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D. We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents

(U) The NIE stated that "we assess that Iraq has some BW agent and maintains the capability to produce B. anthracis, botulinim toxin, aflatoxin, Clostridium perfringerns (gas gangrene) and ricin toxin." The NIE also noted that Iraq "may be able to produce a number of other incapacitating and lethal agents that it has researched over the years" and assessed that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad's offensive BW program."

1. Smallpox

(                ) The 2002 NIE stated in the key judgments that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program." The body of the 2002 NIE expanded on this assessment:

"Various intelligence reports and DELETED indicate that Iraq probably has retained unauthorized stocks of Variola major virus, the causative agent of smallpox. Baghdad reportedly kept smallpox virus samples from its 1971-1972 outbreak, DELETED. We assess that the chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad's offensive BW program, although credible evidence is limited."

(U) The NIO and Deputy NIO for Science and Technology (S&T) told Committee staff that the statement "although credible evidence is limited" was not included in the key judgments because the issue was adequately addressed in the body of the NIE, and because of space limitations in the key judgments, they decided not to reiterate the point. The Deputy NIO added that she expected the readers of the NIE to read both the key judgments as well as the body of the document. When asked by Committee staff if a policymaker who read only the NIE 's smallpox key judgment, and not the body of the NIE's BW section, would have been misled about the uncertainties behind that assessment, an INR BW analyst responded, "Absolutely, particularly on such a sensitive topic as smallpox. And it's important to remember that people who were reading this at the time when we were having a national debate on whether people should be immunized and what the threat was from al-Qa'ida on smallpox, it was a much more charged atmosphere than the one we are in right now."

(                ) The assessment "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Baghdad's offensive BW program" was based primarily on intelligence DELETED that Iraq probably had retained unauthorized stocks of Variola major virus, the causative agent of smallpox. The assessment was also based on reporting that kept smallpox virus samples from a 1971-1972 outbreak, as well as reporting that suggested Iraq had the capability to work with the virus and fragmentary reports that were looking into such work.                      SENTENCE DELETED                      DELETED, who said Iraq had saved samples from a smallpox outbreak in the 1970s. DELETED also said that Iraq had "the capability of producing several biological agents - among them . . . smallpox." The report indicated that at the time of the conversation in May 2002, DELETED.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     . The report does not indicate that any of Iraq's work on smallpox was applied to an offensive biological program.

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(                )                                                              PARAGRAPH DELETED                                                             . The former UN BW inspector noted that he believed that the quantity of dry agent the machine could produce was too small to be very useful in a biological weapons program and stated that "I don't think that machine was designed to dry smallpox to make weapons material. That would be a hard way of doing it." CIA BW analysts told Committee staff that they believed any quantity of dry agent would be useful in a biological weapons program.

(                ) Another HUMINT report from February 2000 discussed reported research conducted at a facility run by the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad, involving a number of agents including smallpox.                      SENTENCE DELETED                      No mention is made in the report about whether the reported efforts at Abu Ghurayb were successful in creating a delivery method for smallpox.

(                ) The IC provided the Committee with DELETED additional HUMINT reports. One of the reports said an Iraqi scientist had "published on pox viruses DELETED described Iraqi work on "a poxvirus such as monkey pox" A third report said Iraq worked on camel pox virus. None of the reports referenced smallpox.

(  ) One report provided to the Committee suggested that, at least as of 1991, smallpox was not a part of Iraq's offensive BW program. DELETED report from 1995 detailed DELETED.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     .                      SENTENCE DELETED                     . CIA B W analysts also told Committee staff that they believed that work on camelpox would give Iraq the capability to work on smallpox if they had it.

(U) In a written response to a question from Committee staff, the CIA said "We have no evidence that Iraq ever weaponized smallpox." The NIE's assessment that, "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program," was based on the intelligence indicating that it was likely within Iraq's ability to produce smallpox agent.

2. Other Agents

(U) The NIE also noted that "Iraq has some BW agent and maintains the capability to produce B. anthracis, botulinim toxin, aflatoxin, Clostridium perfringerns (gas gangrene) and ricin toxin" and that Iraq "may be able to produce a number of other incapacitating and lethal agents that it has researched over the years." To show which agents Iraq has researched, the NIE included a table titled "BW Agents that Iraq has Researched." The table listed twenty one biological agents that Iraq had researched. While some of the agents listed on the chart are highly lethal agents that Iraq had confirmed it weaponized prior to 1991, others do not appear to have been researched for weapons purposes, while others have little or no utility in a BW program.

(U) BW Agents that Ira has Researched

(U) Of the 21 agents listed on the chart, only one is an effective and lethal battlefield BW agent that Iraq had declared to the UN that was researched, produced and weaponized prior to 1991: anthrax.

