C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions
(U) Conclusion 99. Despite four decades of intelligence reporting on Iraq, there was little useful intelligence collected that helped analysts determine the Iraqi regime's possible links to al-Qaida.
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( ) Conclusion 100. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not have a focused human intelligence (HUMINT) collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism until 2002. The CIA had no sources on the ground in Iraq reporting specifically on terrorism. The lack of an official U.S. presence in the country curtailed the Intelligence Community's HUMINT collection capabilities.
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( ) Conclusion 101. PARAGRAPH DELETED
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