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Intelligence

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A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

(                            ) In order to more fully understand why the CCDC recommended certain changes to the Intelligence Community's (IC) HUMINT collection activities, Committee staff interviewed HUMINT collection officers in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, including collection officers in the Near East (NE) Division and the Counterproliferation Division (CPD). These officers briefed Committee staff on the IC's HUMINT collection posture against Iraq from the end of the Gulf War until the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). CIA officers told staff that the IC's HUMINT collection efforts throughout this period were dedicated to                      SENTENCE DELETED                      the IC obtained human intelligence on a variety of issues. Most of this information obtained through CIA's sources was related to political and military issues, not WMD, however. The CIA had no dedicated WMD sources on the ground in Iraq until the late nineties.                      SENTENCE DELETED                      The CIA                                                                                           did not have any WMD sources in Iraq after 1998. When asked about the lack of sources with access to WMD, the Deputy Chief of CPD told Committee staff that "despite an intense, vigorous recruitment campaign against Iraq WMD targets . . . we were never able to gain direct access to Iraq's WMD programs."

(                    ) A CIA officer from NE told staff that when he came to his position in 2001, the CIA had four Iraqi sources reporting on non-WMD topics.                      SENTENCES DELETED                     

(                ) The recommendations in the CCDC study responded to these deficiencies in HUMINT WMD collection. The CCDC study found that HUMINT operations against Iraq WMD were extremely limited. HUMINT was heavily dependent on liaison sources and although, by 2001, there were                                           sources inside the country and                                           outside the country, HUMINT collection against the Iraq WMD target was still negligible.                      SENTENCE DELETED                      When Committee staff asked why there had not been an aggressive HUMINT strategy developed to target Iraq's WMD prior to the CCDC study, the NICB said that budgetary constraints prevented them                      SENTENCE DELETED                     

(                ) The NICB told Committee staff that getting people on the ground was difficult and said that Iraq was a "tough                                           problem." The CCDC recommended instead that the IC focus its HUMINT strategy                                          . The CCDC study team recommended the                                           :

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(                ) The NICB told Committee staff that even before the CCDC study was finalized, the IC began implementing many of these recommendations and aggressively pursued HUMINT collection. The NICB said both the CIA and the DIA developed well organized efforts                      SENTENCE DELETED                      These operations failed to provide any usable intelligence. The NICB told Committee staff that the negative results were reported in intelligence reports.

(                ) In September, 2001, the DCI established a Joint Task Force within CIA's Counterproliferation Division (CPD) of the Directorate of Operations (DO). According to the Deputy Director of CPD, "there was a full complement of UNSCOM inspectors inside Iraq from '91 until December '98, so the focus wasn't as intense as it was after that in recruiting sources on WMD." The DCI's Iraqi WMD issue manager for the clandestine service told staff that "before the Task Force was set up, there were fewer than half a dozen at some times, individuals working on Iraq.                                           There were very few assets                               at all reporting on Iraq's WMD efforts." After the Task Force was established, the CIA recruited                               sources,                                      whose information resulted in the production and dissemination of over 400 intelligence reports. This was an increase from only 90 reports in 2000.

(                ) Some other examples of how the IC tried to improve HUMINT collection against Iraq's WMD programs included:

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(                ) After this push to improve HUMINT collection, the CIA made contact, through other sources,                      SENTENCES DELETED                     

(                              ) From late summer 2002 until the start of OIF in March 2003, the CIA 'dramatically picked up the pace" of HUMINT collection according to a CIA collector.                      SENTENCE DELETED                      CIA officials told Committee staff this resulted in                 or more sources reporting                              by March 2003. Just prior to the start of OIF,                      SENTENCE DELETED                      None of these sources provided information on Iraq's biological, chemical or nuclear weapons programs.

(                )                      SENTENCE DELETED                      Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered placing a CIA officer in the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq's WMD programs. A CIA officer said, "because it's very hard to sustain . . . it takes a rare officer who can go in and                                       survive scrutiny                                       for a long time."



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