O. The Use of Iraq as a Safehaven
(U) Iraqi Support for Terrorism contained the following summary statements regarding Iraq's provision of safehaven (The CIA used the term "providing safehaven" to describe both active assistance and passive acquiescence to the presence of al-Qaida in Iraq) to terrorist groups, in general, and al-Qaida specifically:
Iraq continues to be a safehaven, transit point, or operational node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the United States . . . .
Regarding the Iraq-al-Qaida relationship, reporting from sources of varying reliability points to . . . discussions of Iraqi safehaven for Usama bin Ladin dating from the early 1990s
We assess that 100 to 200 al-Qaida members and associates have relocated to Kurdish-controlled northeastern Iraq . . . .
A variety of reporting indicates that senior al-Qaida terrorist planner al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad between May-July 2002 under an assumed identity.
(U) The CIA did not assert in any of its assessments that Iraq had committed to a formal arrangement permitting al-Qaida members to transit and live within Iraq. Instead, the CIA considered the intelligence reporting on discussions about safehaven between Iraq and al-Qaida and on the presence of individuals the CIA assessed to be al-Qaida members or associates in Iraq. The CIA assessed that Iraq was "aware of the general nature and scope of the activity taking place there [in Iraq]."
(U) The CIA based its assessment regarding Iraq's provision of safehaven to al-Qaida on the following information and presumptions:
- Intelligence reports on discussions between Iraq and al-Qaida regarding safehaven,
- Iraqi regime's likely knowledge of al-Qaida presence in northeastern Iraq; and
- Presence of al-Qaida associate Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad in the summer of 2002, and
1. Discussions of Safehaven
( ) Iraqi Support for Terrorism noted generally, "A variety of reporting indicates that senior al-Qaida leaders and Iraqi officials have discussed safehaven in Iraq." The intelligence reporting provided by the CIA in support of this assessment was primarily intelligence reports and press reports on discussions between the two groups.44 SENTENCE DELETED A CTC operational summary from April 13, 1999, notes four other intelligence reports mentioning Saddam Hussein's standing offer of safehaven to Usama bin Ladin.45 SENTENCE DELETED 46. SENTENCE DELETED 47. The last report included in the CTC summary was a HUM INT report on DELETED an offer of safehaven from Saddam Hussein DELETED.48 According to a press report from the Italian Milan Corriere Delia Sera dated September 17, 1998, an Iraqi delegation to the Sudan agreed to accept Usama bin Ladin should he no longer be permitted to stay in Afghanistan. Another press report from the Paris Arabic newspaper Al-Watan Al-'Arabi dated January 1, 1999, stated that an Iraqi delegation visited Usama bin Ladin in the summer of 1998 and "bin Ladin tried to feel the Iraqi official's pulse about the possibility of being received in Baghdad" should he be expelled from Afghanistan. According to this press report, however, the Iraqi envoy was not authorized to offer safehaven to bin Ladin and instead returned the discussion to the possibility of cooperation.49
2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq
( ) In Iraqi Support for Terrorism, the CIA noted:
DELETED intelligence and DELETED reporting confirm that al-Qaida fighters began to relocate to Kurdish-controlled northeastern Iraq after the Afghanistan campaign began in the fall of 2001, hosted in an area controlled by a local Kurdish extremist group, Ansar al-Islam.
( ) SENTENCE DELETED in the Kurdish-controlled regions of northeastern Iraq. SENTENCE DELETED Additionally, the CIA also cited two HUMINT reports DELETED which provided the CIA with understanding into al-Qaida activities in the region. SENTENCE DELETED
( ) Regarding the Iraqi regime's likely knowledge of the al-Qaida presence in northeastern Iraq, in Iraqi Support to Terrorism, the CIA noted,
- Baghdad probably has a window into al-Qaida activities SENTENCE DELETED was identified as an IIS associate by DELETED detainees DELETED.
( ) SENTENCE DELETED The CIA also stated, "Baghdad reportedly has had contacts with AI,DELETED" Nevertheless, the CIA judged that, given the various reports which indicated Iraqi intelligence operatives were active in the northeast as well as the rest of the country, "it would be difficult for al-Qaida to maintain an active, long-term ( ) In Iraq Support for Terrorism, the CIA noted:
A variety of reporting indicates that senior al-Qaida terrorist planner al-Zarqawi
was in Baghdad DELETED. A foreign government service asserted that the IIS knew where al-Zarqawi was located
despite Baghdad's claims that it could not find him.
( ) PARAGRAPH DELETED now working closely with al-Qaida, were also in Baghdad in the summer of 2002. The CIA also provided the Committee with a finished analytic product DELETED, which discussed their support of al-Zarqawi 's network from Baghdad during that period.
( ) As indicated in Iraqi Support for Terrorism, the Iraqi regime was, at
a minimum, aware of al-Zarqawi's presence in Baghdad in 2002 because a foreign government
service passed DELETED information regarding his whereabouts to Iraqi authorities in June 2002. Despite Iraq's pervasive security apparatus and its receipt of detailed information about al-Zarqawi's possible location, however, Iraqi Intelligence told the foreign government service it could not locate al-Zarqawi. SENTENCE DELETED
( ) SENTENCE DELETED al-Zarqawi and his network were operating both in Baghdad and in the Kurdish-controlled region of Iraq. The HUMINT reporting indicated that the Iraqi regime certainly knew that al-Zarqawi was in Baghdad because a foreign government service gave that information to Iraq. Though the intelligence reports established the presence of al-Zarqawi in Baghdad during 2002 and the activities of his network in other areas of Iraq during 2002 and 2003 .
footnotes
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