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S-225 Azov - ABM-2 System
5Ya26 (PRS-1) S-225 (Test Only) ABM-2
5Ya27 (V-825) S-225 (Test Only) ABM-2

This endo-atmospheric (lower-tier) defense system was under development during the early 1970s as part of the ABM-2 system, probably along with the prototype of the similar Gazelle eventually developed for the ABM-3 system. It and was apparently cancelled after the success of the ABM-3's Gazelle.

In May 1961 came the decision to start developing the S-225 for the protection of objects with limited dimensions of attacks BR single strategic purpose, including intercontinental classes. It should be noted that while the ballistic target was a relatively large head portion and following housing last stage rocket. As an information agent could serve only radar since it must be weatherproof.

S-225 was supposed to stand on duty in remote regions, but it was not designed independently. It was a "missile defense", By a resolution of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU, the lead developer of the advance project of the S-225 system was KB-1 - this is the current Almaz concern, all the "large" air defense systems from S-25 to S-500 were created here. The prominent scientist and designer Alexander Raspletin, who created a number of air defense systems, but most importantly, one of the “whales” on which the anti-aircraft defense, and not only it, is the automatic control theory, was appointed the general designer, and Grushin, chief designer of OKB-2, was entrusted with the missile defense.

To simplify the system with an eye to massive (as far as possible for such a complex system) deployment of it threw everything unnecessary. As part of the complex, they left only guidance radars - RSN-225 (transportable equipment, containerized), a command transmission station - SEC - to interceptor missiles, a computer complex, also in containers and, of course, anti-missile launchers in the quantity that will be deemed necessary.

Compared with the air defense radars, ABM radars must operate at significantly greater distances, since the goal is an order of magnitude greater speed. Another feature is to a small reflective surface - less than 0.1 m2. For these reasons, the radar system for the S-225 should have several orders of magnitude greater energy potential compared with any air defense radar. Despite the success in domestic and foreign radio electronics, it was impossible to create the necessary capacity in one electronic devices. The high power electromagnetic energy to the radiator iwa a serious difficulty. Therefore, it was decided the necessary power of the radiation produced by the addition of energy in the space of several generators, each of which would have a maximum achievable power at that time.

Another method of increasing the capacity of the radar antenna was to increase the receiving unit. This could be achieved by increasing the size of the aperture. Given the extremely tight balance of time to search and target acquisition, it needed a quick overview of the space. This is best achieved by electronic scanning. Radar also had the goals to accompany induced on the target missile, which must be possible to deflect the beam in a wide range.

All these functions are best performed when used as a receiving and transmitting antenna phased arrays (AFD). It was decided to use them, although neither KB-1 nor in domestic practice had the experience of the development of such antennas.

The second challenge was the creation of an interceptor missile. In contrast to the anti-aircraft missiles, anti-missile need to be controlled both in the atmosphere and on the exoatmospheric portion of the flight, as the interception could be carried out at an altitude of 80-100 km. To this end, the PR should have both aerodynamic and gasdynamic controls. Furthermore, because stress balance time from detection to target intercept, due to its high speed (up to 7 km / sec) PR must have a high average speed. The development of such a missile came from CB "Torch" with the chief designer of PD Grushin at the head.

In this "simple and cheap" complex, the radar itself and the missile defense itself would inevitably become the most complex components. Although they tried to simplify this part to the utmost. The missile defense guidance system was designed by the simplest radio command - this will then turn out to be the only right decision. Moreover, since the missiles were designed to intercept targets along the predicted trajectories, and also due to the effect of screening the signal with a powerful engine torch, they only began to be controlled at the final section, “shooting” at the “meeting point” of the predicted trajectory. The rocket in the initial and middle sections was controlled only by the built-in software device, and the launch control system determined the required launch moment with high accuracy.

Two missiles were designed for the complex: 5Y27 medium-range and 5Y26 short-range. Ballistic target interception range up to 200km, altitude up to 100km. But such parameters could be provided only in the presence of a nuclear warhead - 2-3Mt. The radio command method can no longer provide the required accuracy at such ranges, and aerodynamic steering wheels at such heights - maneuvering with the necessary overloads. Steering micromotors have not yet been sufficiently proven technology.

