F. Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure
(U) On December 17, 2002, CIA analysts produced a review of Iraq's WMD declaration to the UN titled, U.S. Analysis of Iraq's Declaration, 7 December 2002. On December 30, 2002, the points from the paper were worked into talking points for the National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology titled, Talking Points on US Analysis of Iraq 's Declaration. The two assessments reviewed Iraq's "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure" to the UN of its WMD programs and made only two points regarding the nuclear program. The assessments said the declaration, "fails to acknowledge or explain procurement of high specification aluminum tubes we believe suitable for use in a gas centrifuge uranium effort. Fails to acknowledge efforts to procure uranium from Niger, as noted in the U.K. Dossier." The titles of both of these assessments said, "U.S. analysis," suggesting that they represented more than just CIA's position. Yet, known dissenting views from INR and the DOE regarding the purpose of the aluminum tubes were not included in the assessments. INR's view that the Niger reporting was "highly dubious" also was not included in the assessments.
(U) Information provided to the Committee indicates that the December 17, 2002 assessment was passed to the President without INR or the DOE having an opportunity to review or comment on the draft. An INR analyst sent an e-mail to CIA asking, "Do you happen to know offhand if INR will get to review and clear the draft `detailed analysis' of the declaration before it's issued in its capacity as a 'U.S.' position? We were not invited to review or clear on the draft preliminary 'U.S.' assessment, which subsequently went to POTUS, et al." A CIA analyst responded to the INR analyst that all agencies had been invited to participate in the analysis. The INR sent another e-mail noting that INR and DOE analysts had been able to review the declaration and make comments, but had left CIA prior to the preparation of the talking points for the NSC. He said INR and DOE analysts did not even know that such points were being prepared or provided to the NSC, but said the CIA was well aware of their positions and should have included them in the points. Although the INR analyst's concerns were passed to the CIA on December 23, 2002, their alternative views also were not included in the December 30, 2002 talking points.
(U) The INR analyst forwarded his e-mail comments to a DOE analyst who responded that "It is most disturbing that WINPAC is essentially directing foreign policy in this matter. There are some very strong points to be made in respect to Iraq's arrogant non-compliance with UN sanctions. However, when individuals attempt to convert those 'strong statements' into the 'knock out' punch, the Administration will ultimately look foolish - i.e. the tubes and Niger!"
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