(                ) Three of the agents on the chart are agents that Iraq declared to the UN that it had weaponized prior to 1991, but have differing and debatable utility as a battlefield BW weapon: aflatoxin, ricin and botulinum toxin (botulism). Aflatoxin, a type of mycotoxin, may cause cancer and liver damage, but only years after exposure. IC analysts told Committee staff that there are indications in the scientific literature that aflatoxin can suppress the immune system, which may increase the effectiveness of other BW agents, but there are no indications that Iraq had weaponized aflatoxin for this purpose. A HUMINT report relating information DELETED noted that Iraqi scientists admitted to some level of research on other mycotoxins for BW purposes sometime prior to 1991. Although aflatoxin is a mycotoxin, the category "mycotoxins" is listed separately on the NIE's chart. A former senior UN BW inspector told Committee staff that the Iraqis had admitted to producing about ten grams of a mycotoxin that could serve as an effective BW agent prior to 1991 ". . .for special purposes for the intelligence service."

(U) Another agent on the chart, Tilletia species (wheat cover smut), also known as wheat bunt and wheat rust, is a fungus that can significantly reduce crop yields. Iraq declared to the UN that it weaponized tilletia species as an antiagricultural BW agent prior to 1991.

(                ) Four of the agents, enterovirus 70, camelpox virus, clostrinum perfringens (gas gangrene) and rotavirus, are incapacitating agents on which Iraq admitted to have conducted BW-related research and development work prior to 1991. These are agents that would result in symptoms such as muscle pain, blurred vision, vomiting, and diarrhea, that could have incapacitating effects. One report provided to the Committee indicated that DELETED also considered the possibility that Iraq's camelpox work was intended to cause economic damage to Saudi Arabia by attacking their camel herds.

(                ) The IC also provided the Committee with intelligence reports that suggested Iraq had conducted BW research on seven of the agents listed on the NIE's chart: brucella, tularemia, plague, tetanus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, cholera, and smallpox. A HUMINT report describing DELETED the former Iraqi BW facility at Salman Pak revealed that Iraq had samples of four of these eight BW agents: brucella, tularemia, clostrinum perfringens (gas gangrene), and tetanus.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     . A 1999 HUMINT report describes an order given by Hussein Kamal DELETED in 1994 to conduct research on, among other topics, tetanus. When DELETED asked why the military was interested in "public and animal health issues" Kamal told them that the work was for "Iraq's biological warfare program."

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(U) As noted in the preceding discussion concerning smallpox, the last of the eight BW agents, the only report provided to the Committee which provided a Iraqi BW link to this agent was a February 2000 HUMINT report which discussed reported research conducted at Abu Ghurayb, near Baghdad, involving a number of agents including smallpox. The report that said experiments had reached an advanced stage and were moving into the "production phase" and noted that in 1995 one of the researchers commented that tests at the facility focused on how to introduce materials into soft drinks and "other mediums." One of the specific projects undertaken was to produce lethal pills. No mention is made in the report about whether the reported efforts at Abu Ghurayb were successful in creating a delivery method for smallpox.

(                ) Two reports provided to the Committee discussed glanders, an agent listed on the NIE's chart.                      SENTENCE DELETED                                           SENTENCE DELETED                                           SENTENCE DELETED                     . A former senior LTNSCOM BW inspector told Committee staff that glanders is an effective BW agent that had been weaponized by the Soviet Union. He noted, however, that he was not aware of any evidence that Iraq had worked with glanders in a BW program. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control's internet web page notes that glanders is ". . . still commonly seen among domestic animals in. . .the Middle East . . . ."

(                ) A 1999 HUMINT report was provided to the Committee that discussed Iraqi research on shigella dysenteriae, the causative agent for dysentery. The report states that staff DELETED researched "shigella", among other pathogens, but notes that the report's source did not recall what strains of shigella were held at the facility. The report also notes that the facility had been inspected by UNSCOM more than once, and prior to each inspection the head of the department forbade his staff from discussing their work with inspectors. The head of the department also instructed his staff to keep the pathogens at home until after the UNSCOM inspections had finished.

(                ) None of the intelligence provided to the Committee showed a BW link to two of the agents listed on the NIE's chart. One of those agents, Staphylococcal enterotoxins, DELETED.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     . No other intelligence was provided to the Committee that would indicate a BW connection to Iraqi research conducted on this agent.                      SENTENCE DELETED                     

(U) A chart in a CIA paper published one month after the NIE that was titled, Iraq: Biological Warfare Agents Pose Growing Threat to US Interests, presented another depiction of Iraq's biological agent research. The chart titled, "Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents" showed three levels of research activity - research and development (R&D), production, and weaponization - and provided three different levels of confidence of the IC's knowledge of Iraq's work - confirmed, probable and suspected. This chart presented a more accurate depiction of the certainty and uncertainty behind the assessments of Iraq's biological agent research and made clear which agents were researched for weapons purposes. The title of the chart in the NIE, "BW Agents that Iraq has Researched" suggested that all of the agents were researched for weapons purposes, while the CIA publication more clearly indicated that the agents were "possible" BW agents.

(U) Status of Possible Iraqi BW Agents

` Iraq declared to UNSCOM that it worked with this BW agent.