C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production
(U) The judgment in the NIE that Iraq was expanding its chemical industry primarily to support CW production was based on intelligence reports which showed construction and other activity at suspect Iraqi CW facilities, particularly the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants. Iraq's Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants were designed and built as dedicated CW precursor production plants in the 1980s, but were heavily damaged during the first Gulf War. Iraq told inspectors in the 1990s that it was rebuilding the plants for civilian chlorine and phenol production. Both chlorine and phenol have CW applications, but also have legitimate civilian uses such as water treatment or pesticide and resin production. The IC judged that Iraq's civilian needs for chlorine were already adequately met through UN authorized imports and three other chlorine plants in the country. The IC also noted in the NIE that Iraq modified the phenol plant after the departure of UN inspectors in 1998, which they assessed suggested that it was modified for illicit use.
( ) At least DELETED imagery reports provided to the Committee did show that the Fallujah II chlorine and phenol plants had been operational since March 2000 and that both plants had been modified after the departure of UN inspectors. DELETED showed PARAGRAPH DELETED support elements at both facilities.
( ) To show how the IC determined that Iraq's chlorine needs were adequately met without the Fallujah II chlorine plant, the IC provided the Committee with a chlorine stockpiles at Iraq's water treatment plants. SENTENCES DELETED The IC also said that Iraq had three other chlorine production plants in the country that were continuing to produce chlorine. At the end of 2000, just one of the plants was producing 25 tons of chlorine per day. According to the CIA analysts, this was DELETED more than the DELETED Iraq needed for water treatment each day.
( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED
( ) The NIE also noted that personnel at the facility had engaged in DELETED burial of equipment, SENTENCES DELETED In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said that DELETED burial indicates that Iraq was, "hiding equipment so that it could be dug up easily later," and said that even if the equipment was damaged, other reporting showed that Iraq had repaired such equipment in the past for use at this facility. SENTENCE DELETED
( )The NIE also said that Iraq was using its procurement network to try to acquire precursors for chemical agents it had made in the past. The IC provided at least thirty DELETED intelligence DELETED reports to the Committee which indicated that Iraq was trying to procure chemicals and equipment with both CW and legitimate civilian applications. Some of the reports noted specifically that the chemicals were probably for legitimate purposes. SENTENCE DELETED None of the remaining reports showed that Iraq had ultimately obtained any of these chemicals or that the chemicals were intended for a weapons program. SENTENCE DELETED
( )Finally, the NIE noted that the management of the facility included individuals identified as personnel from Iraq's pre Gulf War CW program. DELETED reports provided to the Committee indicated that in 2000 and 2001 several individuals who worked in Iraq's CW program were working at the Fallujah II facility. One of the reports noted, however, that there was no indication that these individuals were conducting chemical warfare research at the facility.
(U) None of the intelligence reporting provided to the Committee showed that Iraq was expanding its chemical infrastructure "primarily" to support CW production. Although the word "primarily" was in the draft NIE which all analysts had the opportunity to review and coordinate, IC analysts told Committee staff during interviews that they do not believe the assessment that the expansion was "primarily" intended to support a CW program accurately represented their views. When asked whether in retrospect there was anything analysts regretted including in the NIE, a CIA analyst told Committee staff "There's a line in there about how Iraq's chemical industry was rebuilt primarily to support the CW program, and we don't think it was `primarily.' We think that the program was benefitting from it, but we don't think that's why they were rebuilding the industry." In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the DIA said that it had proposed deleting the word "primarily" from the NIE text at the NIE coordination meeting because "It was difficult to distinguish how much of the chemical industry was supporting CW programs versus various non chemical warfare programs." Non chemical warfare programs include both civilian chemical programs and conventional weapons programs. The DIA told the Committee that the disagreement on whether to exclude the word "primarily" was not of sufficient importance to warrant a footnote to the NIE. An INR analyst told Committee staff that he had "no specific recollection" from the NIE coordination meeting about this specific passage, but noted that "In general, INR judged that Iraq could use elements of its dual use infrastructure to support a CW capability, but that we had little specific intelligence to judge that Iraq was producing chemical warfare agents in 2002."
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