B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons
(U) The statement that, "Baghdad has chemical . . . weapons," was made only in the key judgments of the NIE and not in the main text of the document. The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Conventional Military Issues who was responsible for the chemical weapons section of the NIE, told Committee staff that the statement was intended to be a summation of assessments in the main text. The statement is broader than previous IC assessments provided to the Committee which used less definitive language in describing Iraq's CW capabilities. For example, the 2000 ICA said, "We believe that Iraq has chemical agent and stable intermediaries in bulk storage, production equipment, and filled munitions that are still militarily useful." The elimination of "we believe" from the 2002 NIE key judgments removed the indication that this was an assessment rather than a fact. Analysts from several intelligence agencies told Committee staff that in retrospect they believe that the statement, "We judge that Baghdad has chemical weapons," would have been a more accurate reflection of their views in the 2002 NIE.
(U) Because the judgment that Iraq had CW was not specifically described in the body of the NIE, no intelligence reporting was provided by the IC directly in support of that assessment. IC analysts told Committee staff, however, that the assessment was based in part on Iraq's inability to fully account for the destruction of pre Gulf War CW and precursors, suggesting that Iraq may have retained some of those chemicals. Information from UNSCOM reports provided to the Committee shows that Iraq's total production and holdings of CW agents could not be verified, and that Iraq could not account for over 1,500 metric tons of chemical precursors and over 550 artillery shells that had been filled with mustard CW agent. According to LINSCOM, in 1998, the mustard agent was still of the highest quality and was still militarily viable. The CIA estimated in 1998, based on UN reports of precursor chemicals for which Iraq had not been able to account, that Iraq could have had up to 200 metric tons of mustard agent.
( ) The assessment was also based on DELETED reporting from the spring and summer of 2002 which suggested that Iraq was possibly moving chemical munitions. The IC provided several DELETED reports to the Committee to support their assessment that Iraq had transported chemical munitions in 2002. The first report showed that a tanker truck, identified as a DELETED decontamination vehicle was present at a small, secured ammunition storage area at the al Musayyib Barracks, a Republican Guard facility. According to the DELETED report, this vehicle had been associated with CW storage and transshipment prior to the Gulf War. The report also noted that during UN inspections at the al Musayyib Barracks in 1997, Iraqi officials attempted to stall the inspectors, which raised the IC's suspicions that sensitive materials were being stored at the facility. According to the DELETED report, in 2002, DELETED cargo trucks arrived at the al Musayyib barracks' main depot and small storage area where the DELETED decontamination vehicle was located and appeared to come and go Additional DELETED showed that the activity ceased by mid 2002 and the ground in and around the storage facility had been graded. The report noted that grading is a common fire abatement measure at ammunition depots, but also could hide evidence of CW . A final DELETED report provided on this facility showed that the DELETED vehicle had departed the facility by DELETED 2002.
( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED
( ) DELETED of a second facility from DELETED 2002 also showed that possible transshipment activity had occurred at the DELETED Ammunition Depot. This activity was also assessed to be possible CW transshipment because a tanker truck, which could have served as a decontamination vehicle, was present at the facility while a DELETED truck was engaged in probable transshipment activities.
( ) Additional DELETED showed that Iraq had conducted munitions transshipment activity at DELETED ammunition depots and storage sites around Iraq in the spring and summer of 2002. Most of this activity was assessed to be related to conventional munitions.
( ) While the presence of the DELETED decontamination vehicle was assessed to be an indicator of the presence of CW, a July DELETED, 2002 NIMA assessment noted that because of the similarities of the DELETED decontamination vehicles to a SENTENCE DELETED The report concluded that the DELETED vehicle could not be discounted "as a tipoff when assessing possible CW activity," suggesting that it may be present during non CW activity as well.
( ) Intelligence analysts also told Committee staff that the tanker trucks and DELETED vehicles were an indication of possible CW transshipment activity, but could also have been associated with other activities. An analyst from the DIA told Committee staff that, "Today, we don't know whether this vehicle is still associated with the CW program, but it is a specific vehicle that the chemical program used in its former program before 1991." An analyst from INR said, "The DELETED decon vehicle is used for multiple purposes, and , it can also be used as for fire safety as a water truck." SENTENCE DELETED Some of the same hazards exist with conventional munitions as they do for CW munitions, so you need a fire safety truck."
( )The Committee was not provided with any corroborating intelligence reporting prior to publication of the NIE that indicated the transshipment activity at any of the facilities mentioned in DELETED reports was related to movement of CW.
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