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(U) The Committee focused its work in reviewing U.S. intelligence on Iraq's links to terrorism on the quality of intelligence analysis, the objectivity and reasonableness of the Intelligence Community's (IC) judgments, and whether any influence was brought to bear to shape that analysis to support policy objectives. The Committee also examined, however, the role of intelligence collectors in providing the fundamental information upon which the intelligence analysts based their assessments. To understand the collection posture against Iraq's links to terrorism, Committee staff interviewed the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and various members of the National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB), analysts from the Director of Central Intelligence's (DCI's) Counterterrorist Center (CTC), and analysts from the National Security Agency (NSA).

(             ) Notwithstanding four decades of intelligence reporting, IC officials and analysts expressed frustration over the lack of useful intelligence collected on Iraq's involvement in terrorism, particularly on links to al-Qaida. A January 2003 IC assessment of Iraqi support for terrorism explained, "Our knowledge of Iraq's ties to terrorism is evolving and                                         ." Based on information provided to Committee staff, these gaps had three main causes:

1. a late start collecting against the target,
2. the lack of a U.S. presence in Iraq, and
3. reliance on foreign government services, opposition groups and defectors for current intelligence.

(             )                     SENTENCE DELETED                     . Human intelligence (HUMINT) reports were derived                      from detainees, defectors, opposition groups, as well as foreign government services. Analysts explained that information derived from HUMINT provided insight into historical links, but provided little information on the current environment. Thus, the IC's collection, and subsequent analysis, provided an understanding of the historical context of the Iraqi regime's relationships and contacts, but left many intelligence gaps about the Iraqi regime's intentions. Analysts briefed staff on the IC's                      collection efforts, the                      intelligence                      that yielded the bulk of the information on Iraq's ties to terrorism.