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KY-15 Skorost "Speed" Complex 15P666 / 15Zh66 rocket

The development of a medium-speed solid-fuel ballistic missile “Speed” was begun at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering under the leadership of Alexander Nadiradze in 1982. Unfortunately, very little is known about this rocket complex - about what hopes were pinned on this complex, about the military-political reasons that led to its creation, and then to its destruction.

"Speed" was intended for the armament of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Ground Forces with a view to use in the European theater of operations. It had a maximum range of 4000 km and could be equipped with both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. The basis for the rocket was the second and third stages of the RS-12M [RT-2PM, 15Zh62, Topol, SS-25, SICKLE] and the head part with three warheads from the RSD-10 [RT-21M, 15Zh45, Pioneer, SS-20, SABER]. By comparison, the earlier SS-14 CAMP [8K96, RT-2P, RT-15] had been comosed o the second and third stages of the SS-13 SAVAGE ICBM. And the SS-20 was derived from the first and second stages of the SS-16 ICBM. A total of 10 missiles and 30 warheads were built, which were soon eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty.

The retaliatory measures of the Soviet Union were formulated in the Statement of Y. Andropov of November 24, 1983 and at the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. "Any attempt to break the current military-strategic balance," said Yuri Andropov, "the Soviet Union will be able to give an appropriate response, and his word will not be dispersed with the deed."

The USSR undertook a number of measures of a military nature. In particular, the moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in the European part of the country was lifted, and an additional number of sea-based nuclear weapons was deployed. In addition, according to an agreement with the governments of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, in the territories of these countries several dozens of launchers of the operational-tactical mobile ground-based missile complex (PGRK) created in the 1960s and upgraded 1970s.

It should be noted that all these measures did not lead to the desired result, as the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe continued, and the nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the USA reached its highest point since the Caribbean crisis. Moscow was well aware of this, and in order to turn the tide in its favor, they took important steps ahead of time, which had not been announced in advance.

On November 23, 1983, at the initiative of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.Ustinov, it was decided to create, in the shortest possible time, the PGRK forward-based "Speed". The deployment of this complex as part of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) in the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR provided, if necessary, the possibility of lightning (within a few minutes) destruction of the Pershing-2 MRBM, other important NATO military facilities. The “Speed” complex was undoubtedly Dmitry Fedorovich's swan song. Even the provisional name - "Speed" - he came up with, although Alexander Davidovich Nadiradze, director of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, the chief designer of the rocket and the complex did not like it at first.

The deployment of the “Speed” PGRK would have tipped the scales of nuclear confrontation in Europe in favor of the USSR, since the presence of launchers (launchers) of American medium-range missiles in military bases under the constant threat of lightning destruction would lose all meaning. But for a long time these launchers were not adapted well enough for the combat duty in the field conditions, much worse than the PGRK “Speed” launchers. Various anti-war organizations that were active in Western Europe in the first half of the 1980s also strengthened the positions of the USSR.

Soviet planners thought the consequences of the simultaneous deployment of the “Speed” PGRK in Eastern Europe and the Pioneer PGRF [SS-20] in Chukotka, backed up by the combat potential of the Moscow missile defense system, as well as by the capabilities of our remaining nuclear and general-purpose forces that increased significantly in the first half of the 1980s separate), miscalculated rather unequivocally. After a few weeks, during which some people in the West would have to be very worried, the opposing parties would break up peace on the following conditions. The US would remove the Pershing-2 and KRNB from the Western Europe, and the Soviet Union in response would remove the PGRK “Speed” from Eastern Europe, and from Chukotka - the Pioneer PGRK, retaining intact the whole of its grouping of more than four hundred Pioneer-type PGRK launchers deployed from Grodno to Chita by that time.

Flight tests were at the Kapustin Yar training ground. By the beginning of 1985, the first flight of the complex was prepared for testing. Some accounts relate that the development was completed in 1986, wtih the first and only test launch of the rocket took place on 01 March 1987. But this chronology is evidently defective, and seems "offset" by two years.

The assembly of the rockets was carried out by the Votkinsk engineering plant. On March 1, 1985, the first and, as it turned out, the only flight test of the PGRK “Speed” took place at the Kapustin Yar test site. The test ended in failure: the launch of the rocket was normal, but soon after it the system of its emergency detonation worked. The cause of the accident was quickly established. It turned out that due to the most unfortunate miscalculation a flawable defect was allowed in the nozzle block of the first-stage rocket engine. Apparently, the consequences of the colossal overvoltage of forces affected all the same, leading to burnout of the nozzle.

A. Nadiradze was terribly upset and depressed. Nevertheless, due conclusions were quickly made. One failure in flight tests is not a catastrophe. MRSD "Pershing-2", for example, during 18 test launches exploded 5 times. The creators of the Speed complex had every reason to hope that there would be no more failures. Day after day, there was growing confidence that over the coming months the flight tests of the PGRK Speed will be completed. Until the final success, there was “a little more, a little more.”

In March 1985, M. Gorbachev came to power. The first thing that M.Gorbachev did when he came to power was to stop work on the creation of the “Speed” complex. Samples of the launcher and missiles ready for flight testing were subsequently secretly destroyed. Naturally, the question of redeploying launchers of the Pioneer PGRK to Chukotka has never been raised again. The 99th motorized rifle division, forgotten by all, remained in Anadyr and remains there to this very day, which, by the way, was written by Izvestia.

On the basis of the Pioner-3 and Speed missile systems, the latest weapon systems could be created that can by now significantly increase the military potential of our country. However, these weapon systems were never created, because the carriers Pioneer 3 and Speed were destroyed as a class, and work on a number of the most important areas was interrupted.

Nadiradze, chief designer of the missiles and complexes Temp-S, Pioneer, Speed, Topol, did not see the triumph of the new thinking at all. On March 7, 1987, in connection with the signing of the decree on the reduction of the INF, the decree of M.S. Gorbachev further development of the rocket was discontinued. On September 2, 1987, Alexander Davidovich studied the proposals for the elimination of Pioneer missiles. By that time, the decision on their complete liquidation had already been made public. The next day, A. Nadiradze died suddenly in a company car.