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C. Chemical Weapons

(                )Secretary Powell's speech referenced intelligence on Iraq's chemical weapons which had been obtained after the IC published the 2002 NIE on Iraq's WMD programs. Secretary Powell noted in his speech that " . . . we have sources who tell us that [Saddam Hussein] recently has authorized his field commanders to use [chemical weapons]." The IC provided three HUMINT reports which substantiated this statement. The first, dated January    2003, from a CIA                                                                                                                           said                                                                                                                           that the Iraqi government had informed                      that it would launch missiles armed with chemical and biological agents against northern Iraq, Kuwait and Israel within the first two hours of the initiation of air strikes by U. S. and coalition forces. The                      reported                                          that the entire Army I Corps had begun to issue atropine injectors and protective masks to soldiers and informed them they were intended to protect them against a U.S. chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attack.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     

(                )A second CIA HUMINT report                                                                                                                           said that Saddam Hussein had authorized four field commanders to use "prohibited" weapons if U.S. forces crossed the "red line," a box around Baghdad. Another report, dated September 2002, from a foreign government service, did not say that commanders had been authorized to use chemical weapons, but noted that Saddam had ordered that all resources, including chemical and biological weapons, be used to defend the regime from attack. The foreign government service report said that the SSO, under the direction of Qusay Hussein, was in charge of all of Iraq's CBW and that it took an average of 20 minutes to move CBW munitions into place for attack and that the maximum response time was 45 minutes. Both of the reports that noted Saddam Hussein had authorized field commanders to use CBW were obtained by the IC after publication of the NIE on Iraq's WMD programs.

(                ) Secretary Powell's discussion of the intelligence reporting also differed in some respects from previous IC assessments of Iraq's chemical weapons capability in several respects. First, Secretary Powell said that the al-Musayyib site, a suspect chemical munitions storage site, had been used for "at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field." The CIA told Committee staff that State Department speech writers crafted this statement from CIA input that "evidence of movement activity at this site went back as early as 1999." Intelligence provided to the Committee showed only that possible chemical transshipment activity had occurred at the facility and only in the spring of 2002. There were indicators - a.                      vehicle in 1998 and construction of                      in late 2000 - which suggested that the facility may have been involved in suspicious activity, but imagery did not show transshipment or movement activity                      the spring of 2002.

(                ) Second, Secretary Powell said that a HUMINT source corroborated the movement of chemical weapons at al-Musayyib at the same time that imagery had shown the suspicious activity. Referring to the imagery of the transshipment activity, Secretary Powell said, "What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time:" The Committee was provided with a single report from a CIA HUMINT                                           which said that in early August to early November 2002, Iraq had moved possible chemical weapons materials between the al-Musayyib site and another site. The report showed that a HUMINT source confirmed the movement of possible chemical munitions at al Musayyib, as Secretary Powell said, but the report did not show that the movement took place at the same time as shown in the imagery reporting.

(                )Finally, Secretary Powell discussed an imagery report, which said that the ground in and around the al Musayyib storage area had been graded after the transshipment activity had been completed. Secretary Powell said the grading "literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity" The imagery report provided to the Committee said that this type of grading is "a common fire abatement measure in ammunition deports, but could also hide evidence of                                           CW                                          ," noting only the possibility that the purpose; of the grading was to conceal chemical weapons activity.