step and the remaining steps of the intelligence cycle. Planning and directing involves task organizing Ml assets; identifying personnel, logistics, and communications requirements; identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence requirements; developing a collection plan and synchronization matrix; issuing SORs for collection and production; and monitoring the availability of collection information.


Collecting is Pr acquiring information and providing this information to the processing and production elements. It includes the maneuver and positioning of intelligence assets to locations favorable to satisfying collection objectives.


Processing is the conversion of collected information into a suitable form that can be readily used to produce intelligence. Processing includes data form conversion, photographic development, and transcription and translation of foreign language material. As with collection management, processing must be prioritized and synchronized with the commander's PIR. Effective processing management ensures that critical information is extracted and processed ahead of information of lesser immediate value.


Producing involves the integration, evaluation, analysis, and synthesis of information from single or multiple sources into intelligence. At the tactical level, time constraints and demands of the battle tend to make the processing and producing steps indistinguishable.


Disseminating intelligence is the timely conveyance of intelligence to users in a usable form. The diversity of forms and means requires interoperability among command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I ) systems.

The intelligence cycle is a continuous process in which steps are executed concurrently, though not always sequentially. For example, while new information is being collected to satisfy one set of requirements, the G2 (S2) plans and redirects efforts to meet new demands while intelligence produced from previously collected information is disseminated. One or several iterations of the intelligence cycle may be conducted depending on the time constraints of the mission.


The commander directs the intelligence effort by selecting and prioritizing intelligence requirements. They support the commander in conducting and planning operations. The information the commander needs to visualize the outcome of current operations is called the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). CCIRs include information on both friendly and threat forces. The threat information portion of the CCIR are the commander's PIR. In designating PIR, the commander establishes-

  • What he wants (intelligence required).
  • Why he wants it (dependent decision).
  • When he wants it (LTIOV).
  • How he wants it (format, method of delivery).

The commander uses the decision making process to define PIR, select friendly COAs, and refine intelligence requirements. The decision making process includes mission analysis; developing COAs; analyzing and comparing COAs; decision making; and execution. The staff assists the commander in developing intelligence requirements and will generate additional ones in support of the concept of operation and targeting as needed. Each requirement supports a decision expected to occur during the execution of the selected COA. The commander and staff establish these requirements to fill the gaps and voids in the unit's common understanding of the battlefield as shown in Figure 2-6.

For more information on PIR development, refer to FM 34-2, Appendix B, and FM 34-8, Appendix A.

Mission Analysis:

The commander uses IPB products to assess the facts about the battle space and to understand how friendly and threat forces will interact on the battlefield. Mission analysis, supported by IPB, identifies gaps in the command's knowledge of threat forces, the operational environment, and its effects on potential COAs. During mission analysis, the commander identifies his CCIR which provide the G2 (S2) with initial PIR.

Develop Courses of Action:

The commander and staff develop friendly COAs based on facts and assumptions identified during mission analysis. The G2 (S2) ensures that realistic expectations of the intelligence BOS are considered when developing friendly COAs and that most likely enemy COAs are accurately presented.

Analyze and Compare Courses of Action:

Using wargaming, the commander and staff "fight" the set of threat COAs against each potential friendly COA. This enables them to assess when and where they might require intelligence about the threat or events at key areas. These key areas become named areas of interest (NAIs). When, as a result of wargaming, the commander determines he must make a decision based on activity at an NAI, that NAI becomes a decision point (DP) or creates a DP related to that NAI. The information needed by the commander to make that decision becomes an intelligence requirement.

Among the tools the staff uses to record the results of wargaming are the DST and BOS synchronization plan. The DST normally depicts DP and time phase lines (TPLs) associated with an event or decision as well as the commander's options. The synchronization plan supports the DST. It depicts NAIs and DPs, the LTIOV, the commander's options for each BOS, and TPLs associated with a DP and the commander's options.

The G2 (S2) incorporates NAIs, decision points, and HPTs identified during the wargame into a prioritized list of intelligence requirements. He develops and evaluates collection strategies for each intelligence requirement and ensures that intelligence collection is capable of supporting the friendly COA.

Decision Making:

The commander, with staff recommendations, decides upon a COA and issues implementing orders. He approves the intelligence requirements associated with that COA and designates the most important as PIR.