Preliminary study in CB-1 and CB "Torch" had shown the feasibility of the missile defense system the most important objects of the country. Resolution of the CC CPSU and the Soviet Union in May 1963 has been set to develop the preliminary design of the C-225. Work on the system as a whole was led by the General Designer A.A. Raspletin, and on missiles the chief designer P.D. Grushin. For topical reference development system was created a special unit, known as SB-32. It was headed by T.R.Brahman. SB-32 included 3 sections: system development (the beginning K.K.Kapustyan); radar (G.B.Reutov); Computing and software (E.V.Pechenin). Guidance and destruction designed theoretical division (Y. Afonin, K.N.Polyakov, V.G.Tsepilov, V.G.Bludenko). The original technical solutions were proposed by A.L.Pavlenko and the development of technical design documentation carried out in his team (V.I. Vlasov, A.L.Kasatov et al.). In 1970, instead of T.R.Brahman, SB-32 was headed by K.K.Kapustyan and A.F.Eremin.

In early 1964 a preliminary design had been completed, discussed with the scientific and technical community and the customer, which was 4 GUMO. Radar guidance (PCH-225) was to include the antenna post and hardware. Antenna post was placed on a fixed base, fixed to the fitting member of the foundation. The rotary device had two degrees of freedom: the rotation in azimuth and elevation. Thus, the normal to the aperture can be sent to anywhere in the space of the upper hemisphere. On the rotating part fastened desk PAR with the sector beam deviation ± 60 ° and a mirror transmitting antenna irradiators allowing deflecting the beam in the sector of 4x5 °. On the rotating part also placed transmitters with powerful klystron output, the control apparatus and the input of the receivers. This arrangement ensured a minimum loss of high frequency energy.

To control the missiles in targeting the station provided for the command (SEC), including in its membership a rotary antenna post on the carriage with columns reflector antennas and transmitters. The hardware of the SEC was placed in a separate container.

Management of the complex was carried out by computer computing system unattended, as the combat cycle from detection to destruction of the target was a few tens of seconds, and the operator was not capable of such a short time to perform the necessary functions properly. To carry out preparatory operations, performance and condition monitoring equipment provided for the command post (CP) from the operator's workplace - the commander and the chief engineer of the complex.

In 1965 they released the preliminary design of the system and the staff of the KB-1 started to develop technical documentation. Resolution of the Government was asked to create two prototypes in 1967. This was approved by the broad cooperation of manufacturers means. As the main plant was appointed Kuntsevsky MRTZ. Production time was set extremely hard - in 1967, and the presentation on the joint tests - the middle of 1969. Such a short period of time was one of a number of reasons the plants were not sustained, and as a result the production of the first prototype was stretched to the end of 1969.

In the second half of the 1960s as a result of intensive work on the missile defense system in the Union and in the United States, as a countermeasure, in the ballistic missiles along with military elements have begun to include decoys. While these were easy targets, typically, inflatable, which, after separation from the last stage rocket warhead created around 10-12 reflectors identical to radar head. Decoys shaded combat element and thus makes it difficult to intercept. However, light decoys exist only in space, while falling to a height of 90-80 km, they burn up on reentry. But after that, there was very little time for intercepting warheads. This situation forced the creators of missile defense systems to look for new solutions. It was proposed to increase the observation sector PAC with 4x5 ° to the 20x20 ° and begin to build a high-speed missile, which would have had time to intercept the warhead after atmospheric selection of decoys.

The CB-1 developed the transmitting antenna in the form of lamps that can replace the antenna in the radar post the dish and allowed to reject the transmission beam in the sector 20x20°. It was decided to produce and install it in the second prototype of the system. Production time of the second sample was established by 1971.

