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Intelligence

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VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S DELIVERY SYSTEMS

A. Background

(U) In addition to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced several intelligence assessments which addressed Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and, more specifically, Iraq's delivery systems, including missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) produced an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), Iraq: Steadily Pursuing WMD Capabilities. The assessment was prepared at the request of the National Security Council (NSC) for a broad update on Iraqi efforts to rebuild WMD and delivery programs in the absence of weapons inspectors, as well as a review of what remained of the WMD arsenal and outstanding disarmament issues that were the focus of the United Nations Special Commission UNSCOM). In July 1998, the NIC produced an ICA, The Foreign Biological and Chemical Weapons Threat to the United States, which discussed Iraq's development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for possible biological weapons (BW) delivery.

(U) In March 1998, September 1999, July 2000, and December 2001, the NIC produced NIEs on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 201526. These annual reports were requested by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to provide Congress with the latest intelligence on worldwide ballistic missile developments and threats. All of these NIEs provided an assessment of Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities.

(U) These IC products regarding Iraq's delivery programs were consistent in assessing that:

  • Gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles, suggest that Iraq retained a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles.

  • Technical analysis indicated that Iraq's short-range al Samoud missile was capable of exceeding the 150-km range limit imposed by United Nations (UN) sanctions.

  • Baghdad is using the development of shorter-range missiles, allowed under sanctions, to prepare to reconstitute a longer range missile effort.

    (U) In its 2000, 2001, and 2002 intelligence products, the IC updated its assessments and asserted that Iraq had made steady progress in developing its missile programs and was continuing to develop UAVs. The IC assessed that:

  • Iraq was in the final stages of development of the al Samoud missile (2000), may be preparing to deploy the al Samoud (2001), and was deploying the al Samoud and Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), both which exceed the 150-km UN range limit (2002).

  • Construction and testing activity showed a clear intent to resume longer-range missile production (2000), Iraq was in the early stages of developing longer range ballistic missiles (2001), and Iraq was developing medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) capabilities (2002).

  • Baghdad was continuing to develop UAVs which probably were intended as delivery platforms for biological weapons (BW). The UAVs posed a threat to Iraq's neighbors and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf (2000, 2002).

    (U) In the 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction the key judgments noted that Iraq was developing a UAV, probably intended as a biological weapons (BW) delivery platform. The body of the NIE made it clear that this developmental program was for small and medium UAVs. Previous intelligence assessments had focused on Iraq's development of larger UAVs for possible BW delivery, which Iraq had crafted from modified jet aircraft. The 2002 NIE also raised the possibility, for the first time, that Iraq's UAVs could threaten the U.S. homeland, if they were brought in or close to, the U.S. The NIE added that Iraq was attempting to procure mapping software of the U.S. for its UAVs which "strongly suggested that Iraq was investigating the use of these UAVs for missions targeting the U.S."

    (U) The Committee examined each of the assessments of Iraq's delivery capabilities outlined above, and all of the available intelligence provided by the IC in support of these assessments. Committee staff also interviewed analysts from each all-source intelligence agency with a role in drafting or coordinating on the delivery section of the NIE including analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the U.S. Air Force's (USAF), National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC,)27 to hear each agency's reasons for their assessments.

    (U) All intelligence agencies agreed with the IC's assessments in the 2002 NIE regarding Iraq's missiles, and there were no footnotes or dissents in this section. USAF intelligence, however, disagreed on several aspects of the NIE regarding Iraq's UAV programs, including the assessment that Iraq's UAVs were probably intended to deliver BW. The USAF assessed that the UAVs were intended primarily for reconnaissance and not BW delivery. The discussion below outlines the intelligence supporting the IC's assessments and discusses any disagreement or alternate judgments about those assessments.

    footnotes

    26 The March 1998 report went through the same coordination and approval process as a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) but was called an annual report to Congress rather than an NIE. The July 2000 NIE was titled Foreign Responses to US National Missile Defense Deployment. This NIE described the IC's assessments of both the foreign response to U.S. missile defense and the foreign ballistic missile threat through 2015.

    27 NAIC has recently been renamed the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC).



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