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R-14 / SS-5 SKEAN - Western Views

A National Security Agency history, "The Soviet Land-based Ballistic Missile Program, 1945-1972" An Historical Overview" [TOP SECRET UMBRA] noted that the SS-5 was assessed as an intermediate-range missile that inherited some of the techniques developed by the Germans in World War II. Its design and capabil~ties additionally reflected work done by the Gernans after the war, in particular. in regard to their involvement in the R-14 Project in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Analysis of all the bits of information from the various human sources eventually succeeded in providing the basis for major technical collection efforts against the Soviet missile test center at Kapustin Yar, a location north of the Caspian Sea area. For example, the British attempted to photograph the Kapustin Yar test center in 1953 but their special Canberra reconnaissance aircraft was damaged and almost shot down by Soviet fighters. Other technical collection efforts included radar, intercepted telemetry, and finally, the U-2 photography. Through these efforts, the US intelligence organizations were able to monitor the Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missile (MRBM and IRBM) development process centered in Kapustin Yar.

Western intelligence organizations soon set up technical collection systems to monitor missile development at the Soviet’s Kapustin Yar test range. The big radar set-up by the USAF at Diyarbakir, Turkey was one example. No country was more important than Turkey. The Soviet missile testing program drove the Turkey option, and in the 1950s the administration became increasingly close to the Turkish government. ln 1955 Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact (a long~forgotten Eisenhower initiative to knit together the proWestern countries on the southern periphery of the USSR). Five years later a relatively antiseptic military coup placed· the pro-American General Menderez in power in Ankara and ushered in a period of harmonious relations between the two countries. The United States had been frantically building collection sites in Turkey in the 1950s.

During its developmental period, the SS-5 was first noted being testeq on the Kapustin Yar range in June 1960. It probably achieved initial operational capability in 1961, and the missile was shown publicly for the first time in a parade in Moscow on 07 November 1964. ~The SS-5 remained an operational missile for many years. Although the missile probably did not achieve operational capability until 1961, reflections of its developrent were seen earlier. System design was probably begun in 1953, as a follow-on project to the R-14.

Aerial photogaphy of the Kapustin Yar rangehead in the late 1950s also showed related developrents, when it revealed a comrplex with three launch areas. The center launch area was still under construction, but enough had been completed to show its orientation toward the 2,000-nautical mile impact area near Krasnoyarsk, making it a likely candidate for testing missiles. Also, Khrushchev, in May 1960, alluded to the imminency of a Soviet IRBM, as it had been speculated by U.S. intelligence analysts that such a missile would evolve from the R-14 Project.

The single-stage SS-5 was assessed as capable of delivering a 3,500-pound reentry vehicle to a maximum range of about 2,200 nautical miles. Its over-all length is 79 feet, with a diameter of eight feet (excluding the fins) weighing about 216,000 pounds, its booster engine is capable of developing 360,000 pounds of thrust. The propulsion segment of this liquid-fueled rocket consisted of four thrust chambers consisteing of turbopump units, each consisting of a turbine, fuel pump, and oxidizer pump.

Two reentry vehicles were associated with the missile; one, designated the Mod 1, was 9.3 feet in length, the other, the Mod 2, was 7.5 feet long. According to Western intelligence the Mod 1 reentry vehicle had a ballistic coefficient of 1300 lb per sq ft. CEP was estimated to be about one-half nautical mile, and warhead yield of both the Mods 1 and 2 was assessed at 1.5 to 5 megatons. Inertial guidance was employed for the SS-5, and velocity control was maintained by engine throttling. Jet vanes on the exhaust nozzles were used for attitude control. A technique successfully userl for this missile pertained to reentry vehicle separation. Solid-fueled retrorockets were enployed to accorrplish separation of the reentry vehicle.

During its developmental period, from June 1960 to April 1963, the missile was launched to distances of 1,050, 2,000, and 2,500 nautical miles. The first two launches of the SS-5 - on 6 and 25 June 1960 - were to the l,050 nautical mile distance. The first full-range launch occurred on 03 August 1960, impacting in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk, a distance, of about 2, 000 nautical miles. These three launches were monitored by the National Security Agency.

The extended-range launches to 2,500 nautical miles occurred on 26 and 29 November 1960, both of which were successful. Two additional extended-range tests were also noted on 14 July and 05 August 1965. The missile launched in August, however, failed to reach the intended impact area. It fell short after reaching a distance of about 1,880 nautical miles.

Intelligence associated with these initial SS-5 events were very limited in 1960. Also, the employment of the SS-5 was first noted on 20 August 1960. Though not yet operational in early 1961, sufficient information had become available by that time to discern sane aspects of its interrlErl usage. On the basis of aerial photography of its launch pad at Kapustin Yar, for example, it was determined that a degree of mobility was designEd into the missile, making it "road transportable." One indication of this capability was the sparseness of permanent construction near the SS-5 lapnch pad at Kapustin Yar. Another indication was the pad itself, which was flat and hard-surfaced with no apparent provisions for venting rocket exhaust gases. On the basis of these observations it was estinated at the time that the rocket could be transported and that launch facilities would be of the soft variety - that is, above ground. The rocket, however, was believed to be deployerl at both soft and hard sites (silos).

Probable user trials for the SS-5 were first held in 1962. The first lasted from February 1963 to January 1967 , the second fran March 1967 to April 1969 and the third from June 1969 through at least June 1970.

The first launch of an SS-5 from a deployed site probably occurred on 22 October 1963 on the Kapustin Yar range. This launcn cincided with the first launch of a deployed SS-7 ICBM by the SRF on the Plesetsk range, impacting on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Aiso, launches of the SS-5 occurred most frequently during its system-developnent period. During this period, of almost three years duration, at least 63 missiles were launched. A sharp decline was noted between June 1963 and August 1966, when only 27 missiles were noted being launched.

The SS-5 (and the SS-4 as well) figured prominently in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Although no SS-5s were actually photographed in Cuba, site preparations for them revealed a number of aspects concerning their intended deployment and operation. Two sites were chosen by the Soviets for initial deployment of the SS-5s in Cuba. One was located in the extreme western part of the island, the other was positioned near the center of the country. Both locations were within eight miles of seaports, apparently because of the difficulty of transporting this large missile and its supporting systems any considerable distance. Each SS-5 battalion in Cuba consisted of two launch pads and a control building. Also, special arch-roofed buildings were seen under construction to house the nosecones.