The project is a new high-speed missile was made in two entities: DB-2 (chief designer of PD Grushin) and KB "Innovator". The proposed KB "Innovator" design was selected. This PR was named CP-1. The missile was a cone without aerodynamic controls. The engine was used, fast-solid with 4 seconds of engine thrust the rocket was accelerated to maximum speed. Thus axial overload is 300 Gs, and skin temperature rose to 2000 degrees. All this required new technical solutions when creating on-board equipment, which should be small-sized and high-strength. The onboard equipment developed in the CB-1: Autopilot - collective PM Kirillov, radios - team VI Tolstikova and VI Long. The rest, except for the warhead and engine, in KB "Innovator" under the leadership of L. Lyuleva. The propulsion system was created in the Perm factory KB led Kozlov.

The S-225 was designed as a single-channel missile and a two-and-a-half channel missile. The third missile in line was accompanied, but not controlled. Her engine finished working later than the first two and the defendant's signal did not break through the ionized torch. It did not include any means of detecting targets - it was assumed that he would receive primary target designation in the format “trajectory somewhere out there” from external radars of a missile attack warning system or other sensors available in the vicinity of a covered object, for example, from Mintz radars RO-1 or RO-2 located in Murmansk and Riga. In the extreme case, optical primary positioning of the guidance radar along the trace left in the atmosphere of the warhead of ICBMs was also allowed. Means of selection of false targets were not initially provided - it was assumed that the atmosphere will cut them off by this moment. The secondary mode of operation of the complex was anti-aircraft - missiles allowed the defeat of weakly maneuvering aerodynamic targets at long range.

Rocket 53T6, previously called PRS-1, and before that 5Y26, intercepted ballistic targets at altitudes up to 45km and ranges up to 120km. Longitudinal overload at start - 300G. The maximum speed of 4km / s, the distance of 100km overcomes in 27s.

Their development was behind the schedule, but the reasons were completely objective: the concept was constantly changing, the development of 5Y26 was transferred from the Fakel design bureau to the Novator design bureau, and for the first time, designers themselves faced the nuances of hypersound: the need to transfer control commands to the object, which moves in a shielding plasma cloud at a speed of about 4 km / s. In this case, the external casing was heated up to 2000gr a few seconds after the start-up. Because of the same plasma cocoon, the use of familiar semi-active guidance systems was also impossible - only the radio command option remained. The 5Y26 missile was renamed PRS-1, and after modernization under the designation 53T6, it became part of the current A-135 Amur missile defense system.

In reality, both missiles should be considered the highest technical achievement. The monstrous overloads and speeds that they developed were provided by the use of fast-burning fuel in the engine with the addition of aluminum powder, a huge nozzle.

It should be noted that the S-225 system had to manage all distribution functions, including functional test and the refinement of external target designation, detection and tracking of targets, PR support, generation and transmission on board the command guidance is carried out automatically by the central computer complex high performance. This specificity PPM programs was that they were created in real time and therefore could not be used in a universal programming language. Creation of programs conducted on mashine language, thus saving performance computers. Such programs could only be created by programmers skilled in the interaction with the real equipment. The main contribution to the programming made by E.V.Pechenin, A.A.Trukhachev, V.V.Titarenko, C.A.Petrov, Y.Ilchenko, A.L.Monin.

As the production of the first prototype funds were delivered to the polygon [test range, not landfill] in Priozersk and deploy to a pre-prepared engineering structures. In 1971, the sample was fully assembled and began working out. In the beginning it was done on simulators, and then with the flight of funds. In view of the duration of work and uncomfortable stay at the site work was carried out on a rotational basis. The test range brigade was headed by leading topics. As the team leader at various times were: K.K.Kapustyan, L.N.Zlobin, A.F.Eremin, A.L.Solovyov, V.A.Skudar, et al.

In 1972 they began testing with ballistic targets that were launched from Kapustin Yar. Moreover, due to the small length of the flight past these did not meet the objectives of speed intercontinental missiles. Therefore, special carriers were used to carry out additional acceleration warhead on a downward trajectory to plot the speed corresponding to intercontinental missiles. These tests pursued a twofold purpose: on the one hand, worked out combat troops BR, on the other - experience accumulated postings ballistic targets by means of radio engineering systems, make the necessary changes to the hardware and software management. Observing the behavior of ballistic targets in the terminal phase of their flight also brought great benefit to developers of ballistic missiles, as made it possible to assess the effectiveness of counteraction to the defending side. Therefore, the observations recorded on magnetic tape, process and transmit the corresponding KB. This function is carried out the analysis department of the test range, headed at the time by Perfilieva

