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Intelligence



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I. INTRODUCTION

(U) In June 2003, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence began a formal review of U.S. intelligence into the existence of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of weapons of mass destruction against his own people, as a part of the Committee's continuing oversight of the intelligence activities of the United States.

(U) Committee staff had, for the previous several months, already been examining aspects of intelligence activities regarding Iraq, including the Intelligence Community's (IC's) intelligence support to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) weapons inspections in Iraq and the IC's analysis and collection of reporting related to the alleged Niger Iraq uranium deal. On June 20, 2003, however, Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman, and Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Vice Chairman, of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a press statement announcing their joint commitment to continue the Committee's thorough review of U.S. intelligence. Chairman Roberts and Vice Chairman Rockefeller said the Committee would examine:

  • the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people;

  • the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;

  • whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch and Congress;

  • whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and

  • other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review.
With the exception of the question of accuracy, all of the foregoing are addressed in this report.

(U) On February 12, 2004, the Committee unanimously agreed to refine the terms of reference of the Committee's inquiry. In addition to the matters set forth in the joint release of the Chairman and Vice Chairman on June 20, 2003, the Committee agreed to examine additional issues in two phases. Issues annotated as phase one have been addressed in this report. Issues annotated as phase two are currently under review by the Committee. The additional issues are:

  • the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom (phase I);

  • whether public statements, reports, and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information (phase II);

  • the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments (phase II);

  • prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq (phase II);

  • any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (phase I and II); and

  • the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) (phase I and II).

(U) In early June 2003, the IC provided the Committee with nineteen volumes (approximately 15,000 pages) of intelligence assessments and source reporting underlying the IC's assessments of Iraq's WMD programs, ties to terrorist groups, threat to stability and security in the region, and repression of its own people. Committee staff began immediately to read and analyze every report provided to determine how intelligence analysts reached their conclusions and whether any assessments were not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee. In late August and early September 2003, Committee staff requested additional intelligence to support IC assessments which Committee staff had judged were not supported by the intelligence that had been previously provided.

(U) The Committee began to receive this additional supporting intelligence in October 2003. In late October 2003, Committee staff requested that the IC provide any intelligence, which had not already been provided, that contradicted the IC's analyses regarding Iraq. For example, Committee staff requested intelligence that showed Iraq had not reconstituted its nuclear program, had not renewed production of chemical agents, and had abandoned an offensive biological weapons program. In early November 2003, the IC wrote to the Committee that it was working to provide the contradictory intelligence requested by Committee staff. In the same letter, the IC said it had uncovered an additional six volumes of intelligence material that supported the IC's assessments on Iraq's WMD programs. These materials were also reviewed by Committee staff. The IC provided the contradictory intelligence information in late November. During the twelve months of the Committee's review, Committee staff submitted almost 100 requests for supplemental intelligence information, received over 30,000 pages of documents in response to those requests, and reviewed and analyzed each document provided. The Committee's request to review Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs) relevant only to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to terrorists was denied by the White House. Without examining these documents, the Committee is unable to determine fully whether Intelligence Community judgments were properly disseminated to policymakers in the executive branch, one of the tasks outlined for review.

(U) Committee staff interviewed more than 200 individuals including intelligence analysts and senior officials with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of State, National Ground Intelligence Center, the Air Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Staff also interviewed former intelligence analysts, National Intelligence Officers, operations officers, collection managers, signals intelligence collectors, imagery analysts, nuclear experts with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ambassadors, former United Nations inspectors, Department of Defense weapons experts, State Department officials, and National Security Council staff members.

(U) The Committee held four preliminary hearings on aspects of U.S. intelligence on Iraq: the Iraq-Niger connection, the CIA and State Department Inspectors General report on the review of the Iraq-Niger issue, the history and continuity of weapons of mass destruction assessments pertaining to Iraq, and Iraq prewar intelligence.

(U) These efforts have enabled the Committee to develop a full understanding of the quantity and quality of intelligence reporting on Iraq's WMD programs, Iraq's ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his violations of human rights including the actual use of weapons of mass destruction against his own people. The Committee has also gained an understanding of how intelligence analysts throughout the IC used that intelligence to develop their assessments on these issues, how those assessments were disseminated to policymakers, whether those assessments were reasonable, objective, independent of political consideration, and whether any influence was brought to bear to shape their analysis to support policy objectives.



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