REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ

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B. Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin BW Agents

( ) The NIE stated that "Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other mobile units for researching and filling agent into munitions or containers, according to multiple DELETED sources. Iraq has pursued mobile BW production options, largely to protect its BW capability from detection, according to a credible source."

( ) A large part of the NIE's discussion of the alleged mobile BW production units was based on information provided by a source described in the NIE as "a credible source" and "an Iraqi defector deemed credible by the IC." The source was an Iraqi defector who had been the subject of debriefings DELETED He was believed by the IC to have been a project engineer involved in the design and production of DELETED biological production facilities in Iraq. SENTENCE DELETED . The source is hereafter referred to by the codename he was given DELETED "CURVE BALL".

( ) The Committee was provided with 112 reports from the DELETED debriefings of CURVE BALL. CIA, DIA and INR BW analysts all told Committee staff that CURVE BALL provided the majority of the specific detail in the IC's assessments concerning the mobile BW production units. An INR BW analyst told Committee staff that if the reporting from CURVE BALL was removed from consideration it would have reduced his confidence in the assessment that Iraq had mobile BW production units. The INR BW analyst noted that without CURVE BALL ". . . you probably could only honestly say that Iraq would be motivated to have a mobile BW program and that it was attempting to procure components that would support that."

( ) Additional reporting from CURVE BALL, and additional human intelligence (HUMINT) sources that analysts believed corroborated his reporting, was instrumental in the IC shifting its characterization of Iraq's mobile BW production program from an assessment in December 2000 that stated, "according to credible US military reporting DELETED Baghdad now can produce biological agents in transportable plants" to the 2002 NIE's assessment that "Baghdad has transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents and may have other mobile units for researching and filling agent into munitions or containers, according to multiple DELETED sources" (emphasis added). A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that, "The big factor changing assessments that we had since the Gulf War was this body of reporting we got on the mobile BW program."

( ) The NIE stated that CURVE BALL reported that, ". . . seven mobile BW production units were constructed and that one began production as early as 1997." The NIE also said that, according to CURVE BALL, the seven units were produced DELETED Reports from CURVE BALL provided to the Committee described the production of seven mobile BW production units. One report DELETED, suggesting that production was underway in 1997. One of the reports also described the DELETED "construction of each of the new mobile biological weapons (BW) agent production units."

( ) The NIE stated that "the reported locations of these plants have been identified in imagery, but Iraq has most likely dispersed these units since the source defected." Several reports from CURVE BALL described the locations of the seven mobile production units. Imagery analysts used this information to identify what they assessed to be the locations in Iraq described by CURVE BALL. In interviews with Committee staff, IC analysts indicated that they viewed the identification of the sites on imagery, and the fact that buildings were DELETED to accommodate the mobile production plants as described by CURVE BALL, as corroboration of CURVE BALL's reporting. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that "we were able to identify the sites he had named to be agricultural sites housing these mobile plants. Stuff like that looked like more corroboration to us at the time." The CIA BW analyst also noted that while the IC was confident that it had identified the seven sites that CURVE BALL was discussing, "when we reviewed the imagery we couldn't find any evidence of the [mobile BW production] labs being there. SENTENCE DELETED

( ) The NIE's discussion of the mobile biological production units concluded with the estimate that if all seven units were operational, Iraq would take ". . . approximately 14 to 26 weeks to produce the amount UNSCOM assessed was actually produced prior [to] the Gulf War." SENTENCE DELETED

1. Other Sources

( ) The NIE stated that the information concerning Iraq's efforts to build mobile BW production facilities ". . . tracks with DELETED evidence that Iraq in the mid-1990s was considering a mobile fermentation capability, DELETED" The DELETED evidence is described in a December 1996 HLJMINT report that provided a translation of two Iraqi handwritten notes DELETED. The report described how the undated notes were written on Iraqi Military Industrial Corporation letterhead found in late 1995 and provided a summary of their contents:

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( ) The NIE also noted that another source provided information to the IC on mobile biological research laboratories. The NIE said, "in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade UNSCOM inspections, according to DELETED, an Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress (INC)." DELETED is hereafter referred to as the INC source. The information provided by the INC source is detailed in a March 2002 Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) intelligence report. The report discussed a project involving several Iraqi ministries, including the Iraqi Intelligence Service, to procure labs that would allow Iraq to conceal "biological research operations" from LTNSCOM inspectors. The report noted that the source was "unaware of the exact nature of the research conducted in the labs." This report, which does not discuss mobile BW production, was the only report concerning mobile BW units from this source. In addition to the INC source, the IC provided the Committee seven other reports concerning Iraqi mobile biological laboratories. None of these reports discussed mobile BW production units. SENTENCE DELETED PARAGRAPH DELETED

( ) Although he was not specifically referenced in the text of the NIE, the IC also provided the Committee with an intelligence report from the debriefing of another Iraqi Asylum seeker DELETED. A report from June 2001, which was the only report from this source provided to the Committee, said that Iraq had transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers at a special armaments factory in Iraq, and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced. The report noted that protective gear had to be worn in these transportable facilities, which were housed in partially underground buildings that were surrounded by a fence. The report also stated that "anyone with open sores was strictly forbidden access to these facilities," and that "warheads with biological agents were stockpiled at this site."

