SS-24 ICBM System Elimination
In May 1997 Ukraine agreed to destroy its SS-24 missiles, in addition to SS-19 missiles, silos and launch sites, utilizing $47 million provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. Withdrawal from combat duty of the SS-24 (RS-22) missiles started on 01 July 1998. Complete liquidation of intercontinental ballistic missiles in Ukraine is planned to be completed by 04 January 2001. In September 1998 a US Department of Defense delegation, headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner, took part in the decommissioning of a SS-24 silo launcher in Pervomaisk, the Nikolayev region, Ukraine. The Pervomaisk base comprises 46 silos with SS-24 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. Decommissioning of a single silo launcher is estimated to cost about US$ 1 million, and the US Government is allocating a total of US$399.2 million. The Bechtel company is the main contractor in the decommissioning program of the Ukrainian silo launchers.
A July 2, 1997 memorandum from the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense to the Program Director, CTR, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) directed DSWA to implement the SS-24 Weapons System Elimination project for the DoD to provide assistance necessary for the GOU to eliminate this weapon system and enable the GOU to eliminate all SS-24 launch silos by 4 Dec 2001 in accordance with the START I Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol. The silos were eliminated by the required date and remediation was completed in September 2002, to coincide with the deactivation of the Ukrainian 43rd Rocket Army.
The SS-24 Weapon System project assisted the GOU to eliminate 46 missile launch silos, 5 launch control centers, and 54.5 missiles. This program is scheduled for completion in the 3rd quarter of FY 06.
The remaining aspects of this program are being executed under four existing contracts. Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI) is performing the SS-24 Silo elimination project under CPFF contract DSWA01-98-C- 0012. Washington Group International (WGI, formally known as Morrison Knudsen (MK)) is performing the SS-24 Missile Disassembly, Storage, and Elimination Program under 2 CPFF contracts, DTRA01-99-C-0014 and DTRA01-99-C-0207. WGI is also executing the SS-24 Propellant Disposition Facility (PDF) project under CPFF contract DTRA01-00-C-0051. While it is expected that these contracts may need to be modified from time to time to address required engineering changes, no additional procurements are planned for this program.
The budget for this part of the SNAE(U) program is based on the history of contracts and activities that have already been executed; the negotiated value of existing contracts, including unexecuted options; engineering change proposals currently under review and negotiation, a requirement to extend the end date of the missile disassembly, storage, and elimination contract by 21 months to accommodate the extended schedule of the PDF.
While the technical risk associated with using water washout to remove propellant from SS-24 missile motors and using conversion to mining explosive as the means of disposing of the removed propellant has been abated due to initial pilot plant tests, engineering changes may still be required, and the cost of this program can be expected to also increase substantially. The Pavlograd Chemical Plant (PKhZ), where the work will be carried out, has frequently identified new requirements and blocked project progress until action was taken to meet these new requirements.
This risk is being addressed by requiring the contractor to construct a "Pilot Plant" and conduct a series of tests prior to going forward with the design and construction of the full-scale facility. In February 2002, the NSAU assumed oversight of the PKhZ and were informed that further progress blockades would result in project suspension. NSAU understands the seriousness of meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives. In January 2003, the results of tests Pilot Plant were assessed, and, although most tests were successful, further test and analysis were ordered to keep the PDF close to its revised schedule and cost. As access issues are being addressed with PKhZ and NSAU, future issues are also being identified and are being refined and addressed with longer lead times.
Risk to performance is high because of the technical limitations that may be imposed as a result of the PDF "Pilot Plant" tests.
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