J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE
(U) Analysis from individual intelligence agencies on Iraq's missile programs was consistent between agencies and consistent with the Community products discussed earlier in this report. Committee staff, therefore, focused the discussion of individual agencies' analysis on UAVs.
( )As early as 1998, the CIA began reporting on a possible CBW delivery mission for Iraq's UAVs and the possibility that Iraq was developing some UAVs, specifically the L-29, primarily for the BW delivery mission. In January 1998, the CIA and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)29 wrote a joint intelligence report, Possible Iraqi Development of UAV for CBW Delivery, in which the agencies discussed the possibility of delivery of BW agent from an Iraqi modified L-29 UAV. This report stated, "according to DELETED, Iraq had developed UAVs specifically for the delivery of chemical and biological agents." The report also mentions that Iraq had acquired or developed UAVs since the early to mid-1980s for air defense training, reconnaissance, or decoy missions.
(U) In March 1999, a second joint CIA and NIMA intelligence report, Iraq: Final Development of Al Bai'aa L-29 UAV as Possible CBW Delivery System, stated, "intelligence reporting suggests that the (L-29) system may be intended for chemical or biological warfare agent delivery against U.S. military forces." The report did not mention other possible missions for the UAVs. In June 2001, WINPAC published an intelligence assessment, Iraq's L-29: A Biological and Chemical Warfare Challenge to US Forces, which also discussed the possible threat posed by L-29s capable of delivering BW. As with the 1998 report, this assessment mentioned other possible missions for the L-29 including reconnaissance, communications monitoring, and conventional weapons delivery, although it judged that those missions were secondary to a CBW delivery role.
(U) Prior to 2002, the DIA's finished intelligence products also discussed possible unconventional missions for Iraq's UAVs. In May 2000, the defense intelligence assessment, Iraq's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missile Programs: Progress, Prospects, and Potential Vulnerabilities, noted that Iraq had made great progress in converting the L-29s into UAVs "possibly for biological agent delivery." The assessment cautioned that "a definitive link between the L-29 and the Iraqi biological warfare program has yet to be established, but L-29 aircraft could serve as line source aerial delivery platforms to disseminate biological agents." The report did not discuss other possible missions for the UAVs.
(U) In a February 2000 Military Intelligence Digest (MID) article, Iraq: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, the DIA assessed that "the L-29 program-probably a test bed for more advanced UAVs - has been indirectly associated with Iraq's biological warfare program and could pose a threat to allied forces in the Persian Gulf." The MID also noted that "Baghdad reportedly is considering several other missions for the L-29: electronic countermeasures (using the L-29 to fly electronic jammers or decoys); photographic or signals reconnaissance; communications relay to distant nodes; air defense (using the L-29 to draw Western fighters into areas covered by Iraqi air defense systems.)"
( ) The NAIC's analysts assessed that the L-29 UAV would have been well suited by range and payload to carry CBW agents; however, they did not believe the Iraqis had successfully completed development of the L-29 for this mission. In a March 1999 Defense Intelligence Reference Document, Iraq L-29 UAV Conversion, NAIC wrote, "possible mission applications for the L-29 UAV could include use as an aerial target, reconnaissance UAV, airborne jammer or electronic intelligence (ELINT) collector, conventional explosive delivery vehicle, test bed for development of other UAV flight systems, or as a possible delivery system for chemical or biological agents." In this report, NAIC stated that the immediate objective of Iraq's L-29 program was to develop the technology necessary to produce UAVs that could be used as a threat vehicle.
(U) The NAIC also briefed a slide presentation to DoD officials from August through October 2002. The presentation outlined NAIC's view that Iraq's L-29 UAVs were not operational and that the small UAVs were designed to carry cameras, jammers, and other equipment that suggested the UAVs were intended for battlefield reconnaissance.
(U) INR told the Committee they did not publish any intelligence products specifically on Iraq's UAVs prior to publication of the NIE.
(U) None of the finished intelligence assessments provided to the Committee from any of the intelligence agencies discussed the reporting about Iraq's attempts to acquire mapping software for its UAV program.
footnotes
29 NIMA has recently been renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
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