Along with tests after launches, V-825 began testing in the management of the radio equipment system. The closed-loop control was carried out 16 launches, during which in addition to the test of the missile was fulfilled onboard equipment control, autopilot, Listener and the defendant. Independent tests of the missile V-825 were initiated in June 1969. They were aimed at working out the first stage propulsion system out of the container, the disclosure of stabilizers, separation steps and on-board equipment. By the beginning of 1971 was carried out six autonomous launches with the management of the internal programmer. It is possible to move to a launch from the ground-based control model sample, and check the radio request-response, and radio. It should be noted that the provision of radio communications with the rocket is of great complexity due to the darkening of torch rocket engine. During the tests several times to change the layout and design of on-board antennas. The solution to this problem V.I.Long made a great contribution.

By the beginning of the contour test rocket with the first prototype was carried out 15 launches. Of these, 13 were autonomous. In February 1973, we began testing missiles in closed-loop control with the use of the first prototype. The first 7 starts made conditional on a fixed target, located in different parts of the affected area. The following 6 launches in 1974-1975 carried out by the conventional moving target, simulating the flight of IRBM and ICBM. Complete the test intercept real targets in October 1976 - IRBM, in July 1977 - ICBM. Pointing accuracy was sufficient for their destruction.

The largest contribution to the creation and guidance systems were K.N.Polyakov, V.G.Tsepilov, V.I.Kiryushkin, V.G.Bludenko and others. They proposed a completely original method of guidance in "shooting point", which allows the most advantageous way to use ballistics missiles and high accuracy guidance.

In parallel with the fire testing of fire were complex wiring ballistic targets. By that time, considering the creation of a potential enemy missile defense, ballistic missiles, designers were forced to equip strategic missile complex means to overcome missile defense. The structure means were not only decoys, filtered by the atmosphere, but the heavy elements that penetrate deep into the atmosphere, simulating the warhead. Testing of PCB components and assess their effectiveness was only possible on the results of radar observations in the terminal phase of their flight thus posting Radar VS-225 became a prerequisite for testing. On the other hand, the results of transactions of different assembly gave a rich experimental material for the creation of a system of selection for background decoys for defense system.

Successful implementation made the military leadership of the country to decide on the deployment of radio equipment in Kamchatka, where the shooting took place with internal length of the route. As a result, a second set of equipment, made by the technical documentation so-called second prototype of the S-225 and fabrication plant cooperation, it was decided to put on Kamchatka. It was named 5K17. Due to difficulties in working out of hardware and software in place of the final deployment was decided to initially deploy complex 5K17 on the position of the second prototype of Priozersk.

In early 1975, manufacturers in the test range was delivered in containers mounted apparatus RDA-225, computing facilities, command posts and means of autonomous power supply. In a short time the equipment was installed at the facility, associated cabling, tested and adjusted in May 1975 Radio Engineering Complex was tested at conducting ballistic targets. Then it was dismantled, loaded on the railway platform and delivered to Vladivostok. By using landing craft it was brought to Kamchatka. Use of conventional cargo vessels was excluded, as the place of delivery did not have berths capable of receiving large vessels. Landing craft landed on the flat coast and containers using tractors were taken ashore. Thereafter, they were brought to the object, deployed and installed.

Such prompt action on entering the complex 5K17 made possible by the adoption of a very progressive method for design of equipment in containers that were installed, configured, and provided for compliance with specifications in the factories. The complex 5K17 was tested first by satellite and then ballistic targets. As a result, the complex was commissioned in the autumn of 1975 and put into operation. For the creation of the complex 5K17 main actors work were awarded the State Prize. From CB-1 they included K.K.Kapustyan, G.B.Reutov, V.I.Vlasov, and others.

Given that for the selection of targets they used a small portion of the flight, for its interception there remained very little time. The rocket V-825m due to the relatively low speed, could not perform this task. Therefore, the project went full speed on the creation of high-speed missile IRS-1.