( ) Committee staff found several areas of concern regarding the HUMINT sources upon which the IC relied to build its assessments concernin Iraq's mobile BW production program. Those sources were CURVE BALL, DELETED, the INC source, and DELETED.

2. CURVE BALL

( ) SENTENCE DELETED . A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that the translation process used to debrief CURVE BALL led to some misunderstandings. CURVE BALL spoke in English and Arabic, which was translated into a Western European language. DELETED DHS officers DELETED translated the reports back into English before transmitting them to the DELETED Intelligence Community. SENTENCE DELETED

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( ) The IC provided the Committee with a copy of an evaluation of the intelligence reporting from CURVE BALL that was submitted by DELETED DIA BW analysts. The evaluation stated that "overall, the fact that the source may be valuable and the reporting appears to be of major significance are presently compromised by reporting inconsistencies as noted in the guidance below." SENTENCE DELETED The DHS intelligence officer responsible for collecting and reporting the intelligence from CURVE BALL was unable to tell Committee staff whether these concerns had been raised DELETED. The DHS intelligence officer did not recall the particular evaluation provided by the DIA B W analysts, or if DELETED provided any information in response.

( ) A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff that a Department of Defense (DOD) detailee who provided technical advice on CURVE BALL ". . . thought that the guy might be an alcoholic and that bothered him a lot." The detailee who provided technical advice to the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) on BW matters, met CURVE BALL in May 2000 in order to administer DELETED . The detailee is the only American intelligence official to have met CURVE BALL before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

( ) The DOD detailee raised several concerns about CURVE BALL's reliability in an electronic mail (e-mail) he wrote to the Deputy Chief of the CIA's DELETED Iraqi WMD Task Force after reading a draft of Secretary Powell's speech to the U.N. The detailee noted that "I believe I am still the only [United States Government] USG person to have had direct access to him. There are a few issues associated with that contact that warrant further explanation, in my opinion, before using him as the backbone for the Iraqi mobile program." The detailee explained,

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The DOD detailee also expressed concern in his e mail that,

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( ) The detailee's e mail was sent to the Deputy Chief of the DELETED Iraqi WMD Task Force on February 4, one day before Secretary Powell delivered his speech. The detailee told Committee staff that prior to receiving a draft copy of Secretary Powell's speech he had "had many discussions with the analysts about my concerns with CURVE BALL as this whole thing was building up and taking on a life of its own. I was becoming frustrated, and when asked to go over Colin Powell's speech . . . and I went through the speech, and I thought, my gosh, we have got - I have got to go on record and make my concerns known . . . ."

( ) The detailee also told Committee staff that during his DELETED of CURVE BALL, he had several opportunities to speak with the DELETED who had DELETED responsibility for debriefing CURVE BALL. The detailee observed that ". . . this is an opinion of mine and I really have nothing else to base it on, but it was obvious to me that his case officer, for lack of better words, had fallen in love with his asset and the asset could do no wrong. I mean, the story was 100 percent correct as far as DELETED was concerned."

( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED The INR BW analyst also told Committee staff that he was not aware that the detailee had concerns that CURVE BALL might have a drinking problem.

( ) Because of Committee staff's concerns about the IC's reliance on a single source and questions about CURVE BALL's reporting, the Committee requested an IC assessment of CURVE BALL and his reliability. The DHS provided the Committee with an information paper on December 17, 2003 that stated ". . . the Iraqi design engineer [CURVE BALL] is not a biological weapons expert nor is he a life science expert. Source simply designed DELETED production facilities. He never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents." The DHS assessment also noted that "the source's reporting demonstrates a knowledge of and access to personalities, organizations, procurement, and technology related to Iraq's BW program." Concerned that the assessment had said the primary source behind the IC's assessments of the Iraqi mobile BW production program had "never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents," Committee staff asked DHS to clarify what appeared to be a serious discrepancy. The DHS was unable to respond to the request for several weeks, noting to Committee staff that the matter was being handled by the DCI's staff. The DHS then issued a correction to the Committee on January 15, 2003 that stated the information in the December 17, 2003 paper contained several errors and DELETED. . . ." The DHS correction also stated that "by virtue of his position, and as reflected in the published Intelligence Information Reports, the source demonstrated extensive knowledge of Iraq's BW program. As the project manager, he had intimate details of the mobile BW program." The author of the December 2003 DHS paper which stated that CURVE BALL "never claimed that the project he was involved in was used to produce biological agents" was the DHS intelligence officer who had primary responsibility DELETED for collecting and reporting the intelligence from CURVE BALL's debriefings. In an interview with Committee staff, the DHS officer stated that in his haste to provide an assessment of the source to the Committee, he had misread some of the intelligence reports from the source.

