L. Biological Conclusions
(U) Conclusion 48. The assessment in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that, "[W]e judge that all key aspects - research & development, production, and weaponization - of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
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(U) Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
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(U) Conclusion 50. The statement in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.
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( ) Conclusion 51. The Central Intelligence Agency withheld important information concerning both CURVE BALL's reliability and DELETED reporting from many Intelligence Community analysts with a need to know the information.
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( ) Conclusion 52. The Defense Human Intelligence Service, which had primary liability for handling the Intelligence Community's interaction with CURVE BALL's DELETED debriefers, demonstrated serious lapses in handling such an important source.
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(U) Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that " Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
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(U) Conclusion 54. The assessments in the National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iraq's capability to produce and weaponize biological weapons agents are, for the most part, supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee, but the NIE did not explain that the research discussed could have been very limited in nature, been abandoned years ago, or represented legitimate activity.
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(U) Conclusion 55. The National Intelligence Estimate misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOIVI)1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability.
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(U) Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts' assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents.
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(U) Conclusion 57. The assessment in the National Intelligence Estimate that "Iraq has . . . dry biological weapons (BV) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.
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