The commander prioritizes the complete set of intelligence requirements which includes his-

  • Own command.
  • Subordinate commands and adjacent units in the form of specific requests for intelligence.
  • Higher command in the form of specific requests for intelligence.

PIR are the key intelligence requirements, listed in priority order, which the unit must answer or satisfy to achieve mission success. PIR support the planned operation and associated branches and sequels. The commander's PIRs drive the intelligence cycle.


The G2 (S2) synchronizes the intelligence operation with the combat operation to ensure the Intelligence BOS provides the required intelligence when needed. He identifies the indicators and specific information requirements (SIR) necessary to satisfy each PIR. The G2 (S2) will allocate most of his efforts to those requirements designated as PIR, and develops a collection plan and synchronization matrix. This collection plan includes direction to organic assets and coordination with higher echelons for collection requirements beyond the organic capabilities of the unit.

The collection management and synchronization process orchestrates, prioritizes, and focuses the Intelligence BOS. The plan includes the collection, processing, and dissemination required to support each intelligence requirement, The intelligence synchronization matrix ensures intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination are in concert with the commander's operation. Synchronization ensures the commander receives the intelligence he needs, in the form in which he can use it,and in time to influence his decision making.

As the commander executes his selected COA, the G2 (S2) and collection manager monitor the execution of the collection plan. They use the intelligence synchronization matrix to ensure-

  • Collection assets are focused on the proper PIR at operation.
  • Intelligence, required to support the commander's decisions, is delivered on time.

As information arrives, the G2 (S2) uses various techniques to keep track of the degree to which PIR are satisfied, understanding that 100 percent satisfaction rarely occurs, Using the intelligence cycle, the commander and G2 (S2) continually prioritize the set of requirements and reassess the designation of PIR as the operation progresses.

For more information on the decision making process, collection management, and intelligence synchronization, refer to FM 34-2 and FM 101-5.


When developing the concept of operations, tactical commanders should consider EW assets the same as they do artillery assets.

FM 100-5, 14 June 1993

EW is an essential component of command and control warfare (CW). As part of C2W, EW is used in conjunction with MDCI to protect friendly command and control (C ) while attacking the enemy's C structure. Effective use of EW as a decisive element of combat power requires coordination and integration of EW operations with the commander's scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. The integrated use of EW throughout the battlefield supports the synergy needed to locate, identify, damage, and destroy enemy forces and their C structure.


EW is an overarching term that includes three major components: electronic attack (EA), electronic warfare support (ES), and electronic protection (EP). The overlapping ovals in Figure 2-7 illustrates that some EW actions are both offensive and protective and may use ES in their execution, Other EW functions, such as the use of wartime reserve modes (WARM), can fall under either EA or EP.The actions listed under each of the major components are illustrative, not all-inclusive.

Electronic Attack:

EA uses lethal (directed energy) and nonlethal (jamming) electromagnetic energy to disrupt, damage, destroy, and kill enemy forces. Ml units use nonlethal EA to jam enemy C and targeting systems. It can also support psychological and deception operations. Jamming degrades or denies the enemy effective use of his C and targeting systems. Electronic deception causes an enemy to misinterpret what is received by his electronic systems. For more information on Electronic Attack, refer to FMs 24-33, 34-40(s) and 34-40-7.

Electronic Warfare Support:

ES gathers information by intercepting, locating, and exploiting enemy communications (radios) and noncommunications emitters (radar's). ES gives the commander timely information upon which he can base his immediate decisions. Intelligence obtained through ES supports all-source analysis, EA, and EP. As one source of combat information, ES focuses on the commander's immediate needs for identifying the enemy's intent and obtaining targeting information.

Electronic Protection:

EP protects personnel, facilities, or equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy EW which degrades or destroys friendly communications and noncommunications capabilities. Good electromagnetic emanations practices are the key to a successful defense against the enemy's attempt to destroy or disrupt our communications and noncommunications systems. Proper management of electromagnetic emanations makes the use of our communications equipment appear to be without pattern; as a result, it is difficult for the enemy to target and is consistent with good EP practices. For more information on Electronic Protection, refer to FM 24-33 and FM 34-40(S).

Army EW operations are developed and integrated as part of the commander's overall concept of operations. The execution of EW operations occurs across all BOSS and units. EW often provides commanders with substantial capabilities to electronically influence and control the battlefield.

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