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( ) Committee staff asked a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) polygraph expert with 29 years of experience with polygraph examinations about the possibility of a "false negative" resulting from a polygraph examination. A false negative is when a subject who is telling the truth is judged to be deceptive on a polygraph. The DoD polygraph expert told Committee staff that in regard to polygraph examinations, "anything could always be a false positive or a false negative. The polygraph is not 100 percent accurate and will never be 100 percent accurate, because we're dealing with the psychology and the physiology of the individual." SENTENCE DELETED

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4. INC Source

( ) As previously discussed, a March 2002 report from the INC source, DELETED stated that in mid-1996 Iraq decided to establish mobile laboratories for BW agent research to evade IJNSCOM inspections. The NIE described the source by name and noted that he was an "Iraqi defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress." He had defected from Iraq in late 2001, and was brought to the attention of the DIA by Washington-based representatives of the INC in February 2002. After several meetings with the INC source, a DIA debriefer assessed that some of the information he provided ". . . seemed accurate, but much of it appeared embellished." The DIA debriefer believed that ". . . the source had been coached on what information to provide." The DIA's report from the INC source, however, described him as a "first time reporter who is considered reliable" and does not note the debriefer's concerns that he had been coached or that he had embellished information. The report also stated that the "source passed a DHS-administered polygraph regarding information included in this report."

( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED

( ) In April 2002, the CIA published an assessment of the INC source that stated that DHS had terminated contact with him after four meetings because of suspicions he was a fabricator. In May 2002, DIA issued a "fabrication notice" which said that the information the INC source provided was "assessed as unreliable and, in some instances, pure fabrication." A DIA investigation of this source that resulted in the fabrication notice, questioned the source's truthfulness and noted that the ". . . information is now considered suspect." Although the source passed "an issue-specific DIA administered polygraph examination, DIA's discussions with the examiner indicate that some areas were not fully explored, which could account for the potential fabrication." In July 2002, the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia provided the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs with an assessment of Iraqi defectors who had been brought to the attention of the IC by the INC and noted the concerns the DIA and the DELETED had about the source's reliability. Despite the April 2002 CIA assessment, the May 2002 fabrication notice and the July 2002 assessment suggesting the source may have fabricated information, the source was highlighted in the October 2002 NIE, and he was one of the four HUMINT sources specifically referred to in the part of Secretary Powell's February 2003 speech before the UN Security Council that discussed the mobile BW production units.

( ) 5. DELETED

( ) Although he was not specifically referenced in the text of the NIE, the IC also provided the Committee with an intelligence report from the debriefing of another Iraqi asylum seeker DELETED The June 2001 report, which is the only report from this source that discussed mobile BW units, stated that there were transportable facilities for the production of biological weapons mounted on trailers at a special armaments factory in Iraq, and that there were other Iraqi sites where biological weapons were produced. The detailee also expressed concern about this source in his e-mail concerning Secretary Powell's UN speech. He noted that the source was "DELETED, but one whose reliability nor reporting has been evaluated," and said the reporting had inconsistencies that needed further checking. The detailee added, "we sure didn't give much credence to this report when it came out. Why now?" The detailee's e-mail was written four months after the NIE was published.

6. Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW Programs

( ) An INR BW analyst told Committee staff that ". . . as a community the U.S. BW analysts generally think that BW programs historically have shifted from large-scale fixed facilities producing large quantities of BW agents being stockpiled to smaller dual-use facilities that can be mobilized. SENTENCE DELETED So it's very appealing to the analysts to learn about a mobile BW program. It fits with what we think the state of the B W program worldwide are heading toward. It's kind of like a built-in bias."

( ) A CIA Directorate of Operations (CIAlDO) officer told the Committee that when he began serving as the Deputy Chief of the CIA Iraq WMD Task Force in the summer of 2002, the Iraqi BW program was not the focus of the Iraq WMD Task Force's efforts because, while many questions existed about other issues such as Iraq's nuclear weapons program, analysts felt fairly certain that they knew what the BW program looked like and believed the issue was largely "wrapped up." He noted that although there was always a lot of ambiguity with these sources, the CIA's lead analyst on Iraq's BW program was adamant about the existence of the Iraqi mobile BW platforms. He noted that was "a bull dog with these sources." The CIA/DO officer told Committee staff that the CIA BW analyst and the Department of Defense detailee who was assigned to CIA/DO had "locked horns" over the reliability of the mobile BW HUMINT sources. The CIAlDO officer noted that he had several conversations with the CIA BW analyst about the detailee's concerns over the reliability of the mobile BW HUMINT sources. In one of these conversations, the CIA BW analyst discounted the detailee's concerns by stating that the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) had multiple sources reporting on the program, and that the detailee was not aware of all of this reporting.

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