B. Scud-Type Missiles
(U) The IC assessed that gaps in Iraqi declarations and Baghdad's failure to fully account for destruction of prohibited missiles strongly suggested that Iraq retained a small force of Scud-type ballistic missiles. The NIE said that the covert force may contain "up to a few dozen" Scud-variant short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). UNSCOM data and reports provided to the Committee showed that the UN had been unable to account for two of 819 Scud missiles Iraq acquired from the Soviet Union, seven indigenously produced al Husayn Scud-type missiles, 50 conventional Scud warheads and over 500 tons of proscribed Scud propellants Iraq claimed to have destroyed unilaterally.
( ) In addition to these accounting discrepancies, more than twenty intelligence reports from at least ten different human intelligence (HUMINT) sources of varying reliability provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq retained prohibited Scud missiles, trucks to carry and conceal them and hid the missiles, launchers, and missile components at various sites in Iraq. Some of these reports indicated that the information v who "may have provided it to influence as well as inform," but others were provided by independent sources. For example, in 1998 a source with indirect access, reported that components of Iraqi Scud missiles had been kept in Iraqi military installations and that other missile parts were hidden on large trucks that moved continuously in Iraq. SENTENCE DELETED A report said that an Iraqi general who defected wrote DELETED that Iraq retained prohibited Scud-type missiles, and a report said that Iraq was hiding about five to eight Scud missiles .
( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED
( )Other information provided to the Committee suggested that Iraq destroyed its Scud missiles in the years after the Gulf War. Intelligence reports describing DELETED debriefs of Hussein Kamel (Saddam Hussein's son in law who defected from Iraq in 1995) show that Kamel told interviewers that Iraq had destroyed all of its Scud missiles. This information was not mentioned in the NIE.
(U) Finally, it is unclear exactly how the IC established the estimate that Iraq may have retained "up to a few dozen" Scuds. Analysts told Committee staff that the number was estimated based on Scud missiles and components for which the UN could not adequately account, but the IC had no estimate of the number of components that may have been withheld from inspectors.
NEWSLETTER
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