| Classified NIE |
White Paper |
| We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of United Nations
(UN) resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and
biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess
of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a
nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative
view at the end of these key judgments.) |
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions.
Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left
unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during
this decade. |
| We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD
efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception
efforts. |
Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. |
| In the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its
nuclear weapons program. |
Most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear
weapons program. |
| Most analysts believe that Saddam's personal interest in and
Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum
tubes for centrifuge rotors . . . provide compelling evidence
that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for
Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that
reconstitution of the nuclear program is underway but assess
that the tubes probably are not part of the program.) |
Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain proscribed high-strength
aluminum tubes are of significant concern. All intelligence
experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons and that
these tubes could be used in a centrifuge enrichment
program. Most intelligence specialists assess this to be the
intended use, but some believe that these tubes are probably
intended for conventional weapons programs. |
| We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of
mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX. |
Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare
agents, probably including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and
VX. |
| Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW
stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric
tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents -
much of it added in the last year. |
Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of
CW agent. |
| We judge that all key aspects - R&D, production, and
weaponization - of Iraq's offensive BW program are active
and that most elements are larger and more advanced than
they were before the Gulf War. |
All key aspects - R&D, production, and weaponization - of
Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements
are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf
War. |
| We judge that Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW
agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing
a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by
bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. |
Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is
capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of
such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs,
missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including
potentially against the U.S. Homeland. |
| Iraq maintains a small missile force and several
developmental programs, including for a UAV probably
intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
White Paper |
Iraq maintains a small missile force and several
developmental programs, including for a UAV that most
analysts assess probably is intended to deliver biological
warfare agents. |