The development was led by Sverdlovsk KB "Innovator" by the Chief Designer V.A.Lyulevym. This Bureau began work in 1967. The task was extremely difficult. It was necessary to accelerate the rocket a few seconds to a speed of approximately 4 km/sec. It could only make the engine to rapidly burning solid propellant. This engine design was led by Kozlov, chief designer of the Perm Design Bureau. Given that during the flight in the atmosphere at a high velocity missile surface is heated by friction with the air to a temperature above 2000 degrees, it required special measures for protection of structures and equipment.

The fuselage of the IRS-1 was designed as a cone with a special thermal barrier coating without protruding elements. As guidance and stabilization it used gas-jet engines with thrust vector is perpendicular to the axis of the missile. IRS-1 was a single-stage scheme with detachable warhead. The challenge was to create onboard equipment stabilization and control for such a missile. It should be compact with low weight and efficiency during overload up to 300 units. In addition, as early as 3-4 seconds into the flight the rocket was formed on the surface of high-temperature plasma, which is a screen for the propagation of radio waves. The development of on-board equipment made in the CB-1: in the autopilot division itw as led by P.M. Kirillov and radio apparatus and sight Division by V.I.Tolstikova and V.I.Long.

Work ceased on the first Azov complex with ground launchers. Soon, the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to continue building the A-35 system and testing the most advanced Argun complex. After discussing the issue of what to do next with the Azov complexes, it was decided to use the PRS-1 and B-825 test launchers in order to develop anti-missile missiles for the new missile defense system, which did not contradict the treaty. The radar facilities of the first and second prototypes were used to test the short-range intercept system and the 5K17 measuring complex, as well as to monitor the head parts of the ICBMs undergoing tests in the interests of missile defense and the missile defense system.

For this purpose, on the second sample of "Azov" in 1975-1977, the equipment and combat programs were refined. In the development of the S-225 system in the Central Design Bureau "Almaz" under the leadership of B.V. Bunkin, a project of a missile defense system for positional areas and starting positions of intercontinental ballistic missiles S-375 with anti- missile systems PRS-1 was created.

Since the mid-1970 there was full swing adjustment equipment, streamlining of management of combat programs and testing the second sample S-225. Some times they worked two samples simultaneously. Due to the large capacity of the second sample for antenna systems and computing resources, since 1977, the wiring on the first sample were discontinued, and the second sample started production tests. They were aimed at certification of radio equipment for the transmission of their employees in the operation site. In fact, it was the joint testing with the customer. In 1982, production tests had been completed, and by 1985 the second means of the sample submitted for further testing.

In 1981, also under the leadership of B.V. Bunkin was developed a project of the S-550 system for missile defense of important facilities in the country. The main designer of the system was AA. Lehmann . The means of the system were developed already on the element base of the new generation. Orders for the manufacture of funds were distributed between the country's plants and the assembly of the pilot complex was completed. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the work ceased, and the reserve was destroyed.

ABM-2 - Western Views

Chief Designer A. Raspletin of TSKB Almaz undertook the development of the S-225 road-mobile anti-missile and anti-aircraft system. It was developed between 1965 and 1978. This was a two-echelon ABM system intended for interception of one or two warheads. The S-225 included a phased array radar for target tracking and interceptor guidance, a station for transmission of commands, anti-missile interceptors with nuclear warheads, and the command homing posts 5YA26 (designed by the OKB Novator) and 5YA27 (designed by the Fakel). It was planned to receive target designation for the system from the Dnestr-M radars stationed in the trans-polar area (RO-1 in Murmansk) and Latvia (RO-2 in Riga), and later from the Donets radars.

The open literature provided few insights into the details of this system. Components apparently consisted of:

• S-225 Interceptor
• Flat Twin radar
• Pawn Shop command transmitter

This system, incorporating various improvements over the ABM-1, was under active development in the early 1970's. According to Western assessments, this system was possibly conducted in parallel with the more capable ABM-X-3 system, as a hedge against the failure of that development effort. Work apparently halted in the late 1970's.

Sources and Methods

• ABM AND SPACE DEFENSE A. Karpenko Nevsky Bastion, No. 4, 1999, pp. 2-47