H. The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting
(U) The NIE stated that "The nature and amounts of Iraq's stored BW material remain unresolved by UNSCOM accounting." The NIE went on to state that "From the end of the Gulf war to mid- 1995, Iraq denied that it had an offensive BW program, claiming that it had conducted only `defensive research.' Only after UNSCOM confronted Baghdad with irrefutable evidence of excessive growth media procurement did Iraq admit that it had an offensive BW program and had made 30,000 liters of concentrated biological weapons agents. Even then, UNSCOM estimates that Iraq's production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin could have been two to four times higher than claimed by Baghdad."
(U) UNSCOM's final report noted that Iraq "categorically denied" it had a BW program from 1991 to 1995 and took "active steps to conceal the program" from UNSCOM. "In 1995, when Iraq was confronted with evidence collected by the Commission of imports of bacterial growth media in quantities that had no civilian utility with Iraq's limited biotechnology industry, it eventually, on 1 July 1995, acknowledged that it used this growth media to produce two BW agents in bulk, botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis . . . ."
(U) The NIE described Iraq's inability to substantiate claims that a large amount of growth media was lost in failed production runs or stolen from the high security BW facility at Al-Hakam and other sites. UNSCOM's final report listed the growth media as an unresolved accounting issue, and IC analysts told Committee staff that they did not believe that it is possible that growth media could have been stolen from a facility like Al-Hakam. A former LTN inspector told Committee staff, however, that he found it believable in light of the chaos and looting that followed immediately after the defeat of the Iraqi army in 1991. He noted that Iraqi guards abandoned their posts at many Iraqi government facilities. When asked why an Iraqi would want to steal growth media, he noted that there was not necessarily any logic to looting.
( ) The NIE also described Iraq's failure to provide adequate proof that it destroyed 157 aerial bombs it had filled with BW agent. The UNSCOM final report stated that inspectors were unable to verify both how many aerial bombs existed and how many were actually destroyed. The NIE noted that "Iraq claimed that it produced four aerosol spray tanks by modifying a Mirage F-1 fuel drop tank. We have no evidence that the Iraqis destroyed these tanks, DELETED" While the LTNSCOM report noted that inspectors were not satisfied that the prototype drop-tank was destroyed, "The remains of the other three drop tanks were inspected by the Commission." The IINSCOM final report also noted that "There is no evidence to corroborate that only four were produced. Interviews indicate that 12 tanks were to be modified."
(U) The NIE stated that UNSCOM's final report indicated that ". . . about 20 mobile double-jacketed storage tanks, which we judge may contain previously produced agent, remain unaccounted for." UNSCOM's final report states that "20+ tanks remain unaccounted for." The report noted that these tanks "were used to transfer agent between production and filling or deployment site and for storage of agent. Owing to their properties, they can be used for long-term storage of agent under controlled conditions . . . ."
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